Lebanese Politics

The Time For Moderation
1984...

1984…

For a country that took 11 months to get out of the deadlock, the events of the past few days are revealing. Sleiman Frangieh will not run for the presidential elections: It’s official. In his interview with Al-Mayadeen, the leader of the Marada party endorsed the candidacy of Michel Aoun. The FPM leader on the other hand was busy commending Saad Hariri’s speech “characterized with moderation“. On the other side of the political spectrum, Amine Gemayel was praising the Iranian policies in the regions, only days after Hariri promised the Patriarch that the presidential elections would be held on time.

M8 Unified

Although it might be hard to believe, Frangieh’s withdrawal makes sense. For M14, he is the most despised Christian leader out there. For Hezbollah and Amal, he is a minor Christian politician. For the FPM, he is a local ally that mustn’t get stronger under any circumstances, especially that he is more likely to answer to Damascus than to Rabieh in case something goes bad between the Syrian regime and its biggest Christian ally. Frangieh hence has no shot at all to become president in 2014: Even if he runs as the sole candidate backed by M8, his name can never become a consensual one, and M14 pressure on Jumblatt would eventually prevent the latter of voting for the Marada candidate. By running for office in 2014, Frangieh would have angered the FPM, lost the elections, and found himself isolated. Patience is a virtue. Out of the “Maronite four” (Gemayel, Geagea, Aoun and himself), Frangieh is by far the youngest, and the very fact that in 2020 Amine Gemayel would be 78, Michel Aoun 86 and Samir Geagea 67 makes him the perfect candidate for the elections. By then, he would have become M8’s number one, the Syrian crisis would have probably ended, and he’ll get to have  6 years to adapt to any new situation, make new alliances, or switch sides. In 2020, the odds can be in his favor. In 2014, they’re not.

Michel Aoun on the other hand understood the rules of the game (after years of experience). The president is practically always a consensual one, especially in times of crisis. Fouad Chehab was elected for refusing to engage the army in the conflict. Charles Helou was elected because he was one of Chehab’s closest men to the opposition. Sleiman Frangieh was elected for his pro-Nasserist history and his anti-Palestinian tendencies. Elias Sarkis was elected for staying neutral throughout the first year of the civil war. In Lebanese politics, if you don’t compromise, you lose it all: Raymond Edde stayed 50 years in the opposition and never made it to the presidential palace. And for the millionth time (see here, here, here, here and here), this is what Michel Aoun is trying to achieve. Even though he might never become a consensual candidate in the matter of a year’s effort, he can still become M8’s most moderate politician. And how do we know it works? Because his new moderate attitude made Frangieh withdraw for lack of support from M8 and M14, forced the different M8 factions to pamper him more (so he doesn’t defect) and eventually unified M8 behind him while turning him into a more acceptable candidate to M14. After spending most of 2012 and 2013 accusing Hariri of being an extremist politician supporting rogue Islamist militants, he describes Hariri in 2014 of being the voice of moderation. There is no such thing as a coincidence. Everyone hoping to succeed has to be a moderate ahead of the presidential elections. For Michel Aoun, being a moderate means that he’ll have to praise the Future Movement.

M14 Unified

When I say everyone, I include M14’s candidate. And while we’re at it, there will be one,  and only one candidate coming from the ranks of M14. Hariri reiterated in his meeting with the Patriarch on Friday that the March 14 coalition would field one presidential contender. Meanwhile in the Christian camp of M14, the Kataeb – now strong of their huge share in the cabinet – are preparing their comeback. Among the possible candidates for the presidency, there’s LF leader Samir Geagea (head of the biggest Christian M14 party) , popular independent MPs such as Boutros Hareb, and last but not least former president Amine Gemayel, leader of the Kataeb party.

M14 needs a candidate that is in full harmony with its policies while being at the same time acceptable by M8. Samir Geagea, while being the strongest Christian in M14, doesn’t fit the criteria. The majority of independent MPs , although enjoying some support and prestige from the parliament – Boutros Hareb has been in the parliament for the past 42 years – are also too violent for M8.

One has to see it from a very particular perspective. Aoun is popular, was a commander of the army and a former prime minister,  is seen as protector of Christian interests (due to his stances on the cabinet formation and the electoral law), has strong allies, is currently establishing ties with various parties – notably the Future Movement, and is fashioning himself as a moderate. If M14 wants a serious competitor, the first name coming to mind is Amine Gemayel. He leads Lebanon’s oldest and most prestigious Christian party, had the same stances regarding the electoral law and the cabinet, has good ties with most of the parties and is at the core of M14. Also who’s better to compete with Aoun than the president who appointed him as commander of the army and later prime minister?

The Kataeb are aware of their sudden power in the executive power and of the precious value of their leader: Amine Gemayel asked for the elections to be held on time, dismissed any other consensual candidate by requesting the parliament to elect a strong president (hinting at “the Maronite Four”), nominating himself to the presidency and finally starting to laud some of the M8 rivals, namely Iran. Like Michel Aoun, he is showing his moderate side. While rumors on the streets say that Hariri is likely going to endorse the leader of the Kataeb, Gemayel’s relation with Lebanon’s kingmaker Walid Jumblatt isn’t very good (due to civil war-related issues). Since Jumblatt isn’t a fan of Aoun either, we might probably see a third consensual name endorsed by the centrists. The press is circulating the names of Jean Obeid (who apparently also enjoys the support of Berri and Hariri) and the usual “two Maronites” : the commander of the army and the governor of the central bank.

2014 Is Not 2008 (Or Is It?)

Even if the elections are held on time, and even if the M8 and M14 alliances do not boycott the elections and everything goes according to the plan (no lack of quorum), there is still one problem: None of both alliances can secure 65 votes (absolute majority) to support its candidate. While it is more obvious by the day that M14 and M8 would be each supporting one candidate to the presidency, it remains unclear what side Walid Jumblatt and Mikati’s parliamentary blocs would back. If the Jumblatt-Mikati duo decides not to participate in the elections, neither M8 nor M14 will be able to secure the post for its candidate. Without Jumblatt and Mikati, M14 has around 58 MPs while M8 has a bit less than that (around 57).

The constitution stipulates that a 2/3 majority is necessary to elect a president in the first round, while an absolute majority would be needed for all the rounds after that. unlike 2007, when the presence of M8 and M14 in the parliament would have probably ended in an M14 candidate as a president (since they held the majority), the elections of 2014 are different. Even if everyone shows up, the elections would be like a play. The MPs will keep voting for the same candidates, and since no camp can secure 65 votes, the elections can go on forever. In other words, none of the two coalition will take it upon itself to boycott the parliamentary session and get treated with disregard from the public for “paralyzing the states’ institutions”. Because unlike 2008, there is no coalition holding the majority of votes in the parliament which means that the minority coalition doesn’t need to boycott and block quorum in order to prevent the majority of electing a president of its ranks.

While nothing is official or definite, we are approaching the elections with 2 candidates, Michel Aoun of M8 and Amine Gemayel of M14 that are – unlike 2007 – fighting to get the support of the rival camp by playing the moderate card, while the name of the third consensual candidate is soon to be determined.

Reminder: The government didn’t win the confidence vote yet.

Eleven Months Later: Who Won?

Lebanese Cabinet Of 2013

1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137,138,139,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160,161,162,163,164,165,166,167,168,169,170,171,172,173,174,175,176,177,178,179,180,181,182,183,184,185,186,187,188,189,190,191,192,193,194,195,196,197,198,199,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,207,208,209,210,211,212,213,214,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,226,227,228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,247,248,249,250,251,252,253,254,255,256,257,258,259,260,261,262,263,264,265,266,267,268,269,270,271,272,273,274,275,276,277,278,279,280,28,282,283,284,285,286,287,288,289,290291,292,293,294,295,296,297,298,299,300,301,302,,303,304,305,306,307,308,309,310,311,312,313,314,315,316,317,318,319,320,321,322,323,324,325,326,327,328,329,330.

330 days. I wanted to write 11 months, but it surprisingly seemed so normal, so I decided to count the days since Mikati resigned. It took the politicians 330 days to form a cabinet. Just to make it clear, it usually takes 0, 3, 30 or 33 days to form one. But no, it had to be 330 days. 330.

But that’s ok, it’s not even like we missed important events. Only democratic parliamentary elections, an electoral law, laws and democracy in general, oh and everything related to governing a country. But then again, that’s ok, because instead, we got a Syrian spillover, burned books, suicide bombers and a new local record in forming governments (yep, Salam broke Rachid Karami’s record of 1969 – Tamam, right?).

Anyway, enough nagging, and here’s a small analysis.

The Two Surprises

I know it’s a very long time ago, but let’s rewind 11 months. Tammam Salam was nominated as M14’s candidate to the premiership, and in order to to prevent Jumblatt from shifting back to M14, and M14 from taking power again, M8 made a brilliant move and decided  to endorse Tammam Salam. The “If you can’t beat them, join them” policy resulted in 8 to 9 months of political confusion.  M14 didn’t risk forming a government without M8. When M8 shocked everyone again in January and declared that they were ready to join M14 in an 8-8-8 cabinet lineup, Future Movement found their way out of the impasse: It would apparently seem that M8 gave up the blocking third and lost the battle, and at the same time, M14 wouldn’t be angering Hezbollah.

A Quick Look At The Names

Change and reform bloc : Gebran Bassil  (FPM) for the foreign ministry, Elias Abou Saab (FPM) for the education ministry, Arthur Nazarian (Tachnag) for the energy ministry, Rony Araiji (Marada) for the  culture ministry.

Hezbollah: Hussein Hajj Hassan for the ministry of industry, Mohamad Fneish as a minister of state.

Amal: Ali Hassan Khalil for the ministry of finance, Ghazi Zaiter for the ministry of public works and transports.

PSP: Wael Abou Faour for the ministry of public health, Akram Chehayyeb for minsitry of agriculture.

Presidential share: Samir Mokbel  as minister of defense and vice-PM, Alice Chabtini as minister of the displaced, Abdel Motleb Hannawi as minister of sports.

PM’s share: Tammam Salam as prime minister, Mohamad Machnouk as minister of environment.

Future Movement: Ashraf Rifi for the  justice ministry, Nohad Machnouk for the interior ministry, Rachid Derbas for the ministry of social affairs, Nabil De Freij as minister of state for administrative reform (yes, apparently such a ministry exists).

Kataeb: Sejaan Kazzi for the ministry of labor, Alain Hakim for the ministry of economy, Ramzi Jreij for the ministry of information.

M14 independent Christians: Michel Faraoun for the ministry of tourism, Boutros Hareb for the ministry of telecommunications.

A total of 4 ministers for the FM,  4 for the FPM bloc, 3 for the Kataeb, 2.5 for the president ( apparently Abdel Motleb Hannawi is more of a consensual candidate between Berri and Sleiman), 2.5 for Amal, 2 for Hezbollah, 2 for the PM, 2 for the PSP and 2 for the M14 independent Christians.

Start Counting

Although it might seem at first that this is an all-embracing cabinet where centrists, M8, and M14 have equal shares of 8 seats, it’s not actually an 8-8-8 cabinet. Technically, M8 didn’t give up the blocking third, since Jumblat is now more or less considered  to be part of the M8 sphere. Also technically, M14 are controlling the majority in the government since the president hasn’t quite been a Hezbollah fan for the past 6 months and most importantly because Tammam Salam – just as a reminder-  is Future Movement’s Beirut Member of the parliament more than he is a centrist.

Also, this is very weird, but M14 didn’t actually get 8 ministers: The FM has 4, the Kataeb 3, and the M14 independents 2. A total of 9 ministers, not 8 (hence an exception to the 8-8-8 accord). But this can be explained by the fact that Hezbollah was trying to make it up for the FM (because of the rejection of Rifi as interior minister). Also Hezbollah shouldn’t care a lot since the two PSP ministers and Abdel Motleb Hannawi are likely to be closer to M8, which means that the 8-8-8 government formula eventually turned out to be a 9-8-7 one – or to be more realistic, a 13-11 one (If you count Hannawi and the PSP ministers as M8 ministers)

Did The Kataeb Just Win The Lottery?

With approximately 5 members out of 128 in the parliament (3.90%), the Kataeb are receiving 3 out of 24 seats in the cabinet (12.5%). That’s not all: They  received the  key economic ministries; the economy and labor ministries. The official spokesman of the government (information ministry) is also apparently an FM/Kataeb consensual candidate. So why are they being  treated so well? Because the FM needed to reward them twice: The first time for accepting to extend the term of the parliament in June, and the second time for entering the government when the Lebanese Forces boycotted it against the will of the FM. The FM also needs to spoil them for two other reasons: The first one is to create tension between them and the LF ahead of the presidential elections by giving them an unreasonable share and throwing – even if it’s in an indirect way –  the Lebanese Forces outside. It would hence look as if the FM have a more “docile” Christian ally that is also representative of the Christian community. It would also give the impression that the FM is not hijacking Christian ministries anymore – like the Aounist propaganda says. The other reason of allocating the 3 ministries to the Kataeb  is to deny the FPM the courtesy of being the most important Christian party in the cabinet. If you haven’t noticed, there are only 2 pure Aounists in the government (the two others belong to the aounist allies, Marada and Tachnag), while there are actually 3 Kataeb in the cabinet. The kataeb – believe it or not – somehow suddenly became the second biggest party represented in the cabinet and the biggest Christian one.

2.5,3,3.5 or 4 Seats For The President?

When I counted the number of ministries for the first time, I found 25 seats, not 24. So I counted again, and again, and again, until I realised something very important: Even though the president has 3 ministries (I did not count Hannawi), he has 2 ministers (Samir Mokbel has two portfolios but votes once). So basically, the president gets a big share of ministries – the biggest he ever had –  but with only two ministries. Because theoretically the president has 4 portfolios: A sovereign one (Defense), a prestigious one (VP of the PM), and two minor ones. But when the time comes, Hannawi will probably side with Nabih Berri while Samir Mokbel – even though he has two ministries –  can only vote once.

By giving the president a big share of ministries but a small voting power, the political class is strengthening the centrist president but at the same time denying him too much decisive voting power that might  influence the post-Sleiman era in case the parliament fails to elect a president.

Bassil And Rifi: Equality?

If you take a quick look at the names of the new ministers, you notice two separate things: Gebran Bassil is there, and so is Ashraf Rifi. But Rifi is not interior minister, and Bassil is not energy minister. Interestingly enough, Rifi is for the FPM what Bassil is for the FM: The most annoying politician of the rival party. So if you think of it this way, there’s some kind of an undeclared compromise: Both politicians get to stay in the cabinet, but both don’t get what they want. Bassil is not energy minister and Rifi is not interior minister.

Two Generals

Speaking of the growing number of military men getting involved in Lebanese politics, we have two newcomers: Abdel Motleb Hannawi and Ashraf Rifi.

M8

Amal got two ministries, including the very important finance ministry. There were always talks that the finance minister according to Taef should belong to the Shia community- since the finance minister signs all the decrees along with the Christian president and the Sunni PM – and Berri managed to secure the post for one of his protégés. For the change and reform bloc, they got to keep the strategic energy ministry – even though it’s with the Tachnag now, like the 2008 cabinet – while Bassil is now the number 2 man in the cabinet, holding the foreign ministry. The FPM did not only receive a sovereign portfolio (foreign ministry) for the first time in the history of all embracing cabinets: The minister of education is also a member of the FPM and a Christian party member for the first time since ages. Even though Hezbollah only has one portfolio (but two votes since there’s a minister of state that is pro-Hezbollah) they got what they wanted: They weren’t forced out of the cabinet, they control the blocking third (via Jumblatt) in the government, and they pleased their allies ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections – hence making a potential FM-FPM alliance harder.

M14

The FM got 4 seats (+ Salam’s 2). So there shouldn’t be too much Hezbollah weight in the cabinet while at the same time the FM would be running the interior ministry again.  The M14 independents- Boutros Hareb and Michel Faraoun are also supposed to be close to the FM, giving the party a more or less share of 8/9 ministers (4+Salam’s 2+Hareb+Faraoun+ the Kataeb/FM  consensual information minister) out of 24. They also managed to please the Christian minorities by naming a Roman Catholic (Latin) Christian as a minister (They rarely get represented).

Walid Jumblatt, by making sure that the coalitions stayed the same and that his Kingmaker position in the center was hence still secure, also won from the formation of this new government.

So who won? Everybody won – except the Lebanese Forces qui désormais boudent tout seuls dans l’opposition.

Mikati’s resignation happened the day after mother’s day, while the government was formed the day after valentine’s day. That is obviously why they waited for 330 days: They care about our feelings.

Playing The Sectarian Card

FPM government Ad

“We should reduce the difficulties in forming a new Cabinet such as the agreement to postpone discussion on the government’s policy statement rather than adding more obstacles such as the rotation of ministerial portfolios. […] The principle of rotating ministerial portfolios is a sound policy if it is adopted by consensus and consultations (and) at the beginning of a new Parliament or presidential term. […] It is strategic for Lebanon and Christians because it entails international relations stolen from the Christians 25 years ago. It also includes a balanced development that was absent from Christian [areas] for 25 years.  […] Therefore, it is a primary ministry par excellence and should not be a target of exclusion and it is the right of this sect [Christians] to be trusted with Lebanon’s oil for an interim period. […] Is it acceptable to allocate the Interior Ministry to a sect in order to reassure it, allocate the Finance ministry to a specific sect to compensate for it or allocate the Defense ministry to [a party] to protect a grant for the Army?”

In case you didn’t guess, that’s Gebran Bassil talking about the energy ministry two weeks ago. Since this is apparently the primary problem preventing the government formation (for the moment), I thought it would be nice if I tackled the issue.

The Offer

According to media reports, Michel Aoun’s bloc was offered 4 ministers in the government (apparently two for the FPM, one for the Tachnag and another for the Marada) in exchange for the ministries – especially the energy ministry – held by Aounists for the past few years. The FPM would be getting one of the four sovereign portfolios – the foreign ministry – along with the ministry of education. Now the ministry of education might seem as a very minor portfolio, but for the first time since ages, a Christian political party would be handling the education portfolio. There were always fears that the history book might be changed in case a Christian party held the post – in the FPM circles you always hear how the Future Movement would never give it to the Lebanese Forces or the Kataeb – so basically this can be seen as some kind of concession by the Future Movement. Michel Aoun is also being offered one of the most important posts in the cabinet. The ministry of Foreign affairs is a quadruple offer: M8 gets to keep the post it held for the few past years, a Christian gets to be foreign minister for the first time since 2004 and the second time since 1998, a Christian party would be holding the ministry for the first time since the civil war, and most importantly, Michel Aoun would be given a sovereign portfolio for the first time in the history of the all-embracing cabinets (he never had any of the Finance, Interior, Defense or Foreign ministries in any of the previous unity cabinets).

But why do the concessions seem so big, and why is the FPM refusing the offer?

The Diversion

To quote Gebran Bassil:

We should reduce the difficulties in forming a new Cabinet such as the agreement to postpone discussion on the government’s policy statement rather than adding more obstacles such as the rotation of ministerial portfolios.

In other words, Gebran Bassil is basically offering – if one reads between the lines – some sort of compromise including concessions from both M8 and M14 regarding the two remaining obstacles: The policy statement and the ministerial rotation. M8 can use the energy ministry issue in order to get what it wants. A deal would be giving up the ministry in exchange for a more suiting ministerial declaration, or vice versa.

The Strategic Importance Of The Energy Ministry

The energy ministry for the FPM is of a very strategic importance. First, it’s a ministry that has been held by the FPM for the past 5 years. All the achievements of the Aounist ministers, including the Oil plan – among other things –  would go with the wind . Let me quote Bassil again:

“The principle of rotating ministerial portfolios is a sound policy if it is adopted by consensus and consultations (and) at the beginning of a new Parliament or presidential term.”

Also in other words: What matters the most is that the ministry stays under FPM control before the November elections. The moment another minister X replaces Bassil, it would seem on the eve of the parliamentary elections that it was X – not Bassil – that was responsible for everything that previously happened. Thus it would be harder for the Aounists to base their campaign on the energy ministry achievements since what people remember the most after a while are the corruption accusations, not the achievements .

Second, the amount of income the ministry will generate soon (because of the gas fields on the shore) is too damn high. Controlling a ministry that provides the biggest income is in the advantage of FPM, and allows him to use the ministry in order to strike better deals with M14 and increase the number of projects – especially that the elections are very near.

The third reason of keeping the energy ministry under Aounist control is because M8 makes sure that the Oil project is alive and kicking, and hence Hezbollah ensures that the Lebanese government would be entering an oil dispute with Israel regarding the maritime region bordering Israel. Hezbollah will gain a legitimacy boost by declaring that he is here to protect Lebanon’s resources.

It’s not only about the ministry

What is really shocking in Gebran Bassil’s speech is the amount of sectarianism used in order to keep the energy ministry.

“It is strategic for Lebanon and Christians because it entails international relations stolen from the Christians 25 years ago. It also includes a balanced development that was absent from Christian [areas] for 25 years.  […] Therefore, it is a primary ministry par excellence and should not be a target of exclusion and it is the right of this sect [Christians] to be trusted with Lebanon’s oil for an interim period.”

There’s a reason for all that. Michel Aoun’s presence in the government is vital for its creation. When the Lebanese Forces decided to boycott the all-embracing cabinet, the FPM suddenly became the only major Christian party represented in it. Gebran Bassil’s sectarian speech is a reminder to all the cabinet factions that the FPM’s Christian identity is crucial for the government formation. If the Aounist ministers resign because the portfolios aren’t good enough for the FPM, the only Christian political parties remaining in the government would be the Kataeb, the Tachnag, and the Marada. And since the Marada and Tachnag are pro-aounist and are members of the FPM’s change and reform parliamentary bloc , there’s a very big possibility that they would resign too. That leaves the Kataeb alone in the government. I seriously doubt that the Kataeb would take the responsibility of being the only Christian party in the government (and get looked upon by the Christian population with distrust 4 months before the elections) , and there’s an enormous chance that their ministers would resign for lack of Christian representation. Hezbollah, due to fears of a possible alternative FM-FPM alliance that is starting to appear, are likely to exit the government as a sign of solidarity with Aoun.

The Future Movement knew what they were doing when they gave up the Finance ministry to Berri: The Finance minister – it is said – was supposed to be a Shia according to the Taif agreement (since he signs all the decrees along with the president and PM and hence has some kind of veto power). By giving the Finance ministry to a minister loyal to Nabih Berri, the FM made it hard for the speaker to withdraw his ministers from the government in solidarity with Aoun. We still don’t know if the maneuver worked or not, but it surely made Berri think again.

We end up with an all-embracing government that lacks Christian representation and Hezbollah participation. Among the bad scenarios ahead for M14:

1) The government will somehow see light – despite the resignations, but due to the lack of Christian representation, it becomes ethically impossible for the government to assume the powers of the (Christian) president when Sleiman exits in May. This maneuver forces all political factions to elect a president hailing from a Christian political party or face a constitutional crisis. Since the Muslim factions of M8 and M14 would have united the FPM and the LF in the opposition, it becomes harder for the political class to extend the terms of the current president because it would bring the LF and FPM even closer to one another and lead to massive Christian discontent.

2) The government collapses just after its formation. New parliamentary consultations lead to events similar to the ones leading to Mikati’s cabinet, with Safadi – Michel Aoun’s  favori – being nominated to the post of Prime Minister.

One thing is sure though : If you think Michel Aoun is negotiating from a weak spot, don’t.

Reminder: We still don’t have a government.

Is There A Tripartite Alliance In The Making?
Hariri, Berri and Nasrallah

Back In Time… (Picture found on the internet)

An FPM-FM alliance is probably the most logical alliance one can think of in Lebanon. Together, they hold the absolute majority in the parliament. They both started as secular parties, they both have a certain sectarian identity, and they are the parties that least participated in the 1975-90 civil war. Also, they do not have the same electoral clientele, with the FM gathering its strength in the main three cities and the rural Sunni regions, and Aoun mainly controlling the seats of Northern Mount-Lebanon, which means that they will not compete with each other and there will be no rivalry: Aoun is appealing to the Christian electorate and Hariri to the Muslim one.  Aoun can use the extra Sunni votes in Batroun, Beirut, Koura and Zgharta and Zahle to tip the balance in his favor, while Hariri can use the FPM power in several regions especially southern Mount-Lebanon to hold the precious 8 seats of the Chouf. Electorally speaking, if both enter an alliance, they will probably control all the districts except Bcharri, Baalbak-Hermel, Hasbaya-Marjeyoun, Nabatieh, Zahrani, Aley, Bint Jbeil, and Tyre. That’s roughly 90 Members of the parliament under FPM/FM control. 70% of the Parliament. No LF, no PSP, no Kataeb, no Amal, no Hezbollah needed. 70% via the votes of the FPM and the FM, only.

That’s me, in November. (see the full post here)

4 months ago, the Free Patriotic Movement and the Future Movement were having their first meeting since 2005. 7 months ago, the transition had already started. 6 months ago, Nabih Berri, in one of his political maneuvers, declared the March 8 alliance dead. The turning point – apparently – was the day the elections were postponed. M14 made M8 abandon Aoun. But what no one saw back then was that M14 didn’t only make Hezbollah abandon Aoun. It forced Aoun to go on a quest to find a new, stronger ally.

We’re not talking anymore about FPM and FM members having a meeting. We’re not talking anymore about small statements or speculations. We are talking about Michel Aoun meeting  Saad Hariri in Rome and the partisan media being shy about it. We are talking about Aoun congratulating Hariri on his stances. We are taking about Ahmad Al Hariri getting confused and changing the subject when Marcel Ghanem asked him if Michel Aoun was the FM’s candidate to the elections.

We are talking about a brutal change in Lebanese politics. But what are the benefits of such a potential alliance between Aoun and Hariri?

Isolate

Here’s a fun fact: The Future Movement doesn’t need Aoun. Within M14, GMA would be a pain in the ass. They’ll have to share power with yet another ally, keep the rivalry between the FPM, the LF, and the Kataeb under control, and eventually – whether they like it or not – deal with a unified empowered confederation of Christian political parties. The FM would have created a stronger Christian bloc within M14. However, here’s another fun fact: Hezbollah without Aoun, is a Hezbollah that’s all alone (Yeah, it rhymes 😀 ). So, the plan from the FM – I believe – isn’t simply allying with Aoun. It’s isolating Hezbollah, or at least, forcing Hezbollah to enter a tripartite alliance with the FPM and the FM where Hezbollah would have to agree to some of FM’s terms. Aoun mentioned two important things in his latest television interview: That he’s on the same political wavelength with Saad Hariri, and most importantly, that he wishes to include the Sunnis in his memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah. Sums everything up I guess?

The road to Baabda

Aoun learned from his lessons in the previous presidential elections. In 2008, they were 2: If you’re a minority, you lose. If you’re not in the middle, you lose. Remember the words “tripartite alliance” in the previous paragraph? Memorize them well. Aoun knows how to count.  The tripartite alliance, with some help from M14’s pro-FM allies, is likely to form Lebanon’s new parliamentary majority. I believe that some parties – risking electoral annihilation from the FM and FPM alliance – would also join that alliance. For the first time, Aoun would simultaneously be:  (1) In the Middle (2) With a parliamentary majority behind him and (3) The strongest Christian leader backed by the Strongest Muslim allies available. Mabrouk: we have a candidate that meets and even exceeds the criteria.

The Rivals from within

Michel Aoun and Saad Hariri both have one thing in common: The rise of rivals. Let me take the simple example of Saad Hariri:  Najib Mikati and Mohamed Safadi are the masters of their own fate in Tripoli and no longer answer to the FM. In Beirut is rising the bey of Beirut Tammam Salam, while in Saida, Siniora is strong enough to question the supremacy of Saad Hariri. In Akkar and the North in general, the FM’s MPs are not hesitating to take more extremist stances in order to appeal to the local population – sometimes criticizing Hariri himself. Michel Aoun on the other hand faces the existential threat of M8 nominating the more loyal Frangieh instead of him. After all, Frangieh has the age factor on his side. Things are not looking good on both sides, and they both need each other in order to remind their junior allies in the upcoming elections that they remain the strongest among all.

The Lebanese Forces in denial

I have been following Lebanese politics for some time now, and as you can clearly see, I rarely comment on the stances or political strategies of the Lebanese Forces. And it’s not because of love or hate. It’s because there is hardly anything to comment on. It’s always the same stances, the same way, in the same tone. And the monotony isn’t only political. Parliamentary speaking, they hold a number of seats that is way too small to change anything. Electorally speaking, they depend on others practically everywhere while no one depends on them. And they have been absent from the executive power for the past 3 years. In other words – excuse my French and geeky medical terms – ils ont un rôle épidémiologique nul.

But something changed lately (see here, here, here). Geagea is refusing to enter a government that includes Hezbollah, and is going against the all-embracing government decision of Saad Hariri. Hariri can’t brutally change sides and flush his alliance with Geagea in the toilet after 9 years. Apart from turning the Christian population against him, it’s ethically bad for him to be seen as the man that might compromise on everything, including his longtime allies. By boycotting Hezbollah’s presence in the government, the Lebanese Forces are making the impossible to force the FM not to enter the government along with M8 so that the FM would never have the opportunity of gaining a more centrist position that would entitle them to be one step closer to an agreement with Aoun.

8-8-8 and the end of M8?

Suddenly, out of nowhere, Hezbollah agreed in January to the 8-8-8 formula. In a way, Hezbollah succumbed to fear: The fear that if Tammam Salam’s attempt (of  forming an independent cabinet) failed for lack of parliamentary confidence, GMA would name Saad Hariri as new Prime Minister (the same way Jumblatt was supposed to name M8’s candidate  in 2013 but named Salam instead). That’s probably why M8 is trying to please Aoun by giving him important ministries in the government such as the Foreign ministry.

Because of the war in Syria, Hezbollah needs a strong Christian ally on his side more than ever, and both Hariri and Aoun realize that. And that is how and why a deal pleasing the three parties might eventually see light: Hezbollah wants to keep his ally, Aoun wants the presidency, and Hariri wants to go back to the Grand Serail.

Reminder: We still don’t have a government.

A Closer Look At the Governmental Formation
Back to 2010?

Back to 2010?

Rewind to December 2013. The president threatened M8 with the independent neutral cabinet in case they wouldn’t agree in the next few days with M14 on a consensual – non independent – cabinet. For the past 9 months, M8 had refused two proposals:  The first one is an independent cabinet excluding the Hezbollah-led alliance from power (along with everyone else) , and the second one is a consensual 8-8-8 cabinet (8 ministers for M8, 8 for M14, and 8 for the centrists) where M8 wouldn’t control the blocking third (They need 9 of 24 ministers).

Three Birds With One Stone

Back to January 2014: For some reason, M8 yields. It accepts in the first week of 2014 the first condition of M14: giving up the blocking third and only keeping 8 out of the 24 ministers. And for another reason, M14 suddenly accepts to enter a government including Hezbollah and welcomes M8’s move, only 2 weeks after it had accused Hezbollah of being behind the assassination of one of its senior members, and only 1 week before the start of the special tribunal for Lebanon. In other words, this is the hypocrisy of Lebanese politicians. So how exactly did a 9 months deadlock end so fast?

Bird #1

M8 has three problems. The first one is called Michel Sleiman. Should the president form an independent government excluding M14 and M8, Michel Aoun loses the third of the ministers (he has 10 out of 30 in Mikati’s cabinet) while on the other hand, Hezbollah loses twice: The first time by the probable implementation of the Baabda declaration in the ministerial statement removing the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria, and the second time with the removal of the People-Army-Resistance clause undermining Hezbollah’s armed presence in Lebanon.

Bird #2

M8’s second problem is called – I believe you guessed it – M14. The ministerial declaration will radically change – clearly not in favor of Hezbollah. Aoun’s plans of using some ministries for electoral propaganda will fade away. It’s out of question for M8 to let M14 rule by themselves, and I believe the 2005-2008 incidents sum things up regarding that matter.

Bird #3

The third problem is the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Syrian negotiations. One should try to see it in this perspective: Hezbollah’s legitimacy is on the line in La Hague, while in Geneva, there is one only way to stop the regional powers from using the Hezbollah arsenal as a negotiable card. By entering an all-inclusive government with M14, Hezbollah guarantees that not only the Lebanese government is backing him, but also his rivals. Unlike what it seems, Hezbollah doesn’t want to rule by himself at this particular moment. Once Hezbollah makes sure that M14 is by his side in the government he’ll probably lose weight locally, but his diplomatic wars in Geneva and his judicial war in La Hague would be over. After all, how can Lebanon’s neighbors use him as a negotiation card if there’s nothing to negotiate on because his rivals have no problems with him anymore? And most importantly, how can M14 accuse Hezbollah of political assassinations and still share with him power? Isn’t it undermining the STL?

But if M8 is winning even by giving up the blocking third in the government, why is M14 accepting his win and sharing power with M8?

Spoiler alert: M8 is not giving up the blocking third.

8-8-8?

Let’s break things up. The first set of 8 ministers is M8’s share. The second set of 8 ministers is M14’s share. And the third set is the centrists’ share: The president that has to sign the decree, the designated prime minister who won’t accept to form a cabinet in which there is no one on his side but himself, and the kingmaker Walid Jumblatt.

8-8-6-2?

Jumblatt is expected to control the two Druze seats, while he president and the PM will have the rest of centrist ministers by their side.

14-10?

For Hezbollah to agree on an 8-8-8 formula proposed by Walid Jumblatt and no one else, it definitely means that Hezbollah got reassured by Jumblatt that the PSP ministers shall side with him when the moment comes. Also, one shouldn’t forget that Tammam Salam is M14’s Beirut member of the parliament, and that the president has criticized Hezbollah since the early days of Summer. Meaning that Jumblatt is closer to M8, and that the president and his PM are actually backing M14. M8 hence gains the two Jumblati ministers and ends up with 10 ministers. Hello there, blocking third.

12-12?

This is the part when you rely on the biased and inaccurate news and rumors. Apparently, in the dark mysterious alleys of this republic, they say (Shh – I didn’t tell you anything) that there’s a Shiite minister of the president’s share that’s actually being agreed upon between president Sleiman and the speaker Berri. A consensual Centrist/M8 minister means that this Shiite minister would also be close to Nabih Berri and M8 in general. It is also said that apparently Habib Frem, a yet-to-be minister of the prime minister’s share will also stand by M8 when the moment comes. Here you go, a 12-12 government where M14 and M8 are in a way  or another equally represented.

12-12 but pro…?

The government, while seeming at the same time neutral (be it 8-8-8 or 12-12) and consensual, looks a bit more pro-M14 since the 12-12 scenario is for the moments of crisis and it will probably be 14-10 most of the time (Frem and the Shia minister of the president will have to vote with the president and the PM most of the time since they primarily represent them). However, and since the duo M8-Jumblatt controls more than 50% of the parliament seats and that the cabinet is responsible in front of the parliament, the government will have to keep the M8 majority satisfied in order to secure the vote of confidence.

So why did M14 agree to join M8? Because M14 will rule without even having a majority in the parliament.

Meet the latest miracle of Lebanese political deals: A cabinet that is pro-M14 in regular days, that is neutral in moments of crisis and that answers to a M8-led parliament.

Reminder: Agreeing on the government’s form doesn’t mean we have a government.

Lebanese Politics – 2013 In Review
Halleluja painting by Mhamad Saad

Halleluja painting  (Mhamad Saad)

2013 was a year full of political events. Today you probably don’t remember half of them. In five years, you’ll hardly remember anything. What I’ll try to do in this blog post, is to link everything that happened in 2013 in a way that will let us have a bigger picture of a year that will probably be only remembered for an extension of a parliament, a Syrian spillover, a governmental resignation and a political assassination. But 2013 was way more complicated than that.

The War For The Electoral Law – There Is Hope, Part I(January-February 2013)

2013 starts with hope. A hope that a new electoral law will change Lebanese politics as we know it and create new opportunities. Several draft laws will be discussed (see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here). 128 Districts, 50 Districts, 37 Districts, 13 Districts. Majority Law, Proportional Representation, Hybrid  propositions. None of them – except the Orthodox Gathering Law, the worst among them all – will make it through the committees. For the next 3 months, the OGL will be the soul of 2013’s first political maneuver. Michel Aoun – with the Shia parties supporting the law and the Sunni ones refusing it – will use the OGL to embarrass his Christians rivals and turn them against the Future Movement. A double political victory for Aoun : Shattering for the first time the very core of a 8 year-political alliance but also confirming his Christian dominance by showing himself as the sole protector of the Christian interests.

A Lebanese Senator Having a Civil Marriage?  – There Is Hope, Part II (February 2013)

February will be a month of surprises. Saad Hariri – in order to bring March 14 back on its feet – will shock the Lebanese with two particular stances. In an attempt to counter the rising influence of Najib Mikati and the increasing power of Grand Mufti Qabbani, he will endorse Civil Marriage in Lebanon and break the foundations of the Taef agreement, by calling for a bicameral parliament, with two sectarian chambers including a senate based on the OGL law. This second political maneuver of 2013 hits two birds with one stone: Hariri makes sure that he is still the master of his sect by going against his rivals before it’s too late, and tries at the same time to mend bridges with his Christian allies by showing a very moderate side and offering a constitutional concession meant to replace the OGL while securing the Future Movement interests.

A Government Falls (March 2013)

Mikati, alarmed by Hariri’s comeback among the Sunnis, will quickly take action. After failing to keep Rifi as the head of the ISF, he will use that opportunity to show that he is the master of his own fate. His resignation would be the third political maneuver of 2013. To M8, he wants to show he’s irreplaceable. He’s also confirming his status as a powerful Sunni leader not controlled by Hezbollah, and preparing himself as a strong Sunni M8 candidate for the parliamentary elections. But his calculations will prove to be wrong.

Tammam, We Have A Consensual  Candidate (April 2013)

Tammam Salam – after a Jumblattist change of strategy –  will reach the premiership. A half victory for M14, since M8 will quickly endorse him to prevent a formation of a unilateral M14 government. Meet the fourth political maneuver of 2013: If you can’t beat them, join them. This particular maneuver will put Salam in a very hard position. He has no relevant popular backing, and can’t act without M8, M14 and the centrists. The vacuum in the executive power will hence last throughout 2013 because of M14’s refusal to enter a government with M8 and the centrists’ refusal to exclude anyone.

Time Is Money – There Was Never Hope (May 2013)

May is the result of the previous 5 months. No electoral law, governmental chaos and inter-sectarian struggles between the Christian and Sunni leaders will make way to a 14 month extension to the parliament’s term. Only Aoun, who had no interest in keeping the status-quo at that particular moment of strength, was against this extension. Since the extension bought time for Hezbollah’s fight in Syria and Kept Berri speaker for one extra year, they won’t oppose it and tensions will rise between the various March 8 sections. Meet 2013’s fifth political maneuver, or how M14 began shattering the M8 alliance by siding with Hezbollah against Aoun in the parliament.

Jihad In Saida (June 2013)

In very odd circumstances, Ahmad Al-Assir’s forces will clash with the Lebanese army. A blow to all the rising Salafis that tried to take advantage of the Sunni political vacuum after Hariri’s self-exile. Three main winners will emerge from the political annihilation of Ahmad Al-Assir: Hezbollah (M8 will be able to make a stronger case in the Takfiri propaganda), the commander of the army (Higher hopes in the presidential race) and the traditional Sunni Zuamas – Mikati, Hariri, Siniora, Karami, Salam (By the  elimination of a potential rising Salafi rival). The sixth of Lebanon’s 2013 political maneuvers hence consisted in throwing out any unwanted newcomer to Lebanese politics by encouraging him to clash militarily and lose.

It’s All About Nabih Berri (July 2013)

In July, Nabih Berri will try three times to use the vacuum in the executive power and the deadlock in the parliament to consolidate his power. First, he will try to pass several laws in the parliament with no government in power – contre l’usage . Then he will try and break the equilibrium by declaring M8 a dissolved alliance in order to see if M14 might ally with him. He will finally try to set up a deal bringing Hariri back to the premiership and giving  M8 in exchange a proper governmental representation. Nabih Berri’s Triple Maneuver is what will mark the most of July 2013.

The Rise And Rise Of Michel Sleiman (August 2013)

Reinforced by  a regional and local context (expired parliament and no government),  Michel Sleiman will find himself more legitimate than ever. He will hence make statements criticizing the Lebanese status-quo and Hezbollah’s weapons, putting him in a confrontation with March 8 and briefly ending his policy of centrism. Lebanon’s eighth maneuver in 2013 (see here and here for more details) would be in Sleiman’s confrontation with Hezbollah in order to raise the pressure on M8 and force them to concede to the governmental terms of M14.

Fakhreddine’s Legacy (September 2013)

September will be the month of upside-downs. The internal war within March 8 will reach its climax with Aoun’s slow rapprochement to Saudi-Arabia, while all Lebanese politicians will endorse the “Fakhreddine / wait and see” Political Maneuver by siding in the middle and waiting for the progress concerning a possible American strike on Syria. No one wants to preemptively side with the losing faction.

Priorities And Confusion (October 2013)

The very fact that no side lost following the September events made it easier for all the parties to keep their same stances. With no peace in the Syrian horizon, the deadlock regarding governmental formation was now combined with the start of presidential campaigns by the Christian leaders. Frangieh will be responsible of the tenth political maneuver in 2013, by asking for a constitutional amendment that is likely to force political parties to agree on a president, hence slightly implying that he might be a strong candidate and that the M8 internal war is so strong that it might split M8 into two factions: One supporting Frangieh and the other endorsing the Aounist candidate. Merging the two cases of governmental formation and presidential made it more harder for politicians to prioritize which issue is more important, hence drowning the whole situation in a more serious deadlock.

The Price Of Proxies (November 2013)

By November 2013, the spillover in Syria was now too important. Lebanon became once again the region’s bloody mailbox due to an explosion targeting the Iranian embassy. In the aftermath, the different responses by the Three allies – Hezbollah, Iran and Syria – showed that the three of them do not share the same unique enemy, and that the Iranian ties to the U.S. were getting stronger. Throughout summer and autumn, Lebanese proxies of foreign powers will launch – in parallel to the direct ongoing war in Syria – an indirect psychological warfare – let’s call that the eleventh political maneuver because it will strengthen the extremist factions in M8 and M14 – in the form of rigged cars and suicide bombings in Tripoli, the Bekaa and the Southern Suburbs of Beirut.

Manipulation And Flames (December 2013)

A twelfth political maneuver, this time by the president, was destined to loosen the demands of the M8 and M14 coalitions in the governmental formation by exploiting the power of an outgoing president  with no apparent successor. A senior M14 / Future Movement member was assassinated and the two words “Liberation war”  in  Siniora’s funeral speech will put the entire political situation in a  whole new level before 2014.

3,2,1,0! It’s 2014.

3, 2, 1 and 0. Remember these numbers very carefully. In a normal functioning democracy, Lebanon should see 3 governments in 2014. One from January till May (the presidential elections), one from May to November (the Parliamentary elections) and the last one should be formed in December after the elections. 2014 is also a big year full of political events.  We have two elections waiting: The presidential elections are theoretically in May, and the parliamentary ones theoretically in November. The parliamentary elections are supposed to come with a new electoral law, which is also interesting. Regionally, a peace conference is expected for Syria, and Iranian-U.S. ties are improving which will likely affect the Saudi/French attitude in Beirut. Will the deadlock change? Who will be the next president? Will we have a president? Who will be the P.M.? What will be the next moves? Who will win the elections? No matter what happens, 2014 will be full of surprises – partly because we already have nothing to be surprised of now.

In a functioning democracy, Lebanon should see 3 governments in 2014. But  – if the deadlock remains – be in the mood for 2, 1 or no government at all, Lebanon.

Thoughts On Today’s Blast: How A Car Bomb Can Be A Bloody Message
Mohamad Chatah's burned car registration papers from the explosion

Mohamad Chatah’s burned car registration papers from the explosion – found on the internet

A sad day for Lebanon. Mohamad Chatah, a former minister of finance (2008-2009) and a member of the March 14 coalition, was assassinated in a car bombing in Beirut. Let’s just say that the political status quo since April 2013 ends today.

The Tweet

Only one hour before the explosion, Chatah tweeted :

While it’s a fact that Chatah was an important M14 figure – and thus wasn’t exactly a fan of Hezbollah – that particular tweet still means a lot. Unlike other explosions where fingers were pointed at Syria or Hezbollah by other party members after the victim’s death, this time there’s some kind of a posthumous finger-pointing from the victim itself. True, the tweets of Chatah (you can reach them here) targeted Syria and Hezbollah almost on a daily basis, but the last tweet’s timing remains huge . It speaks of taking power, controlling security, pressure, Hezbollah, and Syria, less than an hour before the blast. It can’t get any worse for M8.

The Place

Today’s blast wasn’t very far from the location of the Hariri 2005 explosion site. This is also one of the most secure places in Beirut and Lebanon. That, is a clear message: No one is safe, no place is safe.

The Timing

The assassination happened 20 days before the Hariri trial (Special Tribunal for Lebanon) was about to begin. Chatah was an aide to Hariri, and there were reports that he might have been a witness. The location of the  blast as well as the person targeted (It could’ve been anyone that’s in mainstream M14 but not in Hariri’s inner circle) show that this is not only a political message but rather a judicial one too; an alarm for all the witnesses that they can be and will be harmed should they speak. After all, Wissam Al-Hassan’s death makes a bit more sense doesn’t it? Like Chatah, he was not only a regular M14 affiliated man. He was in Hariri’s  inner circle too.

The Consequences

Mohamad Chatah’s assassination will have a huge impact on the status quo. Chatah was by far one of the most moderate politicians representing the city of Tripoli. It’s a double loss for the city since sectarian tensions will now again rise between Jabal Mohsen and Bab Al-Tabbaneh.

I won’t get into the speculations of who did it, and why he did it. Millions of theories are out there. The first one is that the Syrian regime (and its allies?) killed him to send a message. The second is that it might be an inside job since it would be a major political blow to the March 8 movement. The third is that it’s actually a double conspiracy theory, with the Syrian regime doing it in order for the people to think that it’s an inside job since they have no interest in losing political power in the aftermath of the explosion. And it goes on (triple, quadruple conspiracy theories…). There’s another scenario where a third-party wants to drag Lebanon into a dark, cold era of civil war and sectarian strife for personal gains. And last but not least, there’s the Takfiri-Israeli secret alliance that will destroy the Arab world.

Yes, the previous paragraph was sarcastic. And of course, some of the theories  are more probable than others. This is what the news would be all about for a while. Who killed him, and why. Accusations and propaganda. But the truth is, we will probably never know. Our intelligence agencies are so efficient that the ISF intelligence (Information bureau) and the army intelligence were fighting on the explosion scene instead of figuring things out. But again, I won’t get into the speculations of who did it, and why it was done. That’s the job of the judicial authorities and concerned police departments.

What I want to speak of here is the Future, what happens next: What change of strategy will M14 adopt now that it is under direct, apparent threat. Will M14 see a casus belli and ask Tammam Salam form a unilateral government? Will Jumblatt agree to this? What will be the decision of the witnesses of the STL Hariri trial? How will Hezbollah respond? What would be the impact on the governmental negotiations? on the presidential elections? on the electoral law? on the parliament’s extended term? The political statements are now marked by confusion. Hariri already accused Hezbollah of the blast. My guess is that M8 will accuse Israel. Sectarianism, Syria and conspiracies are all over the news. It will take few days to get clearer. New stances might emerge, and after all, this is the perfect moment for anyone to change sides.

The same way Wissam Al-Hassan’s assassination paved the way for the events of early 2013, this is what will define the rules of the game in 2014.

My condolences to the families of the victims. Hopefully one day Lebanon will cease to be the region’s mailbox.