The War Files (Part VIII) – Bashir Gemayel In 1977

Bachir and Pierre Gemayel

Bachir and Pierre Gemayel

This month marks the 40th anniversary of the Lebanese Civil War that started on the 13th of April 1975. This is why I’ve decided to publish WikiLeaks cables from the war era, every day till the 13th of April. I think it would be interesting to look at things from a different point of view, and since it’s not the Lebanese who are telling the stories, I believe it offers a unique insight on the civil war. Although there are a lot more cables on WikiLeaks, I won’t republish them all  in order to focus on the most relevant ones. I hope you enjoy reading them.

I wanted to post something about the 1982 invasion and Bashir Gemayel’s election as president, but I couldn’t find anything (If you do find something about the early eighties, please mention it in the comment section). This post is a compilation of four cables mentioning Gemayel in the last  months of 1977. The cables are organized chronologically.

ISRAEL AND THE PHALANGE
1977 November 13, 00:00 (Sunday)
1977STATE272087_c
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009
1. CALLED ON PRESIDENT AT 1730 LOCAL NOV 12 AS SCHEDULED. SHEIKH PIERRE GEMAYEL AND SONBASHIR LEFT HIS OFFICE AS I WENT IN. I TOLD PRESIDENT DEPARTMENT HAD INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR LEWIS TO RAISE PROBLEM OF ISRAELI-PHALANGE COOPERATION WITH ISRAELIS AND ASK THEM TO DISCOURAGE CHRISTIANS BEFORE BASHIR’S IDEAS TOOK DEEPER ROOT. I HAD ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ASK HIM WHAT HE COULD TELL US ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH PIERRE GEMAYEL WHICH MIGHT ASSIST AMBASSADOR LEWIS IN HIS
SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 STATE 272087
PRESENTATION.
2. SARKIS SAID PIERRE HAD CALLED ON HIM YESTERDAY MORNING (NOV 11) AS PROMISED AND ON BEING ASKED, SAID HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY PLANS OF BASHIR TO UNDERTAKE ACTION OF THE SORT PRESIDENT DESCRIBED, WITH OR WITHOUT ISRAELIS. IT WAS UNTHINKABLE THAT BASHIR WOULD DO SOMETHING LIKE THAT WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING HIM. AFTER CONSULTING HIM HE MIGHT GO AHEAD AND DO IT ANYWAY, BUT HE WOULD CERTAINLY CONSULT FIRST. PRESIDENT OUTLINED TO HIM SERIOUSNESS OF WHAT BASHIR ALLEGEDLY HAD IN MIND — MILITARY ACTION AGAINST SYRIANS TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH INCIDENT IN SOUTH, THUS PROVIDING AN EXCUSE FOR ISRAELIS TO LAND AT JOUNIEH IN ORDER COME TO RESCUE OF CHRISTIANS. TO THINK IN THESE TERMS WHEN AREA WAS MOVING TOWARDS PEACE WAS HEIGHT OF FOLLY. IT WOULD MEAN DESTRUCTION OF LEBANON.
3. SHEIKH PEIRRE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED HIM ON TELEPHONE TO TELL HIM THAT BASHIR DENIED TOTALLY ANY INVOLVEMENT IN PLANS OF THE NATURE DESCRIBED. HE HAD ARRANGED TO BRING BASHIR THERE THIS AFTERNOON (NOV 12). PRESIDENT HAD CONFRONTED BASHIR WITH FACT THAT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES REPORTED HE WAS PLANNING TO ATTACK SYRIAN TROOPS IN LEBANON IN ORDER GIVE ISRAELIS PRETEXT FOR INTERVENTION, AND THAT HE WAS ALLEGED TO BE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE AGENTS HERE, WORKING OUT COORDINATED PLANS TO THIS END. BASHIR DENIED ACCUSATION FLATLY. PRESIDENT DID NOT BELIEVE HIM BECAUSE HIS INTELLIGENCE SOURCES WERE CERTAIN OF THEIR INFORMATION.
4. I ASKED HOW CERTAIN THEY WERE. SARKIS SAID THEY
SECRET SECRET PAGE 03 STATE 272087
WERE CERTAIN ISRAELIS AND BASHIR WERE WORKING TOGETHER ON PLANS FOR MILITARY ACTION OF SOME SORT. I SAID I HAD LOOKED INTO ALLEGATION ISRAELIS WERE TRAINING PHALANGE AND THAT DID NOT HOLD UP, THERE BEING NO NEED FOR THEM IN FIRST PLACE (DID NOT TELL HIM THAT G-2 JOHNNY ABDO HAD TOLD ME LAST NIGHT STORY WAS NOT TRUE). PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD NOT MEANT TO SAY ISRAELIS WERE TRAINING PHALANGE, HE MEANT THEY WERE HELPING THEM WORK OUT PLANS. LEBANSES KNEW THERE MOSAD OFFICERS HERE WHO WERE CONNECTED WITH THIS ACTIVITY. (ABDO SAID SAME THING LAST NIGHT.)
5. I ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING SPECIAL HE WOULD LIKE AMBASSADOR LEWIS TO CONVEY TO ISRAELIS ON SUBJECT. PRESIDENT SAID NOTHING BEYOND TELLING THEM TO CEASE AND DESIST.
6. COMMENT: HAD BASHIR NOT TALKED TO ME IN SUCH REVOLUTIONARY TERMS LAST WEEK, AND HAD WEIZMAN NOT MADE HIS CRYPTIC REMARK ABOUT THE NORTH, I WOULD BE INCLINED TO THINK THIS WHOLE AFFAIR WAS A MARE’S NEST. THERE IS ENOUGH SMOKE, HOWEVER, SO THAT I SUSPECT SOMETHING IS INDEED GOING ON. JUST WHAT AND HOW SERIOUS IS HARD TO SAY. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD, FOR INSTANCE, THAT BASHIR’S PLANS INCLUDE SURROUNDING THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AT BAABDA AND MOUNTING A COUP D’ETAT, THE MINISTERS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT ALREADY HAVING BEEN CHOSEN. THIS SEEMS PRETTY FAR-FETCHED, BUT THERE ARE MANY YOUNG CHRISTIAN HOTHEADS WHO WOULD GO FOR SUCH AN ADVENTURE.
7. SUGGEST AMBASSADOR LEWIS DRAW ON ABOVE AND OUR 5632 AS HE SEES FIT, STRAIGHTENING OUT THE MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT TRAINING VS PLANNING, AND AVOIDING REFERENCE TO MY OWN VIEWS OR COMMENTS TO SARKIS OR DEPARTMENT. IN VIEW MY RELATIONS WITH BASHIR, AND IMPORTANCE MAINTAINING THAT CONDUIT OPEN, DO NOT WANT TO GIVE HIM
SECRET SECRET PAGE 04 STATE 272087
REASON TO CLAIM THAT I HAVE SQUEALED ON HIM. WE MAY BE SURE THAT ISRAELIS WILL TELL HIM OF LEWIS’S CONVERSATION WITH WEIZMAN, AS THEY ALSO TOLD HIM WE HAD VETOED ATTACK ON NAQURA. REQUEST THAT WEIZMAN OR BEGIN NOT BE GIVEN COPY OF EITHER OF OUR TELEGRAMS ON SUBJECT. THIS PROMISES TO BE A DELICATE MATTER HERE.
PARKER
UNQUOTE VANCE
SECRET
NNN
CONTACTS WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL
1977 November 28, 00:00 (Monday)
1977BEIRUT05890_c
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009
1. APPRECIATE PERSONAL INTEREST YOU TAKING IN ARRANGEMENTS FOR BASHIR GEMAYEL AND AGREE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT USG TAKE CONSISTENT, FIRM POSITION WITH HIM. QUESTION BEFORE US, IT SEEMS TO ME, IS HOW MUCH HE DOES UNDER OUR AUSPICES AND HOW MUCH IS DONE PRIVATELY BY MARONITE COMMUNITY AND ITS OUTRIDERS.
2. THERE IS DISTINCTION BETWEEN MEETING USG OFFICIALS IN THEIR OFFICE AND SEEING THEM AT A SOCIAL FUNCTION. WHILE BASHIR CAN ALWAYS CLAIM HE SAW SO-AND-SO AND HAD TALK WITH HIM EVEN IF HE ONLY SAW HIM AT A COCKTAIL PARTY, THAT IS LESS IMPRESSIVE THAN BEING ABLE TO SAY HE WAS RECEIVED AT THE PENTAGON OR THE WHITE HOUSE. FOR HIM TO SAY HE WAS RECEIVED BY ATHERTON WHO HAD WITH HIM SENIOR OFFICIAL FROM PENTAGON IMPLIES A PENTAGON INTEREST IN BASHIR WHICH IS
CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05890 281733Z
LIKELY TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD HERE. THAT IS WHY I WOULD RATHER NOT HAVE JANDA PRESENT DURING BACHIR’S CALL ON YOU. JANKA’S PRESENCE AT LUNCH, A LESSER OCCASION, WOULD CAUSE FEWER PROBLEMS.
3. AS FOR “DEBRIEFING,” I DON’T THINK THERE WAS ANY MISUNDERSTANDING. DEPARTMENT APPARENTLY HAS IN MIND BASHIR SITTING IN SAME ROOM WITH INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS WHO ASK QUESTIONS AND LISTEN TO HIM. THAT IS WHAT HAPPENS TO ME WHEN I GET DEBRIEFED, AND THAT IS WHAT I ASSUMED WE HAD IN MIND FOR BASHIR. MY PROBLEM IS THAT THIS WILL BE REPLAYED HERE WITH CAPITAL LETTERS–BASHIR GIVES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THE STRAIGHT STORY. THIS GIVES FURTHER CREDENCE TO HIS SELF IMAGE AS PALADIN OF THE CHRISTIAN FORCES SUPPORTED BY THE ENLIGHTENED POWERS OF WASHINGTON IF NOT BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT. PUT THAT THROUGH THE LOCAL AMPLIFYING SYSTEM AND IT IS LIKELY TO COME OUT AS A CONSIDERABLE BOOST TO HIS POSITION. HE IS FEISTY ENOUGH AS IT IS. PLEASE DO CALL OFF THE DEBRIEFING, UNLESS I WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO DO SO THIS LATE IN THE GAME. ANYTHING WE NEED TO HAVE FROM BASHIR WE CAN PROBABLY GET FROM ONE-TO-ONE CONVERSATIONS.
4. WE HAVE NO FEARS ABOUT QUANDT MEETING BASHIR. JUST WANT TO BE SURE FORMER KNOWS HOW IT WILL BE REPLAYED HERE.
PARKER
CONFIDENTIAL
NNN
CONTACTS WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL
1977 November 27, 00:00 (Sunday)
1977STATE283209_c
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009
1. IN MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR BASHIR WE WILL BE SURE NOT TO MAKE TOO MUCH OF HIM. BELIEVE YOU WOULD AGREE THAT THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT WE TAKE A CONSISTENT, STRONG LINE IN SUPPORT OF SARKIS AND IN FIRM OPPOSITION TO BASHIR’S DANGEROUS IDEAS. HE HAS HAD LINES OUT ALL OVER TOWN. HIS INTERMEDIARIES ARE PREPARED TO HOST COCKTAIL PARTIES, IN- VITING PEOPLE FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, ETC. SINCE WE WERE NOT SURE WE COULD EFFECTIVELY BLOCK ALL SUCH CON- TACTS WITHOUT A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION OF OUR OWN, WE FELT IT WOULD BE MORE REALISTIC TO MAKE SURE SUCH CONTACTS TOOK PLACE IN THE DEPARTMENT AND UNDER OUR AUSPICES. DEBRIEFING
CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 STATE 283209
MAY HAVE BEEN THE WRONG WORD TO DESCRIBE THE SESSION WE ENVISAGE AFTER LUNCH ON DECEMBER 5. WE EXPECT HIM TO BRIEF US, NOT THE REVERSE. BY THEN, HAVING SEEN HABIB, HE WILL NOT HAVE ANY ILLUSIONS LEFT ANYWAY. WE CAN CALL IT OFF IF YOU THINK IT NECESSARY. HIS ADVANCE MAN HAS SAID HE WILL BE READY TO TALK FRANKLY ABOUT THE ISRAELI CONNECTION, AND WE WANT TO HEAR WHAT HE HAS TO SAY. AS FOR QUANDT, HE SAW BOTH CHAMOUNS, AND RUNS ACROSS LEBANESE OF ALL KINDS REGULARLY.
2. WE WILL SEND YOU A REPORT BY CABLE AFTER THE VISIT WHICH YOU WILL BE ABLE TO USE TO BRIEF BOUTROS.
VANCE
CONFIDENTIAL
NNN
CONVERSATIONS WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL
1977 December 7, 00:00 (Wednesday)
1977STATE291546_c
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009
1. IN HABIB’S ABSENCE ATHERTON MET WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL AND ALFRED MADY OF THE KATA’IB POLITBURO DECEMBER 3 FOR OVER HOUR, AND VELIOTES HOSTED LENGTHY INFORMAL LUNCH FOR HIM ON THE EIGHTH FLOOR DECEMBER 5 ALSO ATTENDED BY DRAPER, STODDARD, HOWELL, AND POPE (NO DOD OR CIA REPS WERE THERE).
2. GEMAYEL TOOK AN OUTWARDLY MODERATE LINE WITH US, AS HE HAS IN HIS PUBLIC APPEARANCES HERE, BUTTHE CORE OF HIS POSITION WAS OBDURATE. HE SAID HE WANTED TO DISPEL A MIS- CONCEPTION HE SAID HE KNEW WAS WIDELY HELD IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT: THAT “THOSE BLOODTHIRSTY CHRISTIANS” WANTED PARTITION. THIS WAS FALSE, HE SAID, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE
SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 STATE 291546
“NUANCES” TO THIS POSITION. HE WANTED A UNITED LEBANON. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WAS OPPOSED TO A RETURN TO THE BANKRUPT STATUS QUO ANTE OF THE NATIONAL PACT. HE WAS VAGUE ABOUT IDEAS FOR SPECIFIC POLITICAL REFORM, WHICH HE ADMITTED HAD YET TO BE WORKED OUT, BUT SAID THAT SOME SORT OF “DECENTRAL- IZATION” WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT DE JURE PARTITION. DE FACTO PARTITION ALREADY EXISTS. REFORM WOULD HAVE TO BE RADICAL. THERE WAS NO POINT IN GOING BACK TO THE OLD SYS- TEM OF MEDIOCRITY AND COMPROMISE. A NEW SYSTEM, HE SAID, SHOULD OFFER “EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES” BUT DEMAND “EQUAL OBLIGA- TIONS” BY ALL THOSE READY TO PUT LEBANON FIRST. SUCH NECES- SARY CHANGES SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE MONTHS AGO BY SARKIS. NOW THE GAP BETWEEN FACTIONS WAS WIDER THAN EVER, AND HE WAS AFRAID REFORM MIGHT COME TOO LATE. HE WAS CRITICAL OF SARKIS FOR TRYING TO PERPETUATE THE STRONG, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONCEPT, WITH ITS CHEHABIST PHILOSOPHY, G-2 TRAPPINGS, ETC. PRESSED REPEATEDLY TO BE MORE SPECIFIC, HE RETREATED TO PHRASES SUCH AS “ALLOWING DIVERSITY TO THRIVE WITHIN A UNIFIED STATE”. HE ADMITTED THAT LEBANON’S FAILURE TO DEVELOP AN ADEQUATE NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM WAS A DISGRACE. UNDER HIS DECENTRALIZED STATE, THERE WOULD, THEREFORE, BE A PLACE FOR A STRONG EDUCATION MINIS- TRY IN THE OTHERWISE RATHER WEAK CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. HE ASKED FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR SUCH REFORMS.
3. ATHERTON EXPLAINED BASIC PRINCIPLE OF OUR POLICY IN LEBANON WAS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT SARKIS AND HIS UNIFYING POLICIES. HE OUTLINED ROLE OF OUR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS IN THIS CONNECTION. WE THOUGHT THAT SOME REFORM OF THE LEBANESE SYSTEM WAS NECESSARY. WHEN PRESIDENT SARKIS FELT THE TIME WAS RIGHT TO ATTEMPT OR NEGOTIATE SOME RESTRUCTURING, WE WOULD STAND BEHIND HIM. WE WERE NOT NECESSARILY OPPOSED TO IDEAS FOR DECENTRALIZATION AND WOULD BE OPEN-
SECRET SECRET PAGE 03 STATE 291546
MINDED OR SUPPORTIVE ABOUT THE CONCEPT, IF RPT IF IT EN- JOYED BROAD SUPPORT NATIONALLY.
4. GEMAYEL’S CRITICISMS OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE ALSO APPLIED TO A NATIONAL ARMY. HE WAS NOT SO MUCH AGAINST THE BUILDING OF THE ARMY AS HE WAS AGAINST THE OUTDATED PHILOSOPHY WHICH WOULD AFFECT ITS EMPLOYMENT I.E. AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD REPEAT THE MISTAKES OF THE PAST. CITING PAST OCCASIONS WHEN THE ARMY HAD FAILED TO PROTECT THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, THANKS TO THE OBSOLETE “SYSTEM”, HE ARGUED THAT THE VARIOUS COMMUNITIES COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO RELY ON ANY NEW ARMY FOR PROTECTION. THE MAIN FUTURE PROBLEM FOR THE CHRISTIANS IS SURVIVAL. WE DO NOT WANT ANOTHER ARMAGEDDON.
5. THE ONE POINT HE WAS CLEAR ON WAS THAT DECENTRALIZATION MUST INVOLVE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIONAL MILITARY UNITS ALONG CONFESSIONAL LINES, ALTHOUGH THEY COULD BE NOMINALLY UNDER A UNIFIED COMMAND. HE WAS SCORNFUL OF PRESENT ATTEMPTS TO REBUILD THE ARMY, AND OUR ROLE, AND CHALLENGED US TO POINT TO ANY EVIDENCE THAT IT EVEN EXISTED, MUCH LESS THAT IT COULD PLAY AN EFFECTIVE ROLE. IT WAS FOR SHOW ONLY, HE ARGUED. HE HAD SOME CONFIDENCE IN KHOURY, BUT UNLESS HE WERE ALLOWED TO BUILD SEPARATE CONFESSIONAL FORCES AS A FIRST STEP HE WOULD NOT SUCCEED.
6. GEMAYEL WAS ALSO CRITICAL OF THE SHTAURA AGREEMENT. PHASES ONE AND TWO HAD BEEN A HYPOCRITICAL MISE EN SCENE (WE DID NOT ARGUE WITH HIM MUCH ON THIS POINT) AND HE OPPOSED PHASE THREE IN THE SOUTH INTER ALIA BECAUSE (1) IT WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED, (2) A CLAUSE IN THE SHTAURA AGREEMENT WOULD ALLOW THE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO LEBANON UNDER PALESTINIAN COVER, AND (3) EVEN IF THE PALESTINIANS DID MOVE OUT OF THE SOUTH THEY WOULD ONLY MOVE TO JEZZINE AND THE SHOUF AND CAUSE WORSE PROBLEMS. WE PRESSED HIM TO SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR THE S
ECRET SECRET PAGE 04 STATE 291546
SOUTH, BUT THE UPSHOT OF HIS REMARKS WAS THAT HE PREFERRED THE STATUS QUO TO SHTAURA. WE MADE ESPECIALLY CLEAR THAT WE HAD OUR OWN INTERESTS TO CONSIDER AND WOULD DO OUR BEST TO SEE THAT PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWALS OCCURRED.
7. IT MAY BE OF INTEREST THAT AT ONE POINT WHEN WE HELD UP THE EXAMPLE OF THE PNL HANDING OVER ITS SHERMANS TO THE ARMY, GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED TO CAMILLE CHAMOUN ONLY AN HOUR OR SO BEFORE TO CHECK THIS VERY POINT (WHICH CAPTAIN NEHME HAD ALSO MENTIONED TO HIM) AND CHAMOUN HAD DENIED VEHEMENTLY THAT ANY TRANSFER HAD OCCURRED. IN FACT, SAID GEMAYEL, CHAMOUN HAD TOLD HIM THAT IF HE COULD GET MORE TANKS FROM THE AMERICANS HE OUGHT TO BRING SOME BACK. WE PRESUME THIS CONFLICT REFLECTS A LACK OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN DANY AND CAMILLE CHAMOUN, AS WELL AS PNL-KATA’IB RIVALRY.
8. WE BARELY TOUCHED ISRAELI-MARONITE COOPERATION. WHILE SUSPICIOUS OF SYRIAN INTENTIONS, HE ADMITTED THAT THE ADF HAD CAUSED FEWER PROBLEMS AND FRICTIONS THAN ANTICIPATED. HE, LIKE HIS FATHER, HAD CONFIDENCE IN ASSAD, BUT NOT NECESSARILY HIS SUBORDINATES OR SYRIAN AGENTS IN LEBANON. IT WAS A GREAT TEMPTATION FOR THE SYRIANS TO MEDDLE POLI- TICALLY IN LEBANON AND USE THE THREAT OF JAILING THOSE WHO OPPOSED SYRIAN ACTIONS. HE ASSERTED THAT CERTAIN LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS WERE BEING MADE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SYRIAN FACTOR. WITHOUT HIDING HIS DE- TESTATION OF THE PALESTINIANS, HE HAD NO QUICK ANSWERS TO THIS PROBLEM, AND DIDN’T ARGUE WITH OUR POSITION THAT THE BASIC SOLUTION HAD TO BE FOUND IN A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.
9. SUMMING UP, GEMAYEL SENSED HE HAD A GOOD OPPORTUNITY
SECRET SECRET PAGE 05 STATE 291546
TO PRESENT HIS IDEAS FULLY AND TO ASK FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL REFORM. IN TURN, HE RECEIVED A FULL EX- PLANATION OF U.S. ATTITUDES IN CANDID SPIRITED EXCHANGES. HE WAS EXASPERATING IN HIS TENDENCY TO OUTLINE IN EXHAUST- ING DETAIL THE FULL RANGE OF NEGATIVE FACTORS SURROUNDING AN ISSUE WITHOUT PROPOSING SPECIFIC ALTERNATIVES. 10. IN BACKGROUNDING THE LOCAL AN-NAHAR CORRESPONDENT ON GEMAYEL’S CALL ON ATHERTON, WE SAID THAT IT IS USUAL FOR ATHERTON TO MEET WITH PROMINENT VISITORS FROM THE AREA AND TO HEAR THEIR VIEWS, AND THAT NO MORE SHOULD BE READ INTO THE CALL.
VANCE
SECRET
NNN
Advertisements