14 March Alliance

Marj Dabeq And The Tomahawk Effect

It is said, that in 1516, while the Ottomans and the Mamluks were fighting for the Levant in the battle of Marj Dabeq, a Lebanese prince of the house of Maan, known by the name of Fakhreddine I, wasn’t comfortable to fight on the side of the Mamluks as it was too risky to ally himself with one side when the outcome of the battle was still unknown. As the Syrian princes started defecting from the Mamluk ranks, Fakhreddine went on the top of a hill overlooking the meadow (marj) where the battle was ongoing, and did not intervene with his forces until it was clear that one side was in advantage over the other. Needless to say that it was the winning Ottoman army that Fakhreddine I sided with instead of his initial allies, the Mamluks. The Bohtor princes of Beirut, that fought with the Mamluks till the end, were eventually removed from power in Mount Lebanon by the victorious Ottomans and were replaced by the Maans of the Chouf, who were to rule Lebanon for the next 181 years.

How Is That Related To 2013?

As the Americans prepare their Tomahawks to hit the Syrian regime, surrounded by a growing international debate whether an intervention is needed and legitimate in Syria or not, the Lebanese leaders’ silence on the upcoming war is deafening. In a country whose politics were almost inseparable from the Syrian affairs for the past century, the quiet political scene raises many questions, and shows us a cautious – yet wise – behavior from the Lebanese politicians, à la Fakhreddine, wishing to preserve their status in Lebanon in the wake of a possible massive regional modification. Ironically, Marj Dabeq is not only in today’s Syria, but also in a rebel-area near Aa’zaz (North of the disputed Aleppo)on the Turkish border.

Too Early To Predict

For every Destroyer the Americans send to the East Mediterranean, comes a Russian ship; and even at the height of a possible American intervention, the Iranians are still supporting the regime. No one can deny that Obama is relatively a weak president, and the fact that the British won’t be here for him this time, and that the U.N. isn’t much in favor of a strike only makes things worse. The Americans are already leaking out in details some of the objectives of the “limited” strike (here’s a nice sarcastic piece on that), possibly so that the Russians – who clearly aren’t intending to abandon one of their last allies in the levant – realize that it is a small-scaled intervention and don’t respond. To sum things up, the Americans aren’t very comfortable on the offensive side, while on the defensive side the Syrian counter-attack is still ambiguous (Attacking the Israeli north?), making it too early for Lebanese politicians to take sides. It is not even sure if the Americans will go through with their threat, and if so, no one knows what the result may be. Even a military victory for the Americans can turn into a diplomatic failure – Egypt 1956 is a perfect example. In the middle of a vague outcome after the possible war, it seems wiser for the politicians to abandon their traditional regional allegiances and wait for a winner to side with, instead of risking a political setback due to the ally’s defeat.

The Berri/Hezbollah Political Stances

When a Lebanese Zai’m who was for decades Syria’s man in Lebanon is expected to abandon his affiliation with the pro-syrian M8 alliance and side in the middle, you know that everyone is trying to be a centrist in times of turmoil. Hezbollah’s silence is the most remarkable one on the matter. The party fighting along the regime on Syrian soil didn’t yet mention what its response will be on an American intervention and is probably considering all his options.

Everyone Is Considering His Options

Same goes for all the other parties in Lebanon. They can’t preemptively side with the losing party in Syria, so they are all adopting the “wait and see Fakhreddine I strategy”. Most of the parties are warning of a Fitna in wake of the recent explosions (In order to avoid giving opinions on the U.S. Attack), and even the anti-Syrian M14 coalition is rather silent on the issue of an American strike. Anyone would expect Saad Hariri to tweet in support of such a strike, yet we are left with no tweet since the 23d Of August (ever since the debate on the intervention seriously started). Even as the Syrian regime got officially accused of the Tripoli bombings by the Lebanese judicial authorities, the M14 alliance rather stayed silent on the issue, while Al-Akhbar, one of the most pro M8 newspapers – while criticizing the security branch – was quietly condemning the Syrian regime for the Mamlouk-Samaha plot of last year, in a sign that everyone is converging towards a centrist stance.

You compromise, or lose it all.

Lebanon, Or The Mailbox

Smoke rises from the shattered wreckage of the large ABC department store. Scores of people were injured when a rebel bomb exploded in the crowded store. July 8, 1958. Lebanon was always a mailbox.

In 48 hours of chaos, hundreds of Syrians die due to a chemical attack, a Palestinian group launches rockets on Israel‘s Naharaya, Israel responds by raiding a Palestinian camp on Lebanese territory, while later that day two car bombs target mosques in Tripoli. A week earlier, another bomb (courtesy of a Syrian opposition group) rocks the southern suburb of Beirut, just after a week of a Hezbollah-Israel clash that was followed by days of silence. For a republic where the political status quo is still the same since March, things are moving a little too fast on the security side.

As you can see from the small intro above, Lebanon is practically non-existent in Lebanon. It’s all about Syrians, Israelis and Palestinians. The only thing in common between every one of them is the Lebanese soil, where they apparently like to send each other messages.

“Global Jihad Terrorists”

Imagine for a while that Samir Geagea bombarded Larnaca. As a response, the Cypriote air force starts shelling Michel Aoun’s residence. Now that I’ve clearly showed how irrelevant that move is, I would like to point out something here: Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) – An Al-Qaida affiliated group that carries the name of Abdallah Azzam, a.k.a. The Father Of Global Jihad – launched two rockets on an Israeli town, and in response, the Israeli Army attacks the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) in Nehmeh south of Beirut. Once you realize that the AAB and the PFLP-GC are ideological threats and political foes – For the AAB is an islamist right-wing Al-Qaida affiliated anti-Syrian(regime) group, while the PFLP-GC is a secular leftist pro-regime Palestinian party – you understand that the Israeli attack is more like bombing Iran for something Saudi Arabia did, on Jordanian Soil (or simply shelling Aoun’s residence for something Geagea did, you get the point). For the IDF, they were targeted by “Global Jihad Terrorists” (Check the IDF spokesman’s tweet here), so they responded on “terrorists”.

Morse Code

The Syrians and Israelis are communicating. When Chemical weapons are used en plein Damas while UN inspectors were in the area, you understand from Bashar Al-Assad’s show of force that the red lines (Chemical Weapons) the west is drawing mean nothing to him, and that the anti-regime countries couldn’t care less about the Syrian opposition and are not ready to intervene, no matter what. The answer didn’t take a lot of time to come: The Israelis could’ve hit something other than the PFLP-GC, something a bit more related to the AAB. But they chose the Palestinian group that has the closest ties to the regime in Damascus for a reason: They want to deliver a message to Al-Assad, that he is not as free to act as he thinks he is. If they wanted to hit back on the Islamist perpetrators of the attacks, or on the Lebanese (strictly speaking), they would’ve hit Hamas or Hezbollah, but they wanted the message to cross the Lebanese border.

Syria’s Spillover And Psychological Warfare

Lebanon is not only the mailbox linking the Syrians and Israelis, but also the one linking the Syrian themselves. The opposition and the regime, along with their Lebanese allies, are sending each other messages in an accelerating rhythm. No one is making a sufficient remarkable breakthrough on the ground in Syria, which made both sides in a need of a psychological warfare in every possible location. Perhaps intimidating the population, targeting its beliefs, and demoralizing it might eventually lead to questioning the power of both sides among their supporters, and helping to shatter the military front from the opposite side.

The Mailbox’s Side Effects

A month earlier, graffitis in the Christian areas were calling for federalism. After the Rouais bombing in the southern suburbs, Hezbollah’s zone became similar to an independent canton as the party increased its security measures. In yesterday’s press conference, Tripoli politicians started warning of establishing self-security (الامن الذاتي) in the city. In fact, with time passing by and the worsening of Syrian crisis, with no government, with a non-elected parliament, with an outgoing president, with a commander of the army whose presence depends on a ministerial decree, with fear and suspicion spreading everywhere, and with the loss of control and the falling apart of the state’s institutions, the main side effect of the Syrian spillover is no longer the refugees problem, or the shelling of Hermel and Arsal, but rather a slow and steady disintegration of the Lebanese entity and the creation of small federal/security zones that might at any moment clash with each other and drag Lebanon to another civil war.

The End Of The March 8 Alliance?

“There is no such thing as the March 8 alliance anymore, Berri told The Daily Star.”

That quote from the Daily Star article (entitled March 8 finished, Aoun out in the cold) sums it up. But Is really Aoun out in the cold? Or is it some kind of an ingenious Berri tactic?

Between The Lines

The key ministerial portfolio held by an Amal movement minister in the last government was the foreign ministry (of Adnan Mansour). If one reads between the lines, Berri says at some point that “On the domestic level, our choices differ and each will follow their own course”. In other words, Berri is a political genius that just made a bluff. While saying that he will not support the FPM in their struggle for their governmental share, he implicitly states that the FPM are obliged to support him to keep the foreign ministry under Amal control because both have the same choices on a non-domestic level. And Gebran Bassil fell in the trap by agreeing with Berri that “We support Speaker Berri’s saying that we diverge on domestic matters and converge over strategic issues.” In other words, Aoun would be backing a Berrist for the Foreign ministry post but Berri would not be backing Aounists to occupy the domestic-related ministries (All the ministries currently held by Aounists such as the telecom and energy ministries)

No More Sacrifices For Allies?

Rewind to June 2011: A small dispute (Called back then العقدة السنية, meaning “the Sunni Knot”) between Hezbollah’s Sunni allies (Mikati and Karami) over the number of posts that should be held by each of them delays the government’s formation. In a government of 30 ministers, there should usually be 6 Sunnis and 6 Shias; Mikati’s government eventually had 7 Sunnis and 5 Shias. It was Berri back then who untied the knot by sacrificing one minister of his share for Ahmad Karami. This time, Berri made his preemptive move as the Salam cabinet formation is clearly facing difficulties. By declaring the 8 March Alliance dead, Berri is dissociating himself from his allies: He will no longer be pleasing them from his share should they want an extra minister. He is making it clear for Tammam Salam that he is not letting go a minister so that the coalition doesn’t collapse like he did in 2011.

Zoom Out

According to Gebran Bassil, “Political lineups have been shattered”. By getting too busy analyzing the small details, the big picture became unnoticed. While Michel Aoun was busy shattering the March 14 Alliance into pieces via his Orthodox Gathering Law, the other side was preparing to strike back. March 8 knew what was March 14’s Achilles’ heel, but the opposite is also true. March 14’s counter-attack didn’t take long. After the May electoral confusion that nearly destroyed the ties between Gemayel, Geagea and Hariri, March 14 made their move. It was clear that Aoun wanted elections he was going to win, while Berri saw the extension as an alibi to stay 17 extra months as a speaker. It was clear that Aoun wanted his son-in-law Shamel Roukouz to succeed Jean Kahwagi as a Commander of the army, while Berri had no interest in it. It was also clear that there was a tense atmosphere between Berri and Mikati that developed into a constitutional crisis. The plan was very simple: Let time play its role: Postpone the governmental formation until the M8 Alliance collapses. With no government, the extension of the parliament’s terms was an easier job while the constitutional crisis became evident with the appearance of certain deadlines that were irritant to Aoun and Mikati: One doesn’t want an extension of Kahwaji’s term, the other doesn’t want to see the parliament legislating in the presence of a caretaker government (probably to appear as the protector of the Sunni interests in Lebanon). Thus M14 played it smart : They stood by Berri when he wanted to extend the parliament’s term, then blocked all the speaker’s attempts to hold a session by standing with Aoun and making sure that there will be a lack of quorum. All it took was 1 month of conflicting interests between the M8 members to (apparently) end a 7 year alliance. All it took was letting the M8 alliance rule and fail due to the lack of chemistry between its parties.

No Electoral Ground

Political alliances are usually built on the foundations of the electoral alliances. In no electoral district the FPM and Amal find themselves forced to ally with each others to win. No Aounist is elected in a region having Amal votes, while no Amal MP is elected due to Aounist help. In fact, the two parties were an exception in 2009 when they ran against each other in Jezzine (while they were allies), making it easier for M14 to have a seat in the district (even if it didn’t eventually win any MP in the constituency). Once they don’t need each other to get into the parliament, the two parties won’t stick together till life in the parliament. Geagea needs Hariri to secure him MPs in Zahle and Akkar. Jumblatt and Hariri need each other to prevail in the Chouf. Baabda is ideal for an FPM-Hezbollah electoral alliance, and the Kataeb need the small Sunni and Druze votes to prevail in certain constituencies. Out of all the alliances, the easiest one to break was the Berri-Aoun one, because it had no electoral basis.

À La Adnan Sayyed Hussain?

Berri is apparently distancing himself from the Hezbollah-FPM duo and getting closer and closer to the “centrists”, comprising Jumblatt, the President, Mikati and – who knows – Salam. Salam was trying for the past 4 months to get his formula of 8/8/8 ministers (8 for centrists, 8 for M8, 8 for M14) accepted. Once M8 ceases to exist, Hezbollah and Aoun may get their share of 8 ministers independently from Berri, who would be taking a part of the centrists’ share. Once again, Rewind to 2011: A minister supposedly centrist resigns from the Hariri government (That included 10/30 of the ministers from the opposition). The resignation of the eleventh minister, Adnan Sayyed Hussein, who was theoretically a minister loyal to the president, brought the government down (after more that the third of the ministers resigned). Berri might be planning the same strategy again: By announcing the end of the March 8 alliance, he is in fact trying to ensure the blocking third in the government for the “ex-M8” members (by pushing himself to the center away from Aoun). M8 might be playing dead in a last attempt to maximize its share in the government.

So Is It The End?

If you consider that the March 14 coalition doesn’t exist anymore, than you are right to consider the March 8 coalition destroyed. Perhaps it is true: Nobody knows where Jumblatt stands – actually nobody ever knew – while Mikati and Berri are distancing themselves from everyone. On the two other sides: Hezbollah and the FPM struggle alone while the OG law spread confusion and cautiousness between Geagea, Gemayel and Hariri. One thing is sure though: If M14 and M8 are truly from the past now, than they fought themselves till collateral damage prevailed.

Only know you love her when you let her go. Time to see what alliance members truly love each others.

Waiting For The Electoral Law – March 14’s Hybrid Law: A Review

Lebanon's Electoral Map According To The March 14's Hybrid Law. The colored districts are the small winner-takes-all ones and the big ones within the white line are the big districts under proportional unlike in the picture.

Lebanon’s Electoral Map According To The March 14’s Hybrid Law. The colored districts are the small winner-takes-all districts and the big ones within the white line are the big districts under proportional representation.

The Lebanese Forces, Future Movement, and the PSP agreed on a hybrid electoral law last week. The law is very similar to the electoral law the Lebanese Forces proposed in February (Here’s the analysis on that law), with some exceptions. I’m going to use the same arguments I used when I reviewed the previous law, but comment on the new changes. Unlike the previous law that had an unclear criteria here, I didn’t find any criteria at all for this law

Here’s the number of voters by sects, in case you’re interested:

Also, here’s a table for the seat allocations:

Table of seats according to March 14’s hybrid law (High Res)

In a nutshell, the law separates Lebanon into two types of constituencies: 26 small districts (Allocated 68 seats), that are in most cases cazas, under a winner-takes-all system and 6 big districts (Allocated 60 seats), that are in most cases the mohafazas, under a PR system. The main aim of the law is to get the biggest number of Christian-elected MPs to the parliament. The electoral constituencies are in most cases the administrative districts (Cazas, Governorates) of Lebanon. However, there are some few weird things: West Bekaa-Rashaya or Baalbek-Hermel aren’t separated. Also, on a bigger level, the Mohafaza of Mount-Lebanon is split to two districts: A northern bigger one and a southern smaller one (Aley-Chouf).

From Unclear Criteria To No Criteria At All (Or How It Keeps Getting Worse)

My criticism on the old law proposal:

The previous law proposal of the Lebanese forces allocated the seats on the basis of a certain criteria that you can see here. However, a big number of the districts don’t obey to any of the criteria. For example, in Jezzine the Greek Catholics aren’t considered to be a minor sect in the district so the seat stays in the caza and doesn’t shift to the governorate. That’s only one example, and there’s a lot more. Apparently the Christian seats are taken as one block and the minor Christian sects’ seats within a Christian district with a Maronite majority don’t go to the Mohafazas and stay in the caza. The lawmakers need to clarify a few things. Also, there are other districts where the criteria is missing something or doesn’t match the district’s seat repartition. For example, why is it that the Protestant seat gets transferred from Beirut I to the Governorate and not the Armenian Catholic one?

My new criticism: There seems to be no criteria at all in the allocation of seats. There are several small changes in a lot of districts (The Chouf gets 4 MPs instead of 3 in the old hybrid LF proposal. Baalbak gets 4 instead of 5. Tripoli gets for instead of 3, just as examples). Also, the law is clearly in favor of the March 14 parties, while giving the Christians a bigger influence than the 1960 law.

Unequal Voting (same criticism than before)

Among other things that makes this draft law odd is the disproportion of seats within the majoritarian system. For example, Akkar, where 120608 voted in 2009, has 3 seats, while Bcharre that had 17183 voters in 2009 has 2 seats. Bcharre voters are 4.55% of the North’s voters, while Akkar voters are 31.96% of the North voters. That means that on the Mohafaza scale, the Akkaris get to choose 31.96% of 11 MPs which is 3.51 MPs. A total of 3.51+3=6.51 MPs for the people of Akkar, while Bcharre gets to choose 4.55% of 11 MPs which is 0.50 MPs. A total of 2+0.50=2.50 MPs for Bcharre. the number of electors in Akkar are 7.01 times more than Bcharre, which means that Akkar should have 7 times more MPs. Ironically it only has 6.51/2.50= 2.6 times more than Bcharre.

That disproportion between the districts will be present in almost all hybrid laws, because some districts get to have more influence sometimes even though they have a smaller population. And after all, that’s how the law gives more influence to Christians. When the Akkar (66% Sunni) district should be as 7 times more influential than Bcharre (100% Christian) and is instead only 2.66 times more influential, you get to understand how the Christians, 38%, will be able to elect 52 MPs (40.62%). A big number of the small districts happen to be mainly Christian and that’s how the Lebanese Forces draft law can boost the number of the Christian-elected MPs.

The Analysis (The Small Differences That Made Future Movement and the PSP Accept The Law)

If you take a look at the previous electoral law proposed by the Lebanese Forces in February, you’ll quickly spot some interesting differences with the current consensual LF-PSP-FM law:

Instead of having 3 seats, Tripoli gets one additional seat. That means that the Mikati Bloc will find it harder to run on the Mohafaza now that it has lost a Sunni MP there (The “proportional representation” North district has 4 MPs now instead of 5, making it hard for Mikati to get an extra MP using the M8 votes of the Mohafaza, while the FM will get an extra MP on the caza where they can easily win all the 4 seats of Tripoli because it’s under a majoritarian system)
Instead of having 5 seats, Baalbak-Hermel ends up with 4 seats (1 gets transferred to the governorate) meaning that Hezbollah will lose an extra MP that will be put in the governorate where he will be subject to the influence of all of the governorate’s voting where the Shias are 42% thus lessening the Shia influence on that extra seat.
Beirut: Instead of having a Beirut I of 5 MPs and a Beirut III of 2 MPs, the number of MPs becomes 4 for Beirut I that is up to 85% Christian and 4 to Beirut III that is 28% Christian. Meaning that the Christians lose the ability to elect en extra MP in Beirut I while also losing the ability to influence the election of 2 more MPs that were transferred from Beirut III to the Mohafaza (according to the previous LF law) where the Christians are 35%. That suits the FM by minimizing the Christian influence.
Also, there’s a remake of Beirut I. It loses Mdawar (the Armenian district) to Beirut II, meaning that the Armenian population, that supports M8, would not be able to help M8 win Beirut I anymore.
Instead of Having 3 MPs in the Caza and 2 in the Mohafaza for Kesserwan (like the previous LF law proposal), there are now 2 in the Caza and 3 in the Governorate. The LF has lost the 2 previous elections in Kesserwan. Minimizing the number of MPs on the Caza is a smart way from them to get a better result, so that they might win that extra MP in case they get better results in Northern Mount Lebanon.
And now the Best part, the Chouf and Southern Mount-Lebanon: Baabda that has no more than 18% of Druze votes gets removed from Southern Mount Lebanon and added to Northern Mount Lebanon. Also, the Chouf gets an extra MP, making them 4. That can only mean that Jumblat will be able to directly control 6 seats on the majoritarian system (4 from Chouf, 2 from Aley), but also to influence the election on the “Proportional Representation district” of Chouf-Aley (Southern Mount-Lebanon), where the Druze will form around 40%, now that it’s deprived from the Christian-Shia heavyweight of Baabda. 40% of 7 MPs is somewhere around 3 MPs for Jumblatt (that’s if he’s running alone), giving him a total of 9 MPs. Jumblatt will thus be (more or less) able to keep the same size of his bloc.
Northern Mount-Lebanon: Now that Baabda joined the others, the Shia vote will be somewhere around 15%. However, 2 of the 12 seats are Shia, meaning that 16% of the seats are Shia. There will be thus an overflow from the Christian votes toward the Shia seat, and the Christian influence (including the LF) would not be diminished in the PR district.
Hasbaya-Marjeyoun aren’t separated anymore, and there is only 1 MP on the Caza scale and not 2 like before. This is clealry intended to maximize the number of seats on the Mohafaza (South) scale, where M14 hs a bigger chance of getting MPs, knowing that the Shias are a majority in Marjeyoun-Hasbaya meaning that M8 will still win anything there because of the winner takes-all system. The Shia still are a majority in the South, but with proportional representation and a big number of seats, M14 will surely do better.

How Much Christian-elected seats?

On The winner-takes-all districts: Beirut I (4), Baabda (3), Metn (4), Kesserwan (2), Jbeil (1), Batroun (2), Bsharri (2), Koura (2), Zgharta (2), Jezzine (2), Zahle (5). A total of 29
On the Proportional Reresentation districts: North (4.4 = 40% of 11), Northern Mount Lebanon (8.68 = 72% of 12), Southern Mount Lebanon (2.6 = 37% of 7), Bekaa (3.36 = 28% of 12), South (1.65 = 15.6% of 11), Beirut (2.8= 35% of 8). A total of 23.49 seats

That means that the Christians, under that draft law, would elect 52.49 seats. Under the previous hybrid law draft, the Christians were able to elect 56. The Lebanese Forces had to please their allies somehow….

So Who Wins?

I’m going to consider that the Lebanese are reluctant to change, elect the same MPs again and again and apply the results of 2009 on the new Lebanese Forces law.

The Cazas

M14: Koura (2), Batroun (2), Bcharri (2), Meniyeh-Donieh (2), Tripoli (4), Akkar (3), Metn (1/4), Chouf (4), Aley (2), Saida (2),, Zahle (5), West Bekaa-Rashaya (3), Beirut (4,2,4). A total of 42/68 seats in the winner-takes-all districts for M14

M8: Zgharta (2), Metn (3/4), Jbeil (1), Kesserwan (2), Baabda (3), Jezzine (2),Tyre (2), Saida Villages(1), Nabatiyeh (2), Bint Jbeil (2), Marjeyoun (1), Baalbak-Hermel (5). A total of 26/68 seats in the Winner-takes-all districts for M8.

PS: For Beirut, I considered that the agreements of Doha splitting the Beirut 2 seats equally between M14 and M8 are now history. For the Governorate of Beirut (Proportional Representation), I use the same results as 2009.

The Governorates

I used the results of 2009, and made these tables:

PS: I don’t know what the minimum threshold (The minimum percentage that a list should have so that it can get one of its candidates elected) will be, so I made the assumption that it would be somewhere around 10%. That’s why you will notice the presence of independent MPs.

That means that the final outcome is 68 (26+42) MPs for M14, 55 MPs for M8 (29+26), and 5 Independent MPs.

As you can notice, we have an independent breach, but the results are clearly in favor of M14, even almost the same results than 2009 (70-58). A lot of things changed since 2009 and a number of alliances will probably change, but that’s approximatively how the results might look like.

With 9 seats for Jumblatt, and a difference of 70-58, the Bey of Mukhtara will still be Lebanon’s Kingmaker. That’s exactly why the Progressive Socialist Party gave its approval to this draft law.

Gerrymandering, Again.

How Tammam Salam Became A Consensual Candidate

Tammam Salam (REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir)

Tammam Salam. That’s the name of the man that will be tasked to form a new government once the consultations end. A consensual Prime Minister it seems.

A small background

Tammam Salam boycotted the elections of 1992 – like most of the Christians at the time – as a refusal of Syrian hegemony. Salam participated in the 1996 elections and won. In the 2000 elections he lost against Rafiq Hariri and in the 2009 elections he won in Saad Hariri’s list. That kind of makes him a centrist person. He also doesn’t speak about Syria and its crisis and doesn’t criticize Hezbollah, at least not like other Future Movement MPs. He has an Islamic influence coming from the Makassed foundation. He’s also from Beirut. The last time a PM was a Beiruti was 13 years ago. His Grandfather was Beirut’s MP in the Ottoman parliament, and was also the head of the Municipality. His father was Prime Minister under Bechara El Khoury, Camille Chamoun, Fouad Chehab, and Sleiman Frangieh. That’s four of the five Pre-war presidents of Lebanon. The Lebanese flag was also drawn in his father’s house. That last thing probably doesn’t matter, but you can see what I mean.

Tamam Salam is in the middle. Between Christians and Muslims, between Shias and Sunnis. And he’s strong within the Sunni community (A thing Mikati suffered with at the beginning). He is also a Beiruti, and not any Beiruti. He is the son of Saeb Bey Salam, and the grandson of Salim Ali (Abu Ali) Salam.

How it all started

Tammam Salam was nominated as M14’s candidate, and Jumblatt endorsed him, after refusing Rifi. Tammam Salam won’t participate in the elections if he’s nominated, which means that his success (If he succeeds) won’t be a direct threat to Mikati and Hariri. Tammam Salam visited Saudi Arabia – whose ambassador in Lebanon ironically said in the same day that the Saudis do not interfere in Lebanese Politics – where he got the blessing he needed. Also, after the Saudi ambassador – who ironically said that the Saudis do not interfere in Lebanese Politics – visited Mikati, Mikati said he doesn’t want to be Lebanon’s next Prime Minister. Then, after leaving Saudi Arabia – whose ambassador in Lebanon ironically said that the Saudis do not interfere in Lebanese Politics – one day before he gets nominated, Tammam Salam came back to Lebanon. Here you go, Saudi Arabia’s support.

And then?

Now’s here’s the tricky part. Hezbollah lost Mikati. Hezbollah also lost Jumblatt. And Hezbollah is losing Syria. Hezbollah can’t also repeat what he did in 2011. The elections are way too close. He made that mistake on the 7th of May 2008 and lost the 2009 elections because of it. So what will Hezbollah do? He plays it smart. M8 can endorse Karami, Tabbara, Abdul Rahim Mrad, or anyone else, but the M8 coalition will probably lose because Jumblatt won’t give his support. Instead of fighting a lost battle, they take M14’s achievement, make Jumblatt’s swing votes look useless – while they’re not at all – and push with Tammam Salam making him a consensual candidate. That’s how M14 don’t exactly look like winners, and Saudi Arabia’s increasing influence (while Syria is on fire) doesn’t look that important because Salam is suddenly everyone’s candidate. And he can be everyone’s candidate. Check the background part again.

It’s only the beginning

It’s a huge responsibility for Tammam Salam. He will have to form a unity cabinet (Because Jumblatt wants a unity government), make sure we have a new electoral law (now that the Christian parties will boycott any elections under the 1960 law) and organize elections. He’s also short on time because the parliament’s expiry date is soon unless it extends its term. Forming a government, agreeing on an electoral law and organizing elections all in 3 months is a mission impossible. Only to form a government, it took Hariri five months and Mikati seven . And that’s another dilemma for Tammam Salam. Will he agree on the parliament’s term extension? What will his stance be on the STL, the issue that brought Hariri’s government down? What will his stance be on the name of the ISF commander, the issue that brought Mikati’s government down? It’s going to be a tough road for Salam. It’s going to be even more difficult when different parties will start asking their share of the cake, and we might have a new interesting slice of the pie this time: The ministry of Petroleum.

The real winners? Prime Minister Tammam Salam, Kingmaker Walid Jumblatt, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Jumblatt is already enjoying his success: Naming the PM, choosing the type of the government, and even Vetoing.

The Reasons Behind Mikati’s Resignation

Deputy Prime Minister Samir Moukbel and Mikati after the resignation (The Daily Star)

The Lebanese government of June 2011 is now history. Najib Mikati resigned due to a lack of agreement on an electoral comitte to oversee the elections and Mikati’s failure to extend the the term of ISF chief Ashraf Rifi . You can see his resignation speech [here]. Such a move can be full of meanings, so why did Mikati resign? And more importantly, why now?

It’s all in the Speech

Mikati said that he thought about resigning twice before. The first time was about M8’s refusal to fund the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and the second time was when Wissam Al-Hassan was assassinated. If Mikati had resigned when the STL wasn’t being funded, it would’ve been too early. Back then, M14 was still strong and he could’ve been easily replaced. If Mikati had resigned after Al Hassan’s funeral, it would’ve also been a fatal bullet for his political career (Resigning meant that his government was responsible for what happened). At both times, Mikati knew that if he would resign it will have negative consequences on him before everyone else. So why now? Mikati wanted an alibi to leave the government so that he can run in the elections. But he couldn’t simply leave. He wanted to leave in a context that makes him stronger, not weaker. And instead of giving him one reason to quit, they gave him two. It was the perfect moment for him. The first motive is a national one, while the second motive is about Sunni politics.

A National Alibi

Mikati resigned because they wouldn’t let him organise elections. Read that sentence, (more…)

Waiting For The Electoral Law -The Lebanese Forces’ Hybrid Law: A Review

Lebanon’s Electoral Map According To The Lebanese Forces Hybrid Law. The colored districts are the small winner-takes-all ones and the big ones within the white line are the big districts under proportional unlike in the picture.

There has been a lot of talk on a hybrid Proportional-Representation/ Winner-Takes-All electoral law in the past few weeks, and almost all the parties (PSP, Phalanges, Amal, Lebanese Forces) gave their proposals of hybrid laws in the electoral committees. The different hybrid draft laws are very similar to each other and mostly differ in the percentage of MPs elected by proportional representation (30%, 40%, 50%) but less in the constituencies’ boundaries (Small districts for the winner-takes-all seats and big ones for the PR seats). I’m going to review the draft law proposed from the Lebanese Forces. You can see the criteria of the law here.

Here’s the allocation of seats according to the law and the number of voters by sects:

Allocations Of Seats According To The Lebanese Forces Hybrid Draft Law, Christian-Elected MPs Are In Red. Click to enlarge. Taken from the Lebanese Forces website

In a nutshell, the law separates Lebanon into two types of constituencies: 27 small (more…)

Moulahazat

A Lebanese Political Blog