Lebanese Politics

Aoun-Geagea: Is It Truly a Declaration of Intent?

FPM leader Michel Aoun and LF leader Samir Geagea speak during a joint press conference in Rabieh, Tuesday, June 2, 2015. (The Daily Star/Stringer)

“A declaration of intent” (اعلان النوايا), they called it. Because you know, as the Lebanese say, “المهم النية”.

Surprise. For the first time since 2005, Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea met. Live. Face to face. Without having to shoot at one another like the good old days of the late eighties.

But if you have been following Lebanese politics for the past 9 months, the meeting between the leaders of the two main Christian parties shouldn’t be surprising. Both parties were having talks since Hezbollah and Mustaqbal started their dialogue earlier this year (Aoun even tasted Geagea’s truffles in January!), the talks were making good progess in April, and the declaration of intent was actually finished a month ago. In fact, if you remember correctly, the fear of an FPM-LF rapprochement led the Kataeb, Michel Sleiman, and other minor Christian politicians to unite under one front in March. So no, it should not be that surprising to see Kanaan and Riachi telling us that the FPM and the LF are intending to continue the dialogue and work within the constitution in order to protect their interests.

What is weird here is the timing of the declaration. When they finished it last month without directly announcing it, it was assumed that both parties were waiting for M8 and M14 to agree on the major issues such as the presidential elections. It’s still too soon to be sure why that specific timing was chosen, but it seems right now that Geagea was trying to sabotage a potential rumored Aoun-Hariri deal on the way: letting Aoun name the commander of the army in exchange of conceding to some of Mustaqbal’s terms such as M8 lifting its veto on some centrist presidential candidates. Only yesterday, I was talking about how important it is for Aoun and the FPM that Roukoz becomes commander of the army. If you read the declaration, you’ll find out that it revolves around one main idea: protecting the Christian interests, and at their core, the election of a strong president (look for the sentence in bold in the original text). And in case you still don’t know what a “strong president” means after 12 months of presidential vacancy, let me enlighten you: Strong = Aoun and /or Geagea.

Aoun looked like the bigger party yesterday, since it was Geagea the one who visited him in Rabieh, but don’t be fooled by the formalities, since in the end, the leader of the Lebanese Forces succeeded in bringing back the “strong president” rhetoric to life, thus pushing Aoun away from the idea of a consensual president and a Roukouz deal with the Mustaqbal and the PSP. Yesterday, it wasn’t a new alliance between the LF and the FPM that was starting. It was the consensual candidate – Roukoz deal that was being put off the table, At least for now.

Anyway, here’s the original text of the declaration (directly from the source), if you would like to waste five minutes of your times on a text that could be summed up with the sentence “We agree to find an agreement”

لما كان الحوار هو الوسيلة الفضلى لتبادل الآراء وتفاعلها من اجل صياغة رؤية مشتركة حول القضايا والمواضيع ذات الاهتمام المتبادل على جميع الصعد السياسية والاقتصادية والادارية والاجتماعية،

ولما كان التيار الوطني الحر والقوات اللبنانية قد عقدا أكثر من لقاء وبحثا أسس التفاهم في ما بينهما، فوجدا أن التنافس السياسي أمر مشروع وواجب لارساء قواعد الديمقراطية وبلورتها في نظام للحكم.

ولما كان حزبا التيار الوطني الحر والقوات اللبنانية قد أجريا مراجعة للعلاقة التي سادت بينهما خلال أكثر من ربع قرن وذلك من أجل تنقية الذاكرة من مناخات الخصومة السياسية التي طبعت تلك العلاقة، والتطلع بالتالي نحو مستقبل يسوده التنافس السياسي الشريف و/أو التعاون السياسي.
– التزام نهج الحوار والتخاطب السياسي البناء والسعي الدائم للتوافق على ثوابت وقواسم مشتركة
– تأكيد الايمان بلبنان كوطن نهائي سيد حر مستقل وبصيغة العيش المشترك وبضرورة التمسك بالمبادئ الواردة في مقدمة الدستور بصفتها مبادئ تأسيسية ثابتة
– اعتماد المبادئ السيادية في مقاربة المواضيع التي هي على ارتباط وثيق بالقضايا الاقليمية والدولية على أن تؤخذ في الاعتبار امكانات الدولة اللبنانية والمعادلات الاقليمية والدولية
– الالتزام بمرتكزات وثيقة الوفاق الوطني التي اقرّت في الطائف والتعهد باحترام أحكام الدستور كافة دون انتقائية وبعيداً عن الاعتبارات السياسية والابتعاد عن كل ما من شأنه التلاعب بأحكام الدستور أو اساءة تفسيره
– التأكيد على أن وثيقة الوفاق الوطني قد طبقت منذ اقرارها وخلال عهد الوصاية وحتى اليوم بشكل معتور مما يوجب تصويب المسار من خلال العودة إلى مرتكزات الميثاق الوطني واحكام الدستور المتعلقة بالمناصفة الفعلية وصحة التمثيل النيابي الفعال والشراكة الصحيحة بين مكونات المجتمع اللبناني كافة بما يحفظ قواعد العيش المشترك وترجمة ذلك في قانون انتخاب يؤمن القواعد المشار اليها اعلاه وفي انتخاب رئيس للجمهورية قوي ومقبول في بيئته وقادر على طمأنة المكونات الأخرى والايفاء بقسمه

وبالتزامات الرئاسة بما يؤمن الشراكة الفعلية الميثاقية والمصلحة الوطنية العليا
– العمل على تعزيز مؤسسات الدولة وتشجيع ثقافة الاحتكام الى القانون والمؤسسات الشرعية لحلّ أي خلاف أو اشكال طارئ وعدم اللجوء إلى السلاح والعنف مهما تكن الهواجس والاحتقانات
– دعم الجيش على الصعيدين المعنوي والمادي بصفته المؤسسة الضامنة للسيادة والأمن القومي وتكريس الجهد اللازم لتمكينه وسائر القوى الأمنية الشرعية من التعامل مع كل الحالات الأمنية على الأراضي اللبنانية كافة بهدف بسط سلطة الدولة وحدها على كامل الأراضي اللبنانية
– ضرورة التزام سياسة خارجية مستقلة بما يضمن مصلحة لبنان ويحترم القانون الدولي وذلك بنسج علاقات تعاون وصداقة مع جميع الدول ولا سيما العربية منها مما يحصن الوضع الداخلي اللبناني سياسياً وأمنياً ويساعد على استقرار الأوضاع وكذلك اعتبار اسرائيل دولة عدوة والتمسك بحق الفلسطينيين بالعودة إلى أرضهم ورفض التوطين واعتماد حل الدولتين ومبادرة بيروت 2002
– الحرص على ضبط الأوضاع على طول الحدود اللبنانية السورية بالاتجاهين وعدم السماح باقامة منطقة عازلة في لبنان وباستعمال لبنان مقرا او منطلقا لتهريب السلاح والمسلحين ويبقى الحق في التضامن الانساني والتعبير السياسي والاعلامي مكفولا تحت سقف الدستور والقانون والمصلحة الوطنية العليا
– احترام قرارات الشرعية الدولية كافة والالتزام بمواثيق الامم المتحدة وجامعة الدول العربية
– العمل على تنفيذ القرارات السابقة التي تم الاتفاق عليها في طاولة الحوار الوطني
– ايجاد حل لمشكلة النزوح السوري والمتعاظمة والتي أصبحت بمثابة قنبلة موقوتة أمنيا واقتصاديا وسياسيا واجتماعيا لا سيما مع تفاقمها مع مشكلة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين وذلك عن طريق تأمين عودة النازحين إلى المناطق الآمنة داخل الأراضي السورية
– ضرورة اقرار قانون جديد للانتخابات يراعي المناصفة الفعلية وصحة التمثيل بما يحفظ قواعد العيش المشترك ويشكل المدخل الأساسي لاعادة التوازن إلى مءسسات الدولة
– الالتزام بوثيقة الوفاق الوطني لجهة اعتماد اللامركزية الإدارية والمالية الموسعة ونقل قسم كبير من صلاحيات الادارة المركزية ولا سيما الانمائية منها إلى سلطات لامركزية منتخبة وفقاً للأصول وتأمين الايرادات الذاتية اللازمة لذلك
– الالتزام بأحكام الدستور المتعلقة بالمالية العامة وبأحكام قانون المحاسبة العمومية التي تحدد موازنة الدولة وشموليتها وأصول ومهل اعدادها وتقديمها إلى المجلس النيابي وكذلك اعداد الحسابات المالية وتدقيقها وتصديقها وفقاً للأصول وكذلك الالتزام بضرورة تحديد سقف للاقتراض لا يمكن تجاوزه الا باجازة جديدة من المجلس النيابي وبضرورة ترشيد الانفاق والحد من الهدر والانفاق غير المجدي ومحاربة الفساد المستشري وإعمال قانون الاثراء غير المشروع وانشاء المحكمة الخاصة بالجرائم المالية
– التأكيد على التمسك بالمبادئ الكيانية المؤسسة للوطن اللبناني والتي هي سبب وجوده وجوهر رسالته في التسامح والتنوع والتعايش الفريد القائم على المشاركة الكاملة في الحكم والعمل المشترك من اجل اقرار القوانين المحققة لذلك وفي طليعتها قانون استعادة الجنسية وقانون تملك الأجانب كما العمل من أجل الحؤول دون القيام بأي اجراءات تخالف المبادئ المنبثقة من الصيغة اللبنانية ومن الميثاق الوطني.

وإذ يعتبر الطرفان أن اعلان النوايا هذا، يهدف إلى وضع المبادء الديمقراطية ومعاييرها كأساس لتنظيم علاقتهما، يؤكدان على ابقاء المبادئ الدستورية والميثاقية فوق سقف التنافس السياسي، كما يؤكدان على ارادتهما ورغبتهما بالعمل المشترك والتواصل في جميع المجالات والمواقع الممكنة لتنفيذ التزاماتهما المنوه عنها اعلاه ويعتزمان العمل على تفعيل انتاجية اتفاقاتهما حيث يتفقان، والتنافس من دون خصام حيث يختلفان، كما يتعهدان بالتواصل الدائم والتباحث المستمر للتفاهم على كافة المواضيع ذات الشأن العام والوطني.

375 days since the 25th of May. 211 days since the 5th of November.

The War for Shamel Roukoz

Lebanon’s next commander of the army?

This is the 12th post in a series of monthly posts covering the presidential elections. This post is about the month of May 2015.

It has been a busy month in Lebanese politics. Last time I wrote something, Lebanese politicians were still arguing about Yemen. In May however, it was the name of the next commander of the army that kept everyone busy.

Moukhtasar Moufid

In the very first days, the remnants of the Mustaqbal-Hezbollah April political clash were still there: Hezbollah’s bloc accused the Future Movement of violating Taef. At the same time, the FPM and the LF were finishing up their declaration of intent, and were agreeing to boycott the legislative session until some of their demands were met, like prioritizing the election of the president, and working on the electoral law (Here’s a reminder of the irony here, since the FPM are the ones who are boycotting the presidential elections). But as things were finally calming down on the Muslim front between Hezbollah and the FM, signs of a major battle between Hezbollah and Syrian militants near the northeastern border were looming. And to make things even more complicated, the debate on the security appointments started: The ISF chief retires on the 5th of June, and the army commander on the 23rd of September.

In case you wondered, that’s what the post will be mainly about – since I believe we’ve all had enough of the routine weekly fights between M8 and M14.

Deal or No Deal

As I said in November, the presidential elections are not about the president. In fact, no one cares about the president. Not even Lebanon cares. The proof? we have been without a president for more than a year. And for more than a year, the country has perfectly adapted to a life with no head of state. The cabinet meets regularly, the parliament doesn’t meet regularly and life goes on. So basically, nothing changed. The presidential elections are more about a deal than about a glorified chair. The presidential elections are about the electoral law, the security appointments, the formation of the next cabinet, the position vis-à-vis the Syrian war, and many more details. And to be more precise here, the president is not even part of the presidential elections deal. In fact, he’s the guy who is supposed to oversee its enforcement.

And for 12 months, there has been no sight of any attempt of a deal. However, the terms of the security officials are due to end soon, and this could be an occasion for our politicians to start drafting a package they could agree on.

This could also be the moment where we become without a president, a commander of the army, elections, and plunge into chaos, emptiness and darkness.

*plays classical music*

Anyway, there’s an opportunity to move forward here, and of course, the maneuvering has already begun.

The War for Shamel Roukoz

One of the most important parts of the deal is the name of the next commander of the army. Lebanon is overwhelmed by refugees, the Islamic State is at our gates and the Syrian spillover is not likely to stop anytime soon. That makes the commander of the army a key player in the next couple of years. The country’s stability is depending on the army, now more than ever. For Michel Aoun, March 8’s presidential candidate, the name of the next of the next General in charge of the LAF matters even more: His son-in-law, Shamel Roukoz, currently heads the army’s special forces (The Maghawir) and could fit well as a commander of the army. Michel Aoun is likely to retire really soon (Here’s a reminder that Aoun is currently 80 years old), and unless them FPM has someone with influence in a top post, the future of the party will be in Jeopardy when the transition comes. The FPM needs someone to follow like Aoun, and Roukoz seems the man to fulfill the legacy. Once Roukoz becomes commander, he will likely be the FPM’s potential candidate for the presidency – while maintaining a consensual image. That would mean that if the FPM plays its cards well in the next general elections and Roukoz succeeds as commander, the FPM could be looking in 2021 at a party whose Roukoz is leading its men in the executive power as president, and whose Bassil is leading its MPs in parliament, while Aoun would remain the “Godfather of the party”. Last week, Michel Aoun was asking for the election of the president via direct elections (That wasn’t the first time he proposed the idea) while at the same time promising that he will not allow that the same officers (in other words, Kahwagi) stay in charge. This aggressive maneuvering is not because Aoun wants to weaken his main presidential rival, but rather because he knows – like probably everyone else in the FPM – that the future of the FPM depends on Roukoz’s appointment as commander. Once he becomes commander of the army and gets the right political backing, he would be in a position to be as influent as his father-in-law and ultimately succeed him as the party’s leader and idol. Let’s face it, he’s far, far more popular than Bassil.

The FM and the PSP realize how badly their Christian rivals want the post, and are playing it smart. Instead of vetoing the appointment, they’re outmaneuvering Aoun by accepting the nomination (Here’s a link of Hariri saying yes to Roukoz, and another link of Jumblatt saying yes to Roukoz), before probably requiring some concessions from the FPM: (1) Someone not named Michel Aoun as president, (2) a gentler electoral law towards the FM and PSP’s interests, and (3) Hezbollah agreeing to some of their terms.

Le Piège

But that’s not all of it. Giving Roukoz the green light comes at a price: The FM insist on naming Roukoz commander after the presidential elections, making it a difficult task for Aoun to accept that deal: What if the next president doesn’t want Roukoz to lead the army? (after all, the president is according to the Constitution the “Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces” and should have a say in the nomination of the commander). What if things don’t work out, and the FPM ends up losing both the presidency and the army? It’s a risky prospect for Aoun. Yet the main problem for the FPM isn’t about naming the new commander before or after the presidential elections. It’s about the context of the nomination. There is something big about to start in Arsal, we just don’t know when it will happen. March 14 are calling for the army to exclusively take charge of things in the northeastern regions , and it’s not only because they want Hezbollah out of the equation. In case you have noticed, the army – although having clashed with the militants there last August – is slowly dissociating itself from the upcoming battle and the outgoing skirmishes and tensions. And that’s for three main reasons: (1) It would probably lead to the death of all the military hostages, only making things worse for the army and its command, (2) it would put the Lebanese army at the heart of the Syrian conflict, and most importantly, (3) it would be the political deathbed of any commander of the army aspiring to become president. One should read the FM’s statements in depth: They accept Roukoz as a commander of the army, while at the same time asking for the army to exclusively be in charge of defending Arsal’s jroud. For the FPM, that means two things: That Kahwagi, who will no longer be commander of the army, will slowly lose momentum as a presidential candidate *Michel Aoun smiles*, while at the the same time Shamel Roukoz will have to (1) clash with the militants in Arsal – bringing him in direct confrontation with the Sunnis – and (2) contain Hezbollah a couple of Kilometers next to one of their core centers of influence (Baalbak). Not to mention how much the population will be angry when 30 hostages from all over the republic get slaughtered by the militants once the army tries to take control of the situation near Arsal.

For the FPM, appointing Roukoz as commander seems like one of the two steps needed to secure the presidential elections of 2021 (since the commander of the army is usually the candidat-favori). For the FM however, appointing Roukoz seems like the easiest way to try to sow discontent between the FPM and Hezbollah, and between a possibly consensual candidate and the Sunni electorate.

*Michel Aoun stops smiling*

374 days since the 25th of May. 210 days since the 5th of November.

The WikiLebanon Files (Part V): Mikati Called Hezbollah a Tumor Needing Removal in 2008

In the past month, there has been a lot of talk in Lebanon about what Hezbollah calls “The Shias of the U.S. Embassy” (شيعة السفارة), an expression taken from an Al-Akhbar article that exposed some WikiLeaks cables where anti-Hezbollah Shia were quoted cooperating with the embassy in order to undermine the main Shia party. Anyway, and since it’s apparently that time of the year when people start mentioning anti-Hezbollah officials chatting with the ambassador, here’s an anti-Hezbollah Najib Mikati calling Hezbollah a tumor needing removal, 7 months after the 7th of May events, 7 months before the 2009 general elections, and 3 years before Hezbollah chose him to replace Hariri as a Prime Minister.

Enjoy the irony of Lebanese politics.

LEBANON: WITH DAS HALE, MIKATI CALLS HIZBALLAH A “TUMOR” NEEDING REMOVAL
Date: 2008 December 19, 15:08 (Friday)	Canonical ID: 08BEIRUT1773_a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: National Security Council \| North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) \|Secretary of Defense \| Secretary of State \|The League of Arab States \| U.S. Mission to European Union (formerly EC) (Brussels) \| United Nations (New York) \|United States Central Command

(b) and (d). SUMMARY

——-

1. (C) Former Prime Minister Najib Mikati told visiting NEA DAS Hale and the Ambassador that Sunni leader Saad Hariri, with whom Mikati acknowledged seeking an electoral alliance, would win the Tripoli district in Lebanon’s 2009 parliamentary elections. Mikati said he would refuse the position of prime minister absent backing of the Sunni population and acknowledged that Hariri would likely be Lebanon’s next prime minister. On President Sleiman, Mikati expressed concern that the LAF and the Maronite Patriarch — traditional stalwarts of support for the president — were not 100 percent behind Sleiman. DAS Hale emphasized the need to support Sleiman — who has proven himself independent-minded and supportive of UNSCR 1701 and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon — despite imperfect conditions.

2. (C) Describing Hizballah several times during the December 18 meeting as a “tumor,” Mikati said the group’s mini-state must be removed in order to preserve Lebanon. He noted that diplomatic relations with Syria were purely “cosmetic” but argued better relations with Lebanon’s neighbor provided the GOL space to counter Hizballah. Hale agreed that relations between the two sovereign neighbors was important, but must be based on mutual respect and non-interference. Mikati opined that Hizballah’s ultimate goal in Lebanon was to create an Iranian military base on the Mediterranean from which Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic revolution could be carried to the west. Mikati called Russia’s recently-announced gift of MIG-29 fighter planes “strange.” End summary.

“BLOOD OF HARIRI” STILL IN TRIPOLI

———————–

3. (C) In a December 18 meeting with visiting NEA DAS David Hale and the Ambassador, accompanied by NEA/ELA Desk Officer Matthew Irwin and Econoff, former Prime Minister Najib Mikati said he expected the 2009 parliamentary elections to be tough only in certain areas, specifically the Metn, west Bekaa, and Zahle. Akkar and Mina would go entirely to Hariri, Mikati assessed. He acknowledged that “because I exist,” there will be a fight in Tripoli. However, Mikati — who described himself as not a “man of fighting” — said “the blood of (assassinated former Prime Minister Rafiq) Hariri still exists” in Tripoli and Saad Hariri would take the electoral district. DAS Hale noted that Lebanon’s independence was a priority for the U.S.

4. (C) Mikati expected 70 percent of the Tripoli population would back Hariri; the other 30 percent Mikati described as those whose votes are for sale. While admitting he had no desire for a slot for himself on the Hariri list, Mikati said he was trying to join forces with Hariri. Mikati said he could not go against the popular sentiment in the north favoring Hariri. On northern Lebanon’s other major Sunni politicians, Mikati said he had heard Minister of Economy and Trade Mohammed Safadi was trying to build bridges to former Prime Minister Omar Karami.

NO PM POST WITHOUT SUNNI BACKING

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5. (C) On post-election cabinet scenarios, Mikati assessed that Prime Minister Fouad Siniora was “expired.” Describing Siniora as a friend whom he respects, Mikati, nonetheless, said Siniora should take a break from the position. Mikati tallied a checklist to determine Hariri’s potential as prime minister. He assessed Hariri wanted the slot but wondered whether Saudi Arabia wanted Hariri in the post. Mikati offered a hesitant yes to his own rhetorical question on Hariri’s capabilities for the position. The job was challenging; the person chosen would need to build the state

BEIRUT 00001773 002 OF 003

again, Mikati said. According to Mikati, Hariri is the most likely candidate for prime minister after the 2009 elections.

6. (C) Responding to a question about the prime minister post in the event of a March 8 victory, Mikati said he would refuse the position under the circumstances because he would not be representing the Sunni population. Citing the unsuccessful governments of Salim Hoss and Omar Karami, Mikati said becoming prime minister without the full support of the Sunni community would always result in failure. Mikati said he was “not ready to fail.” He mentioned former Prime Minister Abdul-Rahim Mrad as a potential PM in a March 8-dominated government. DAS Hale acknowledged the need for Sunni backing of any prime minister — who is the highest Sunni representative in government — and stressed the importance of avoiding candidates such as Mrad in the post.

HESITATION ON SLEIMAN

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7. (C) Describing President Michel Sleiman as quiet and unchallenging, Mikati said he had not yet seen in Lebanon the results of Sleiman’s efforts, domestically or from his many trips abroad. However, Mikati assessed Sleiman was trying to demonstrate his wisdom and judgment before serving as arbitrator, the traditional role of Lebanon’s presidents. According to Mikati, once Sleiman is arbitrator, he can govern. Nonetheless, Mikati described as “worrisome” a December 17 conversation with Sleiman in which the President said his job was easier than what he had expected. Mikati told DAS Hale and the Ambassador he had counseled Sleiman to create strong state institutions to counter Hizballah’s mini-state.

8. (C) The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Maronite Patriarch, traditional strongholds of presidential support, are not stalwartly pro-Sleiman, according to Mikati. He described the LAF as polarized toward March 8 with most officers supporting Hizballah and opposition Christian leader Michel Aoun. Mikati described Sleiman as unsure he had the LAF’s full support. Fear of fracturing the army had probably also prevented then LAF Commander Sleiman from taking any drastic decision between 2005 and 2008, Mikati said.

9. (C) On the traditional buttress of support for the president from the Patriarch, Mikati ceded that Sfeir was “not in love with Sleiman.” DAS Hale opined, however, that despite these concerns President Sleiman seemed to recognize he had more room for maneuvering than his predecessor. Sleiman had demonstrated support for Lebanon’s independence, adherence to UNSCR 1701, and progress on the Hariri tribunal, DAS Hale said. Despite his operating in an imperfect situation, President Sleiman still deserved support.

HIZBALLAH: A “TUMOR” IN THE STATE ———————–

10. (C) Mikati, speaking as a “statesman,” argued Lebanon could not survive with a Hizballah mini-state. Regardless of his personal views on the group, Mikati said he was expecting Hizballah to bring Lebanon to a “sad ending.” He assessed that Hizballah was just like a tumor that, whether benign or malignant, must be removed. While acknowledging weakening the group would take time, DAS Hale agreed that a non-state entity with the power of creating war and peace in Lebanon was tremendously dangerous. He supported enacting multiple policies and employing multiple tools to confront the group and to make Hizballah’s backers see more liabilities in their support than assets. Continuation of the National Dialogue would also help counter Hizballah.

11. (C) On Hizballah’s goals in Lebanon, Mikati assessed Iran was using the group to create a military base on the Mediterranean. Ayatollah Khomeini’s goal to export the Islamic revolution to the west required a launching point, which, according to Mikati, is Lebanon. This goal will take time but Hizballah is patient, he said. DAS Hale told Mikati that peace with Israel was the most direct way to counter

BEIRUT 00001773 003 OF 003

such intentions. Mikati agreed that peace with Israel would be a “happy ending,” but questioned whether Syria would make an agreement without Iranian permission.

12. (C) Mikati expressed doubt that upcoming parliamentary elections, regardless of a March 14 or opposition victory, would change Lebanon’s tumorous “reality.” DAS Hale stressed, however, that a Hizballah-dominated government would significantly change the country’s internal situation and potentially the U.S. stance toward the GOL. DAS Hale emphasized preservation of a pro-independence cabinet, even if not all the ministers are March 14.

“NEUTRALIZE” SYRIA THROUGH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

—————————

13. (C) Mikati called diplomatic relations with Syria “cosmetic,” but important. He emphasized the need to keep Lebanon’s interests a priority, but assessed that “neutralizing” the Syrian track made completing work simpler in Lebanon. While acknowledging the need for good state-to-state relations between the neighbors, DAS Hale said Syria’s faction-based support of Lebanese politicians was unacceptable. Noting the visits of Lebanon’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Interior, and LAF Commander, and the upcoming visit of Minister of Defense Elias Murr, Mikati assessed the Syrians had chosen the particular “island” of coordination they sought in Lebanon. Mikati argued that neutralizing Syria would enable the GOL to “gain time” on Hizballah.

CONCERNED ABOUT GOL DEBT

————————-

14. (C) Responding to DAS Hale’s inquiry about the state of the Lebanese economy, Mikati said that, looking at loans from commercial banks, the Lebanese economy was doing well. However, Mikati expressed concern about government debt –projected to reach $9.5 billion next year — held in commercial banks. He argued some of the short-term government loans should be negotiated to long-term loans. Additionally, a shortage of transfers from abroad could cause liquidity problems in Lebanon. The transfer of dollars into Lebanese pounds — which yield much higher interest rates — would also reduce bank liquidity. However, Mikati expressed confidence in Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh and his handling of the issues.

A “STRANGE” GIFT FROM THE RUSSIANS

———————————–

15. (C) Talking with the Ambassador before DAS Hale’s arrival, Mikati described the Russian gift of MIG-29 fighter planes — which received extensive local media coverage in recent days — as “strange.” He questioned whether Defense Minister Murr asked specifically for the planes or if the Russians had chosen independently to offer them. Mikati said the planes would be “impossible” to maintain and small helicopters would have been more useful for the LAF.

16. (C) Comment: Mikati clearly was presenting himself for our benefit as a foe of Hizballah, as he is looking forward to potential opportunities to return to the Prime Ministry. End comment.

17. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this cable.

SISON

Eleven Months of Vacuum

Lebanese children hold placards and a giant Yemeni flag during a demonstration organized by Hezbollah, in front the United Nations headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, Sunday, April 5, 2015. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)

Ten years ago, the Syrian army was withdrawing from Lebanon. In April 2005, “Syria was out”. But the truth is, Syria was never out. Syria was everywhere. Syria is everywhere. For a brief moment, it seemed as if the politics of Syria and Lebanon would be at last separated from one another. But we were wrong. In the seven years that followed, the political coalitions in Lebanon were built on nothing but their stance regarding Syria, and for the 3 years after that, Lebanese politics became about the Syrian Civil War. The government will be formed when things in Syria settle down, they said. The president will be elected when things in Syria settle down, they said. Even the parliamentary elections would be held when things in Syria settle down, they said. And that last thing, it was said twice. Lebanese politics became a part of the Syrian Civil War. The Syrian Civil War became part of Lebanese politics.

But then came April 2015. The rival coalitions were not arguing about Syria anymore. At least not as much as they had argued during the past half century.

Congratulations, Lebanon. You have finally been promoted. Instead of arguing about Syria, Lebanese parties are now arguing about Yemen. You know, because we have a proper budget, no public debt, a president, a functioning cabinet, an elected parliament, no threats on our southern and northern borders, and most importantly, a successful democratic sovereign free republic. A republic so successful that its parties and elected representatives have spare time to discuss the politics of a country whose capital lies 2200 Km south of Beirut.

Anyway, enough nagging, and let’s look at the political events of the eleventh month of presidential vacancy.

Yemen, Yemen, Yemen. Did I forget to mention Yemen?

That, dear reader, was a short summary of the three productive weeks we had between the 27th of March and the 17th of April.

Also, it seems that the FM-Hezbollah dialogue is “still safe and sound” despite the war of words. No offense here, but isn’t a war of words the exact opposite of a dialogue? Or do we have to be in a state of war to declare the dialogue a dead-end?

Oh, and by the way, in case I wasn’t too clear, Sanaa is 2200 Km far from Beirut. Deux-mille-deux-cents Kilomètres.

Gebran Bassil

This is by far the event of the month (Hint: It’s also about Yemen). A couple of days after the Saudis launched their campaign, Gebran Bassil, the FPM’s no.2 dropped April’s political bomb: From the Sharm Sheikh summit, he told the world that he expressed support for “legitimacy in any Arab country, especially in Yemen”. Four days later, Bassil struck again: “We don’t wish to see Hezbollah fighting with the Houthis or see anyone from the Future Movement fighting alongside the Saudis”. For the second time in the same week, Bassil was indirectly criticizing the FPM’s key ally, Hezbollah. True, the last statement also included Future Movement criticism, but the very fact that Gebran Bassil dared to start a “mini rebellion” against Hezbollah means a lot, even if it’s just a simple maneuver to make the FPM look as if they care about Lebanon and Lebanon only. Gebran Bassil’s stances were actually so strong that Aoun had to intervene in the very beginning of April with reports saying that he described the Saudi war in Yemen as illegal. But that did not stop Bassil from continuing what he started: On the second day of April, he said that “National unity remains an overriding priority for Lebanon’s foreign policy“.

Aoun’s relative silence here says a lot too. I’m going to put in context: “He [Samir Geagea] said after holding talks with Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi at Bkirki: “In principle, there is nothing stopping Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun from becoming president, but we have to take into consideration his political platform.”” (April 3)

Walid Jumblatt

Gebran Bassil wasn’t the only one criticizing Hezbollah this month. On March 30, Jumblatt launched an anti-Iran tirade. This stance was followed by a direct critique of Nasrallah’s speech on the first of April, describing it as lacking objectivity. By the 19th of April, Jumblatt asked “What’s wrong with Nasrallah?“. Jumblatt criticizes Hezbollah every now and then, but this time it came together with a Bassil criticism. It was not a very pleasant month for the party of God.

Tammam Salam

Not a very pleasant month indeed. As if the waves of criticism coming from the FPM, the FM, the PSP, the Saudi ambassador and the Grand Mufti weren’t enough, the Prime Minister said that Beirut supported any move that preserves Sanaa’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

If you have been following Lebanese politics for the past few months, you’d notice that Hezbollah usually doesn’t get into a war of words with Tammam Salam (Because weakening him would mean strengthening his ally/rival Hariri). Well, guess what? The pressure was too high on Hezbollah this time that the party’s minister in the cabinet Hussein Hajj Hassan said in a statement that “Prime Minister Tammam Salam’s remarks on the Saudi military intervention in Yemen at the Arab League summit two days ago do not represent the views of the Lebanese government”

But to be fair here, Salam’s pro-Saudi stance (even if discreet) is understandable. It was Saudi pressure that eventually brought Salam to the premiership in April 2013. This is why Hezbollah probably didn’t make a big deal out of it and chose to calm things down in the cabinet meeting.

Nabih Berri

Even Berri tried to distance himself and Amal as much as possible from the FM-Hezbollah clash over Yemen. Within 7 days, the speaker said he supported three things: (1) Oman’s efforts to solve the crisis (April 1), (2) himself hosting the Yemeni dialogue 😛 (April 5) and (3) moving forward with the FM-Hezbollah talks he’s mediating (April 8).

With Tammam Salam and Jumblatt pushed slightly/temporarily towards M14, Berri found himself in April as the new Kingmaker in the Lebanese centre. He wants to host the Yemeni dialogue, because solving the presidential crisis in Lebanon is so 2008.

The Three Blows

Hezbollah suffered three more blows this month. The first blow was when M8 politician Michel Samaha confessed on the 20th of April that he transported explosives (with support of Syrian regime officials) into Lebanon with the aim of targeting Lebanese politicians and religious figures. (Although deep down, and as I said three years ago, this could be a good thing for Hezbollah since it would give the impression that they had nothing to do with the assassinations of the M14 politicians, and that it was Syria via its operatives all the time)

The second blow was the mysterious death of Rustum Ghazali, Syria’s man in Lebanon from 2002 till the 2005 withdrawal. While his death doesn’t have direct or even indirect consequences on the Lebanese scene, Lebanese and Syrian politics are still interconnected and it was seen as victory for M14. And a victory for M14 is never a victory for M8.

And because it wasn’t yet the worst month for M8 since the beginning of time, the third blow came from The Maronite Patriarch who accused Aoun and his March 8 allies of being responsible for the presidential vacuum. That’s the most violent criticism coming from the Maronite church since August 2014.

Yemen and the Baabda Declaration

Also, in other news, Michel Sleiman indirectly declared his candidacy as a “consensual candidate” if all parties accept the Baabda declaration and distance themselves from outside conflicts (inspired from the Lebanese dilemma over Yemen). His reelection would be unconstitutional: Presidents can’t have two consecutive terms in Lebanon. But then again, he was elected unconstitutionally since grade one civil servants need a constitutional amendment to be elected ( something the parliament did not do when they elected him in 2008), so who cares.

If a former protector of the constitution gets elected unconstitutionally and wants to get reelected unconstitutionally, I really don’t know what to say.

Actually, I know what to say. I’ll just repeat what I said at the beginning of the post: Lebanon is a successful democratic sovereign free republic.

341 days since the 25th of May. 177 days since the 5th of November. 773 days till the next parliamentary elections. Just kidding. We’re never going to have elections again 😀

Also, 3 days since Salma Hayek came to Lebanon.

(This last sentence was an attempt to make this political blog more “social”)

The War Files (Part XIII) – Lebanon In The Valley Of Despair

A U.S. Marine uses a mirror on a stick to check underneath a car in front of the building used as the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Oct. 25, 1983.

This month marks the 40th anniversary of the Lebanese Civil War that started on the 13th of April 1975. This is why I’ve decided to publish WikiLeaks cables from the war era, every day till the 13th of April. I think it would be interesting to look at things from a different point of view, and since it’s not the Lebanese who are telling the stories, I believe it offers a unique insight on the civil war. Although there are a lot more cables on WikiLeaks, I won’t republish them all in order to focus on the most relevant ones. I hope you enjoy reading them.

For the past two weeks, I have been publishing WikiLeaks cables about events during the Lebanese Civil War. But there is something I did not mention well enough: The Lebanese Civil War was more about destruction than politics. This is why in this post, the WikiLeaks cables are about the killing, the bombs, the explosions, the shelling and the fighting. You’ll find 13 cables in this last entry of the series. The title of this last post is actually a title of one of those WikiLeaks cables (Yep, we were in despair).

The summary of a cable from November 1976 says it all: “LIKE A BOXER PUNCH-DRUNK FROM FOUR GRUELING ROUNDS OF PUNISHMENT, BEIRUT CONTINUES TO RISE FROM THE CANVAS; THE LEGS ARE WOBBLY, THE VISION BLURRED. THERE ARE RISING HOPES BUT AS YET LITTLE CONFIDENCE, THAT THE CITY WILL NOT HAVE TO ANSWER THE BELL FOR ROUND 5 (They’re talking about another round of infighting in beirut)“

Is it me, or do we still repeat that same sentence at least once every two to three years?

Wars should not be political maneuvers.

I repeat, 15 year civil wars should not be political maneuvers.

Tenzakar W Ma Ten3ad.

RENEWAL OF TENSION IN SIDON AND ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON
Date: 1975 March 6, 15:47 (Thursday)	Canonical ID: 1975BEIRUT03028_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006
To: AMEHBASSY JIDDA \| Commander in Chief European Command Vaihingen Germany \| Defense Intelligence Agency \|Department of State \| Egypt Cairo \| Iraq Baghdad \| Israel Jerusalem \| Israel Tel Aviv \| Jordan Amman \| Kuwait Kuwait City \| Secretary of State \| Syria Damascus

1. TENSIONS GENERATED THROUGHOUT LEBANON OVER PAST WEEK BY CLASHES BETWEEN LEBANESE ARMY AND “ARMED ELEMENTS” INSIDON (REFTELS) HAD BEGUN TO LESSEN PERCEPTIBLY LATE MAR 5, FOLLOWING COUNTRY-WIDE MANIFES- ATIONS BY CITIZENS (MOSTLYCHRISTIANS BUT SOME SHI’A) DEMONSTRATING IN SUPPORT OF ARMY AND GOL. DEMONSTRATIONS WENT OFF MORE OR LESS PEACEFULLY, WITH ONLY ONE PERSON REPORTED KILLED (ACCIDENTALLY BY STRAY BULLET). COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03028 061643Z

OF MINISTERS MEETING EVENING MAR 5 RESULTED IN DECISION BY SOLH CABINET (BACKED BY PRES FRANGIE) TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE, ALTHOUGH MIN OF WATER AND ELECTRICITY MALIK SALAM CARRIED OUT HIS THREAT TO RESIGN AND WALKED OUT OF MEETING. STAGE THUS SEEMED SET FOR FURTHER DIMINUTION OF TENSIONS AND PROGRESSIVE RETURN TO NORMALITY MAR 6, THANKS TO TYPICALLY LEBBANESE SOLUTION IN WHICH NO PROBLEMS WERE REALLY SOLVED BUT WERE MERELY TO BE BRUSHED UNDER RUG FOR TIME BEING.

2. UNFORTUNATELY, WIDESPREAD APPREHENSION RE POSSIBLE ISRAELI RETALIATION AGAINST LEBA ON FOR LAST NIGHT’S TERRORIST OPERATIN IN TEL AVIV, FOLLOWED BY NEWS AT MID-DAY MAR 6 OF DEATH IN AUB HOSPITAL OF EX-DEPUTY MAAROUF SAAD (WHO HAD BEEN WOUNDED IN FEB 26 CLASHES IN SIDON (SEE BEIRUT 2611) HAVE CHANGED ALL THIS. PLO OFFICES IN BEIRUT APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN EVACUATED, AND FEDAYEEN ARE REPORTEDLY ON FULL ALERT IN AND AROUND COUNTRY’S 15 REFUGEE CAMPS, INCLUDING THOSE NORTH OF TRIPOLI WHERE TRIGGER-HAPPY ELEMENTS THIS MORNING ACTUALLY OPENED FIRE ON OVERFLYING LEBANESE AIR FORCE PLANES, PROBABLY ON ASSUMPTION THEY WERE ISRAELI. AS NEWS OF SAAD’S DEATH SPREAD DURING AFTERNOON, OTHER DISRUPTIVE INCIDENTS BEGAN OCCURRING AT VARIOUS POINTS IN BEIRUT, WHERE GROUPS OF HIS LEFTIST AND SUNNI MOSLEM SYMPATHIZERS (ACCOMPANIED IN SOME PLACES BY FEDAYEEN) HAVE TAKEN TO BLOCKING ROADS, BURNING TIRES, SHOOTING IN AIR, ETC. SIDON REPORTEDLY IS AGAIN GRIPPED BY TENSION, WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF “ARMED ELEMENTS” (I.E., FEDAYEEN AND THEIR LEFTIST ALLIES) HAVING REOCCUPIED STREET BARRI- CADES AND POSITIONS ON ROOFTTPS. LEBANESE ARMY AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES HAVE CANCELLED ALL LEAVES AND UNITS ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN TRYING CLEAR CROWDS AND BARRICADES FROM SEVERAL ARTIERIES IN BEIRUT, INCLUDING ROAD TO AIRPORT. MOST SHOPS AND BUSINESSES CLOSED EARLIER THAN USUAL, AND LATE AFTERNOON RUSH-HOUR TRAFFIC AP- PEARS LESS THAN NORMAL.

3. CONDITIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE HAVE CREATED PALPABLE ATMOSPHERE OF PUBLIC NERVOUSNESS AND FOREBODING. GENERAL FEELING SEEMS TO BE THAT FURTHER TROUBLE

— CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03028 061643Z

GENERATED INTERNALLY OR BY ISRAELIS, OR BOTH–IS STILL TO COME. I HAVE TAKEN PRECAUTIONOF ADVISING EMBASSY’S AMERICAN STAFF TO AVOID UNNECESSARY MOVEMENT AT LEAST DURING NIGHT MAR 6-7.

HOUGHTON

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

BEIRUT SECURITY SITUATION DETERIORATES–ONCE AGAIN
Date: 1975 June 26, 15:05 (Thursday)	Canonical ID: 1975BEIRUT08149_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

1. FIRM RESPONSE OF INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES TO INCIDENTS BEGINNING JUNE 23( REFTEL) FAILED TO RESTORE RELATIVE CALM. WHILE PERSISTENT CLASHES CONTINUE TO BE RELATIVELY RES- TRICTED GEOGRAPHICALLY, NIGHT OF JUNE 25/26 SAW FIERCE EX- CHANGES IN AIN RUMANNEH, SHIAH, FURN AS SHUBAK. RESIDENTS OF SURROUNDING AREAS HAVE DESCRIBED FIRING OF BOTH AUTOMATIC AND HEAVY WEAPONS (MORTARS,RPGS, ETC.) AS HEAVIEST SINCE APRIL TROUBLES AND ARE BRACING FOR RES- URGENCE OF HEAVY FIRING ONCE DARKNESS DESCENDS ON CITY TONIGHT

2. CLASHES, WHICH BEGAN TUESDAY AND SPUTTERED ALONG WEDNESDAY. PICKED UP CONSIDERABLE STEAM AFTERNOON JUNE 25 AND CONTINUED THROUGH HOURS OF DARKNESS.SECURITY FORCES PERSISTING IN EFFORTS TO CONTAIN SITUTATION AND APPARENTLY HAVE ORDERS TO OPEN FIRE ON FRANC TIREURS, USING AS MUCH FIRE POWER AS NECESSARY TO SILENCE SNIPERS. LEBANESE ARMY SOURCE REPORTS CASUALTY FIGURES OF 11 KILLED, 46 WOUNDED AND WE UNDERSTAND SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED IN AFFECTED AREAS. SAME ARMY SOURCE TOLD DATT THAT UP TO 60 ROUNDS OF 120MM MORTAR FIRE WERE RECEIVED IN AIN RUMMANNEH DURING NIGHT OF 25/26 JUNE. SOME STRAY ROUNDS FELL OUTSIDE AIN RUMMANNEH AND RELIABLE LEBANESE OBSERVER RE PORTS SHELL OR ROCKET, WHICH FAILED TO EXPLODE, STRUCK WALL OF MAIN MILITARYS HOSPITAL. SAME SOURCE COUNTED TWENTY HEAVY EXPLOSIONS DURING HALF HOUR.

3. EVIDENCE WHICH HAS ACCUMULATED SINCE NOON JUNE 25 POINTS FINGER OF RESPONSIBLLITY FOR OUTBREAK AT PALESTINIAN “REJECTION” FROM AND THEIR LEBANESE LEFTIST ALLIES. OFFICIAL GOL SOURCE STATES THREE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED BY SECURITY FORCES (PARA 1, REFTEL ) HAVE NOW BEEN IDENTIFIED AS PALES TINAINS AFFILIATED WITH IRAQI-SPONSORED ARAB LIBEATION

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08149 261721Z FRONT (ALF)

. OTHER INFORMANTS CLAIM BULK OF FIGHTING HAS BEEN BETWEEN LEBANESE GENDARMES AND ARMED ADHERENTS OF PFLP, ALF, AND PFLP-GC (ALLIES IN THE “REJECTION” FRONT) AND RAG-TAG COLLECTION OF LEBABESE LEFTISTS REPRE- SENTING LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY, PRO-IRAQI BAATH PARTY INDEPENDENT NASSERISTS, ETC,. SUCH ALIGNMENT SUGGEST LIBYAN AND IRAQI HAND BEHIND OUTBREAK (GEORGE HABBASH AND OTHER “REJECTIONIST” NOTABLES ARE CURRENTLY ENJOYING IRAQI HOSPITALITY— FBIS JN250640Y AND JN251945Y)

4. PHALANGE APPARENTLY HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN RECENT FIGHTING. LATEST REPORTS INDICATE THAT, ALTHOUGH MOBILIZED AND IN POSITION IN NEIGHBORHOODS WHICH THEY CONTROL, PHALANGE MILITIAMEN ARE PRIMARILY OBSERVERS IN CURRENT CLASHES. IT IS IN OUR VIEW, EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT PHALANGIST LEADERS WOULD SEEK CLASHES AT THIS TIME. SO FAR AS WE DETERMINE, PHALANGIST FORCES ARE CRITICALLY SHORT OF CERTAIN KINDS OF AMMUNITION, ESPECIALLY MORTARS ROUNDS AND BELTED MACHINEGUN AMMO, POSSIBILTIY WHICH IS SOURCE OF CONCERNTO SECURITY OFFICIALS, EXISTS THAT PHALANGISTS AND OTHERS COULD BE DRAWN IN, IF CLASHES CONTINUE.

5. OVER LAST SEVERAL DAYS, WE UNDERSTAND THAT JOINT GOL/PLO PATROLS AND LIAISON GROUPS HAVE CONTINUED TO OPERTATE. IN VIEW OF ‘ARAFAT’S JUNE 23 MEETING WITH PRES FRANGIE AND FORMER’S JUNE 25 STATEMENT REGARDING PLO RESPECT FOR LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY (SEPTEL), ACTIVITIES OF “REJECTIONISTS” AND THEIR LEBANESE COHORTS APPEAR AS MUCH A CHALLENGE TO ‘ARAFAT’S AUTHORITY AS THAT OF GOL. WE HAVE NO RPT NO REASON TO BELIEVE AT THIS TIME THAT ITS NOT RPT NOT COOPERATING WITH GOL TO CONTAIN AND SUPRESS FIGHTING. PLO APPARENTLY PARTICIPATED IN JOINT EFFORTS TO ARRANGE CEASFIRE JUNE 25 (FBIS JN251737) WHICH PROBABLE BROKE DOWN BECAUSE IN STIGATORS OF CURRENT OUTBREAKS DID NOT CONSIDER THEMSELVES BOUND BY AGREEMENT. SINCE EVENING JUNE 25, GOL SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE INFORMED US SEVERAL TIMES THAT FATAH RPT FATAH UNITS ARE FIGHTING ALONG SIDE GENARMES AGAINST “RE- JECTIONIST” PALESTINIANS. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM THIS STORY WITH PALESTINIAN CONTACTS. IF TRUE, HOWEVER, “REJESTIONISTS” INCREASING OPEN CHALLENGE TO PLO LEADER-

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 BEIRUT 08149 261721Z

SHIP IN PAST TEN DAYS MAY HAVE FORCED ‘ARAFAT TO TAKE MEASURES WHICH HE HAS HERETOFORE BEEN RELUCTANT TO ADOPT.

6. SO FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, ALL AMCITS ARE SAFE. BOTH LEB- ANESE AND FOREIGN RESIDENTS, HOWEVER ARE STILL BEING WARNED TO AVOID AIN RUMMANNEH/SHIAH AREAS AND OLD DAMASCUS ROAD THROUGH FURN AS SHUBAK IS CLOSED TO TRAFFIC.

GODLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

BEIRUT TRIES HARD TO RETURN TO NORMAL, BUT FIGHTING WON’T GO AWAY
Date: 1975 September 27, 10:37 (Saturday)	Canonical ID: 1975BEIRUT12041_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

1. FIGHTING TOOK PLACE IN MANY OF THE USUALLY HOT QUARTERS OF EAST BEIRUT NIGHT OF SEPT 26-27 AT ABOUT SAME INTENSITY AS PREVIOUS NIGHT. SLOW DROP IN LEVEL OF STRIFE THUS HOPEFULLY REMAINS PATTERN, BUT PERSISTENCE OF FIGHTING CAUSING SOME OBSERVERS TO FEAR ROUND 4 WILL DRAG ON FOR SOME TIME.

2. AS OF 1200 HOURS (LOCAL) SEPT 27, USUAL DAY- LIGHT LULL IN HEAVIEST FIGHTING PREVAILS. SNIPERS ARE CITY’S MAIN DAYTIME PROBLEM. TRAFFIC IS UP EVEN FROM IMPROVED LEVEL OF DAY BEFORE. AIR- PORT ROAD IS OPEN. AIRPORT ACTIVITIES ARE MORE OR LESS NORMAL, DESPITE CONTINUING FUEL SHORTAGE. CITY IS MAKING DETERMINED EFFORT TO NORMALIZE.

3. ACCORDING TO INTERNAL SECURITY HQ, TREND TOWARD DISARMING OF BARRICADES IS OCCURRING AS POLICE AS- SUME CHARGE OF MANY OF THESE STRONGPOINTS FROM PRIVATE MILITIAMEN. BUT THIS IS CLEARLY A CON- TINUING PROBLEM FOR HARASSED INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES. APPARENTLY, IT IS NOT RPT NOT TRUE THAT ARMY HELPING INTERNAL SECURITY IN CITY, CONTRARY TO SEPT 25 ANNOUNCEMENT (REFTEL), ALTHOUGH LOANS OF ARMY’S ARMORED VEHICLES TO POLICE–A LONG- STANDING PRACTICE–HAVE BEEN STEPPED UP.

4. ANOTHER HOPEFUL SIGN IS THAT THE DORMANT CEASE- FIRE COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF SECURITY FORCES REPRE- SENTATIVE, PLO REP TEWFIQ SAFADI, AND DANY CHAMOUN (WHO REPLACED HIS BROTHER) WILL BE BEEFED UP WITH A PHALANGE REP AND A MEMBER OF RAYMOND EDDE’S NA- TIONAL BLOC PARTY.

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 BEIRUT 12041 01 OF 02 271152Z

5. CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS ALMOST CERTAINLY BEING COMMITTED BY BOTH SIDES. PREDICTABLY, MOSLEMS AND LEFTISTS BLAME PHALANGE STUBBORNESS WHILE CHRISTIANS SEE MALEVOLENT HAND OF LIBYANS AND OTHERS BEHIND EXTREME LEFT. THE PREVIOUSLY RE- PORTED FIGHT BETWEEN PHALANGE AND LEFTIST PPS IN METN AREA IS TAKEN BY CHRISTIANS AS SIGN OF LEFTIST PLOT TO KEEP TROUBLE BOILING. THIS BATTLE STILL CONTINUING AT SOMEWHAT LOWERED INTENSITY WITH IN- TERNAL SECURITY NOW TRYING TO DISARM MILITANTS OF PPS.

6. A SHARP VERBAL ATTACK BY LEFTIST LEADER KEMAL JUMBLATT AGAINST THE PHALANGE SEPT 26, PUBLISHED IN

CONFIDENTIAL NNN CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12041 02 OF 02 271208Z 53 ACTION NEA-10 INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 OPR-02 AID-05 OMB-01 SAB-01 SCCT-01 A-01 SY-05 SCS-03 SCA-01 OC-05 CCO-00 EB-07 COME-00 AGR-05 FEA-01 OES-03 TRSE-00 IO-10 ACDA-05 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 /125 W ——————— 021933 O P 271037Z SEP 75 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6414 INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY USINT BAGHDAD AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY PARIS AMCONSUL STUTTGART AMEMBASSY TEHRAN AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2973 USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK COMSIXTHFLT CTF SIX ZERO CTF SIX ONE CTF SIX TWO FOSIF ROTA SPAIN FICEURLANT NORFOLK VA DIA WASHDC CIA WASHDC CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 BEIRUT 12041 02 OF 02 271208Z C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 12041

BEIRUT PRESS TODAY, HAS REKINDLED POLITICAL TEMPERA- TURE. HE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO RECONCILIATION WITH THE PHALANGE, WITH HE CLAIMED WAS POLITICALLY ISOLATED, BEFORE BASIC LEFTIST DEMANDS ARE MET. HE ALSO ATTACKED LONG-TIME MOSLEM LEADER SAEB SALAAM FOR “WISHING TO EXTEND HIS DOMINION OVER THE MOS- LEMS OF BEIRUT.” JUMBLATT SAID THESE MOSLEMS WERE MORE PROPERLY REPRESENTED BY JUMBLATT HIMSELF. THESE REMARKS MAKING OBSERVERS WONDER WHAT THE ATMOSPHERE WILL BE WHEN “NATIONAL DIALOGUE COMMITTEE” RENEWS TALKS SEPT 29.

7. A PARTICIPANT IN LAST THURSDAY’S OPENING SESSION OF THE “DIALOGUE” TELLS US THAT THE 20-MAN GROUP MAY BE ENLARGED, THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY BEFORE THE SEPT 29 SESSION. PRIMIN KARAME HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPANSION THROUGH PRIVATE CONTACTS. SAME SOURCE TELLS US THAT REASON SECOND SESSION NOT SCHEDULED UNTIL SEPT 29 WAS TO AVOID SPECTACLE OF DEADLOCK–A STRONG POSSIBILITY IN EARLY SESSIONS–WHILE FIGHTING HAD STILL NOT DIED DOWN.

8. NEWSPAPERS REPORT FOOD SUPPLY IN BEIRUT IS GOOD IN ALL AREAS AND THAT FOOD PRICES ARE ONLY SLIGHTLY ABOVE NORMAL. TO ALLEVIATE FLOUR SHORT- AGE IN SOUTH, GOVERNMENT IS TRUCKING GRAIN TO SIDON. ARMY IS BOTH CLEARING TRACKS AND PROVIDING ESCORT FOR TWO-THREE TRAINLOADS OF FUEL OIL DAILY FOR BEIRUT’S POWER GENERATING PLANTS. GASOLINE TANKER SHIP IS BEING UNLOADED TODAY AT MOBIL PORT AT DORA NEAR BEIRUT, AND DISTRIBUTION WILL BEGIN IM- MEDIATELY. MOBIL, WHICH IS COORDINATING GASOLINE AND FUEL OIL DISTRIBUTION, BELIEVES “GIFTS” FROM EAGER FILLING STATION OPERATORS WILL OVERCOME RELUCTANCE OF TANKER TRUCK DRIVERS TO CROSS CON- FESSIONAL LINES. ALTHOUGH SOME AREAS OF BEIRUT ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE GASOLINE AS LONG AS ANY FIGHTING CONTINUES, THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE

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COUNTRY, THE MOUNTAIN AREAS, AND THE BAKAA VALLEY ARE NOW WELL-SUPPLIED FROM MEDRECO RE- FINERY NEAR SIDON. IPC REFINERY IN TRIPOLI IS MAKING SOME DELIVERIES IN THAT AREA. BUTANE AND AVIATION FUEL TANKER SHIPS REMAIN OFF SHORE.

9. IN OTHER AREAS OF THE ECONOMY, PORT AUTHORITIES HAVE ASKED WORKERS TO REPORT TO DUTY ON MON, SEPT 29. BECAUSE BANKS HAVE NOW BEEN CLOSED FOR TEN DAYS, MONEY IS IN SHORT SUPPLY. MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION HAS ASKED GOVT INDEMNIFICATION FOR LOSSES. TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND LEBANESE REFUGEES NOW REPORTEDLY IN SYRIA. 10. TH BEST OF EMBASSY KNOWLEDGE, ALL AMCITS ARE SAFE EXCEPT AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. IBM HAS CON- TINGENCY PLANS TO EVACUATE SOME EMPLOYEES ON MON. IF BEIRUT OFFICE IS STILL UNABLE TO FUNCTION. SMALL SALES STAFF WILL WORK OUT OF PARIS AND FINANCIAL OPERATIONS WILL MOVE TO KUWAIT.

GODLEY

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BEIRUT FIGHTING ESCALATES AGAIN
Date: 1975 October 8, 14:20 (Wednesday)	Canonical ID: 1975BEIRUT12544_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY: SECTIONS OF BEIRUT WITNESSED HEAVY CLASHES NIGHT OF OCT 7-8 AND INTO OCT 8. PROGRESS ON THE POLITICAL FRONT AWAITS TOMORROW’S SCHEDULED MEETING OF THE “DIALOGUE”. HOW- EVER, AS BEFORE, PARTICIPATNS IN THAT MEETING MAY HAVE TO FOCUS ON SECURITY PROBLEM IF MAJOR CLASHES OCCUR AGAIN TONIGHT. END SUMMARY.

1. A RESUMPTION OF HEAVY SHOOTING AND EXPLOSIONS OCCURRED NIGHT OF OCT 7-8 IN SEVERAL PARTS OF BEIRUT, CONTINUING INTO OCT 8. CHIYAH AND AIN EL-RUMANNEH WERE THE SCENE OF CLASHES WHICH AT TIMES RIVALED IN INTENSITY THE HOTTEST PERIOD A FEW WEEKS AGO. A MORTAR ROUND KILLED AND WOUNDED MANY PEOPLE ON STREET IN FRONT OF BAKERY IN MOSLEM AREA DURING EARLY MORNING HOURS, RAISING EMOTIONS AMONG CITY’S MOSLEMS. AT MID-MORNING TODAY THE FIGHTING SUBSIDED, BUT IT PICKED UP AGAIN LATER IN CITY CENTER WHERE CLASHES CONTINUE AS OF 1400 HOURS (LOCAL). A CURFEW WAS REES- TABLISHED COVERING ALL OF BEIRUT STARTING TONIGHT. THE ELABOR- ATELY CONSTRUCTED CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN JEOPARDY AS MANY PRIVATE MILITAMEN ARE REPORTED PREPARING TO RETURN TO BARRICADES.

2. REPORTS FROM NORTH LEBANON INDICATE CONTINUED FIGHTING IN THE ZGHORTA AREA. INTERNAL SECURITY HQ IN BEIRUT TOLD US AT 0900 HOURS (LOCAL) TODAY THAT THE NORTH WAS QUIET AS OF THAT TIME, BUT PICTURE IS MURKY.KIDNAPPINGS AND EXCHANGES OF FIRE BETWEEN MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN AREAS ARE KEEPING TENSIONS HIDH THERE. THE FLUCTUATING CLASHES ARE PROVING HARD TO STOP DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF THE ARMY.

3. RENEWED VIOLENCE AGAIN BROUGHT INCIDENT ECONOMIC REAWA- KENING TO HALT, AND FEW SHOPS AND NO BANKS OPENED. TODAY’S

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MEETING OF BUSINESS AND LABOR LEADERS TO DISCUSS OPERATING PRO- BLEMS UNDER CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS WAS CANCELLED. CATHOLIC EDUCATION LEADERS MET YESTERDAY TO CONSIDER OPENING OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLS. ANNOUNCEMENT SAID A SPECIAL COMMITTEE WOULD DECIDE ABOUT OPENING OF SCHOOLS ON A REGION BY REGION BASIS AS SECURITY CONDITIONS PERMIT. ALTHOUGH NEWSPAPERS ANNOUNCED ABOUT A WEEK AGO THAT LOCAL ARABIC SCHOOLS WOULD OPEN ON SCHEDULE ON OCT 15 IF SECURITY CONDITIONS PERMIT, WE UNDERSTAND MINISTRY OF EDUCATION IS NOW CONSIDERING POSTPONE- MENT. TO PERMIT CONTINUATION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES, THE NEW CURFEW EXEMPTS HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES, BAKERY WORKERS, AND SIMILAR PERSONNEL. SO FAR, ROUND FOUR HAS NOW SERIOUSLY DIS- RUPTED MOST ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES FOR THREE WEEKS.

4. THERE IS LITTLE VISIBLE PROGRESS ON POLITICAL FRONT PENDING TOMORROW’S RESUMPTION OF “NATIONAL DIALOGUE COM- MITTEE”. IF FIGHTING FLARES TONIGHT, LEADERS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE “DIALOGUE” ARE APT TO BE PREOCCUPIED WITH IMMEDIATE SECURITY ISSUE. THE “DIALOGUE” HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO ADDRESS THE LONG-TERM ISSUES FOR WHICH IT WAS CREATED. 5. THE MARONITE PATRIARCH CONFERRED YESTERDAY WITH CAMILLE CHAMOUN, RAYMOND EDDE, AND PIERRE GEMAYEL IN A WIDELY PUBLICIZED MEETING AT BKERKE. THESE THREE TOP MARONITE POLITICIANS ARE PERENNIAL RIVALS, AND THE PATRIARCH APPARENTLY MADE AN EFFORT TO RECONCILE THEM. THE MAIN RESULT OF THE MEETING WAS AN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WERE OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF PARTITIONING LEBANON. ASKED AFTERWARD IF THE QUESTION OF PRES FRANGIE’S RESIGNATION HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, THE PATRIARCH SAID IT HAD NOT ARISEN “BECAUSE WE DID NOT ENVISAGE THIS EVENTUALITY”. MEANWHILE, FRANGIE HAD LUNCH YESTERDAY AT THE HOME OF PRIMIN KARAME IN A SHOW OF CORDIAL RELATIONS BET- WEEN THE TWO. OTHER GOVT LEADERS INCLUDING CHAMOUN AND GEN HANNA SAID WERE ALSO GUESTS. GODLEY

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FIGHTING ERUPTS AGAIN IN BEIRUT
Date: 1975 October 25, 11:22 (Saturday)	Canonical ID: 1975BEIRUT13277_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

1. SUMMARY: FIGHTING ESCALATED SHARPLY IN BEIRUT LATE OCT. 24 AND NIGHT OCT. 24-25. IT CONTINUES AS OF 1100 HOURS (LOCAL) OCT. 25, AT SLIGHTLY REDUCED INTENSITY. CAPITAL’S ECONOMY REMAINS VIRTUALLY PARALYZED. ALL THREE SUB-COMMITTEES OF “NATIONAL DIALOGUE” MET YESTER- DAY. PARLIAMENT IS SCHEDULED TO CONVENE TODAY, AND IF IT DOES MEET INTEREST CENTERS ON WHETHER KARAME WILL SPEAK AGAIN ON RECORD OF HIS GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. AN UPSURGE OF VIOLENCE TOOK PLACE IN BEIRUT LATE OCT. 24 AND NIGHT OF OCT. 24-25. FIGHTING ERUPTED BETWEEN CHIYAH (SHIITE) AND AIN EL RUMANEH (CHRISTIAN), TWO QUARTERS THAT HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN CLASHES ONLY SPORADICALLY DURING LAST TWO WEEKS OR SO. FIGHTING ALSO CONTINUED AROUND RAS EL-NABA, SOUTH OF CITY’S CENTER, AND BETWEEN LAILEKE (MIXED MOSLEM- CHRISTIAN) AND HADATH (CHRISTIAN) IN SOUTHERN OUTSKIRTS OF CAPITAL. IN ADDITION, THREE FACTORIES WERE BURNED IN DIFFERENT AREAS – THE SECOND NIGHT THIS PRACTICE HAS OCCURRED, GIVING RISE TO SPECULATION THAT CERTAIN UNKNOWN GROUPS ARE DELIBERATELY AIMING AT ECONOMIC SABOTAGE.

3. BY MORNING OCT. 25, THE FIGHTING HAD SUBSIDED SLIGHTLY INTO WHAT AN OBSERVER AT INTERNAL SECURITY HQ IN BEIRUT CALLED A “RELATIVE CALM, BUT NOT A REAL CALM.” SNIPERS REMAINED ACTIVE IN VARIOUS PLACES AND THERE CONTINUED TO BE EXCHANGES OF FIRE, WHICH AT LAST REPORT AS OF 1100 HOURS (LOCAL) HAD BECOME SERIOUS IN KANTARI AREA OF WEST CENTRAL BEIRUT.

4. ARMY TODAY IS MANNING CHECK POINTS AT VARIOUS ENTRANCES TO THE CAPITAL, PATROLLING SEBMENTS OF

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OUTLYING ROADS ANDPROTECTING FUEL DEPOTS AND GRAIN MILLS IN THE VICINITY OF DORA.

5. THE BEKAA VALLEY REMAINS TENSE, BUT APPARENTLY THE ARMY IS STILL ABLE TO KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL.

6. ECONOMY OF BEIRUT REMAINS VIRTUALLY PARALYZED FOR SEVENTH DAY. IN MEETING YESTERDAY, CHAMBER OF COMME CE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT FACT THAT FACTORIES AND OTHER BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS ARE INCREASINGLY TARGET OF SABOTEURS.

7. YESTERDAY’S MEETING OF THE POLITICAL SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE “NATIONAL DIALOGUE” ASSIGNED EDMOND RABBATH, ONE OF ITS MEMBERS WHO SPECIALIZES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, TO DRAW UP A SUTDY ON CONFESSIONALISM, ITEM NO. 1 ON THE SUB-COMMITTEE’S AGENDA. THE CONOMIC AND SOCIAL SUB-COMMITTEES ALSO HELD A JOINT SESSION YESTERDAY WHICH REESULTED IN A DECISION TO INVITE WRITTEN OPINIONS FROM VARIOUS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORGANS, SUCH AS THE BEIRUT CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND THE LABOR FEDERATION. THE MEMBERS ALSO AFFIRMED THEIR BELIEF THAT THE WORK OF THESE TWO SUB-COMMITTEES DEPENDS ON PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL SUB-COMMITTEE.

8. POLITICAL INTEREST CENTERS ON TODAY’S SCHEDULED PARLIAMENTARY SESSION. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE QUESTION WHETHER THE SESSION WILL OCCUR, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IN- SECURE CONDITIONS MAY FORCE DEPUTIES TO STAY AWAY BUT ALSO BECAUSE SOME POLITICAL LEADERS ARE TRYING TO KEEP THE EMERGING FEUD BETWEEN PREMIER KARAME, ON ONE HAND, AND PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND INTERIOR MINISTER HCAMOUN, ON OTHER, FROM BREAKING IRRETRIEVABLY INTO THE OPEN. IT ALMOST ERUPTED LAST THURSDAY WHEN KARAME DEFENDED HIS RECORD AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT AND CRITICIZED CHAMOUN AND FRANGIE IN INDIRECT FASHION.

GODLEY

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STILL NO LETUP IN BEIRUT FIGHTING
Date: 1975 October 28, 13:55 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID: 1975BEIRUT13386_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

1. COMBAT CONTINUED THROUGH NIGHT OF OCT. 27-28 AND UP TO LATE MORNING TODAY, OCT. 28, IN MANY QUARTERS OF BEIRUT. LEVEL OF FIGHTING VARIES CONSIDERABLY. SEVERAL OF THE TRADITIONALLY ACTIVE AREAS IN EAST BEIRUT HAVE BEEN INVOLVED, AS WELL AS THE INTERNATIONAL HOTEL SECTION IN THE WEST CENTRAL PART OF CITY. FIGHT IN HOTEL AREA IS IN ITS THIRD DAY AND PITS KATAEB AGAINST NASSERITES OF IBRAHIM QULAYLAT AND PALESTINAIANS. LATTER ARE ADVANCING FROM KANTARI REGION (UP HILL FROM HOTELS) AND ALSO FROM AIN MREISSEH QUARTER FURTHER WEST (NEAR U.S. EMBASSY). OUR CURRENT IMPRESSION IS THAT KATAEB AT DISADVANTAGE AND LOSING GROUND.

2. EFFORTS STILL UNDERWAY TO PUT SUBSTANCE INTO LATESTCEASEFIRE APPEAL. KARAME HAS MET WITH SUCCESSION OF POLITICAL LEADERS AND ANNOUNCED ABOUT NOON TODAY THAT A HIGH-LEVEL “SECURITY COMMITTEE” IS TO BE FORMED WHICH WILL SIT IN THE PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE UNTIL THE CEASEFIRE IS OBSERVED. THE COMMITTEE CONSISTS OF HIMSELF, SAEB SALAM, ABDALLAH YAFI, RAYMOND EDDE, PIERRE GEMAYEL, ADEL OSSEIRAN, PHILIPPE TAQLA, GHASSAN TUEINI, KAMAL JUMBLATT, AND CAMILLE CHAMOUN. IN ADDITION, MARONITE PATRIARCH KREISH YESTERDAY ISSUED APPEAL TO ABIDE BY CEASEFIRE, AND TODAY WAFA PLO NEWS AGENCY) SUPPORTED PATRIARCH’S CALL IN STATEMENT OF ITS OWN.

3. TENSION CONTINUES HIGH IN ZAHLE AFTER A SERIES OF CLASHES. THE ARMY’S EFFORTS TO KEEP LID ON THESE HAVE NOT STOPPED FIGHTING BUT HAVE MANAGED TO DAMPEN LEVEL. COMPARED TO FIERCE COMBAT IN PARTS OF BEIRUT, SIMMERING BEKAA STRIFE UNDERSTANDABLY DRAWING RELATIVELY LITTLE ATTENTION IN PRESS. 4. PARLIAMENT FAILED TO MEET YESTERDAY FOR LACK OF QUORUM. IT IS TRYING AGAIN TODAY. SOME OF THE HEAT SEEMS TO BE OUT OF THE KARAME FEUD WITH CHAMOUN AND FRANNGIE. TODAY’S PROJECTED SESSION HIGHLIGHTS A SPEECH EXPECTED

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FROM THE PREMIER PROPOSING “HIS SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS”, A FORMAT DESIGNED TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION. HOWEVER, A QUORUM HAD NOT BEEN REACHED AS OF MIDDAY AND KARAME’S ABOVE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE “SECURITY COMMITTEE” MAY BE IN LIEU OF HIS PLANNED SPEECH. GODLEY

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LEBANON IN THE VALLEY OF DESPAIR
Date: 1975 November 1, 14:50 (Saturday)	Canonical ID: 1975BEIRUT13628_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY: GENERALIZED AND HEAVY CLASHES OVERNIGHT AND CONTINUING INTO NOVEMBER 1, HAVE PERSISTED DESPITE PRIMIN’S FRANTIC EFFORTS TO ARRANGE AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE (SEVERAL TIMES NIGHT OCT 31/NOV 1). SAVAGERY AND MUTUAL SELF-DESTRUCTION AMONG ARMED BANDS HAS ACHIEVED MOMENTUM AND LIFE OF THEIR OWN WHICH RENDERS POLITICAL EFFORTS THUS FAR INEFFECTIVE OR EVEN IRRELEVANT. GROWING VOLUME REPORTS PLACE ARMED BANDS FROM SYRIAN TERRITORY IN BEKAA VALLEY WHERE ZAHLE IS ONCE AGAIN HOT SPOT. PRIMIN KARAME IS MEETING WITH FAITHFUL FEW OF SECURITY COMMITTEE, BUT THIS IS NOT EXPECTED TO AFFECT DEEPENING DESPAIR AND MANY FEAR THAT KARAME, HIS LINES TO CHAMOUN AND GEMAYEL THREATENED, MAY NOT RPT NOT HAVE IT IN HIM FOR ANOTHER COLLEGE TRY. END SUMMARY.

1. AT TIME OF DRAFTING THIS CABLE, CLASHES IN MAIN HOTEL DISTRICT ADJACENT TO EMBASSY CONTINUE. SMALL ARMS FIRE IS HEARD, PUNCTUATED OCCASIONALLY BY EXPLOSIONS. ELSEWHERE IN CITY, SECURITY SITUATION DETERIORATED AFTERNOON OCTOBER 31 AND HEAVY FIGHTING WAS REPORTED OVERNIGHT. IN ADDITION TO HOTEL DISTRICT, SHIA/AIN RUMANNEH/FURN ASH SHURBAH COMPLEX BROKE DOWN BEGINNING APPROX 1300 HOURS YESTERDAY. CLASHES THERE OVERNIGHT WERE REPORTEDLY AS BAD AS ANY PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED AND CASUALTIES IN THAT SECTOR ALONE WERE ALLEGED TO BE BETWEEN 40 AND 100 DEAD. AS OF MID-MORNING TODAY, ONLY MACHINE GUN EXCHANGES WERE REPORTED BETWEEN SHIAH AND AIN RUMMANEH, BUT WE HAVE NO MORE RECENT INFORMATION. EXCHANGES OF UNDETERMINED FEROCITY WERE EXPERIENCED OVERNIGHT ALONG CENTRAL AXIS PARALLELING BESHARA AL-KHOURY STREET (I.E., SODOCE, RAS AN NABEH, NASRA, WESTERN ASHRAFIYAH, ETC.); BETWEEN QARANTIANA AND NORTHERN ASHRAFIYAH; AND BETWEEN SUBURBS OF HADATH

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AND LAYLAKI. IN SUMMARY, DESPITE PERSISTING EFFORTS TO IMPOSE A CEASE-FIRE, WE NOW BACK TO SQUARE MINUS ONE ON SECURITY SCENE.

2. DURING EXCHANGES OF MORTAR AND OTHER HEAVY WEAPON FIRE LAST EVENING, SEVERAL ROUNDS FELL IN VICINITY OF SABRA/SHATILA PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMP (IN NEARBY MARTYR’S CEMETARY, WE ARE TOLD). UNTSO SOURCE STATIONED NEAR KUWAIT EMBASSY TRAFFIC CIRCLE INFORMED UN SECURITY OFFICIALS IN EARLY MORNING THAT NOISE AT THAT LOCATION WAS GREATER THAN PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED IN THAT AREA. UN OFFICIALS PRESENTLY ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE WHETHER EXCHANGES HEAVIER THAN HERETOFORE OR CLOSER. UNRWA OFFICIAL INFORMED EMBOFF MORNING NO. 1 THAT CAMPS NEAR BEIRUT ARE GENERALLY QUIET, ALTHOUGH UNRWA ACCESS TO AREAS LIMITED. HE SAID PALESTINIANS HAVE MOVED MOST FEDAYEEN COUT OF SABRA/SHATILA AND THAT ONLY RESIDENTS AND ARMED MILITIA REMAIN. HE NOT RPT NOT CERTAIN WHERE MAINLINE UNITS HAVE GONE BUT BELIEVES THAT MOVE WAS EFFORT TO AVOID DRAWING DIRE UPON CIVILIAN CAMP POPULATION. IT IS EQUALLY CONCEIVABLE, HOWEVER, THAT FEDAYEEN WERE WITHDRAWN SO THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE PINNED DOWN IN CAMP, SHOULD DECISION TO COMMIT PALESTINIAN FORCES TO BATTLE HAVE TO BE TAKEN.

3. WE ARE RECEIVING INCREASING NUMBER OF REPORTS OF MOVEMENT OF ARMED MEN FROM SYRIA INTO BEKAA VALLEY. IDENTITY OF ALLEGED INFILTRATORS VARIES, WITH THEM IDENTIFIED VARIOUSLY AS SA’IQA, PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY, OR SYRIAN TROOPS. UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, IT IS DOUBTFUL WE WILL EVER BE IN A POSITION TO CONFIRM ALLEGED MOVEMENTS FROM SYRIA IN PERSON. HOWEVER, SOURCES WHICH DATT CONSIDERS RELIABLE HAVE REPORTED SUCH MOVEMENT. ON OCTOBER 29 CHIEF OF STAFF OF INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES, BGEN DAHROUGH, TOLD ARMA THAT A “MASSIVE” INFILTRATION OF SA’IQA FORCES FROM SYRIA INTO LEBANON WAS UNDERWAY. IN LONG TELECON WITH SENIOR LEBANESE ARMY OFFICER IN BEKAA VALLEY ON NOVEMBER 1, DATT WAS TOLD THAT THERE ABOUT 2000 “SYRIAN” TROOPS (THE LEBANESE OFFICER SAID “SYRIAN; NOT LEFTIST, NOT PLO, NOT PLA”) IN THE VICINITY OF

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ZAHLE AND THAT THESE FORCES WERE INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING AGAINST THE CHRISTIAN INHABITANTS AND THE LEBANESE ARMY UNITS THERE. TO DATT, THESE REPORTS CONSTITUTE CONFIRMATION OF INFILTRATION FROM SYRIA.

4. CONTINUATION OF CIVIL STRIFE HAS LED MANYLOCAL OBSERVERS TO EXPRESS CONCERN THAT PRIMIN KARAME WILL REACH THE END OF HIS ROPE MOMENTARILY. WE WERE ABLE TO REACH PRIMIN’S OFFICE AT APPROX. 1020 HOURS THIS MORNING AND OFFICE DIRECTOR MUSSEIKI INFORMED US THAT KARAME, WHO SPENT SLEEPLESS NIGHT AT SERAIL, WAS AT TIME OF CALL MEETING WITH “SEVERAL MEMBERS” OF SECURITY COMM. MUSSEIKI WAS RELUCTANT TO IDENTIFY THOSE PRESENT (WHICH WE TAKE TO INDICATE THAT CHAMOUN, GEMAYEL AND JUMBLAT HAVE NOT RPT NOT JOINED FORLORN CONVOCATION), BUT HE INDICATED THAT KARAME HAD BEEN “IN CONTACT” WITH ALL SIDES, “INCLUDING THE PHALANGISTS.” MUSSEIKI SAID THAT KARAME HAD ARRANGED SEVERAL CEASE-FIRES OVERNIGHT, BUT ADMITTED THAT NONE OF THEM HAD BEEN “FULLY EFFECTIVE” (A GROSS UNDERSTATEMENT). MAJOR EFFORT WAS ALLEGEDLY AGREEMENT BY ALL PARTIES TO CEASE FIRING AS OF 2130, OCTOBER 31. WHEN THAT HOUR ARRIVED, HOWEVER, EXCHANGES INTENSIFIED RATHER THAN CEASING.

5. KARAME’S RELATIONSHIPS WITH KEY CHRISTIAN LEADERS APPEAR TO HAVE WORSENED SUBSTANTIALLY. LAST NIGHT, KARAME GAVE A TELEVISION INTERVIEW IN WHICH HE SUGGESTED PHALANGE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONTINUED VIOLENCE, BY INDICATING SNIPING FROM THE HOLIDAY INN AND ASHRAFIYAH WERE PROXIMATE CAUSES. PHALANGISTS HAVE NATURALLY REACTED ANGRILY WITH THEIR DAILY, “AL AMAL” DETAILING ALLEGED CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS AND PROVOCATIONS FROM OTHER SIDE AND CALLING UPON KARAME TO REMAIN AN “ARBITER” AND NOT BECOME A PARTY. THIS LATEST ALTERCATION HAS PROBABLY GIVEN A FURTHER SHOVE TO WIDENING GAP BETWEEN KARAME AND CHAMOUN, WHO WERE ALREADY RUMORED TO ON VERY BAD TERMS. IF THIS DANGEROUS TREND CONTINUES, KARAME COULD END UP WITH ONLY THE MOST TENUOUS CONTACTS WITH CHAMOUN AND GEMAYEL, AS WELL AS FRANGIE.

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6. AT 1330 TODAY I TELEPHONED KARAME TO TELL HIM WE HAD DECLARED LEBANON DISASTER AREA TO GET SOME MEDICINES. TOLD HIM WE THOUGHT DOING FINE, PATRIOTIC JOB UNDER TERRIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES, ETC. FIVE MINUTE EXCHANGE DID NOT GIVE ME IMPRESSION HE PLANNING RESIGN AND HIS MOOD APPEARED TO BE ONE OF TOUGH SCRAPPER.

7. IN GENERAL, WE FEEL CONFIDENT IN STATING THAT TODAY, THERE ARE NO RPT NO OPTIMISTS IN LEBANON, UN- LESS THEY ARE AMONG THE GROWING NUMBER OF LOOTERS OPERATING IN ABANDONED (AND SOME STILL OCCUPIED) NEIGHBORHOODS OF THE CITY.

8. ALL AMCITS ARE SAFE AS FAR AS WE AWARE, WITH EXCEPTION THOSE REPORTED SEPTELS AND REV. JIRAIR SOGOMIAN, CHAPLAIN HAIGAZIAN COLLEGE WHO WAS SHOT IN HAND OCT. 31 ON STREET NEAR COLLEGE. HE WAS ADMITTED AUB HOSPITAL AND IS IN GOOD CONDITION. FAMILY NOTIFIED.

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LEBANON OFF THE MAT BUT NOT ON ITS FEET
Date: 1975 November 6, 15:10 (Thursday)	Canonical ID: 1975BEIRUT13908_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006
To: Central Intelligence Agency \| Commander in Chief European Command Vaihingen Germany \| DAMASCUS PRIROITY \|Defense Intelligence Agency \| Department of State \| Egypt Cairo \| Fleet Intelligence Center Europe and Atlantic \| Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility Rota Spain \| France Paris \| Germany Stuttgart \|Greece Athens \| Iran Tehran \| Iraq Baghdad \| Israel Jerusalem \| Israel Tel Aviv \| JIDDA PRIORITYY \| Jordan Amman \| Kuwait Kuwait City \| Russia Moscow \| Secretary of State \| Task Force Six One \| Task Force Six Two \| United Kingdom London \| United Nations (New York) \| United States Sixth Fleet

1. SUMMARY: LIKE A BOXER PUNCH-DRUNK FROM FOUR GRUELING ROUNDS OF PUNISHMENT, BKEIRUT CONTINUES NOV 6 TO RISE FROM THE CANVAS; THE LEGS ARE WOBBLY, THE VISION BLURRED. THERE ARE RISING HOPES BUT AS YET LITTLE CONFIDENCE, THAT THE CITY WILL NOT HAVE TO ANSWER THE BELL FOR ROUND 5. END SUMMARY.

2. BEIRUT AND MOST OF LEBANON ENJOYING ANOTHER DAY OF CALM NOV6, WITH ONLY RARE BURSTS OF MACHINEGUN FIRE TO MAR THE FAMILIAR CIVILIAN NOISE POLLUTION OF HAMRA AND OTHER REAWAKEN- ING COMMERCIAL DISTRICTS. TWO ROCKETS WERE FIRED INTO ASHRAFIYEH OVERNIGHT, BUT GENERAL ABSENCE OF BACKGROUND EXPLOSIONS ALMOST EERIE. DESPITE CALM, LEBANESE VENTURING OUT IN FALL FINERY WEAR A WARY EXPRESSION AND COMPETENT OBSERVERS ARE NOT RPT NOT PREPARED TO DECLARE PEACE IN OUR TIME. SOME, IN FACT, ARE PREDICITING A RETURN TO ARMS AS EARLY AS NEXT MONDAY. TRIPOLI REPORTEDLY IS TENSE FOLLOWING DISCO- VERY OF UNIDENTIFIED BODY, BUT WAVE OF KIDNAPPING IN BEIRUT IS APPARENTLY FINISHED AS OF THIS REPORT.

3. TODAY’S NEWSPAPERS CARRY REPORTS OF PRES FRANGIE’S PRAISE FOR “KARAMISM” AND PRIMIN’S PERSISTENCE DURING NOV 5 CABINET MEETING. IT IS NNOT YET CLEAR WHAT PROMPTED THIS UNCHAR- ACTERISTIC OUTBURST, BUT THE CYNICAL OBSERVERS ON THE SCENE ARE DIAGNOSING IT AS A CASE OF “IF-YOU-CAN’T-BEAT-THEM-JOIN-THEM (PARTICULARLY WHEN THEY SEEM SUCCESSFUL)”. ON THIS NOTE, HOW- EVER, CABINET SESSION WAS OFF TO SMOOTH START AND ATMOSPHERE IS DESCRIBED AS “GOOD”. CABINET, WHICH WILL PROBABLY MEET AGAIN NOV 8, INTER ALIA (A) APPROPRIATED LL 18 MILLION FOR ARMORED VEHICLES, ETC., FOR INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES: (B) DISCUSSED INTERNATIONAL (READ FRENCH) INITIATIVES; AND (C) CON- SIDERED MEASURE TO ENSURE RESUMPTION OF NORMAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. HIGHER COORDINATION COMM (RECENTLY EXPANDED TO ENCOMPASS ALL IDENTIFIABLE LEBANESE FACTIONS AND “MODERATE”

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ALESTINIANS) CONTINUED ITS WORK AND FOCUSSED NOV 5 ON ENDING KID- NAPPING AND SURRENDERING PERPETRATORS TO CRIMIAL COURTS. LEBANESE ARMY, WHICH HAS ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTER- NATIONAL ROADS, ANNOUNCED ORDERS TO FIE UPON ARMED ELEMENTS ON THESE THOROUGHFARES AND ACTUALL ARRESTED 20 PERSONS IN HAZMIYEH YESTERDAY WHEN THEY ATTEMPTED TO SET UP A ROADBLOCK.

4. NOW THE BAD NEWS. (A) PHALANGIST ELEMENTS REMAIN THIS MORNING IN HOLIDAY INN AND CANADIAN MILITARY ATTACHE REPORTS THAT ENTRY IS FORBIDDEN TO ANYONE NOT HOLDING A PASS FROM THE PHALANGE HEADQUARTERS. BOTH SIDES ARE ACCUSING THE OTHER OF BAD FAITH IN OBSERVING TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE AND CITY REMAINS MINUTES (ONE HOUR AT MOST) FROM RESUMPTION OF CLASHES AT ANY GIVEN TIME; (B) BOTH SIDES CONTINUING TO REARM AND REPROVISION WITH PUBLIC ATTENTION BEING GIVEN TO VESSEL AT JOUNIEH (PHALAN- GIST) AND A USUALLY-RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTING THAT ANOTHER SHIP OFF-LOADED AT SIDON (PALESTINIAN LEFTIST) WITHIN THE LAST FOUR TO FIVE DAYS; (C) KARAME/CHAMOUN RELATIONSHIP IS PATCHED UP SOMEWHAT, BUT DIFFERENCES, WHICH COULD EASILY SURFACE UNDER STREE, PERSIST, CHAMOUN STILL WANTS ARMY TO ENTER IN FULL FORCE WITH FLAGS FLYINNG WHEREAS KARAME, WHO HAS RECENTLY INCREASED THE ARMY’S ROLE, PERFERS TO INSINUATE IT AS NEEDED AT MORE MEASURED PACE (BEIRUT 12296). OFF-LOADING OF SHIP AT JOUNIEH IS APPARENTLY BONE OF CONTENTION BETWEEN KARAME ON ONE HAND AND FRANGIE/ CHAMOUN ON OTHER. PRIMIN COMPLAINED NOV 6 TO AMBASSADOR THAT ARMY HAS NOT RPT NOT IMPLEMENTED HIS ORDER TO HALT DIS- EMBARKATION OF SHIP’S CARGO. ALL INGREDIENTS OF A FURTHER FLARE- UP CONTINUE TO BE PRESENT AS GOL TURNS ITS HAND TO EFFORTS TO CLEAR AWAY THE FALLOUT FROM RECENT STRIFE.

5. LARGE NUMBER OF SHOPS AND SOME BANKS ARE OPEN. MOST BANKS SET EXCHANGE RATE AT LL2.25 PER DOLLARY (BUYING) AND LL 2.60 PER DOLLAR (SELLING). WIDE DIFFERENCE (NORMALLY ONLY TWO OR THREE PIASTRES) IS MEANT TO DISCOURAGE TRANSACTIONS UNTIL MONDAY IN ORDER TO ALLOW TIME FOR BANKS TO PROCESS BACK- LOG OF PAPERWORK AND FOR MARKET TO STABILIZE. ZGHORTAWI OIL TANK DRIVERS ATTEMPTED TO TAKE DELIVERIES FROM IPC REFINERY IN TRIPOLI, BUT WERE BLOCKED BY TRIPOLITANIANS; IN RETALIATION, ZGHORTAWIS BLOCKED ROAD TO REFINERY. NEVERTHELESS, OIL MINISTRY REMAINS OPTIMISTIC THAT, IF CURRENT LULL CONTINUES,

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 BEIRUT 13908 061714Z

THIS DISPUTE WILL BE SOLVED IN TIME FOR DELIVERIES TO BEIRUU ON NOV 10 RPT 10.

6. ALL AMCITS REMAIN SAFE TO OUR KNOWLEDGE. AMERICAN COMMUNITY SCHOOL IS TOYING WITH IDEA OF OPENING MINI-SCHOOL NOV 10, IF CONDITIONS PERMIT.

GODLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PROGNOSIS
Date: 1976 July 12, 14:47 (Monday)	Canonical ID: 1976BEIRUT06147_b
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006
To: Department of State \| Secretary of State

1. MEA/BEIRUT SAYS IT HAS NO IDEA WHEN IT WILL BE POSSIBLE REOPEN BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT CLOSED JUNE 27 WHEN MEA BOEING 707 HIT ON GROUND DURING RIGHTIST BOMBARDMENT. AIRCRAFT TOTALLY DESTROYED, KILLING PILOT AND SEVERELY BURNING TWO CREW MEMBERS. MEA POSITION REAFFIRMS PESSIMISM OF MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS ADEL OSSEIRAN WHO SAID JULY 6 HE DOUBTED AIRPORT WOULD REOPEN SOON. SEE REFTEL.

2. ALTHOUGH MEA SAYS IT WILL RECOMMENCE SERVICE IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF “GUARANTEES,” ACTIVITY OF MEA/BEIRUT INDICATES AIRLINE COMPANY HAS LITTLE HOPE OF GETTING SUCH GUARANTEES SOON. GUARANTEES INCLUDE CHRISTIAN DEMANDS THAT LEBANESE FROM EASTERN SECTOR BE PROVWDED SAFE PASSAGE TO AND FROM AIRPORT, THAT AIRPORT NOT BE USED FOR ARMS ENTRY AND THAT JOINT RIGHT/LEFT COMMITTEE SUPERVISE AIRPORT OPERATION. OSSEIRAN, WHO IN REFTEL DESCRIBED THE JUNE 27 SHELLING OF AIRPORT AS BASELESS, NOW SAYS DEMANDS OF RIGHTIST GROUPS ARE “ILLOGICAL.”

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06147 130545Z

3. AIRPORT HAD REOPENED TO LIMITED SERVICE JUNE 23 AFTER BEING CLOSED SINCE JUNE 7 WHEN AREA BECAME ACTIVE BATTLE GROUND OF SYRIAN BACKED SAIQA FORCES VERSUS FATAH AND LEFTISTS. BUT MEA MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEES, MANY OF WHOM LIVED FOR MONTHS AT AIRPORT, UNABLE TO REACH THEIR HOMES AND FREQUENTLY UNDER FIRE, APPEAR WITH DEATH AND WOUNDING OF COLLEAGUES TO HAVE REACHED LIMIT OF ENDURANCE. MEA HAS TEMPORARILY TRANSFERRED HEAD OFFICE TO PARIS.

4. TRANS-MEDITERRANEAN AIRWAYS, ONLY CARGO SERVICE OPERATING OUT OF BEIRUT IN RECENT MONTHS, ALSO REPORTED MOVING HEADQUARTERS FROM BEIRUT TO LONDON AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.

5. MEA EVACUATING PERSONNEL VIA ROAD TO DAMASCUS AND MOST HAVE REPORTEDLY ALREADY LEFT COUNTRY. TWO BURNED CREW MEMBERS, ONE AMCIT AND ONE LEBANESE, EVACUATED BY ROAD TO DAMASCUS ON JULY 4 AND FLOWN TO BURN CENTER IN BIRMINGHAM, ENGLAND. CONVOY OF TWO BURN VICTIMS ALSO EVACUATED FIVE OTHER MEA EMPLOYEES.

6. RELIABLE MEA SOURCE REPORTED JULY 6 THAT AIRPORT RUNWAYS STILL USABLE, CONTAINING ONLY EIGHT SMALL RUPTURES DUE BOMBARDMENTS. CONDITION OF RADAR AND CONTROL TOWER EQUIPMENT SUBJECT OF CONFLICTING REPORTS, BUT SAME SOURCE REPORTED JUNE 24 THAT EQUIPMENT STILL INTACT. HOWEVER, IT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT AIRCRAFT CAN LAND AT AIRPORT IN DAYLIGHT HOURS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO CONTROL TOWER. LATEST DEMONSTRATION WAS JULY 8 LANDING OF ICRC DC-6 CARRYING SIX TONS MEDICAL SUUPPLIES.

7. AIRPORT PRESENTLY UNDER CONTROL ARAB LEAGUE FORCE COMPOSED OF SOME 700 SYRIANS, 300 LIBYANS, 500 SAUDI ARABIANS, AND 500 SUDANESE. PERIODIC BOMBARDMENTS CONTINUE. PURPOSE OF ARAB LEAGUE FORCE IS TO SUPERVISE CEASE-FIRE WHICH SO FAR HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO IMPOSE. AIRPORT WAS PRIMARY RALLY POINT OF SYRIANS ANDLIBYAN ARAB LEAGUE FORCES WHO ACCEPTED CONTROL OF AREA FROM REGULAR SYRIAN ARMY ON JUNE 21. HOWEVER, CONTINUED QUARRELS HAVE KEPT AL FORCES FROM ADVANCING FROM AIRPORT AREA AND JUNE 23 SHELLING SEEN LARGELY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06147 130545Z IN RESPONSE TO HEIGHTENED CHRISTIAN FEARS THAT AIRPORT BE USED AS ENTRY POINT FOR ARMS FOR PALESTINIANS AND LEFTISTS. CHRISTIANS ALSO MISTRUST LIBYAN INTENTIONS, HAVING REJECTED LIBYYANS AS LEGITIMATE PARTICIPANTS IN ARAB LEAGUE FORCE.

8. CHRISTIAN ARTILLERY CONTINUES DOMINATE AIRPORT FROM SEVERAL POINTS AND, UNLESS GUARANTEES CAN BE WORKED OUT, IT IS UNLIKELY CHRISTIANS WILL ALLOW AIRPORT REOPEN, ALTHOUGH SOME ICRC AND OTHER MERCY FLIGHTS MAY BE ALLOWED IN. FOR NOW CHRISTIANS QUITE CONTENT WITH JOUNIEH PORT AS SUPPLY ENTRY AND PERSONNEL EXIT PORT. SOME 12 BOATS NOW PROVIDING DAILY SERVICE BETWEEN LEBANON AND CYPRUS.

SEELYE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNN

SHELLING OF AUB CAMPUS
Date: 1976 October 18, 15:45 (Monday)	Canonical ID: 1976BEIRUT08047_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006
To: Department of State \| Secretary of State \|Syria Damascus

1. EMBASSY HAS JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT DURING GENERAL SHELLING OF WEST BEIRUT OCT 18, FOUR SHELLS EXPLODED ON AUB CAMPUS ITSELF, PLUS TWO ON ABDUL AZIZ STREET ADJACENT TO AUB HOSPITAL, AND TWO ON BLISS STREET NEAR SAUDI EMBASSY. NO ONE WAS KILLED OR SERIOUSLY INJURED IN AUB OR ABDUL AZIZ EXPLOSION, BUT FOUR PEOPLE WERE REPORTEDLY KILLED ON BLISS STREET.

2. AUB ACTING PRESIDENT COWAN AND DEAN ELIE SALEM BELIEVE SHELLING OF AUB CAMPUS AND NEAR HOSPITAL ON ABDUL AZIZ STREET MAY BE RESULT OPENING OF AUB MEDICAL SCHOOL OCT 18, AND AN INDICATION OF WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF AUB OPENS FULL CAMPUS ON NOV 1 AS SCHEDULED. THEY ARE CONSIDERING DIRECT APPROACH TO CHRISTIAN LEADERS, ASKING THEM TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO SPARE AUB/AUH FROM FURTHER BOMBARDMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08047 181628Z

3. COMMENT: OUR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT SHELLING TODAY (OCT 18) HAS BEEN UNUSUALLY HEAVY AND WIDESPREAD ON BOTH SIDES OF CONFRONTATION LINE IN BEIRUT, AND WE HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT AUB/AUH IS BEING SINGLED OUT AS A TARGET. HOWEVER, COINCIDENCE OF OPENING OF AUB MEDICAL SCHOOL (NO FIRST-YEAR CHRISTIAN STUDENTS HAVE YET ARRIVED) AND HEAVIEST SHELLING AUB/AUH HAS SUFFERED THIS YEAR CANNOT BE IGNORED. REGARDLESS OF REASON, ANY FURTHER SHELLING OF AUB/AUH, PARTICULARLY IF SOMEONE IS KILLED, MAY MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR UNIVERSITY TO OPEN. CHARGE THEREFORE REQUESTS AUTHORIZATION TO ATTEMPT TO TELEPHONE PRESIDENT SARKIS (WHEN HE RETURNS), FORMER PRESIDENT CHAMOUN, PIERRE GEMAYEL, CHARBEL KASSIS (GUARDIAN OF THE CEDARS) AND LEADER OF THE TANZIM ASAP TO: (A) DESCRIBE RECENT SHELLINGS AT AUB/AUH, (B) EMPHASIZE DANGER TO INNOCENT LEBANESE AND FOREIGN STUDENTS AND FACULTY; AND, (C) SAY HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE DEPARTMENT TO ASK THEM TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO PREVENT SHELLING OF AUB/ AUH IN THE FUTURE.

4. IF CHARGE NOT ABLE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THESE MEN BY PHONE, WOULD PLAN SEND LETTERS ALONG LINES OUTLINED ABOVE. BELIEVE IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL IF DEPT COULD ASK AMB GHORRA IN NEW YORK TO PASS SAME MESSAGE TO CHAMOUN.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY ASAP.

LANE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CHRISTIAN CHURCHES BOMBED IN TRIPOLI
Date: 1985 January 10, 16:42 (Thursday)	Canonical ID: 85BEIRUT172_a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: Israel Jerusalem \| Israel Tel Aviv \|Secretary of State \| Syria Damascus	Linked documents or other documents with the same ID: 85BEIRUT1725_a

1. (U) THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL ATTACKS AGAINST CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS IN TRIPOLI DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY 8-9. TWO CHURCHES, MARONITE AND GREEK ORTHODOX, WERE BOMBED ON TUESDAY, CAUSING SERIOUS DAMAGE, WHILE ANOTHER GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH AND AN EVANGELICAL INSTITUTION WERE DAMAGED IN ATTACKS WEDNESDAY. A CHRISTIAN CEMETARY WAS ALSO BOMBED WEDNESDAY NIGHT.

2. (U) ISLAMIC UNIFICATION MOVEMENT (TAWHIID) HAS ISSUED TWO CONSECUTIVE CONDEMNATIONS OF THE ATTACKS, NOTING THAT TRIPOLI HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN AN EXAMPLE OF RELIGIOUS UNITY, AND DEPLORING EFFORTS “TO FRIGHTEN THE CHRISTIANS OUT OF THE CITY.” WEEKLY MEETING OF ISLAMIC DAR AL-FATWA WEDNESDAY ALSO CONDEMNED THE BOMBINGS, AS DID BRIG. OTHMAN OTHMAN, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES DURING A VISIT TO TRIPOLI WEDNESDAY.

3. (C) CHRISTIAN NOTABLE AND LEBANESE FORCES CHARTER MEMBER, CHARLES MALIK, TOLD POLOFF THAT FOUR CHRISTIANS HAVE, AS WELL, BEEN MURDERED ON ROADS NEAR TRIPOLI, AND THAT CHRISTIAN RESIDENTS OF AREA FEAR FOR THEIR LIVES. HE SAID THAT “LEBANESE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY” IS THINKING OF PREPARING A DEMARCHE TO STATE DEPARTMENT ON TRIPOLI VIOLENCE.

4. COMMENT (C): AS ALWAYS IN BEIRUT, LIST OF POSSIBLE PERPETRATORS OF THESE ATTACKS IS A LONG ONE, BEGINNING WITH TAWHIID ITSELF. MANY OBSERVERS ATTRIBUTE BOMBINGS, WHICH COME SOON AFTER RECENT DEPLOYMENT OF LAF INTO TRIPOLI AS PART OF NORTHERN SECURITY PLAN, AS EFFORT TO EMBARASS GOL (WHILE AT SAME TIME INTIMIDATING CHRISTIANS). ELABORATING ON THIS HYPOTHESIS, CHRISTIAN LEBANESE EMBASSY EMPLOYEE FROM KOURA REGION HAS TOLD US THAT MUCH BLAME IS BEING LAID AT FEET OF STILL-ACTIVE COMMUNISTS IN TRIPOLI, WITH RATIONALE BEING THAT LATTER ARE TRYING TO DISRUPT SECURITY PLAN THERE AND PLACE THE BLAME ON TAWHIID “PRINCE” SHA’BAN, WHO RECENTLY BOASTED IN A PUBLIC SPEECH THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD BEEN CRUSHED IN TRIPOLI. A SIMILAR ARGUMENT, HOWEVER, COULD BE MADE THAT TAWIID’S MAIN RIVAL IN TRIPOLI, THE ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY, IS BEHIND BOMBINGS.

BARTHOLOMEW

BOMBS IN WEST BEIRUT
Date: 1985 January 14, 14:05 (Monday)	Canonical ID: 85BEIRUT240_a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: Israel Jerusalem \| Israel Tel Aviv \|Secretary of State \| Syria Damascus

1. (C) SINCE THE SMUGGLER’S INN BLAST OF JANUARY 9, THERE HAVE BEEN FOUR MORE BOMBINGS IN WEST BEIRUT, KILLING SEVEN MORE PEOPLE AND INJURING AS MANY AS 80 MORE. IN ADDITION, A LARGE EXPLOSIVE CHARGE PLACED IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING HOUSING THE EMBASSY’S CHIEF POLITICAL SECTION LOCAL EMPLOYEE FAILED TO DETONATE WHEN ITS FUSE EXPLODED SUNDAY NIGHT. DETAILS FOLLOW.

2. (U) THREE PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND 27 INJURED FRIDAY WHEN A BOMB EXPLODED OUTSIDE THE BANK OF BEIRUT AND ARAB COUNTRIES ON CORNICHE MAZRA’ IN WEST BEIRUT. EXPLOSION DEVASTATED THE INSIDE OF BANK, DUG A LARGE CRATER IN SIDEWALK, AND CAUSED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO VEHICLES AND OTHER BUILDINGS.

3. (U) THREE BOMBS EXPLODED SATURDAY, KILLING THREE PEOPLE AND INJURING AS MANY AS 60. TWO OF THE BOMBS, BOTH PACKED WITH NAILS, WENT OFF WITHIN FIVE MINUTES OF EACH OTHER IN THE PSP-CONTROLLED MUSSEITBEH AREA WHILE THE THIRD INJURED SIX PERSONS AND DAMAGED PROPERTY ON HAMRA STREET NEAR A PSP CHECKPOINT.

4. (C) EMBASSY POLITICAL SECTION EMPLOYEE GABY AKKAR, A CHRISTIAN, SAID THAT UNLIKE BOMB WHICH DESTROYED HIS CAR LAST MONTH, HE IS CERTAIN THAT LAST NIGHTS ABORTED EXPLOSION WAS IMED AT HIM. HE SAID THAT CHARGE WAS PLACED DIRECTLY UNDER THE BALCONY OF HIS APARTMENT. AKKAR SAID THAT HE IS NOW MAKING PLANS TO MOVE HIS FAMILY INTO THE EAST WHERE IT IS SAFE.

5. (C) COMMENT: LEBANESE PUBLIC FIGURES HAVE INEVITABLY ACCUSED ISRAEL OF BEING BEHIND BLASTS, WHILE THE SYRIAN BA’ATH PARTY HAS SINGLED OUT PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS. JOURNALISTS RESIDENT IN THE WEST VARIOUSLY ATTRIBUTE THE BLASTS TO THE MUR- ABITUN, WHICH THEY SAY IS RETURNING TO THE AREA IN FORCE AND REINVIGORATING THE OLD MURABITUN-PSP FEUD, OR HIZBALLAH,SIGNS OF WHOSE PRESENCE THEY SAY ARE INCREASINGLY DAILY. IN THIS REGARD, U.S. JOURNALISTS DESCRIBED THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN WEST BEIRUT AS HAVING SUNK TO TRULY HOBBESIAN LEVELS OF NASTINESS IN LAST MONTH, WITH THE COMBINATION OF CAR BOMBS AND ARMED ROBBERIES KEEPING MQST PEOPLE LOCKED INDOORS AT NIGHT. THERE ARE PRESENTLY REPRESENTA- TIVES OF ONLY THREE AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA RESIDENT IN BEIRUT (ASSOCIATED PRESS, LOS ANGELES TIMES, AND NEW YORK TIMES); SOME OF THESE ARE THINKING ABOUT LEAVING.

BARTHOLOMEW

INTENSE FIGHTING ALONG BEIRUT’S GREEN LINE
Date: 1985 May 7, 10:26 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID: 85BEIRUT2659_a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: CUS \| Israel Tel Aviv \| KKU \| Secretary of State

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE NIGHT OF MAY 6-7 WITNESSED SOME OF THE HEAVIEST GREEN LINE FIGHTING SINCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JULY 4, 1984, BEIRUT SECURITY PLAN. AS ALWAYS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO RECONSTRUCT THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS. HOWEVER IT APPEARS THAT THE FIGHTING BEGAN AS AN EXCHANGE OF SHELLING (TANKS, ROCKETS, AND ARTILLERY BY BOTH SIDES), THEN ESCALATED INTO BLIND SHELLING OF RESIDENTIAL AREAS IN BOTH EAST AND WEST BEIRUT. THE HEAVIEST FIGHTING WAS APPARENTLY CONCENTRATED IN THE PORT AND RAS AL-NABAH AREAS, WITH SHELLS HITTING THE EASTERN RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS OF ASHRAFIYAH AND SIN AL-FIL, AS WELL AS VARIOUS WEST BEIRUT NEIGHBORHOODS. SCATTERED ROUNDS ALSO FELL IN THE GENERAL AREA OF AWKAR, RABIYAH, AND NACCACHE, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE AREAS WERE SPECIFICALLY TARGETED.

3. ALTHOUGH EXACT FIGURES ARE UNAVAILABLE, IT IS CLEAR THAT CASUALTIES WERE HEAVIER THAN IS USUAL IN GREEN LINE FIGHTING. EMBASSY SOURCES REPORT SEEING UP TO TWENTY-FIVE BODIES IN THE PORT AREA, AND THE LAF REPORTS LOSING ONE KILLED AND TWELVE INJURED. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT THE PSP AND AMAL REQUESTED A CEASE-FIRE FOR 1600 HOURS LOCAL TIME IN ORDER TO RETRIEVE THE DEAD AND WOUNDED FROM THE NO-MAN’S LAND SEPARATING THE WARRING FACTIONS. THE RIZK TOWER IN EAST BEIRUT WAS HIT BY A TANK ROUND, DESTROYING GOL REPEATER EQUIPMENT AND DAMAGING THE ANTENNA OF A GOVERNMENT TELEVISION STATION.

4. AUB SOURCES INDICATED THAT THE UNIVERSITY SUFFERED ONLY LIGHT DAMAGE, ALTHOUGH ONE STUDENT SUFFERED INJURIES REQUIRING HOSPITALIZATION. SCHOOL IS OPEN TODAY, MAY 7, BUT ATTENDANCE IS SPARSE. THIS SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE PREVAILING ATTITUDE AMONG AMERICAN CITIZENS IN WEST BEIRUT IS ONE OF “DEPRESSION.” THEY SEE NO DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE THREAT, SUCH AS OF THE LF OR LAF CROSSING THE GREEN LINE TO ATTACK WEST BEIRUT, BUT RECENT EVENTS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A FEELING OF HOPELESSNESS ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE OF LEBANON. THIS SOURCE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH AUB AMCIT FACULTY MEMBERS ARE NOT PLANNING TO LEAVE BEIRUT NOW IN RESPONSE TO A PERCEIVED THREAT, MANY ARE PLANNING ON LEAVING LEBANON AFTER THE END OF THE TERM IN LATE JUNE, EITHER BY NOT RENEWING THEIR CONTRACTS OR BY TAKING A YEAR’S SABBATICAL.

5. THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND REMAINS TENSE MAY 7, WITH MOST STORES REPORTEDLY CLOSED IN MUCH OF WEST BEIRUT AND THE ASHRAFIYAH SECTION OF EAST BEIRUT. THOSE SHOPS THAT ARE OPEN ARE MOSTLY OF THE MOM AND POP FOOD STORE VARIETY. THE SITUATION APPROACHES NORMAL IN EASTERN AREAS FURTHER FROM THE GREEN LINE. ALL GREEN LINE CROSSINGS ARE OFFICIALLY CLOSED.

6. COMMENT. IT IS STILL TOO SOON TO TELL IF RECENT OUTBREAKS REPRESENT SPONTANEOUS OUTBURSTS OR ARE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. WE EXPECT THE SHARP FIGHTING ALONG THE GREEN LINE TO CONTINUE. HOWEVER, DESPITE UNSUBSTANTIATED RUMORS OF TROOP MOVEMENTS AND FEARS OF IMPENDING CLASHES, SUQ AL-GHARB HAS REMAINED CURIOUSLY QUIET. END COMMENT.

BARTHOLOMEW

NOTE BY OC/T: HEADING AS RECEIVED.

CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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The War Files (Part VIII) – Bashir Gemayel In 1977

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The War Files (Part X) – The Christian Infighting Of 1985

The War Files (Part XI) – The Muslim Infighting Of 1985 And 1986

The War Files (Part XII) – Amal, Hezbollah, Syria: Yes, They Were At War

The War Files (Part XII) – Amal, Hezbollah, Syria: Yes, They Were At War

Image taken after the 1988 clashes between Hezbollah and Amal (source)

When people mention 1990 in Lebanon, the first thing coming to mind is Aoun’s downfall on the 13th of October. But in August 1990, a forgotten war between Syria, Amal, Hezbollah, and (indirectly) Iran was still ongoing. This post includes two cables covering the Shia infighting and the Amal-Hezbollah-Syria peace agreement of 1990. The two cables are organized chronologically

SYRIA AND THE IQLIM AL TUFFAH FIGHTING
Date: 1990 August 2, 15:03 (Thursday)	Canonical ID: 90DAMASCUS4736_a
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: SECRET
From: Syria Damascus	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: Egypt Cairo \| France Paris \| Israel Jerusalem \| Israel Tel Aviv \| Jordan Amman \| Russia Moscow \| Saudi Arabia Riyadh \| Secretary of State \| United Kingdom London \| United Nations (New York)

B) DAMASCUS 03433 C) FBIS NC3007112690 D) DAMASCUS E) FBIS NC 2607110790 F) DAMASCUS 4694 G) NICOSIA 4983 H) FBIS NC2907184290 I) NICOSIA 04992

1. (C) DAMASCUS HAS ADOPTED A LOW PUBLIC PROFILE ON THE AMAL-HIZBALLAH FIGHTING IN THE IQLIM AL TUFFAH, DESPITE ITS INTENSITY AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES. SYRIAN MEDIA HAS GIVEN LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE BATTLES AND THE SARG APPEARS TO BE TAKING FEW, IF ANY, STEPS TO TRY TO END IT. THE FLURRY OF PUBLIC DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY BETWEEN DAMASCUS AND TEHRAN, WHICH FOLLOWED PREVIOUS CLASHES BETWEEN THE TWO SHIA’ MILITIAS HAS NOT OCCURRED. UNLIKE ITS IRANIAN COUNTERPARTS, THE SARG HAS NOT CALLED FOR A CEASE-FIRE AMONG THE COMBATANTS. DAMASCUS IS SUPPORTING THE INTERVENTION OF THE LEBANESE ARMY INTO THE AREA, BUT PROBABLY ALSO REALIZES THE LAF CAN DO LITTLE TO STOP THE FIGHTING WITHOUT THE ACQUIESCENCE OF BOTH AMAL AND HIZBALLAH. INTERESTINGLY, AN ARTICLE IN AN NAHAR, AN INDEPENDENT WEST BEIRUT NEWSPAPER, PORTRAYED THE FIGHTING AS AN “UNDECLARED WAR” BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAN.

——————— DAMASCUS UNCONCERNED? ———————

2. (C) DAMASCUS HAS PAID LITTLE PUBLIC ATTENTION IN THE MEDIA TO THE FIGHTING THUS FAR, FOCUSING INSTEAD ON THE HRAWI GOVERNMENT’S JULY 11 PLAN TO IMPLEMENT TA’IF. THE SARG HAS TAKEN NO STEPS AIMED AT HALTING THE FIGHTING. EVEN THOUGH, THE FIGHTING IS IN AN AREA OF LEBANON WHERE THERE IS NO CONCENTRATION OF SYRIAN TROOPS, DAMASCUS AND TEHRAN HAVE BROKERED CEASE-FIRES BETWEEN AMAL AND HIZBALLAH PREVIOUSLY. DAMASCUS PROBABLY DOES PERCEIVE AN INTEREST IN STEMMING HIZBALLAH’S ROLE AND ANY GROWTH IN INFLUENCE AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING. IRANIAN FORMIN VELAYATI CLAIMED IN HIS LETTER TO LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER HUSS (REF A) THAT IRAN HAS BEEN IN CONTINUOUS CONTACT AND CONSULTATION WITH THE SARG, BUT EMBASSY DAMASCUS HAS NOTED A LACK OF PUBLIC DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. WE HAVE DETECTED NO SHUTTLING OF IRANIAN OR SYRIAN DIPLOMATS BETWEEN THE CAPITALS OR INTO LEBANON TO TALK WITH AMAL AND HIZBALLAH OFFICIALS.

3. (S) EMBASSY HAS ALSO DETECTED NO ATTEMPT BY THE SARG TO STOP THE FLOW OF ARMS TO THE COMBATANTS. PRESS ACCOUNTS INDICATE THAT SOME OF DAMASCUS’ OTHER LEBANESE SURROGATES, SUCH AS ELIE HUBAYQA, ARE ASSISTING AMAL, WHICH PROBABLY INCLUDES SUPPLYING ARMS. IF THE SYRIANS CAN PREVENT THEIR PROXIES FROM SUPPLYING GENERAL AWN AT A MOMENT’S NOTICE (REF D), THEY ALMOST CERTAINLY COULD EXERT THE SAME INFLUENCE ON THEIR PROXIES WHO ARE SUPPLYING AMAL.

4. (S) DAMASCUS IS ALSO VOID OF ANY RUMORS HINTING THAT THE SYRIANS MAY HAVE CLOSED THE BORDER TO LEBANON TO SHUT DOWN THE THE IRANIAN PIPELINE TO HIZBALLAH OR STOPPED THE FLOW OF ARMS FROM THE BIQA’ TO THE SOUTH. CONTROL OF THESE PIPELINES ARE THE SARG’S PRINCIPAL LEVERAGE OVER THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND HIZBALLAH AND ONE THEY HAVE USED DURING PREVIOUS CLASHES BETWEEN AMAL AND HIZBALLAH. EARLIER THIS YEAR, DAMASCUS SHUT THE LEBANESE BORDER TO THE IRANIANS IN PART TO PROTEST IRAN’S SUPPLYING OF ARMS TO HIZBALLAH. WHEN THE SARG REOPENED IT, IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND THEIR SUPPLIES ENTERED LEBANON UNDER TIGHTER CONTROLS (REF B). UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, THE SYRIANS SHOULD BE AWARE OF WHAT IS CROSSING THE BORDER INTO LEBANON. (COMMENT: BECAUSE OF ITS CONTROL OVER THE PIPELINE, THE SARG MAY NOT HAVE BEEN CAUGHT TOTALLY OFF GUARD BY THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING SEVERAL WEEKS LATER, REALIZING THAT HIZBALLAH HAD BEEN RESUPPLIED.)

5. (C) THE SARG HAS ALSO ALLOWED ITS ALLY, AMAL LEADER NABIH BERRI TO PUBLICLY CALL FOR THE REMOVAL OF IRANIAN FORCES FROM LEBANON. BERRI HAS MADE SEVERAL STATEMENTS OVER THE LAST COUPLE OF MONTHS REITERATING THIS POINT WITH LITTLE DETECTABLE REACTION FROM THE SARG. AMAL OFFICIALS HAVE ACCUSED IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS OF PARTICIPATING IN THE FIGHTING AND HAVE EVEN BLAMED THEM FOR ESCALATING IT (REF C).

———————- WHAT DAMASCUS HAS DONE ———————-

6. (C) THE SARG HAS ANNOUNCED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE INTERVENTION OF THE LEBANESE ARMY (LAF) INTO THE IQLIM AL TUFFAH IN ORDER TO HALT THE FIGHTING (REF F). LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL LAHUD WAS IN DAMASCUS OVER THE WEEKEND MEETING WITH GENERAL SHIHABI, ACCORDING TO LEBANESE PRESS REPORTS (REF G). THE PLAN TO INTERVENE IN THE IQLIM FIGHTING PROBABLY WAS A TOPIC OF CONVERSATION, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE LAF HAS FEW TROOPS AND WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO GET INVOLVED BOTH IN THE IQLIM AND AID IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JULY 11 PLAN IN BEIRUT.

——————- AN “UNDECLARED WAR” ——————-

7. (U) AN NAHAR, AN INDEPENDENT WEST BEIRUT NEWSPAPER, PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE ON JULY 25 ENTITLED “THE IQLIM AL TUFFAH WAR IS BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAN” (REF E). THE ARTICLE QUOTED SOURCES CLOSE TO DAMASCUS AS SAYING “THE FIGHTING…BETWEEN ‘HIZBALLAH’ AND ‘THE AMAL MOVEMENT’ IN IQLIM AL TUFFAH…IS ACTUALLY AN UNDECLARED WAR BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND SYRIA.” THE SYRIAN SOURCES BASED THIS CLAIM ON THREE FACTORS: — THE FAILURE OF AN INDIRECT AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S., WHICH HAD BEEN BROKERED BY SYRIAN FORMIN SHARA’, EARLIER THIS YEAR; — IRAN’S FEARS OF THE INCREASING PROSPECTS FOR ARAB RECONCILIATION; AND — HIZBALLAH AND IRAN’S FEARS THAT THEY WILL BE LEFT OUT OF THE PLANNING FOR LEBANON’S FUTURE.

8. (C) THE ARTICLE ALSO PRESENTS THE IRANIAN VIEWS ON WHAT LED TO THE ABOVE PROBLEMS. THE IRANIAN SOURCES BELIEVE THE SYRIAN SPONSORED US-IRANIAN AGREEMENT FAILED BECAUSE OF “DAMASCUS’ CONNIVANCE WITH WASHINGTON” AND DAMASCUS ‘S FALLING INTO THE U.S. TRAP AND ITS (DAMASCUS) IGNORANCE OF THE FACT THAT “U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION…HAS NOT CHANGED.” SYRIA’S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH EGYPT AND THE NEVERENDING ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE SYRIA AND IRAQ TRIGGERED THE SECOND IRANIAN FEAR. THE JULY 11 PLAN’S EXCLUSION OF THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS UNTIL “ALL OBSTACLES, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH ARE THE FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENTS, ARE OVERCOME” HEIGHTENED THE LAST IRANIAN CONCERN.

9. (C) ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE, IT WAS THE IRANIAN FUNDAMENTALIST ANALYSIS OF THE SYRIAN STAND CONCERNING LEBANON THAT “PROMPTED THEM (IRAN AND HIZBALLAH) TO ESCALATE THE WAR IN THE IQLIM AL -TUFFAH WHERE SYRIA HAS NO DIRECT PRESENCE AND WHERE ITS ALLIES CAN NOT STAND ALONE AND … WIN.” THE ARTICLE STATES THE AIM OF THE FIGHTING IS TO SEIZE CONTROL OF TERRITORY AND MAKE IRAN AND ITS ALLIES HEARD IN LEBANON AND THE REGION. (COMMENT: LEBANESE PRESS HAS REPORTED THAT DAMASCUS HAS ASKED THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE TO INCLUDE HIZBALLAH IN THE EXPANDED LEBANESE CABINET. THE SARG DID SPECIFY, HOWEVER, THAT HIZBALLAH MUST FIRST ACCEPT TA’IF. IN OTHER WORDS, SARG IS DEMANDING THAT HIZBALLAH AND GENERAL AWN LIVE UP TO THE SAME CONDITIONS — AN UNLIKELY EVENT.) (REF I)

10. (C) DAMASCUS PROBABLY WILL MAINTAIN ITS PUBLIC AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS THE FIGHTING AS LONG AS AMAL HOLDS ITS OWN AGAINST HIZBALLAH, WHICH RECENT IRANIAN AND . HIZBALLAH CALLS FOR A CEASE-FIRE SEEM TO INDICATE. THE SARG CAN HIDE ITS INACTION BEHIND THE JUSTIFICATION THAT IT HAS NO TROOPS IN THE AREA TO INTERVENE.

– 11. (C) THE CURRENT WILDCARD IS THE POTENTIAL ISRAELI REACTION TO THE CONTINUED FIGHTING IN THE IQLIM. SO FAR, NEITHER THE SARG OR THE SYRIAN MEDIA HAS MADE AN ISSUE OF RECENT ISRAELI STATEMENTS THREATENING POSSIBLE INTERVENTION SHOULD THE FIGHTING THREATEN ISRAEL’S SECURITY (REF H). THE ISRAELIS MAY BE LOOKING CLOSELY AT THE PLO’S PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON IN THIS REGARD.

12. (C) THE AN NAHAR ARTICLE NO DOUBT GOES TO FAR IN CASTING THE FIGHTING IN THE IQLIM AS ENTIRELY A “WAR” BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAN BUT TENSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SPONSORS PROBABLY ARE A FACTOR. THE ARTICLE DOES CORRECTLY HIGHLIGHT MANY OF THE RECENT EVENTS WHICH HAVE CAUSED STRAINS BETWEEN DAMASCUS AND TEHRAN. THE TWO COUNTRIES ULTIMATELY ARE AT ODDS IN THEIR VISION FOR LEBANON’S FUTURE.

DJEREJIAN

SYRIAN-IRANIAN MEETINGS IN DAMASCUS LEAD TO NEW AMAL-HIZBALLAH AGREEMENT
Date: 1990 November 7, 15:35 (Wednesday)	Canonical ID: 90DAMASCUS7323_a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
From: Syria Damascus	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: Algeria Algiers \| Commander in Chief European Command Vaihingen Germany \|Cyprus Nicosia \| Egypt Cairo \| France Paris \| Israel Tel Aviv \| Italy Rome \|Jordan Amman \| Morocco Rabat \| Saudi Arabia Riyadh \| Secretary of State \|Tunisia Tunis \| United Kingdom London \|United Nations (Geneva) \| United Nations (New York)

1. (U) AN IRANIAN DELEGATION LED BY IRANIAN VICE PRESIDENT DR. HASAN HABIBI MET SYRIAN COUNTERPARTS IN DAMASCUS NOVEMBER 3-5 WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SUPREME SYRIAN-IRANIAN COUNCIL TO DISCUSS A FULL RANGE OF BILATERAL AND REGIONAL SUBJECTS. ACCOMPANYING HABIBI WERE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER VELAYATI, HIS ASSISTANT GHOLAM REZA SAN’ATI, DIRECTOR OF THE MIDDLE EAST SECTION OF THE IRANIAN MFA MAHMUD HASHEMI-RAFSANJANI, ASSISTANT DEFENSE MINISTER MUHAMMAD VAHIDI, ADVISER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AHMAD FAS MALIJIAN, AND CHIEF OF PROTOCOL FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT MUHAMMAD HOSEYN DANYAL.

——————————- AMAL-HIZBALLAH AGREEMENT SIGNED ——————————-

2. (U) THE SYRIAN MEDIA ON 5 NOVEMBER ANNOUNCED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LEBANESE SHIA AMAL AND HIZBALLAH MOVEMENTS FOLLOWING TALKS AT THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY WHICH REPORTEDLY BEGAN THE EVENING OF 4 NOVEMBER. THE ACCORD WAS SIGNED BY AMAL LEADER NABIH BERRI AND HIZBALLAH SECRETARY GENERAL SUBHI AL-TUFAYLI “UNDER THE AUSPICES” OF THE IRANIAN AND SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AND IN THE PRESENCE OF SYRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF IN LEBANON, BRIGADIER GENERAL GHAZI KANAAN. ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT: — THE TWO SIDES WILL HELP FACILITATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON “IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS ABILITY TO ENFORCE LAW AND ORDER.” — ANY DISAGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT MUST BE RESOLVED THROUGH REFERENCE TO THE SYRIAN AND IRANIAN PARTIES AND SUBJECT TO THEIR INTERPRETATION. — ALL PERSONS EVACUATED AS A RESULT OF AMAL- HIZBALLAH FIGHTING SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THEIR “AREAS, VILLAGES, AND HOMES.” — A COMMITTEE WILL BE FORMED, “COMPRISING BRIGADIER. GENERAL. GHAZI KANAAN AND (IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SYRIA) AKHTARI,” TO SUPERVISE AND FOLLOW UP IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. — FURTHER TO THE APPENDIX TO THE DAMASCUS AGREE- MENT (JANUARY 30, 1989), AND IN CASE EITHER PARTY VIOLAQTHE AGREEMENT, THE “INJURED PARTY” MUST INFORM THE COMMITTEE, WHICH WILL THEN CONVENE IMMEDIATELY TO “TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION TO DETER THE VIOLATOR WITHIN A MAXIMUM PERIOD OF 24 HOURS. IN CASE OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE, THE ACCUSED WILL BE HANDED OVER TO THE CONCERNED AUTHORITIES.” — THE AGREEMENT WILL TAKE EFFECT AS OF 10 NOVEMBER 1990.

—————————————– NO OTHER CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENTS NOTED, YET —————————————–

3. (U) BEYOND MENTIONING HABIBI’S DESCRIPTION OF HIS TALKS AS “SUCCESSFUL AND FRUITFUL” ON HIS RETURN TO TEHRAN NOVEMBER 6, THE SYRIAN MEDIA HAS NOT PROVIDED DETAILS OF ANY SUBSTANTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS TOWARD THE STATED GOAL OF “CHARTING A PLAN OF ACTION” TO DEVELOP BILATERAL RELATIONS “IN ALL FIELDS.” BOTH SIDES AGREED TO FORM SUBCOMMITTEES TO FOLLOW UP THE SYRIAN-IRANIAN JOINT COMMITTEE’S THREE SESSIONS ON BILATERAL COOPERATION. HABIBI MET WITH SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASAD (IN LATAKIA) ON NOVEMBER 4, AS WELL AS WITH VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM. OTHER MEETINGS BETWEEN IRANIAN AND SYRIAN OFFICIALS DEALT WITH LEBANON AND OTHER “REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES,” ACCORDING TO THE LIMITED MEDIA REPORTING.

—————————————- EXCHANGE OF POSITIONS ON THE GULF CRISIS —————————————-

4. (C) WHILE SYRIA CONSIDERS ITS SUCCESS ENSURING IRANIAN COMPLIANCE WITH UN SANCTIONS ON IRAQ TO HAVE BEEN THE SUPREME ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ASAD’S SEPTEMBER VISIT TO IRAN, THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES APPARENTLY CONTINUE TO BE AN ISSUE. ALTHOUGH SYRIAN MEDIA HAVE BEEN LARGELY SILENT ON GULF-BELATED ISSUES (SEE SEPTEL ON INFORMATION MINISTER SALMAN’S RECENT REAFFIRMATION THAT SYRIA DEMANDS IRAQ’S FULL AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT), WE NOTE THAT IRANIAN MEDIA CITED HABIBI’S NOVEMBER 4 STATEMENT THAT “ALLIED FORCES MUST WITHDRAW FROM THE REGION” AND THAT KHADDAM SAID IN RESPONSE THAT “THE PERMANENT PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES HAS NOT TOLERABLE.” THE TWO SIDES ALSO RECONFIRMED THEIR REJECTION OF ANY GEOGRAPHICAL CHANGES IN THE REGION AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR COLLECTIVE REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION. SYRIAN PRESS ON NOVEMBER 7 QUOTED HABIBI’S ARRIVAL STATEMENT AFFIRMING SYRIA’S AND IRAN’S CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ’S INVASION OF KUWAIT AND THE TWO GOVERNMENTS’ CALL FOR IRAQ’S UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL.

——- COMMENT ——-

5. (C) THIS LATEST AGREEMENT TO END THE OFTEN BLOODY INTRA-SHIA FEUDING IN LEBANON WILL LIKELY BE THE PRINCIPAL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS VISIT. UPON HIS RETURN TO TEHRAN, HABIBI LAUDED THE AGREEMENT AS AN ACHIEVEMENT WHICH WILL ENABLE “THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL CAPABILITIES TO CONFRONT THE ZIONIST ENEMY.” HIZBALLAH LEADER AL-TUFAYLI ECHOED THIS SENTIMENT WHILE AMAL LEADER BERRI, BY CONTRAST, MERELY VOICED THE HOPE THAT AMAL AND HIZBALLAH MEMBERS WILL BE ABLE TO “RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND VILLAGES.” 6. (C) THE ABSENCE OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT OTHER ASPECTS OF THE VISIT MAY REFLECT DISAGREEMENTS OVER THORNY BILATERAL MATTERS LIKE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. OUR COLLEAGUES TELL US THAT ASAD DID NOT OVERCOME THE RESISTANCE TO CONTINUED OR INCREASED ECONOMIC AID TO SYRIA BY CERTAIN HARDLINE IRANIAN CLERICS, BECAUSE OF SYRIA’S 5.5 BILLION USD DEBT, DURING ASAD’S VISIT TO TEHRAN. AS A RESULT, NO CONCRETE TRADE AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED, ALTHOUGH SYRIA IS STILL TAKING ADVANTAGE OF CONTINUED IRANIAN WILLINGNESS TO SELL IT OIL AT BELOW-MARKET RATES. WHETHER THESE REPORTS ARE TRUE, IT DOES NOT APPEAR FROM THE COMPOSITION OF THE IRANIAN DELEGATION OR THE MODEST SYRIAN MEDIA COVERAGE THAT THIS FIRST GATHERING OF THE SYRIAN-IRANIAN SUPREME COUNCIL WILL RESULT IN HIGHER IRANIAN AID LEVELS FOR SYRIA.

DJEREJIAN

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The War Files (Part I) – The Chaos Before The War: 1973-1974

The War Files (Part II) – 1975 and 1976: Karami The Presidential Candidate, “Hafez Assad The Latest Incarnation Of the Crusaders”, and “A Certain Brigadier Aoun”

The War Files (Part III) – The Brown-Chamoun Meetings Of 1976

The War Files (Part IV) – Meeting Kamal Jumblatt

The War Files (Part V) – Meeting Saeb Salam

The War Files (Part VI) – Elias Sarkis, The Forgotten Wartime President

The War Files (Part VII) – The Cairo Peace Negotiations Of 1976

The War Files (Part VIII) – Bashir Gemayel In 1977

The War Files (Part IX) – The Chaos Following The Israeli Partial Withdrawal

The War Files (Part X) – The Christian Infighting Of 1985

The War Files (Part XI) – The Muslim Infighting Of 1985 And 1986

The War Files (Part XI) – The Muslim Infighting Of 1985 And 1986

A Shiite Muslim AMAL militiaman fires his AK-47 assault rifle during skirmishes with Druse irregulars on Corniche Mazraa road, West Beirut, Lebanon, Feb. 20, 1987. (photo credit: AP)

Today’s post is about cables covering the Muslim/Palestinian/Sunni/Shia chaos and infighting (between Amal, Hezbollah, Palestinian militias, the PSP, the Mourabitoun – among others) that happened in the last years of the war. The cables are organized chronologically.

POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF WEST BEIRUT FIGHTING
Date: 1985 April 18, 17:56 (Thursday)	Canonical ID: 85BEIRUT2325_a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: Cyprus Nicosia \| Egypt Cairo \| France Paris \| Israel Jerusalem \| Israel Tel Aviv \|Jordan Amman \| Saudi Arabia Riyadh \|Secretary of State \| Syria Damascus \|United Kingdom London

1. CONFIDENTIAL – ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. FOLLOWING MAJOR FIGHTING ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 16-17, A TENSE CALM NOW PREVAILS IN WEST BEIRUT. SHIITE AMAL MOVEMENT LEADER NABIH BARRI EMERGED AS THE PRIME VICTOR IN THE INTRAMUSLIM FIGHTING. STATEMENTS MADE BY THE VARIOUS LEADERS TRACK WITH OUR ANALYSIS (REFTEL A) THAT THE FIGHTING REFLECTED TWO MAJOR CONFLICTS: LEBANESE SHIA VS. LEBANESE SUNNI AND LEBANESE SHIA VS. PALESTINIANS. THE AMAL MOVEMENT, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE DRUZE PSP AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE “NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT,” HAS DEALT A SEVERE BLOW TO THE SUNNI MURABITUN MILITIA AND HAS COME OUT OF THE AFFAIR WITH ITS POSITION AS THE STRONGEST POLITICAL AND MILITARY FORCE IN WEST BEIRUT CONFIRMED AND ENHANCED.

3. THE SYRIAN ROLE REMAINS UNCLEAR, BUT MANY HERE SPECULATE THAT DAMASCUS MUST HAVE CONDONED THE AMAL/PSP MOVE AGAINST THE MURABITUN AND ITS PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIAN ALLIES AND MAY HAVE, IN FACT, ACTIVELY SUPPORTED THE CLASH.

4. IN HIS RESIGNATION STATEMENT, PRIME MINISTER RASHID KARAMI EXPRESSED DESPAIR OVER THE APRIL 16-17 FIGHTING, POINTED AN ACCUSING FIGURE AT DAMASCUS, AND ASKED FOR SYRIA TO HELP RESOLVE THE ENSUING CRISIS. IT IS TOO SOON TO MAKE ANY FIRM PREDICTIONS AS TO WHO THE NEXT PRIME MINISTER MAY BE OR WHAT FORM THE NEW CABINET MAY TAKE, BUT WE SET FORTH BELOW SOME OF THE RELEVANT FACTORS.

END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

——————————- AMAL, BACKED BY PSP, VICTORIOUS ——————————-

5. THE DUST IS NOW SETTLING IN WEST BEIRUT AFTER VERY HEAVY FIGHTING OCCURRED ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 16-17, RESULTING IN APPROXIMATELY THIRTY PERSONS KILLED AND ONE HUNDRED WOUNDED. BEIRUT AIRPORT REMAINS OPERATIONAL, AND THE GREEN LINE IS PARTIALLY OPEN, BUT SPORADIC SNIPING CONTINUES IN VARIOUS AREAS OF WEST BEIRUT.

6. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, STATEMENTS BY KEY LEADERS CONFIRMED OUR EARLIER ANALYSIS THAT THE EVENTS OF APRIL 16-17 REFLECTED A SHIA-SUNNI CONFLICT. THE SHIITE AMAL MILITIA, BACKED BY THE DRUZE PSP, HIT HARD AT THE SUNNI MURABITUN MILITIA, REPORTEDLY TAKING CONTROL OF ALL SIGNIFICANT MURABITUN POSITIONS, INCLUDING THE “VOICE OF ARAB LEBANON” RADIO STATION LOCATED IN THE ABDUL NASR MOSQUE.

7. THE REACTION OF SUNNI LEADERS HAS BEEN STRONG. PRIME MINISTER KARAMI RESIGNED (SEE BELOW), AND THE GRAND MUFTI OF THE REPUBLIC, SHEIKH HASSAN KHALID, STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE SHIA FOR STRIKING AGAINST TRADITIONALLY SUNNI WEST BEIRUT. “IT IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEIRUT TO BE STRUCK AND HUMILIATED AND ITS AUTHORITY SEIZED BY THOSE VERY PEOPLE THAT IT PROTECTED AND WILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT…BY THOSE THAT IT WELCOMED AND HONORED AND WILL CONTINUE TO WELCOME AND HONOR.” THE MUFTI ADDED THAT THE SUNNIS WOULD NOT PERMIT THE INHABITANTS OF WEST BEIRUT TO BE “STRUCK AS IF THEY HAD BECOME ISRAELI AGENTS.” EXPRESSING SOLIDARITY WITH PRIME MINISTER KARAMI, FORMER PM TAKIADDIN SOLH STRONGLY REGRETTED THE FIGHTING WHICH “OPPOSED PARTIES STRUGGLING FOR A COMMON CAUSE…WHO SHOULD DIRECT THEIR WEAPONS EXCLUSIVELY AGAINST THE ISRAELI ENEMY.”

8. AMAL LEADER NABIH BARRI RESPONDED VEHEMENTLY TO THE MUFTI’S NOTION THAT THE SHIA WERE GUESTS IN TRADITIONALLY SUNNI WEST BEIRUT. “BEIRUT IS MY CITY AND MY CAPTIAL,” HE SAID, “WE WILL NOT ACCEPT CANTONS THAT DEFINE US AS FOREIGNERS WHEN WE ARE PEOPLE OF THE HOUSE.” SUPPORTING BARRI’S STATEMENT, THE DRUZE PSP SAID IT “COULD NOT UNDERSTAND…HOW HE (THE MUFTI) COULD QUALIFY CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF WEST BEIRUT (I.E., THE SHIA) AS INTRUDERS. …THOSE WHO DEFEND WITH THEIR BLOOD THE CAPITAL AGAINST FASCIST-PHALANGE AGRESSION, THOSE WHO STRUGGLE SO THAT BEIRUT WILL REMAIN ARAB AND FREE CANNOT BE CALLED INTRUDERS.”

9. IN THE SECOND INSTANCE, THE APRIL 16-17 FIGHTING WAS A SHIA-PALESTINIAN SET-TO. THE SHIA, BACKED BY THE DRUZE, STRUCK HARD NOT ONLY AT THE SUNNI MURABITUN BUT ALSO AT THE PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE MURABITUN. THEIR SUCCESS IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, WAS LESS OVERWHELMING, IN PART BECAUSE THE PALESTINIANS APPARENTLY DID NOT “RISE TO THE BAIT” AND PARTICIPATE IN THE FIGHTING WITH ALL THEIR FORCE. SINCE THE FIGHTING, AMAL AND PSP HAVE REPORTEDLY ESTABLISHED CHECKPOINTS AROUND THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS, TIGHTENING CONTROL OVER THE INFLUX OF ARMS.

10. IN A MAJOR PUBLIC STATEMENT, AMAL HIT HARD AT THE PALESTINIANS. BARRI CALLED THE FIGHTING A “NIGHTMARE” IN WHICH HIS AMAL MILITIA CONFRONTED “AN UPRISING CAREFULLY PLANNED BY ARAB HANDS EXPLOITING SECTARIAN IDEAS, FOREIGNERS, INTRUDERS, AND GUESTS IN BEIRUT.” BARRI ASKED RHETORICALLY “WHY SOME OUTSIDERS (I.E., THE PALESTINIANS) ARE CONSIDERED AS GUESTS, EVEN IF THEY COME FROM ANOTHER REGION AND ANOTHER CONFESSION, WHILE THE REAL GUESTS IN BEIRUT (I.E., THE SHIA), WHO HAD THE HONOR OF LIBERATING THE CITY FROM THE CHAINS OF MAY 17 AND THE AGENTS OF ISRAEL, ARE NOT WELL LOOKED UPON…”

11. ON THE GROUND, THE VICTORS HAVE MOVED TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR GAINS. LEADERS OF AMAL, PSP, AND THE SMALLER MEMBERS OF THE LEFTIST “NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT” (SYRIAN SOCIALIST NATIONAL PARTY, LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY, SYRIAN ARAB BAATH PARTY) MET AT BARRI’S WEST BEIRUT RESIDENCE ON APRIL 17 AND ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF A UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN ORDER IN WEST BEIRUT (A THROW-BACK TO AN IDEA FIRST FIELDED AFTER THE FEBRUARY 6, 1984, FIGHTING AND DROPPED AFTER STIFF SUNNI RESISTANCE). THIS GROUP PLANS TO SET UP AN OPERATIONS ROOM AND A BUREAU OF CITIZENS AFFAIRS. IT SAYS IT WILL ALSO COMMAND A JOINT “STRIKE FORCE” INITIALLY COMPRISING 300 MEN, TO BE DOUBLED TO 600, DRAWN IN EQUAL NUMBERS FROM AMAL, THE PSP, AND THE JUNIOR MEMBERS OF THE NDF. ACCORDING TO THE BEIRUT DAILY, “LE REVEIL,” WEST BEIRUT NEIGHBORHOODS HAVE BEEN PARCELED OUT AMONG THESE GROUPS. AMAL IS REPORTEDLY RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN TARIQ AL-JADIDAH, FAKAHANI, MAZRAH, AND KARAKAS; THE PSP IN RAS BEIRUT, HAMRA, AYN AL-MURAYSA, MINAT AL-HISN, MUSAYTIBAH, AND RAWSHAH; AND THE VARIOUS SMALLER GROUPS UNDER THE EGIS OF THE PSP IN SMALL, TOKEN SECTIONS OF TERRITORY.

12. NOTABLY ABSENT FROM REPRESENTATION ON THE UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND OR IN THE DIVISION OF SPOILS IS ANY SUNNI MUSLIM GROUP. LACK OF GOL OR LAF PARTICIPATION GOES WITHOUT SAYING. MORE THAN EVER BEFORE, NABIH BARRI HAS ESTABLISHED HIMSELF AS THE STRONGMAN OF WEST BEIRUT. THROUGH THE FORMATION OF THE UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND AND THE ANNOUNCED FORMATION OF A “POLITICAL HIGH COMMAND,” THE SHIITE AMAL MOVEMENT WITH ITS ALLIES IS CONSOLIDATING AND FORMALIZING ITS CONTROL OF WEST BEIRUT. THIS WILL BE A BITTER PILL FOR THE SUNNI COMMUNITY TO SWALLOW.

———– SYRIAN ROLE ———–

13. THERE AS BEEN MUCH SPECULATION AND LITTLE CONCRETE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE ROLE THAT SYRIA MAY HAVE PLAYED IN THE APRIL 16-17 FIGHTING. AS WE ANTICIPATED (REFTEL A), THE FACT THAT NABIH BARRI HAD JUST RETURNED FROM DAMACUS BEFORE THE FIGHTING HAS FUELED SPECULATION THAT SYRIA CONDONED AND PERHAPS ACTIVELY SUPPORTED THE MOVE AGAINST THE MURABITUN AND, ESPECIALLY, AGAINST THE PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS. ACCORDING TO THIS LINE OF REASONING, SYRIA MAY NEXT UNLEASH AMAL AND THE PSP AGAINST THE PRO-ARAFAT PALESTINIANS IN THE BEIRUT SOUTHERN SUBURBS AND IN SIDON. IN ANY EVENT, SYRIA IS CERTAINLY WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS HERE CLOSELY AND IS APPARENTLY NOT UNHAPPY WITH THE COURSE THEY HAVE TAKEN SO FAR.

14. IN HIS RESIGNATION STATEMENT (REFTEL B.), PRIME MINISTER KARAMI EXPRESSED DEEP DESPAIR OVER THE VIOLENCE IN WEST BEIRUT. HE OBLIQUELY BUT CLEARLY BLAMED SYRIA FOR THE “GRAVE AND SERIOUS” EVENTS AND CALLED ON IT TO HELP SORT OUT THE CRISIS. ON APRIL 18, KARAMI DEPARTED FOR DAMASCUS TO MEET WITH SARG LEADERS.

—————————- REPLACING THE PRIME MINISTER —————————-

15. THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS LATEST BATTLE IN WEST BEIRUT WAS TO FORCE THE RESIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTER KARAMI WHO, CONFRONTED WITH BARRI’S SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON SUNNI INTERESTS, HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO RESIGN. THE SELECTION OF A NEW SUNNI PRIME MINISTER IS SUBJECT TO A NUMBER OF RESTRAINTS. FOREMOST IS THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF ANY SUNNI NOTABLE AGREEING TO REPLACE THE DESPAIRING KARAMI UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITIONS. KARAMI CLEARLY FELT HUMILIATED BY THE EVENTS OF APRIL 16-17; NO SELF-RESPECTING SUNNI WOULD OVERTLY ATTEMPT TO PROFIT BY THE “EFFENDI’S” DISCOMFITURE. SECONDLY, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE A SUNNI LEADER TO PRESIDE OVER A CABINET WITH AN UNREPENTANT BARRI AND JUMBLATT PRESENT. FINALLY, SYRIA’S APPROVAL OF THE NEW PRIME MINISTER WILL BE REQUIRED. NOT KNOWING SYRIA’S EXACT ROLE AND INTENTIONS IN THE EVENTS IN THE WEST, THE PROSPECTIVE SUNNI CANDIDATES WILL BE WARY.

16. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE CAN FORESEE ONE FORM WHICH A POSSIBLE SOLUTION MIGHT TAKE. FOR EXAMPLE, A MEETING OF SUNNI RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL NOTABLES AT THE DAR AL-FATWA, THE SEAT OF THE GRAND MUFTI, MIGHT ISSUE A SET OF CONDITIONS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE MET BEFORE A SUNNI COULD ACCEPT THE PREMIERSHIP. THIS WOULD ALLOW THE NEW PRIME MINISTER TO CLAIM THE BACKING OF THE SUNNI COMMUNITY FOR NEW TERMS FOR HIS PARTICIPATION, THUS MORE OR LESS TURNING THE PAGE ON KARAMI’S RESIGNATION. WE CANNOT PRECLUDE THAT, UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, KARAMI HIMSELF MIGHT NOT BE REINCARNATED.

17. POSSIBLE PRECONDITIONS (APART FROM CONCILIATORY STATEMENTS AND GESTURES FROM AMAL AND THE PSP) INCLUDE AN AGREEMENT THAT BARRI AND JUMBLATT WOULD PARTICIPATE IN CABINET MEETINGS, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY PLAN FOR THE SUNNI HEARTLANDS OF WEST BEIRUT, SIDON, AND POSSIBLY TRIPOLI. ANY OF THE ABOVE CONCESSIONS WOULD BE HARD TO EXTRACT FROM THE SHIA, WHO ARE RIDING HIGH AT PRESENT. THUS THE CABINET CRISIS MIGHT BECOME A DRAWN-OUT AFFAIR.

———————— FORMING A NEW GOVERNMENT ————————

18. AS FOR THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT, WE SEE TWO PRIMARY OPTIONS. THE FIRST, A SMALL CABINET MUCH LIKE THE OUTGOING “NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT,” APPEARS DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. BASICALLY THE SAME PERSONALITIES WOULD BE INVOLVED, AND THE SAME ANIMOSITIES WOULD REAPPEAR. IN SUM, THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE KARAMI GOVERNMENT ARE PROBABLY TOO DEEP TO BE SIMPLY PAPERED OVER, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE RISE OF SHIA POWER VIS-A-VIS THEIR SUNNI CORELIGIONISTS. THE SECOND, AN ENLARGED GOVERNMENT, RUMORS OF WHICH HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, MIGHT PROVE A MORE FEASIBLE OPTION. IN THIS CASE, WE WOULD POINT OUT THE REPUTATION OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER TAKIADDIN SOLH AS A CONCILIATOR PRESIDING OVER LARGE GOVERNMENTS (THOUGH AGAIN, WE RECALL KARAMI’S PHOENIX-LIKE QUALITIES).

BARTHOLOMEW

CONTINUED WAR FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS — ANOTHER SYRIAN FAILURE?
Date: 1986 December 1, 15:26 (Monday)	Canonical ID: 86DAMASCUS7104_a
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: SECRET
From: Syria Damascus	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: Commander in Chief European Command Vaihingen Germany \| France Paris \| Israel Tel Aviv \| Lebanon Beirut \| Secretary of State

1. SECRET – ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AS REFTELS POINT OUT, SYRIA APPEARS TO BE FACING A SUBSTANTIAL DEFEAT IF IT IS NOT ABLE TO QUICKLY AND RESOLUTELY RESOLVE THE LATEST ROUND IN THE “WAR OF THE CAMPS” IN LEBANON. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS LATEST ROUND OF FIGHTING ALREADY REPRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL FAILURE OF SYRIAN POLICY WHICH THREATENS TO ERODE DAMASCUS’ STRATEGY TOWARDS THE PALESTINIANS AND ITS EFFORTS TO SABOTAGE THE PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION PROCESS NOW GOING ON. FURTHER IT DAMAGES SYRIA’S IMAGE WITHIN THE ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND INCREASINGLY CONTRIBUTES TO DISSENT WITHIN THE POLICY- MAKING PROCESS IN DAMASCUS ITSELF. END SUMMARY.

3. WE CONCUR WITH EMBASSY BEIRUT (REFTEL) THAT THE CONTINUED FIGHTING BETWEEN AMAL AND THE PALESTINIANS, IN WHICH AMAL PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN SADLY DEFICIENT, REPRESENTS A MAJOR DILEMMA FOR SYRIAN POLICY-MAKERS. INDEED, WE WOULD GO FURTHER AND SAY THAT THE FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE FIGHTING AT THIS POINT ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO AMAL AND THE SYRIANS ALREADY REPRESENTS A SEVERE SYRIAN DEFEAT AND THREATENS TO FURTHER UNRAVEL DAMASCUS’ ALREADY DISINTEGRATING PALESTINIAN POLICY. —

4. A JORDANIAN JOURNALIST WITH EXCELLENT PALESTINIAN CONTACTS HAS TOLD US THAT IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE, THE PFLP — THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE SYRIAN-BACKED PNSF WITH SUBSTANTIAL POPULAR SUPPORT AMONG THE PALESTINIANS — HAS TAKEN A DECIDEDLY ANTI-SYRIAN LINE AND HAS SPLIT WITH THE MORE TRACTABLE PRO-SYRIAN ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE ABU MUSA FATAH GROUP, THE PFLP-GC, AND SAIQA. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE, THE PFLP IS NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF ITSELF, THE DFLP, FATAH AND THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE CAMPS. SPECIFICALLY, THE PFLP NEGOTIATORS REFUSE TO TURN OVER TERRITORIES GAINED IN THE SIDON AREA TO ANYONE BUT MUSTAFA SA’ID’S POPULAR NASSARISTS MOVEMENT. THE SCENARIO WE HAVE RECEIVED OF NEGOTIATIONS POSITS GREAT BITTERNESS BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AS A WHOLE ON THE ONE HAND AND NABIH BERRI AND THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE OTHER, AS WELL AS A GREAT DEAL OF BACK-BITING WITHIN BOTH THE PALESTINIAN AND LEBANESE GROUPINGS.

5. THE MILITARY FAILURE ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON IS NOT DAMASCUS’ ONLY DILEMMA. AS IN PREVIOUS SYRIAN EFFORTS TO SUBJUGATE THE PALESTINIANS IN THE LEBANESE REFUGEE CAMPS THROUGH THE USE OF DAMASCUS’ AMAL SURROGATE, THE LATEST FIGHTING HAS CREATED GREAT BITTERNESS AMONG OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS. DAMASCUS IS PRESENTLY OR HAS RECENTLY BEEN HOST TO A VARIETY OF SENIOR ARAB AND ISLAMIC ENVOYS — ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIMI, LIBYA’S MAJOR JALLUD, SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTER PRINCE NAIF, AND A NUMBER OF SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICIALS. WHILE JALLUD AND THE IRANIANS HAVE BECOME PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THE PALESTINIAN/LEBAN- ESE NEGOTIATIONS, WE UNDERSTAND THAT BOTH THE ALGERIAN AND THE SAUDI DELIVERED TOUGH MESSAGES TO ASAD REGARDING THIS LATEST ASSAULT ON THE PALESTINIANS. THE SYRIANS MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TAKE SOME SMALL COMFORT IN THE ANNOUNCE- MENT BY THE “PAN-ARAB COMMAND” CALLING FOR SOLIDARITY WITH SYRIA AGAINST THE AMERICAN, BRITISH AND ISRAELI CONSPIRACY AGAINST IT, SUPPORT FOR AMAL, AND A REDEFINI- TION OF THE PALESTINIAN ROLE IN LEBANON. THIS ORGANIZATION IS, HOWEVER, ONE OF LITTLE STANDING AMONG THE ARAB STATES AS A WHOLE, TO SAY THE LEAST, AND IS LARGELY A SYRIAN-LIBYAN CREATURE. INDEED, EVEN THIS MINOR “VICTORY” AND JALLUD’S VERY CAREFUL STATEMENT OF MEASURED SUPPORT HAVE BEEN CONTRADICTED BY LIBYAN LEADER MO’AMMAR QADHAFI’S LATEST BLAST CONDEMNING AMAL. —

6. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, NOT ALL THE LEBANESE GATHERED HERE ARE IN FULL SUPPORT OF SYRIA EITHER. WHILE NONE WANT TO SEE THE RECREATION OF THE PALESTINIAN “STATE- WITHIN-A-STATE” IN LEBANON, FEW ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA THAT THIS TYPE OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE CAMPS IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE LEBANESE. AS THEY SEE IT, LEBANESE MILITIAS ARE BEING ASKED TO DO SYRIA’S WORK FOR IT AND TO SHOULDER THE BLAME WITHIN THE ARAB COMMUNITY. DRUSE LEADER WALID JUMBLATT, ACCORDING TO REPORTS, FEELS PARTICULARLY SQUEEZED. AMAL’S SH’IA RIVALS, HIZBALLAH, ARE NOT PARTICIPATING IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND, AS IN THE PAST, HAVE REFRAINED FROM GETTING INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING. AT THE SAME TIME, HIZBALLAH’S IRANIAN MENTORS ARE PARTICULARLY ACTIVE HERE. OF INTEREST, PALESTINIANS TOLD OUR JORDANIAN SOURCE THAT SHAYKHOLESLAM EXPRESSED DEEP SYMPATHY FOR THE PALESTINIAN POSITION WHEN MEETING WITH PNSF LEADERS ON NOVEMBER 24. ON THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 27, HOWEVER, SHAYKHOLESLAM RETURNED TO THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP COLDLY BEARING BERRI’S PROPOSALS. WE DO NOT, NEVERTHELESS, BELIEVE THAT IRAN’S BASIC DISAGREEMENT WITH THE SYRIAN STRATEGY TOWARDS LEBANON HAS CHANGED IN ANY WAY. THEY WANT TO TAKE ASAD’S “LEBANESE CARD” AWAY FROM HIM.

7. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT THE PNSF LEADERS BLINDLY LOYAL TO DAMASCUS DO NOT HAVE ANY REAL ABILITY TO DELIVER THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS IN THE TYRE, SIDON, OR BEIRUT CAMPS. WHAT IS NOW AT STAKE FOR DAMASCUS IS NOT MERELY AN EMBARRASSMENT THROUGH A MILITARY DEFEAT FOR ITS LEBANESE SURROGATES. RATHER, SYRIA IS FACED WITH BITTER DIVISIONS WITHIN ITS OWN UMBRELLA PALESTINIAN ORGANIZA- TION THAT COULD FINALLY TEAR IT APART, LEAVING A RUMP OF “YES-MEN” WITH NO BROAD PALESTINIAN POPULAR SUPPORT. SYRIA COULD LOSE ITS “PALESTINIAN CARD.” —

8. THIS PARALLELS THE CURRENT STAGES OF THE PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION EFFORT, WITH PFLP LEADER GEORGE HABASH NOW IN THE THIRD ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH FATAH NUMBER TWO MAN KHALIL AL-WAZIR IN ALGIERS. ALTHOUGH HABASH CONTINUES TO HOLD OUT FOR HIS DEMANDS THAT INCLUDE PRIOR ABROGATION OF THE AMMAN ACCORDS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADEN-ALGIERS AGREEMENTS, AND PLO BREAKING OFF ITS CONTACTS WITH EGYPT, THE FACT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE IS DEEPLY DISTURBING TO DAMASCUS. KHALID FAHOUM HAS TOLD WESTERN DIPLOMATS THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE INFORMED THE DAMASCUS-BASED PALESTINIANS THAT ANY OF THEM ATTENDING AN ALGERIAN PNC WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO RETURN TO SYRIA.

9. COMMENT: THE CAMPS WAR REPRESENTS A MULTIFACETED, COMPLEX DILEMMA FOR DAMASCUS. ITS IMPACT IS NOT MERELY ONE OF SYRIAN PRESTIGE AND SUPPORT OF ITS AMAL ALLY. IT HAS SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS FOR ASAD’S PALESTINIAN POLICY, HIS IMAGE WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD, AND HIS PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH ARAB AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL – INCLUDING SOVIET – LEADERS. CLOSER TO HOME, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS INTENSE INTERNAL DEBATE AMONG ASAD’S LIEUTENANTS AS TO HOW TO DEAL WITH BOTH THE CAMPS WAR AND LEBANON AS A WHOLE. THUS FAR, ASAD DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE A GRIP ON THE SITUATION. THE LONGER THIS REMAINS THE CASE, THE MORE ROOM HIS LIEUTENANTS WILL HAVE TO MANEUVER AND TO INTRIGUE AGAINST ONE ANOTHER. SEVERAL KEY SYRIAN OFFICIALS, AMONG THEM VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ALI DUBA, HAVE GREAT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE EVOLUTION OF SYRIA’S LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN POLICIES. FAILURE IS NOT USUALLY PERMITTED BY DAMASCUS UNDER ASAD. HOWEVER, AS WE LOOK AROUND HERE, FAILURE SEEMS TO BE BECOMING AN INCREASING PHENOMENA WITHIN SYRIAN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLICY.

10. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

RANSOM

THE CAMPS WAR IN LEBANON
Date: 1986 December 4, 13:17 (Thursday)	Canonical ID: 86BEIRUT6632_a
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: SECRET
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: Algeria Algiers \| Commander in Chief European Command Vaihingen Germany \|Cyprus Nicosia \| Egypt Cairo \| France Paris \| Iraq Baghdad \| Israel Jerusalem \|Israel Tel Aviv \| Saudi Arabia Riyadh \|Secretary of State \| Syria Damascus \|UNVIE MISSION VIENNA \| United Kingdom London

1. (SECRET/NOFORN – ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: THE WAR OF THE CAMPS IN LEBANON CONTINUES UNABATED WITH FIERCE FIGHTING. NOT SURPRISINGLY, LEBANESE POLITICIANS HAVE DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE WAR, DEPENDING ON THEIR POLITICAL OPTIC. THERE FOLLOWS OBSER- VATIONS BY SEVERAL LEBANESE POLITICIANS IN CONVERSATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR DECEMBER 3 AND 4. END SUMMARY.

3. THE CAMPS WAR BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND THE SHIA AMAL FORCES CONTINUES TO RAGE. NOW IN ITS SIXTH WEEK, A MAJOR STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION CONTINUES AROUND SIDON. THE RASHADIYAH CAMP NEAR TYRE REMAINS ENCIRCLED. SHATILA AND BURJ AL-BURAJINAH IN BEIRUT’S SOUTHERN SUBURBS CONTINUE UNDER RELENTLESS BOMBARDMENT. AS REPORTED BY DAO/BEIRUT, ELEMENTS OF THE MUSLIM 6TH AND 1ST BRIGADES OF THE LEBANESE ARMY HAVE JOINED WITH AMAL IN THE SIEGES OF SHATILA AND BURJ AL-BURAJINAH. THE SYRIANS ARE PROVIDING AMMO AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO AMAL. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF UP TO 300 SYRIAN TROOPS IN AMAL UNIFORMS JOINING THE FIGHTING.

4. NATIONAL LIBERALS PARTY PRESIDENT DANY CHAMOUN (MARONITE CHRISTIAN) TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT HE IS DELIGHTED WITH THE WAR OF THE CAMPS. CHAMOUN SAID THAT AS LONG AS THE SHIA AND THE PALESTINIANS ARE KILLING ONE ANOTHER AND LEAVING THE CHRISTIANS ALONE, THE SITUATION IS JUST FINE.

5. FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER FUAD BUTROS (ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN) SEES THE CAMPS WAR AS ENHANCING THE POSSIBILITY OF A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN LEBANESE PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSD. BUTROS SAID THAT SYRIAN FAILURE TO HAVE THEIR SURROGATE AMAL FIGHTERS ACHIEVE VICTORY OVER THE PALESTINIANS HAS FURTHER UNDERMINED ASSAD’S POSITION, WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN WEAKENED BY WESTERN PRESSURE FOLLOWING THE REVELATIONS OF SYRIAN- SPONSORED TERRORIST ACTS. BUTROS BELIEVES THAT BECAUSE ASSAD IS WEAKENED, HE WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO BE ACCOMMODATING TO GEMAYEL. –

6. SHIA MODERATE DEPUTY RAFIQ SHAHIN (WHOSE CONSTITUENCY OF NABATIYAH INCLUDES THE MAGHDUSHAH AREA WHICH COMMANDS THE HEIGHTS OVERLOOKING SIDON) VIEWS THE WAR AS A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE SHIA POSITION. SHAHIN TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE SHIA CANNOT AFFORD TO ALLOW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN ENCLAVE CENTERED AROUND SIDON AND INCLUDING THE HEIGHTS OF MAGHDUSHAH. IF THE PALESTINIANS SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING AND HOLDING SUCH AN ENCLAVE, SOUTHERN LEBANON AND THE SHIA WILL BE CUT IN HALF. THE PALESTINIANS WILL CONTROL ACCESS BETWEEN BEIRUT AND THE SOUTH AND WILL BE IN A POSITION TO CHOKE IT OFF AT ANY TIME. FURTHERMORE, PALESTINIAN RETENTION OF MAGHDUSHAH WILL PUT THE PALESTINIANS WITHIN A KILOMETER OR TWO OF LAHAD’S ISRAELI-SPONSORED “ARMY OF SOUTH LEBANON.” SHAHIN SAID LAHAD’S MILITIA OCCUPIES THE TERRAIN BETWEEN JEZZINE AND SIDON, OVERLOOKING MAGHDUSHAH. SHAHIN ASSERTED THAT A PALISTIANH CLAVE AROUND SIDO, WOULD MEAN UNREMITTING PALESTINIAN OPERATIONS AGAINST LAHAD AND ISRAEL.

7. SHAHIN DESCRIBED AMAL LEADE NABIH BERRI’S POSITION AS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM ALL SIDES. IF BERRI AND AMAL CANNOT REMOVE THE PALESTINIANS AROUND SIDON AND FORCE THEM BACK INTO THE CAMPS, BERRI AND AMAL AS A COHESIVE MOVEMENT WILL BE FINISHED. THE DIVIDED SHIA COMMUNITY WOULD THEN BE PREY TO EVEN MORE EXPLOITATION BY THE IRANIAN-SPONSORED HIZBALLAH EXTREMISTS. –

8. SHAHIN SAID THAT BECAUSE OF OQE CURRENT SITUATION, HIZBALLAH FIGHTERS ARE FIGHTING AND DYING WITH AMAL. SHAHIN’S SON IN NABITIYAH DESCRIBED TO SHAHIN DECEMBER 3 THE FUNERAL OF 15 SHIA FROM ONE VILLAGE: 12 AMAL FIGHTERS AND 3 HIZBALLAH. SHAHIN SAID HIZBALLAH IS ALSO COOPERATING WITH AMAL AROUND TYRE AND IN BEIRUT. THE HIZBALLAH LEADERSHIP DOES NOT LIKE SUPPORTING BERRI BUT BECAUSE OF THE EXTENSIVE BLOODSHED, THE SHIA ARE UNITED AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS.

9. SHAHIN ALSO DESCRIBED BLOODY ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY BOTH SIDES AGAINST NON-COMBATTANTS, WOUNDED, AND PRISONERS. 10. SHAHIN ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE FAILURE THUS FAR OF THE SYRIAN-SUPPORTED AMAL EFFORT ENHANCES GEMAYEL’S LEVERAGE WITH ASSAD. 11. COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS THIRD VERSION OF THE CAMPS WAR DIFFERS FROM THE PREVIOUS TWO. IF THE PALESTINIANS SUCCEED IN SECURING AN ENCLAVE IN AND AROUND SIDON, THEY WILL HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CHANGING THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL MAP OF LEBANON FROM BEIRUT TO THE ISRAELI BORDER.

KELLY

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