Author: Moulahazat

Does Lebanon Need The First Amendment?

Jean Assy, a free patriotic movement activist, was arrested a couple of days ago for tweeting against the president. Should hate speech be protected or not by the freedom of speech? People can debate for hours and hours, and like Elie sums it up pretty well in his post, Jean Assy has people to watch his back, Many other Lebanese – like you – do not.

Is It Freedom?

What is exactly the difference between the United States and Lebanon? Well, you got that right: Everything. But on the top of that everything, there’s the freedom of speech. With freedom of speech, comes the freedom to criticize, and with the freedom to criticize, comes democracy. And with democracy, comes everything else, be it good or bad.

Lebanon – compared to the United States – has no freedom of speech. And it’s not about the biased media, or the conspiracies, or the wasta, or whatever we tend to convince ourselves with. We do not have freedom of speech, because we do not have a constitution that guarantees us freedom of speech. Our constitution, unlike the American one, gives the parliament the right to issue laws that can regulate the freedom of speech. In the United States, the Congress shall make no law regulating the freedom of speech (First Amendment to the Constitution):

Congress Shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances

Meanwhile in Lebanon:

The freedom to express one’s opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association shall be guaranteed within the limits established by law.

You can clearly see the difference between the first amendment and article 13 of the Lebanese constitution: The fact that there’s a law regulating freedom of speech, and that there’s a boundary, really says it all. And according to the law that’s inspired by the constitution, the religious leaders and president are immune to the freedom of speech. I do not understand how we dare to speak of the freedom of press, while something called the Publication Court (محكمة المطبوعات) still regulates the press and censors it. Even social media will be under censorship if the Lebanese Internet Regulation Act (LIRA) passes in the parliament.

The world was shocked in June when Muhammad Al-Qatta, a 15 year old child, got executed by Syrian rebels for blasphemy. KFC Tripoli was burned in September because of an anti-Islam movie that wasn’t even produced in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah made a (very) rare live appearance in a demonstration against that same movie. Draw a caricature mocking a Maronite Patriarch in a Saudi Newspaper, and you become bad. Speak against – Or insult, depending on your political allegiance – the other Patriarch, and you become worse. A human decides to burn the Coran 11000 Km away from Lebanon, and Lebanon’s peaceful – beware, that’s sarcasm – coexistence is suddenly under an imminent threat.

The Two types of Drivers

Two types of drivers in Lebanon exist. And no, they are not classified by gender, but by the way they react to the insults they get while driving. There’s the driver that starts insulting the other driver, stops the car in the middle of the highway, gets out of the car, beats the other driver, threatens him, possibly shoots him, before finally spending the night together at the police station. And then there’s the other type of driver: The one that hears the insult, smiles back while knowing that his mom is not a whore and he is not an animal – specifically a dog – , continues driving and reaches home where he later celebrates father’s day.

La Morale

When Jean Assi insulted the President, did the president become what Jean Assi said about him? No. It only made Jean Assi’s argument weaker. When that American said that the Coran contains satanic verses, did it make the Coran contain satanic verses? No. It only made him look like a bigot. When the Patriach was made similar to the Devil in the caricature, did that make him the devil? I guess that’s a no too.

My Two Cents

You do not censor what you don’t like. That is not and will never be freedom. If you don’t like it, or don’t agree with it – even if it’s hate speech – you move on and/or respond to it. When you censor it, you’re acting like an ostrich hiding its head in the sand. To sum it up: You don’t fight an extremist bigot full of hate speech by putting him in jail because of his words. You fight him by letting him say what he wants, properly responding to him, and make him look like a fool. Otherwise, the hate speech will spread faster, and there would not be any proper control over it. With the absolute Freedom of speech, you can at least know the impact of the thoughts and fight them. For Jon Stewart, a regime (Egypt) that is afraid of a Joke is not a regime. Can a regime afraid of an insult be considered one?

But Before wondering if the Lebanese need the first amendment and an absolute freedom of speech, we should start by wondering if they want an absolute freedom of speech. A right that includes with it the right to “blasphemy”, to write against the 18 sects, to draw comics about the prophet, -who knows- to side with the enemy publicly, to tweet against the president, to issue governmental and security leaks, while being simultaneously protected by the government.

Do the Lebanese really want freedom of speech?

The Week Of Confusion (Or How All The Stances Suddenly Changed)

Tripoli in June 2009 (Agence France-Presse)

Remember Why The Government Collapsed? The Prime Minister resigned when the parties of the coalition couldn’t agree on the formation of the body that will supervise the elections (and to what this body represents: An official green light to the 1960 law). Mikati back then resigned (Link) because Michel Aoun rejected the formation of the body. Jumblatt however, was siding with the President and the Prime Minister, asking to hold elections on time according to the 1960 law.

The Irony

Walid Jumblatt, who always called on holding elections on time, now wants an extension of the parliament’s mandate. Michel Aoun, who once said that he will not run with his party in the elections should they be under the 1960 law, is now officially a candidate. That can only explained by the fact that the political maneuvering Michel Aoun has done with the Orthodox Gathering Law for the past few months clearly made him more popular among Christians than the Christian M14 parties three weeks before elections (Link). If 2000 to 3000 votes change side in each Christian district, the FPM will have the ability to win several more districts than 2009 like Batroun, Ashrafieh and Koura. 10 extra MPs on M8’s side mean that the majority changes side in the parliament. And that makes one understand why the Future Movement are currently Ok. with an extension of the Mandate. Hezbollah doesn’t have time for elections with what is happening at Qussair, and an extension to the Mandate also means that Berri gets to stay speaker for 6 extra months and even 2 extra years (Who knows). And why the big No from Jumblatt to elections? 68 MPs on the side of M8 without the Jumblatt votes make Lebanon’s kingmaker as powerful as the Kataeb. The man who was responsible of the last two governmental changes in 2011 and 2013, will not stay as influential as he is now if the Status Quo changes and an alliance gets able to hold more than 64 MPs without him.

And one can see why the government convenes today to vote for holding the elections on time (Update: That’s what just happened) : The government, of M8 has a chance of getting a majority with the 1960 law, after all. The worst thing that might happen is everyone keeping the same shares for the next four years

Meanwhile, a Blow To All Norms

Selon l’usage, the parliament never convenes to vote or discuss a law with a resigned government in power. In the Lebanese history, this has rarely happened as there are three documented events: a vote to pass a budget in 1969 in the middle of the Cairo agreement crisis, several sessions after the assassination of Rachid Karami in 1987 in the middle of the civil war, and the session that set free Samir Geagea in 2005. In 2013 however, the parliament convened with no “extraordinary reasons”, breaking the rule, only to vote an amendment on the electoral law.
Now here’s the awkward part. A caretaker outgoing Prime Minister, cannot theoretically sign a law the Parliament voted. Yet Mikati signed the law, breaking another norm.
The government that resigned also decides to meet again and take decisions. Not only is it weird and very unconventional that a caretaker government convenes and takes decisions, but to meet in order to vote on the specific reason that brought the government down?
And now the parliament wants to extend its mandate. The parliament, elected by the people for 4 years and 4 only, wants an extension because “they couldn’t agree on an electoral law” (link to an earlier post). What kind of alibi is that? How can’t you feel democracy running in our veins?

Mother of All Deadlocks.

Extending the parliament’s mandate can be considered to be unconstitutional, and just in case the law finds itself on its way to the constitutional council, there’s a big chance that the parliament’s extension would be nullified. However, it takes some time, and there’s a high chance that the result would come too late (July). By then, there would have been no elections held, the outgoing parliament would have no authority and there wouldn’t be another 128 members to replace them. We’re left with a Prime Minister Designate who can’t have a vote of confidence from a parliament that doesn’t exist, with a caretaker government, and with a President leaving in 10 months. Meet the collapse of the Lebanese system.

The Curious Case of Tammam Salam

Tammam Salam doesn’t know what to do. He was supposed to form a government that supervises the elections. But now we seem to be heading to 2 options:

Apparently the resigned government would supervise the elections should they happen, now that it desires to name the body members. Meaning that Salam would not be Prime Minister on election day. What’s the use of Salam’s government if it won’t be there on the 16th of June?
If we’re going towards an extension of the parliament’s mandate, then there is no use anymore for Salam’s “elections government”.

Not only Salam doesn’t know what is required from him, but he also probably doesn’t know which side he is representing and should be thus negotiating with: March 14 parties? Or all the parliament? (taking into consideration that he got named by 124 MPs. (link))

There’s a Lebanese expression: كثرة الطباخين بتحرق الطبخة. Between finding an electoral law, extending the mandate, organizing the elections in three weeks, adjourning elections, forming a government, the Lebanese parties are unable to know on what and with whom to negotiate.

Remember when the 1960 law was “never to be spoken of again”?

Waiting For The Electoral Law – March 14’s Hybrid Law: A Review

Lebanon's Electoral Map According To The March 14's Hybrid Law. The colored districts are the small winner-takes-all ones and the big ones within the white line are the big districts under proportional unlike in the picture.

Lebanon’s Electoral Map According To The March 14’s Hybrid Law. The colored districts are the small winner-takes-all districts and the big ones within the white line are the big districts under proportional representation.

The Lebanese Forces, Future Movement, and the PSP agreed on a hybrid electoral law last week. The law is very similar to the electoral law the Lebanese Forces proposed in February (Here’s the analysis on that law), with some exceptions. I’m going to use the same arguments I used when I reviewed the previous law, but comment on the new changes. Unlike the previous law that had an unclear criteria here, I didn’t find any criteria at all for this law

Here’s the number of voters by sects, in case you’re interested:

Also, here’s a table for the seat allocations:

Table of seats according to March 14’s hybrid law (High Res)

In a nutshell, the law separates Lebanon into two types of constituencies: 26 small districts (Allocated 68 seats), that are in most cases cazas, under a winner-takes-all system and 6 big districts (Allocated 60 seats), that are in most cases the mohafazas, under a PR system. The main aim of the law is to get the biggest number of Christian-elected MPs to the parliament. The electoral constituencies are in most cases the administrative districts (Cazas, Governorates) of Lebanon. However, there are some few weird things: West Bekaa-Rashaya or Baalbek-Hermel aren’t separated. Also, on a bigger level, the Mohafaza of Mount-Lebanon is split to two districts: A northern bigger one and a southern smaller one (Aley-Chouf).

From Unclear Criteria To No Criteria At All (Or How It Keeps Getting Worse)

My criticism on the old law proposal:

The previous law proposal of the Lebanese forces allocated the seats on the basis of a certain criteria that you can see here. However, a big number of the districts don’t obey to any of the criteria. For example, in Jezzine the Greek Catholics aren’t considered to be a minor sect in the district so the seat stays in the caza and doesn’t shift to the governorate. That’s only one example, and there’s a lot more. Apparently the Christian seats are taken as one block and the minor Christian sects’ seats within a Christian district with a Maronite majority don’t go to the Mohafazas and stay in the caza. The lawmakers need to clarify a few things. Also, there are other districts where the criteria is missing something or doesn’t match the district’s seat repartition. For example, why is it that the Protestant seat gets transferred from Beirut I to the Governorate and not the Armenian Catholic one?

My new criticism: There seems to be no criteria at all in the allocation of seats. There are several small changes in a lot of districts (The Chouf gets 4 MPs instead of 3 in the old hybrid LF proposal. Baalbak gets 4 instead of 5. Tripoli gets for instead of 3, just as examples). Also, the law is clearly in favor of the March 14 parties, while giving the Christians a bigger influence than the 1960 law.

Unequal Voting (same criticism than before)

Among other things that makes this draft law odd is the disproportion of seats within the majoritarian system. For example, Akkar, where 120608 voted in 2009, has 3 seats, while Bcharre that had 17183 voters in 2009 has 2 seats. Bcharre voters are 4.55% of the North’s voters, while Akkar voters are 31.96% of the North voters. That means that on the Mohafaza scale, the Akkaris get to choose 31.96% of 11 MPs which is 3.51 MPs. A total of 3.51+3=6.51 MPs for the people of Akkar, while Bcharre gets to choose 4.55% of 11 MPs which is 0.50 MPs. A total of 2+0.50=2.50 MPs for Bcharre. the number of electors in Akkar are 7.01 times more than Bcharre, which means that Akkar should have 7 times more MPs. Ironically it only has 6.51/2.50= 2.6 times more than Bcharre.

That disproportion between the districts will be present in almost all hybrid laws, because some districts get to have more influence sometimes even though they have a smaller population. And after all, that’s how the law gives more influence to Christians. When the Akkar (66% Sunni) district should be as 7 times more influential than Bcharre (100% Christian) and is instead only 2.66 times more influential, you get to understand how the Christians, 38%, will be able to elect 52 MPs (40.62%). A big number of the small districts happen to be mainly Christian and that’s how the Lebanese Forces draft law can boost the number of the Christian-elected MPs.

The Analysis (The Small Differences That Made Future Movement and the PSP Accept The Law)

If you take a look at the previous electoral law proposed by the Lebanese Forces in February, you’ll quickly spot some interesting differences with the current consensual LF-PSP-FM law:

Instead of having 3 seats, Tripoli gets one additional seat. That means that the Mikati Bloc will find it harder to run on the Mohafaza now that it has lost a Sunni MP there (The “proportional representation” North district has 4 MPs now instead of 5, making it hard for Mikati to get an extra MP using the M8 votes of the Mohafaza, while the FM will get an extra MP on the caza where they can easily win all the 4 seats of Tripoli because it’s under a majoritarian system)
Instead of having 5 seats, Baalbak-Hermel ends up with 4 seats (1 gets transferred to the governorate) meaning that Hezbollah will lose an extra MP that will be put in the governorate where he will be subject to the influence of all of the governorate’s voting where the Shias are 42% thus lessening the Shia influence on that extra seat.
Beirut: Instead of having a Beirut I of 5 MPs and a Beirut III of 2 MPs, the number of MPs becomes 4 for Beirut I that is up to 85% Christian and 4 to Beirut III that is 28% Christian. Meaning that the Christians lose the ability to elect en extra MP in Beirut I while also losing the ability to influence the election of 2 more MPs that were transferred from Beirut III to the Mohafaza (according to the previous LF law) where the Christians are 35%. That suits the FM by minimizing the Christian influence.
Also, there’s a remake of Beirut I. It loses Mdawar (the Armenian district) to Beirut II, meaning that the Armenian population, that supports M8, would not be able to help M8 win Beirut I anymore.
Instead of Having 3 MPs in the Caza and 2 in the Mohafaza for Kesserwan (like the previous LF law proposal), there are now 2 in the Caza and 3 in the Governorate. The LF has lost the 2 previous elections in Kesserwan. Minimizing the number of MPs on the Caza is a smart way from them to get a better result, so that they might win that extra MP in case they get better results in Northern Mount Lebanon.
And now the Best part, the Chouf and Southern Mount-Lebanon: Baabda that has no more than 18% of Druze votes gets removed from Southern Mount Lebanon and added to Northern Mount Lebanon. Also, the Chouf gets an extra MP, making them 4. That can only mean that Jumblat will be able to directly control 6 seats on the majoritarian system (4 from Chouf, 2 from Aley), but also to influence the election on the “Proportional Representation district” of Chouf-Aley (Southern Mount-Lebanon), where the Druze will form around 40%, now that it’s deprived from the Christian-Shia heavyweight of Baabda. 40% of 7 MPs is somewhere around 3 MPs for Jumblatt (that’s if he’s running alone), giving him a total of 9 MPs. Jumblatt will thus be (more or less) able to keep the same size of his bloc.
Northern Mount-Lebanon: Now that Baabda joined the others, the Shia vote will be somewhere around 15%. However, 2 of the 12 seats are Shia, meaning that 16% of the seats are Shia. There will be thus an overflow from the Christian votes toward the Shia seat, and the Christian influence (including the LF) would not be diminished in the PR district.
Hasbaya-Marjeyoun aren’t separated anymore, and there is only 1 MP on the Caza scale and not 2 like before. This is clealry intended to maximize the number of seats on the Mohafaza (South) scale, where M14 hs a bigger chance of getting MPs, knowing that the Shias are a majority in Marjeyoun-Hasbaya meaning that M8 will still win anything there because of the winner takes-all system. The Shia still are a majority in the South, but with proportional representation and a big number of seats, M14 will surely do better.

How Much Christian-elected seats?

On The winner-takes-all districts: Beirut I (4), Baabda (3), Metn (4), Kesserwan (2), Jbeil (1), Batroun (2), Bsharri (2), Koura (2), Zgharta (2), Jezzine (2), Zahle (5). A total of 29
On the Proportional Reresentation districts: North (4.4 = 40% of 11), Northern Mount Lebanon (8.68 = 72% of 12), Southern Mount Lebanon (2.6 = 37% of 7), Bekaa (3.36 = 28% of 12), South (1.65 = 15.6% of 11), Beirut (2.8= 35% of 8). A total of 23.49 seats

That means that the Christians, under that draft law, would elect 52.49 seats. Under the previous hybrid law draft, the Christians were able to elect 56. The Lebanese Forces had to please their allies somehow….

So Who Wins?

I’m going to consider that the Lebanese are reluctant to change, elect the same MPs again and again and apply the results of 2009 on the new Lebanese Forces law.

The Cazas

M14: Koura (2), Batroun (2), Bcharri (2), Meniyeh-Donieh (2), Tripoli (4), Akkar (3), Metn (1/4), Chouf (4), Aley (2), Saida (2),, Zahle (5), West Bekaa-Rashaya (3), Beirut (4,2,4). A total of 42/68 seats in the winner-takes-all districts for M14

M8: Zgharta (2), Metn (3/4), Jbeil (1), Kesserwan (2), Baabda (3), Jezzine (2),Tyre (2), Saida Villages(1), Nabatiyeh (2), Bint Jbeil (2), Marjeyoun (1), Baalbak-Hermel (5). A total of 26/68 seats in the Winner-takes-all districts for M8.

PS: For Beirut, I considered that the agreements of Doha splitting the Beirut 2 seats equally between M14 and M8 are now history. For the Governorate of Beirut (Proportional Representation), I use the same results as 2009.

The Governorates

I used the results of 2009, and made these tables:

PS: I don’t know what the minimum threshold (The minimum percentage that a list should have so that it can get one of its candidates elected) will be, so I made the assumption that it would be somewhere around 10%. That’s why you will notice the presence of independent MPs.

That means that the final outcome is 68 (26+42) MPs for M14, 55 MPs for M8 (29+26), and 5 Independent MPs.

As you can notice, we have an independent breach, but the results are clearly in favor of M14, even almost the same results than 2009 (70-58). A lot of things changed since 2009 and a number of alliances will probably change, but that’s approximatively how the results might look like.

With 9 seats for Jumblatt, and a difference of 70-58, the Bey of Mukhtara will still be Lebanon’s Kingmaker. That’s exactly why the Progressive Socialist Party gave its approval to this draft law.

Gerrymandering, Again.

Martyrdom and Abdul-Karim Khalil’s last words

Arabic Version of Abdul-Karim Khalil’s last words (Image found on this Facebook page)

Au nom de mes frères martyrs, écoutez-mois, fils de mon pays et de ma nation. Voici nos dernières paroles. Les Ottomans veulent étouffer la voix de la liberté dans nos poitrines. Ils veulent nous empêcher de parler, mais nous déclarons que nous sommes une nation qui veut son indépendance, une nation qui cherche à se débarrasser du joug Ottoman. Terre de la nation, conserve notre mémoire! Ciel de notre pays, porte à tout Libanais, à tout Syrien, à tout Arabe, le salut de ses martyrs! Dis leur que nous avons lutté pour l’indépendance, et que nous mourons pour l’indépendance.

English version (took from the Facebook page) “My dear fellow countrymen, the Turks want to suffocate our voice in our lungs. But we will ask all the nations of the world for our independence and freedom. My beloved country, remember always these eleven martyrs! O paradise of my country, carry our feelings of brotherly love to every Lebanese, to every Syrian, to every Arab, tell them of our tragic end and tell them: ‘For your freedom, we have lived and for your independence we are dying.'”

These were Abdul-Karim Khalil’s last words before he was hanged (He then kicked the step ladder himself, denying that honor to the hangman) by the Ottomans on the 21st of August 1915 because of his struggle for freedom.

There has always been a debate in Lebanon on what makes a man a martyr. I believe Abdul-Karim Khalil sums it up very well in this part of his speech: “O paradise of my country, carry our feelings of brotherly love to every Lebanese, to every Syrian, to every Arab, tell them of our tragic end and tell them: For your freedom we have lived and for your independence we are dying.”

Even though Abdul-Karim Khalil was not hanged on the 5th and 6th of May with most of the other martyrs, he did belong to the wave of victims that suffered under the Ottomans.

Starving one third of the population till death should not be forgotten. The oppression should not be forgotten. The martyrs of 1915 and 1916 should not be forgotten.

Martyrs’ day should not be forgotten.

Is Lebanon Turning Into A Military State?

Image from 2011 (Associated Press)

There were days when the director of the General Security wasn’t an officer. There were days when even the presence of a General as a democratically elected president would be criticized. These days are over.

For Lebanon’s president Michel Suleiman is a General. His predecessor Emile Lahoud was also a General. The interior minister Marwan Charbel is a General. The head of one of the biggest parliamentary blocs, Michel Aoun, is a General. The new interior minister is likely to be a General. A month ago, a General, Ashraf Rifi, the former head of the ISF, was on the verge of being a Prime Minister-Designate

When Tammam Salam was tasked to form a government, Foreign Policy had a great article on how the same families in Lebanon get to stay in power democratically while the rule of families is being toppled everywhere else in the Arab World. The Frangiehs, the Jumblatts, the Hariris, the Gemayels are few examples. Even when you think it’s not present, you quickly realize that Gebran Bassil is Michel Aoun’s son-in-law, that Marwan Hamade is Gebran Tueni’s uncle, and that Setrida Geagea is Samir Geagea’s wife

Though Lebanese tend to forget that quickly, political inheritance is not the only thing we have in common with the neighboring Arab countries. We also have ruling generals. True, the Arab spring was made to prevent Jamal Mubarak and Seif El Islam Gaddafi of inheriting power, but it was also Colonel Gaddafi and General Mubarak that were the targets. In the same way the Lebanese don’t view the election of the same families to the parliament as a wrong matter, they don’t view the presence of Generals in power as a bad thing.

It is also not possible to elect judges, Grade One civil servants, or their equivalents in all public institutions to the Presidency during their term or office or within two years following the date of their resignation and their effective cessation of service, or following retirement.

Article 49 in the constitution prohibits the commander-in-chief of the army of being a president (unless he’s elected two years after he resigns) for a reason. However the constitution was amended several times in Lebanon’s history to let Grade One civil servants serve as Presidents.

The problem of amending the constitution and letting a commander-in-chief of the army be a president is that one day, like all the countries in the world, we might have a coup – as unlikely as it might sound – and the General can pressure the members of the parliament to amend the constitution and elect him, making his rule look legitimate. If the amendment hadn’t been done several times before, the move would have made him an illegitimate ruler. But now that it’s done, each time he gets criticized for being elected under a constitutional amendment, his response would be: “It was done before. Are you suggesting that Fouad Chehab and Michel Suleiman were illegitimate rulers? They were democratically elected by the parliament, under a constitutional amendment. And you’re telling me that there’s an opposition? Do I need to remind you that the Lebanese Forces did not vote for Suleiman in 2008 and that Raymond Edde was a presidential candidate in 1958?”

But for a coup to succeed in Lebanon, with all the sectarianism and without splitting the army in two armies (or ten, or twenty), it would likely take three centuries. So the main problem of having generals in power isn’t primarily because of a possible coup, but rather because of the nature of the Lebanese system. I’ll make it clearer.

A and B are both represented in the parliament. A and B elect the president, have a say in everything else and can even veto some positions. A and B also have armed wings. On one sunny summer day, A and B clash. The army receives orders to stop the fighting between A and B. There are three possible scenarios:

1) If the officer slightly sides with A, he might get a favor from A. If he sides with B, he might get favors from B.

2) If he stands in the middle, stops the fighting, without actually hunting the armed men down, he gets praised by A and B.

3) If he stands in the middle, stops the fighting and hunts every armed man down, he gets vetoed by A and B.

When Fouad Chehab refused to follow Camille Chamoun’s orders to fight the revolution in 1958, it was scenario 2. When Michel Suleiman did not stick to the orders of the government on banning protests on the 14th of March 2005, it was scenario 2. Emile Lahoud, Michel Aoun and Ashraf Rifi are other examples of the scenario 1 (Who needs scenario 2 when – even if for a while – there’s an A that’s stronger than B?)

That’s why generals become politicians in Lebanon. They take sides, or stand in the middle, depending on the context. But do not be fooled, for there are two types of men standing in the middle: The man who stands between A and B, and the man who stands against A and B (While following the orders of course, that are to stop A and B from fighting)

The “Amn Bel Taradi – الامن بالتراضي”, or consensual security, the fact of stopping the fighting between A and B without actually disarming A and B and punishing them for the instability they are causing, is mainly due to the fact of having officers in power. As you can see, Scenario 3 is missing, not because it’s too good to be true, but because officers in Lebanon made it to top posts due to the scenarios 1 and 2. So why would an officer risk his career by going for scenario 3 while he can get easily rewarded and have all the glory he wants via scenarios 1 and 2? Even when he has the political approval from everyone to go for scenario 3, Scenario 2 for an officer stays the preferred scenario, because it doesn’t get him too much problems. The battles between Jabal Mohsen and Bab El Tabbaneh are a perfect example.

When A and B know that there will not be a response from the army, it’s always an escalation of fighting that follows. Scenario 2 usually goes like that:

1) stop a fight by standing in the middle.

2) But the fighting resumes, and it’s a more brutal battle, because the fighters know there is no punishment.

3) Stand in the middle again and stop the bigger fight.

4) Repeat step 2 and 3 several times. Eventually, it’ll be too big to control and it will be more than a small local battle.

It’s not the fault of the army, and I’m not saying the work some officers are doing in power is bad. Fouad Chehab delayed the civil war 17 years, and Michel Suleiman is probably doing the same thing. But when Generals are democratically given power, it’s for the purpose of keeping things under control. However what happens next is an instability due to the scenario 2 – الامن بالتراضي – that will eventually lead to a total loss of control.

In a nutshell, by bringing neutral generals to power, you think you are doing good, but the scenario 2 – and its consequence, consensual security – will begin, and in order to solve it, you bring more neutral generals to power making things even worse.

When Ahmad Al-Assir Calls For Jihad

Ahmad Al-Assir (The Daily Star/Hasan Shaaban)

Just when you thought the Syrian spillover couldn’t get worse, and that the events happening on the borders, the refugees crisis, the shelling of the Lebanese towns, the political quarrels and the unrest in Tripoli aren’t enough, salafi sheikh Ahmad Al-Assir and sheikh Salem Al Rifai issue a Fatwa for Jihad. It’s quite an important move, considered that Hezbollah is already deeply involved in the Syrian civil war, apparently protecting the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus and leading the battle for Al Qussair. But what is even more interesting is the timing of Assir’s move.

Assir is losing influence. There were times when Ahmad Al-Assir would appear on every television, literally every day. These days are over. The collapse of the Lebanese government that was supported by Hezbollah made Assir lose the attention he got over the past few months. A Sunni moderate coming from a traditional Beiruti family is Lebanon’s prime minister-designate, and he got nominated from all the 27 Sunni MPs. Assir can’t go out and say that Tammam Salam is Hezbollah’s candidate, and Future Movement are clearly making a comeback in Lebanese politics with the appointment of a member of their parliamentary bloc as a PM. Assir never had that important impact in Lebanese politics, but he was rising star that’s now fading away. He can’t draw the attention anymore, is seeing his demonstrations getting banned and can’t attack Hezbollah the same way he used to do, because the party isn’t leading the coalition anymore. All the Sunni parties – except him – will be probably represented in the government, further isolating Lebanese Salafis, and making his speeches look even more sectarian than they are. The ultimate solution becomes calling for Jihad, hoping that he can regain some of the popularity he lost when things calmed down in Lebanon by accusing Hezbollah of killing Sunnis in Syria and by mobilizing Lebanese.

The worst timing ever. Why? Because earlier yesterday, the Greek Orthodox and Syriac Orthodox Bishops of Aleppo were kidnapped. So it’s not a very smart move to scare the Lebanese Christians few months before the elections. Ahmad Al-Assir gave Hezbollah just what he wanted; not more, not less. By calling for Jihad in Syria the same day Bishops get abducted, Sunni Radicalism suddenly became the most important boogeyman for the Lebanese Christians, ultimately reinforcing Michel Aoun at a very critical moment: Governmental formation and electoral law negotiations.

It’s interesting though how Hezbollah and Salafis seem to be fighting each other in Syria. Looks more like a Lebanese spillover in Syria than a Syrian spillover in Lebanon…

Lebanon In The Valley Of Despair – Wikileaks And The Lebanese Civil War

“Lebanon in the valley of despair” is the name of a U.S. diplomatic cable dating from 1975. The best way to commemorate the civil war is by remembering its brutality and the failure of the peace negotiations. I hereby leave you with some parts of the leaked U.S. diplomatic cables of 1975-1976.

1975 March 6 – The Very Beginning

TENSIONS GENERATED THROUGHOUT LEBANON OVER PAST
WEEK BY CLASHES BETWEEN LEBANESE ARMY AND “ARMED
ELEMENTS” IN SIDON (REFTELS) HAD BEGUN TO LESSEN
PERCEPTIBLY LATE MAR 5, FOLLOWING COUNTRY-WIDE MANIFES-
ATIONS BY CITIZENS (MOSTLY CHRISTIANS BUT SOME SHI’A)
DEMONSTRATING IN SUPPORT OF ARMY AND GOL. DEMONSTRATIONS
WENT OFF MORE OR LESS PEACEFULLY, WITH ONLY ONE PERSON
REPORTED KILLED (ACCIDENTALLY BY STRAY BULLET).

(see full text here)

1975 September 26 – Dialogue

LEBANON HAS WAGERED MUCH ON A SINGLE CAST OF THE DICE WITH
THE FORMATION OF THE 20 MAN “COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL DIALOGUE”
(REFTEL). AN EXAMINATION OF PREVIOUS ROUNDS THIS YEAR WILL
SHOW THAT TEMPORARY OF A SIDE ISSUE WHICH HAD ASSUMED CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE IN THE COURSE OF THE FIGHTING. ROUND ONE WAS BROUGHT
TO VMA CLOSE BY GEMAYEL’S AGREEMENT TO TURN OVER FOR QUESTIONING
SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS ACCUSED OF COMPLICITY IN SO-CALLED AIN
RUMMANEH “MASSACRE” OF APRIL 14. ROUND TWO TAPERES OFF FOLLOWING
THE RESIGNATION OF THE MILITARY CABINET WHICH ASSUMED POWER
ONLY AFTER RPT AFTER THAT ROUND BEGAN; AND ROUND THREE ENDED
WITH NAMING OF KARAME CABINET. FOLLOWING SUCCESSION OF ABORTIVE
CEASEFIRE, LEBABESE, WITH ASSISTANCE OF SYRIANS, HAVE SETTLED
UPON DIALOGUE COMMITTEE AS DEVICE FOR HOPEFULLY BRINGING RELIEF
FROM STRIFE WHICH HAS BROUGH THIS COUNTRY AS NEAR TO NATIONAL
COLLAPSE AS ANY DEVELOPMENT IN ITS TROUBLED HISTORY.

(see full text here)

1975 November 1 – Clashes

AT TIME OF DRAFTING THIS CABLE, CLASHES IN MAIN
HOTEL DISTRICT ADJACENT TO EMBASSY CONTINUE. SMALL ARMS FIRE
IS HEARD, PUNCTUATED OCCASIONALLY BY EXPLOSIONS. ELSEWHERE
IN CITY, SECURITY SITUATION
DETERIORATED AFTERNOON OCTOBER 31 AND HEAVY FIGHTING
WAS REPORTED OVERNIGHT. IN ADDITION TO HOTEL
DISTRICT, SHIA/AIN RUMANNEH/FURN ASH SHURBAH
COMPLEX BROKE DOWN BEGINNING APPROX 1300 HOURS
YESTERDAY. CLASHES THERE OVERNIGHT WERE REPORTEDLY
AS BAD AS ANY PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED AND CASUALTIES
IN THAT SECTOR ALONE WERE ALLEGED TO BE BETWEEN 40
AND 100 DEAD. AS OF MID-MORNING TODAY, ONLY MACHINE
GUN EXCHANGES WERE REPORTED BETWEEN SHIAH AND AIN
RUMMANEH, BUT WE HAVE NO MORE RECENT INFORMATION.
EXCHANGES OF UNDETERMINED FEROCITY WERE EXPERIENCED
OVERNIGHT ALONG CENTRAL AXIS PARALLELING BESHARA
AL-KHOURY STREET (I.E., SODOCE, RAS AN NABEH, NASRA,
WESTERN ASHRAFIYAH, ETC.); BETWEEN QARANTIANA AND
NORTHERN ASHRAFIYAH; AND BETWEEN SUBURBS OF HADATH AND LAYLAKI.

IN SUMMARY, DESPITE PERSISTING EFFORTS
TO IMPOSE A CEASE-FIRE, WE NOW BACK TO SQUARE MINUS
ONE ON SECURITY SCENE.

(see full text here)

1975 November 6 – Another Day Of Calm

1. SUMMARY: LIKE A BOXER PUNCH-DRUNK FROM FOUR GRUELING
ROUNDS OF PUNISHMENT, BKEIRUT CONTINUES NOV 6 TO RISE FROM THE
CANVAS; THE LEGS ARE WOBBLY, THE VISION BLURRED. THERE ARE
RISING HOPES BUT AS YET LITTLE CONFIDENCE, THAT THE CITY WILL
NOT HAVE TO ANSWER THE BELL FOR ROUND 5. END SUMMARY.

2. BEIRUT AND MOST OF LEBANON ENJOYING ANOTHER DAY OF CALM
NOV6, WITH ONLY RARE BURSTS OF MACHINEGUN FIRE TO MAR THE
FAMILIAR CIVILIAN NOISE POLLUTION OF HAMRA AND OTHER REAWAKEN-
ING COMMERCIAL DISTRICTS. TWO ROCKETS WERE FIRED INTO
ASHRAFIYEH OVERNIGHT, BUT GENERAL ABSENCE OF BACKGROUND
EXPLOSIONS ALMOST EERIE. DESPITE CALM, LEBANESE VENTURING
OUT IN FALL FINERY WEAR A WARY EXPRESSION AND COMPETENT
OBSERVERS ARE NOT RPT NOT PREPARED TO DECLARE PEACE IN OUR
TIME. SOME, IN FACT, ARE PREDICITING A RETURN TO ARMS AS EARLY
AS NEXT MONDAY. TRIPOLI REPORTEDLY IS TENSE FOLLOWING DISCO-
VERY OF UNIDENTIFIED BODY, BUT WAVE OF KIDNAPPING IN BEIRUT IS
APPARENTLY FINISHED AS OF THIS REPORT.

(see full text here)

1975 December 18 – Dialogue Is Failing

SAEB SALAM AND KAMAL JUMBLATT SEPARATELY ISSUED CALLS
FOR THE RESIGNATION OF FRANGIE AND MININT CHAMOUN, THOUGH
IT MUST BE SOURCE OF EMBARRASSMENT TO TWO MEN OF SUCH
DIFFERENT TEMPERAMENT AND PHILOSOPHY THAT THEY AGREE ON
THIS QUESTION.

(see full text here)

1976 January 14 – The Battle For Beirut Continues

SUMMARY: THE BATTLE OF BEIRUT AND SUBURBS CONTINUES.
TRIPOLI AND ZAHLE AREAS ALSO REPORTED TO BE HOT.
MARONITE MEETING JAN 13 RESULTED IN HARD POSITION ON ISSUE
OF PALESTINIAN PRESENCE BUT A HINT OF FLEXIBILITY OF INTERNAL
POLITICAL REFORMS. PRES FRANGIE IS CONTINUING CONSULTA-
TIONS AMONG CHRISTIAN LEADERS PRIOR TO MEETING WITH
SYRIAN PRES ASAD. THIS MEETING IS STILL PROJECTED FOR
JAN 17. END SUMMARY

2. EXCEPT FOR BRIEF BREATHING SPELL FOR THE BATTLE OF BEIRUT
AND SUBURBS HAS CONTINUED. FIGHTING IN AND AROUND TEL
ZAATAR, THE NORTHERN BRIDGES OVER BEIRUT RIVER, AND THE
HOTEL DISTRICT FIGURES MOST PROMINENTLY. TEL ZAATAR AND
JISR EL PACHA APPEAR TO BE HOLDING OUT WITH LITTLE SIGN THAT
PHALANGISTS HAVE MADE MUCH PROGRESS IN THEIR AREAS. ONE

REPORT STATES THAT JISR EL PACHA HAS BEEN EVACUATED.THIS
IS NOT CONFIRMED BUT PHALANGISTS MAY HAVE TIGHTENED THEIR
HOLD ON THE CAMP. NUMBEROUS ATTEMPTS BY PALESTINIANS
AND THEIR ALLIES TO FORCE THEIR WAY FROM CHIAH PAST HAZMIEH
HAVE FAILED SO FAR, BUT HAVE SERVED TO KEEP THE POT BOILING
FROM FURN EL CHEBBAK THROUGH HADATH-LEIGLCPAM PHALANGISTS
PERSIST IN THEIR EFFORTS TO BRING THE WAR HOME TO TARIK
JADIDE AND MAZRAA BY SHELLING, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN A
GROWING NUMBER OF CASUALTIES.

(see full text here)

1976 April 4 – Syria’s Asad becomes a Crusader

IF I GOT NOTHING ELSE FROM MY MEETING WITH FRANGIE,
CHAMOUN AND GEMAYEL, IT IS THEIR CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL
AND UNMISTAKEABLE BELIEF THAT THEIR PRINCIPAL HOPE FOR
SAVING CHRISTIAN NECKS IS SYRIA.THEY SOUNDED LIKE
ASAD IS THE LATEST INCARNATION OF THE CRUSADERS.

(see full text here)

Some events are very similar to what happened in the past few months:

“TRIPOLI REPORTEDLY IS TENSE”, “LEBANESE HAVE SETTLED UPON DIALOGUE COMMITTEE”, “BRING THE WAR TO TARIK
JADIDE”, “WAVE OF KIDNAPPING IN BEIRUT IS APPARENTLY FINISHED AS OF THIS REPORT”.

Ironically, a wave of kidnapping is also apparently finished as of this post.

Sad.