Lebanese Politics

The War Files (Part III) – The Brown-Chamoun Meetings Of 1976

President Camille Chamoun amd wife at home playing with pet dog May 1958 (Image Credit LIFE Magazine James Whitmore)

President Camille Chamoun and wife at home playing with pet dog, May 1958 (LIFE Magazine/ James Whitmore)

This month marks the 40th anniversary of the Lebanese Civil War that started on the 13th of April 1975. This is why I’ve decided to publish WikiLeaks cables from the war era, every day till the 13th of April. I think it would be interesting to look at things from a different point of view, and since it’s not the Lebanese who are telling the stories, I believe it offers a unique insight on the civil war. Although there are a lot more cables on WikiLeaks, I won’t republish them all in order to focus on the most relevant ones. I hope you enjoy reading them.

Dean Brown was a U.S. envoy who was sent in 1976 in order to try to find a peaceful solution to the civil war. But in Lebanon, he isn’t famous for this job: The Christians will tell you that he told Chamoun he was intending to move the Lebanese Christians to Canada or the United States (It’s arguably the most important rumor/conspiracy theory of the civil war), while the Muslims will tell you that his sole plan was to strengthen Syria and the Christians and throw the PLO outside of Lebanon (“WE CAN ONLY SEE IN THE MISSION OF THE AMERICAN EMISSARY A GROSS FORM OF IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS THROUGH WHICH THE USA TRIES DIRECTLY TO HINDER THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEBANON FROM A TRIBAL AND CONFESSIONAL FEUDALISM INTO A STATE UNIFYING THE PEOPLE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A DEMOCRATIC SECULARIZED SYSTEM”).

I was never really convinced that Brown might have actually suggested mass immigration from one country to another, so I did some digging on WikiLeaks, and found several cables about Brown’s meetings with the Christian leaders. Apparently, Chamoun wanted Brown to support an independent Christian state, and Brown did not give the green light to Chamoun’s proposal, which could have angered Chamoun (and pushed him to accuse Brown of trying to transfer the Christians to Canada?)

Now of course, other things might have been mentioned in other meetings, but something as important as mass immigration would have at least been mentioned in the following cables (Spoiler alert: Brown never mentioned it in those). Anyway, take a look at the cables (Trust me, it’s worth it). There are tens of other cables, but I only put those mentioning meetings between Chamoun and Brown. I also organized the cables chronologically from the oldest to the newest so you could see how things changed between the first meetings and the last ones. And if you really, really don’t care about anything but the conversations with Chamoun, look for his name in red.

TALK WITH CHRISTIAN LEADERS
Date: 1976 April 2, 18:03 (Friday)	Canonical ID: 1976STATE079728_b
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Department of State	Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006
To: Egypt Cairo \| Israel Tel Aviv \| Syria Damascus

SUMMARY: MET WITH CHRISTIAN LEADERS TODAY. BASED ON WHAT WE SAW, I AM RELATIVELY RELAXED ON THEIR PROSPECTS FOR HOLDING OUT. FRANGIE WORRIED ABOUT NEED FOR SYRIAN OR OTHER TROOPS TO GUARANTEE CEASEFIRE, BUT APPEARS PREPARED TO RESIGN IN CONTEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD FOLLOW. END SUMMARY

1. GOT METICULOUS PRESENTATION OF CHRISTIAN POSITION FROM PRESIDENT FRANGIE TODAY, WHO WAS JOINED HALF-WAY THROUGH BY CHAMOUN AND GEMAYEL IN MEETING WHICH LASTED ALMOST THREE HOURS. ALL EMPHASIZED PROBLEM WAS NOT LEBANESE BUT HAD

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BEGUN WITH PALESTINIANS. GENERAL THEME OF FOREIGNERS AND LEFTISTS IDEOLOGICALLY INSPIRED BY SOVIETS AND BANK- ROLLED BY LIBYANS, IRAQIS, ETC., HIGHLIGHTED PRESENTATION. FRANGIE WAS THE MOST INFORMATIVE AND SPECIFIC. CHAMOUN CONCENTRATED ON ALARMIST DESCRIPTION AIMED AT PRODUCING SOME KIND OF U.S. ACTION. GEMAYEL WAS THE MOST EMOTIONAL AND REPETITIOUS, EMPHASIZING LEBANESE PATRIOTISM. ALL DESCRIBED WILL TO FIGHT TO THE END IN VERY DESPERATE TERMS, BUT WERE SHORT ON FACTS TO SUPPORT DESPARATE CONCLUSIONS.

2. WHEN I ASKED POINT-BLANK HOW LONG CHRISTIANS COULD HOLD OUT, FRANGIE SAID WITH OUTSIDE HELP INDEFINITELY. WITHOUT SUCH OUTSIDE HELP, 10 TO 20 DAYS. CHAMOUN PRODUCED CHURCHILLIAN NEAR-QUOTE: “GIVE US THE TOOLS AND WE WILL DO THE JOB.” FRANGIE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT IF NEED BE, MARONITES COULD HOLD OUT IN THE MOUNTAINS INDEFINITELY, AS THEY HAD DONE FOR HUNDREDS OF YEARS IN THE PAST. BY SAME TOKEN,NUMBER OF SENIOR CHRISTIAN OFFICERS WITH WHOM WE TALKED ON OUR WAY TO THE MEETING IN JOUNIEH DISPLAYED NO ALARM OVER MILITARY SITUATION AND DID NOT MENTION SHORTAGES IN AMMUNITION, BEYOND NOTING THAT IT WAS USED MORE SPARINGLY BY THEM THEN BY PROFLIGATE OTHER SIDE WHICH SEEMED TO ENJOY UNLIMITED SUPPLIES.

3. FRANGIE DESCRIBED AIMS OF OTHER SIDE AS EITHER (A) MAKING LEBANON A MOSLEM COUNTRY (WHICH WAS TRADTIONAL AIM OF MOSLEMS) OR (B) CHANGE POLITICAL REGIME (WHICH WAS NEW AIM OF LEFTISTS SUPPORTED FROM OUTSIDE). ALL THREE DESCRIBED PRESENT OFFENSIVE AGAINST PRESIDENT AS AIMED AT INSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENCE, WHICH LEFTISTS WISH TO DEMOLISH JUST AS LEFTISTS ARE INDISCRIMINATELY DEMOLISHING LEBANESE COMMERCE, INDUSTRY AND REAL ESTATE. FRANGIE IN PARTICULAR MADE MUCH OF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS CONSTANT NEW LEFTIST DEMANDS AND EXPLAINED MARONITE INTRANSIGENCE (INCLUDING HIS WEASELING ON HIS OWN RESIGNA- TION) IN TERMS OF DANGER OF SLIPPERY SLOPE.

4.FRANGIE SAID ANY CEASEFIRE HAD BE GUARANTEED IF IT NOT TO FAIL AS HAD DOZENS OF EARLIER ONES. BY THIS HE

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MEANT FORCE AND LOTS OF IT. HE AND OTHERS MADE CLEAR THAT THEY DID NOT LIKE SADAT ARAB PLAN BUT SUPPORTED SYRIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION. THEY SAID SYRIANS HAD BEEN PREPARED TO INTERVENE IN FORCE BUT WERE PREVENTED BY U.S. DECLARATIONS OPPOSING ANY UNILATERAL INTERVENTION. I TOLD THEM IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT INTERVENTION IS NOT A LIGHT MATTER AND THAT THEIR ADVOCACY OF IT SHOULD BE RATIONALLY AND NOT JUST EMOTIONALLY THOUGHT THROUGH, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO REACTIONS IT MIGHT PROVOKE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. I KNOW THE POINT GOT THROUGH.

5. THE THREE OF THEM, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A GROUP, SAE LITTLE PROSPECT FOR SYRIANS TO PLAY CEASEFIRE POLICING ROLE,USING ONLY THOSE SYRIAN-CONTROLLED TROOPS, SUCH AS PLA AND SAIQA, WHICH ARE ALREADY IN COUNTRY. SAID THIS WOULD ASSUME HIGH DEGREE OF PALESTINIAN MODERATION AND WILLING- NESS TO ABIDE BY CAIRO ACCORDS (WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, FRANGIE MADE AN ABSOLUTE CONDITION OF ANY PERMANENT CEASE- FIRE). GEMAYEL WAS LESS CATEGORIC THAN OTHERS. HE SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE WORTH CONSIDERING IF U.S. BELIEVED AFTER TALKING TO SYRIANS THAT THEY HAD ENOUGH FORCES IN LEBANON.

6. IF CEASEFIRE, COUPLED WITH SOME GUARANTEE OF ENOUGH FORCE TO MAKE IT STICK,WERE ACHIEVED, FRANGIE TOLD US HE SAW NO PROBLEM FOLLOWING AGREED CONSTITUTIONAL COLUTION. THIS WOULD BE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 73 OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE PARLIAMENT AND ELECTION OF EW PRESIDENT UNDER CONDITION FREE OF PRESSURE, AFTER WHICH REMAINDER OF HIS PERIOD OF OFFICE WAS TOO SHORT TO BE WORHTWHILE AND HE WOULD TAKE A BADLY NEEDED REST. THIS STATEMENT OF WILLINGNESS TO RESIGN WAS PERHAPS THE SINGLE MOST SOLID PIECE OF INFORMATION WE GOT FROM FRANGIE. HE SOUNDED CONVINCED ENOUGH, BUT I DID WONDER WHY HE DID NOT REPEAT THIS STATEMENT IN FRONT OF CHAMOUN AND GEMAYEL. IN THEIR PRESENCE, HE LIMITED HIMSELF TO ARGUING,AS THEY WERE, THAT CALL FOR HIS RESIGNATION WAS A FALSE ISSUE.

7. ALSO SAW MARONITE PATRIARCH. HE TOLD ME HE WOULD BE

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SEEING FRANGIE ET AL SOONEST AND WOULD MAKE POINT THAT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENITIES CANNOT STAND IN WAY OF POLITICAL REALITIES. HE IS A REFRESHING BREATH OF FRESH AIR IN THIS FETID ATMOSPHERE WHERE SHORT TERM AIMS ARE TOO EASILY CONFUSED WHICH LONG TERM DEVELOPMENTS.

BROWN

UNQTE KISSINGER

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AMB BROWN’S MEETING REPORTS LEBANON SITUATION
Date: 1976 April 5, 19:05 (Monday)	Canonical ID: 1976BEIRUT02979_b
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut
To: Department of State \| Secretary of State

1. HAD COMPLETELY PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH GEMAYEL, MALIK AND CHAMOUN. FRANGIE HAD REPORTER AND INTERPRETER (LUCIEN DAHDAH) PRESENT. TALKED TO THEM FROM FOLLOWING POINTS.

2. FIRST GAVE GENERAL IMPRESSION OF TALKS WITH MUSLIM, DRUZE AND CHRISTIANS. SAID I FOUND GENERALIZED DESIRE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE AND A WISH ON PART OF MOSLEMS FOR GREATER POLITICAL RECOGNITION. POORER CLASSES, MOSTLY SHIA, WHILE NOT STARVING, BELIEVE THEY ARE NOT SHARING SUFFIENTLY IN ECONOMIC PROGRESS. WITH IMAM THERE WAS NORE SORROW THAN ANGER BUT EVEN MOST MODERATE PUSH FOR MORE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE POOR MUSLIM AREAS. AS THEY ASKED, I TOLD THEM THAT MUFTI WWAS TAKING A HARDER LINE ON RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND THAT THEY KNEW HIS TENOR OF THINKING.

3. I TOLD HIM THAT JUMBLATT WAS PREPARED TO EXTEND THE TRUCE IF THE POLITICAL PROCESS WAS WELL UNDER WAY BUT THAT HE HAD GIVEN NO SOLID GUARANTEES FOR THE FUTURE WHICH THEREFORE NECESSITATED FORWARD MOVE- MENT SOON.

4. I THEN SAID I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH THEM THOUGHTS WHICH I HAD NOT YET CHECKED OUT WITH WASHINGTON AS I WANTED THEIR VIEWS BEFORE SO DOING. FIRST WAS WHETHER AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE WE COULD GE TSOME SORT OF SECURITY INTO THE CITY OF BEIRUT TO PUT A STOP TO THE MINDLESS LOOTING AND KILLING NOW GOING ON. WOULD THEY BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO A JOINT FORCCE WITH THE PALESTINIANS, SAIQA AND ARMY? THE SECOND THOUGHT WAS COULD THEY ENVISAGE THE CREATION OF AN INTER- NATIONAL CONSORTIUM ESTABLISHED AT THE REQUEST OF THE NEW LEBANESE GOVT WHOSE TASK WOULD BE TO ASSIST IN THE REBUILDING OF THE SHATTERED ECONOMY, IN SO DOING ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE REESTABLISHMENT OF LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES. I ASKED THEM IN TURN IF THEY COULD AGREE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NEED FOR REFORM.

5. I MADE IT PLAIN TO THEM THAT WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE PLIGHT OF THE MARONITES AND BY THEIR MILITARY DIS- ADVANTAGE. WE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD BE STRONG ENOUGHT TO NEGOTIATE BUT NOT TOO WEAK TO HAVE TO CAPITULATE. I PERSONALLY SAW NO POSSIBILITY OF EITHER PARTITION OR OF A DREAM OF MILITARY VICTORY AS A WAY OUT. THERE- FORE, THERE HAD TO BE NEGOTIATION. IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE PALESTINIAN FORCES BE KEPT PEACEFUL AND I DID NOT SEE HOW WE COULD BE HOPEFUL IN THE CONTEXT UNLESS THERE WAS SOUND HOPE FOR NEGOTIA- TIONS.

6. I SAID IT SEEMED TO ME AFTER ALL MY TALKS IN LEBANON THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO CARRY THROUGH THE GENERALLY AGREED UPON PLAN BOTH PROMPTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH. THERE IS NOT TIME LEFT FOR POLITICAL GAMES AND REALITIES HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT I REALIZED THAT SECURITY IS VERY MUCH IN THEIR MIND. SO IT IS IN OURS.

7. GEMAYEL’S REACTION. GEMAYEL WAS ENTHUSIASTIC. HE SAID HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO CONTRIBUTE THE PMALANGE. HE SAID IT COULD BE DONE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION (PALESTINIANS, SYRIANS, LEBANESE. HE EXPLAINED HE MEANT A REGULAR LEBANESE ARMY OFFICER. HE GREATLY APPROVED OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM PROVIDED IT WAS A LEBANESE INITIATIVE AND THOUGHT THIS SHOULD BE THE FIRST TASK OF A NEW PRESIDENT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CON- SORTIUM SHOULD INCLUDE FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHOS OSTENSIBLE ROLE WOULD BE TO RETRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY. IN THIS WAY THERE COULD BE AN ECHELON MOVE- MENT FROM SECURITY CONTROLLED BY THE MIXED COMMISSION THROUGH SOME INTERNATIONAL FORCES WHO WOULD TRAIN THE LEBANESE AND EVENTUAL ASSUMPTION OF THE LEBANESE OF THEIR OWN DEFENSE. IT VITAL THAT SYRIA BE BROUGHT EARLY INTO THE PROCESS AND INVOLVED THROUGHTOUT.

8. GEMAYEL DID NOT THINK THE WHOLE THING THROUGH AS DID FRANGIE AS YOU WILL SEE LATER BUT HE WILL SUPPORT IT UNLESS OTHERS PRESS HARD ON HIM.

9. WE DISCUSSED ON HIS INITIATIVE THE UPCOMING POLITICAL CHANGES. HE WANTS A NEW PRESIDENT, MARONITE NATURALLY, WHO CAN ATTRACT AS BROAD A CON- SENSUS OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCESS AS POSSIBLE. HE FEELS THAT A PRESIDENT ELEECTED BY A NARROW VOTE WOULD SOON FAILZM I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD VETOES OF ANY CANDIDATE. HE DENIED THIS SAYINF IA STRONG CON- SENSUS DEVELOPS HE WILL NOT STAND IN ITS WAY. (I HAVE CONSIDERABLE DOUBTS ABOUT THIS AS HE IS PPREJUD- ICED AGAINST EDDE AND WILL PROBABLY MAKE IT KNOWN AS THE CONSENSUS IS WORKED OUT.) HE SAID, AS DID THE OTHER, THAT HE WAS IN CONSTANT CONTACT WIITH VARIOUS POLITICAL ELEMENTS ABOUT THE CANDIDATES.

10. IN VIEW OF THE IDEA OF A JOINT FORCE I ASKED HIM WHAT HIS RELATIONS WERE WITH ‘ARAFAT. HE SAID THAT HE HADN’T HAD ANY DIRECT RELATIONSHIP IN MONTHS BUT THAT HE WAS PERFECTLY WILLING TO TALK TO HIM IF IT WOULD GET ANYWHERE.

11. FRANGIE. FRANGIE AS DID THE OTHERS HAD COMMENTS ON MY ANALYSIS OF WHAT I THOUGHT I HAD FOUND.HE TROTTED OUT A WHOLE SERIES OF STATISTICS TO SHOW THAT PRACTICALLY ALL OF THE BUDGET OF LEBANON IS SPENT TO HELP THE POOR PEOLPEL AND THIS MEANS THE MOSLEMS. I TOLD HIM THAT I KNEW THESE STATISTICS. WHAT I WAS TRYING TO DESCRIBE TO HIM WAS A BELIEF OF THE PEOPLE AND THAT STRONGLY-HELD BELIEFS ARE OFTEN MUCH STRONGER THAN STATISTICS. FRANGIE IS SKEPTICAL AS TOO WHETHER THE JOINT COMMISSION CAN BE ESTABLISHED BUT IS QUITE WILLING FOR MARONITE FORCES TO TAKE A PART IN IT. I SAID THE ONLY WAY TO FIND OUT IS TO TRY AND THAT HE MUST AGREE WITH MM, AS HE DID, THAT IT IS VITAL TO PUT AN END TO THE GANGS WHICH ARE TORMENTING THE CITY. AS FOR THE CONSORTIUM IDEA HE AGREED COM- PLETELY THAT IT COULD SERVE AS A SIGN OF HOPE FOR THE PEOPLE WHO COULD SAY TO THEMSELVES THAT THE NEW TASK IS RECONSTRUCTION IN WHICH THE WORLD IS HELPING.

12. AT ONE MOMENT HE SAID THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT. WE ARE SICK AND WE CANNOT TAKE CARE OF OURSELVES. WE NEED GOOD DOCTORS, FRIENDLY ONE TO COME AND EXAMINE THE CAUSES OF THE SICKNESS AND PROVIDE THE REMEDIES. THEY HAVE TO HAVE THE BEST INTEREST OF LEBANON AT HEART.

13. HE SAID THAT THE SYRIANS WERE THE ONLY ONES TO OFFER MEDIATION. HE HAD ESTABLISHED PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH ASAD WHEREIN THEY HAD TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN EACH OTHER. IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE OF THIS HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO ACCEPT THAT MEDIATION. THIS PERSONAL CONTACT WILL BE LOST WHEN HE LEAVES OFFICE. THE SYRAIN REGIME IS ALWAYS SUBJECT TO CHANGE. LEBANON CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT COUNT ON LONG DURATION OF SYRIAN EFFORT. IT SHOULD BE BACKED BY WESTERN COUNTRIES.

14. I TOLD HIM THAT I UNDERSTOOD HIS POINT. IF SYRIA IS NOT IN THE ACT FROM THE BEGINNING, THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE FOR WHAT I HAD PROPOSED. WHILE IT COULD BE TRUE THAT THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IS BASED ON THE TRUST THEIR PRESIDENTS HAVE IN EACH OTHER, A CONSORTIUM WITH SYRAIN PARTICIPATION COULD TRANSFORM THAT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP INTO SOMETHING MORE FORMAL AND A POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR SYRAIN GOVT WOULD FIND ITSELF INNVLVED IN AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT. WHILE I COULD NOT GIVE HIM ANY GUUARANTEES I THOUGHT THESE CONSIDERATIONS MIGHT EASE HIS MIND ABOUT THE FUTURE. 14. FRANGIE REPLIED THAT HE WANTED ME TO KNOW THAT HE WOULD USE ALL HIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ASAD TO EASE ANY POSSIBLE SYRIANS SENSITIVITY.

15. WE RUNED TO A POSSIBLE COMPOSITION OF A CONSORTIUM. FRANGIEESAID HE WOULD PREFER IT TO BE WESTERN BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE VALUE OF HAVING ARABS IN IT FOR TWO REASONS: FIRST, TO TAKE CARE OF SYRIAN SENSIBILITIES AND SECOND TO SECRET SECRET PAGE 03 BEIRUT 02979 02 OF 03 052151Z GET ACCESS TO ARAB FUNDS. HE WOULD LIKE THE SYRIANS, JORDANIANS AND SAUDIS IN THE CONSORTIUM. HE DID NOT WANT ARAB COUNTRIES (E.G., IRAQ OR LIBYA) WHO HE CLAIMED WERE INVOLVED IN THE INTER- NATIONAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON.

16. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY IT WAS AQUESTION OF HOW TO APPROACH THE SYRAINS. WHO? CERTAINLY NOT THE PRIME MINISTER WHO WAS ANTI-WESTERN BUT WHO WOULD IN THE END GO ALONG IF THE SYRAINS APPROVED. HE SAID THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR SHOULD DO IT.

17. I ENTERED AGAIN TO REMIND HIM THAT I WAS ONLY TALKING ABOUT A PRIVATE IDEA AND THAT I WOULD REPORT ALL OF OUR CONVERSATION TO MY GOVT BUT I COULD NOT TAKE ON ANY COMMITMENTS AT THIS TIME. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD.

18. HE TOLD ME THAT IN ONE OF HIS EARLIER TALKS WITH THE SYRIANS, THE SYRIANS TOLD HIM THAT THEY WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE THE US PLAY A ROLE IN THE MEEDIATION EFFORT IF THERE WAS SOME SORT OF UN APPROVAL. WHILE THIS DID NOT APPLY DIRECTLY TO WHAT WE WERE DISCUSSING, HE THOUGHT IT WAS A HOPEFUL SIGN. HE SAID AGAIN THAT HE WOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE IN TALK WITH PRES ADAD.

19. WE THEN TURNED TO A POSSIBLE AGENDA OF ACTION. AFTER MUCH TO AND FROM THIS IS WHAT HE THINKS IS GOOD: (A) GET THE AGREEMENT OF THE US; (B) SOMEONE TALK TO SYRIA; (C) THE US TALK TO FRANCE, OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES AND KING KHALED; (D) GET THE NEW PRESIDENT SOLLIDLY ON BOARD AND SET UP THE MECHAN- ISM BY WHICH THE REQUEST WOULD BE MADE.

20. FRANGIE SAID SADLY IF THIS FAILS THEN THE ONLY RECOURSE WILL BE SYRIAN INTERVE TION. HE ASKED IF I THOUGHT IF THE CONSORTIUM WORKED WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR FURTHER SYRAIN FORCES TO ENTER THE COUNTRY AS A PART OF THE CONSORTIUM’S EFFORT TO REBUILD THE LEBANESE ARMY. PERHAPS THIS WOULD BE ONE WAY TO ASSURE THE ISRAELIS.

21. LUCIEN DAHDAH INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT ALL THE ABOV REALLY DEPENDED ON WHETHER THERE COULD BE SECURITY IN THE INTERIM. FRANGIE SAID THERE IS A REAL PROBLEM HERE BECAUSE LARGE NUMBERS OF THE DEPUTIES, FORTY HE ESTIMATED, WERE IN DISTRICTS UNDER PALESTINIAN DOMINATION. THIS INCLUDES KARAME AND KAMEL AL-ASSAD. THAT’S ONE PROBLEM. THE OTHER IS THAT MANY ARE AFRAID TO PUT THEMSELVES UNDER THE PROTECTION OF SAIQA. THE GENERAL QUESTION IS TO MAKE SURE THE ELECTION IN PARLIAMENT IS FREE. IF IT LOOKS LIKE IT IS FORCED IN ANY WAY ON THE DEPUTIES BY NON-LEBANESE EITHER SYRIAN OR PALESTINIAN THEN “THE REVOLUTION WILL CHANGE SIDES AND PARTITION WILL FOLLOW”.

22. HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL FOR THE MARONITES TO AGREE ON ONE CANDIDATE AND NOT TO PROVIDE A DIVIDED FRONT. IF THIS IS DONE AND THERE IS SECURITY, EVENTUALLY THE OTHER PARLIAMENTARIANS WILL FOLLOW. HE PLANS TO MEET TODAY WITH OTHER MARONITE LEADERS ON THIS SUBJECT.

23. THEN CAME THE FIRST PROBLEM. FRANGIE SAID THAT AMIXED COMMISSION COULD PROBABLY BE SET UP IN 48 HOURS. IT WOULD MEAN MAKING SURE OF JUMBLATT, GEMAYEL AND CHAMOUN. THE MIXED COMMISSION WILL HAVE TO USE FORCE AND THIS MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. NEGOTIA- TION WITH LAWLESS BANDS WON’T WORK. BUT THE FIRST TASK OF THE MIXED COMMISSSION WOULD BE TO DEAL WITH THAT AND BY SO DOING SHOW PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY THE DEPUTIES, THAT SECURITY CAN BE PROVIDED FOR THE PARLIAMENT. HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD DELAY THINGS AND STRESSED IN ANY CASE INASMUCH AS NO CONSENSUS ON ANY CANDIDATE HAS EMERGED, THE LEBANESE COULD NOT PROCEED AS FAST AS I HAD TOLD HIM THEY SHOULD. THE SECOND PROBLEM RAISED BY FRANGIE CAME UP TOWARDS THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION. HE ASKED HOW HE COULD GET SOME ARMS FAST TO THE LEBANESE ARMY. I ASKED HIM WHAT LEBANESE ARMY. HE SAID SOLDIERS ARE BEGINNING TO DRIFT BACK ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE. HE THOUGHT AT A MAXIMUM 4-5,000 MEMBERS OF THE ARMY WERE RECUPERABLE, HALF CHRISTIAN, HALF MOSLEM. IF ARMED AND WELL-OFFICERED THEY COULD PROVIDE A REAL FORCE WITHIN A RELATIVEL SHORT TIME. I TOLD HIM THIS WAS A BIG PROBLEM BUT THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS REQUEST. AS WE ENDED OUR CON- VERSATION, FRANGIE SAID HE ACCEPTED THE TWO SUGGESTIONS I HAD MADE WITHOUT RESERVE. HE BELIEVES THAT THERE MUST BE TWO GUARANTEES TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TRANQUILITY OF MIND FOR THE FUTURE. FIRST IS THAT THE REGIME IN ITS PRESENT FORM–EVEN WITH REFORMS WHICH HE HIMSELF WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE MUST SURVE. THE LEBANESE PEOPLE WANT THE DEMOCRACY THE HAVE. SECOND IS THAT THE LEBANON, CREATED AS A COUNTRY WHERE MOSLEMS AND CHRISTIANS HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS, HAS ALSO TO BE MAINTAINED. THE CHRISTIANS NEED GUARANTEES IN THE FUTURE THAT THEY BE ABLE TO LIVE LIKE THEY HAVE ALWAYS LIVED AND THAT THEY NOT BECOME SECOND RATE CITIZENS AS THEY ARE IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WHERE CHRISTIANS ARE ONLY TOLERATED.

24. CHAMOUN. CHAMOUN WAS ANOTHER CASE. HE HEARD ME OUT ON AND THEN SAID HE WANTED ME TO KNOW ONE THING WHICH HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO SAY IN FRONT OF FRANGIE THE OTHER DAY. THE AIM OF THE SYRIANS IS TO BUILD A STATE IN LEBANON WHICH IS 100 PERCENT HOSTILE TO ISRAEL. THE MARONITES WILL NEVER FIGHT THE ISRAELIS. THEY HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. THEY ARE TWO MINORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY SHOULD WORK TOOGETHER TO PRESERVE THEM- SELVES AND IF THE WEST WAS REALLY ASTUTE, IT WOULD ACCEPT THIS AND HELP THEM BOTH. IN LEBANON THIS MEANT CONFEDERATION WHERE TWO COMMUNITIES COULD BE UNDER ONE FLAG BUT MAINTAIN THEIR SEPARATE RIGHTS. PROPOSALS I HAD MADE ARE SHORT TERM. THEY WILL ONLY LEAD TO ANOTHER WAR IN A FEW YEARS. THE CONSORTIUM COULD BE HELPFUL IF IT HAD ON ITS TASK SETTING UP THE CONFEDERATION.

25. I TOLD HIM THAT IN ALL HONESTY, I THOUGHT HIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE ONE. THE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS WOULD HAVE TO FIND THEIR SECURITY IN OTHER WAYS. CONFEDERATION AS HE PROPOSED IT IS ONLY PARTITION. I ASKED HIM TO THINK THIS OVER AGAIN AND TO ASK HIMSELF IF WHAT HE PROPOSED WAS REALLY THE DESIRE OF THE MARONITE AND CHRISTIAN PEOPLE.

26. MALIK. MALIK IS ENTHUSIASTIC. SEES PROBLEMS AS WOULD ANY LEBANESE AND WILL TALK TO HIS CHRISTIAN BROTHERS ABOUT IT.

27. MONKS. ARE ACKNOWLEDGED AS IMPORTANT ELE- MENT IN THE MARONITE COMMUNITY. THEY HAVE BEEN STUDYING THE FUTURE FOR THE PAST YEAR AND GAVE ME THE WHOLE LOF OF REFORM PROPOSALS BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC WHICH I PROMISED TO STUDY. THE LEADERS TOLD ME PRIVATELY SEVERAL TIMES THAT WE WOULD GET NOWHERE WITH CHAMOUN BUT THAT THEY WOULD WORK ON BOTH FRANGIE AND GEMAYEL AND ON OTHER IMPORTANT LEVERS IN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. THEY ARE VERY FEARFUL OF THE EVENTUAL ISLAMIZATION OF LEBANON WITH THE CHRISTIANS IN INFERIOR POSITIONS.

28. IT HAS BEEN A LONG DAY. I APOLOGIZE FOR THE LENGTHH OF THIS BUT I WANTED TO GET THEIR THINKING FIRST HAND. I WILL COMMENT LATER.

BROWN

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LEBANON
Date: 1976 April 9, 23:47 (Friday)	Canonical ID: 1976STATE086650_b
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Department of State
To: Israel Tel Aviv \| Lebanon Beirut \| Syria Damascus \| TEL AVIV BEIRUT DAMASCUS

1. WHILE WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE LEBANESE SITUATION FROM TIME TO TIME WITH DINITZ AT THIS END, WE HAVE NOT GIVEN HIM A SYSTEMATIC ACCOUNT OF DEAN BROWN’S ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE CONVEY TO ALLON, FROM ME, FOR HIS VERY RESTRICTED USE, THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO KEEP THE ISRAELIS UP TO DATE.

2. AMBASSADOR BROWN HAS HELD INTENSIVE ROUNDS OF TALKS WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PRINCIPAL LEBANESE FACTIONS, IN PARTICULAR THE CHRISTIAN LEADERS ON THE ONE SIDE AND JUMBLATT ON THE OTHER, BUT HE HAS ALSO SEEN MODERATE MOSLEM LEADERS. ASIDE FROM HEARING THE POINTS OF VIEW OF THE LEBANESE, HE HAS FOCUSSED HIS ATTENTION ON TWO MAIN POINTS: THE NEED FOR ALL SIDES TO MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE AND TO BE FLEXIBLE IN REACHING THE POLITICAL COMPROMISES THAT WILL BE NECESSARY IN THE NEXT WEEKS; AND THE PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE ABSENCE OF ANY CENTRAL SECURITY FORCE IN THE COUNTRY.

3. IN HIS FIRST TALK WITH FRANGIE, CHAMOUN AND GEMAYEL, HE FOUND THE CHRISTIAN LEADERS CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY SITUATION, ALTHOUGH THE CHRISTIAN MILITARY OFFICERS THEM- SELVES COMMENTED MAINLY ON THE NEED TO CONSERVE AMMUNITION. THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP CLEARLY FELT UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM JUMBLATT, AND FRANGIE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE ESCALATING DEMANDS OF THE DRUSE LEADER. THEY SAID THEY BELIEVED THE LEFT-WING OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST THE INSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENCY, WHICH THE LEFTISTS WISHED TO DEMOLISH ALONG WITH OTHER ASPECTS AND INSTITUTIONS OF LEBANESE LIFE. FRANGIE, IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION, SAID HE SAW NO PROBLEM IN AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION AND ELECTING A NEW PRESIDENT IF THIS COULD BE DONE FREE OF OUTSIDE PRESSURE. HE INDICATED HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESIGN THEREAFTER.

4. IN A SUBSEQUENT SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH THE CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP ON APRIL 5, AFTER HIS FIRST TALK WITH JUMBLATT, BROWN TOLD THEM THAT THE DRUSE LEADER SEEMED PREPARED TO EXTEND THE TRUCE IF THE POLITICAL PROCESS WAS WELL UNDERWAY BUT HAD MADE NO SOLID GUARANTEE FOR THE FUTURE. BROWN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING FORWARD MOVEMENT. HE MADE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. IS DEEPLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE SITUATION OF THE MARONITES AND THEIR MILITARY DISADVANTAGE, THAT WE BELIEVE THEY MUST RETAIN NECESSARY STRENGTH TO NEGOTIATE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL ENSURE SECURITY OF THEIR COMMUNITY, BUT THAT HIS TALKS HAD LED HIM TO BELIEVE THE BEST WAY FOR THEM TO MOVE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WAS TO CARRY THROUGH THE GENERALLY AGREED-UPON PLAN FOR POLITICAL REFORM PROMPTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH. HE THEN TURNED TO THE SECURITY QUESTION, PUTTING FORWARD AS HIS PERSONAL SUGGESTION THE IDEA OF A JOINT FORCE WITH CHRISTIANS, PALESTINIANS, SAIQA AND ARMY ELEMENTS TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WHILE A NEW GOVERNMENT IS BEING FORMED AND THE NECESSARY POLITICAL AND OTHER CHANGES ARE BEING MADE. FOR THE LONGER RUN HE SUGGESTED, ALSO PERSONALLY, AN INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM, TO BE REQUESTED BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, THAT WOULD HELP IN REBUILDING THE LEBANESE ECONOMY AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE REESTABLISHMENT OF A LEBANESE SECURITY FORCE.

5. GEMAYEL AND FRANGIE WERE QUITE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE THE PHALANGE TO A JOINT SECURITY FORCE, GEMAYEL SAYING THIS COULD BE DONE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE SYRIAN- PALESTINIAN-LEBANESE COMMISSION ARRANGEMENT. FRANGIE WAS LESS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY OF THE FORCE. BOTH AGREED WITH THE IDEA OF A CONSORTIUM FOR THE LONGER RUN FUTURE. GEMAYEL MADE THE POINT THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND EMPHASIZED THAT SYRIA WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS THROUGH- OUT. CHAMOUN, ON THE OTHER HAND, DID NOT REACT FAVORABLY TO THESE PERSONAL IDEAS OF BROWN’S. HE THOUGHT THAT SOME FORM OF CONFEDERATION WAS THE ONLY SOLUTION. BROWN TOLD HIM THAT IN HIS VIEW THE CONFEDERATION IDEA WAS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE ONE. CONFEDERATION AS CHAMOUN CONCEIVED IT MEANT ONLY PARTITION AND CONTINUING INSTABILITY, AND BROWN SAID HE BELIEVED THE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS WOULD HAVE TO FIND THEIR SECURITY IN OTHER WAYS.

6. IN BROWN’S FIRST MEETING WITH JUMBLATT, THE DRUSE LEADER DESCRIBED HIS OBJECTIVES IN TERMS THAT WOULD REQUIRE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE LEBANESE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM, GOING FAR BEYOND THE ARRANGEMENT WORKED OUT WITH SYRIAN ASSISTANCE IN JANUARY. JUMBLATT ALSO DID NOT RULE OUT A RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING IF HE DID NOT GET THE REFORMS HE SOUGHT. BROWN TOLD HIM FORCE- FULLY THAT THE MAJOR CHANGES HE SOUGHT WERE UNREALISTIC IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND WARNED HIM OF THE DANGERS IF THE CEASEFIRE WERE NOT MAINTAINED AND A POLITICAL SOLUTION WERE NOT RAPIDLY ACHIEVED. BROWN IS CONTINUING TO MEET WITH JUMBLATT AND WE WILL LET THE ISRAELIS KNOW ABOUT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

7. THE SECRETARY WANTS ALLON TO KNOW THAT WE HAVE BEEN SECRET CONTINUING TO PRESS THE SYRIANS NOT TO INTERVENE MILITARILY, WHILE INFORMING THEM OF OUR EFFORTS TO HELP BRING ABOUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION ALONG THE GENERAL LINES OF THE JANUARY SOLUTION. IT IS CUR IMPRESSION THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE TAKEN SERIOUSLY THE WARNINGS WE HAVE CONVEYED TO THEM ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION, DESPITE THE OBVIOUS PRESSURES THEY FEEL TO INTRODUCE ORDER INTO THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, AND HAVE CONDUCTED THE LIMITED AUGMENTATIONS OF SYRIAN CONTROLLED FORCES IN A WAY MOST CALCULATED TO AVOID PRESENTING THE ISRAELIS WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH THEY MIG;T REACT. WE SHOULD ADD THAT IN HIS TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE LEADERS, SOME OF WHOM HAVE TOLD US OF THEIR HOPE FOR SYRIAN INTERVENTION, WE HAVE ALSO MADE CLEAR OUR OPPOSITION TO THIS COURSE OF ACTION.

8. THE SECRETARY WANTS TO NOTE IN THIS CONNECTION THE REPORT THAT ALLON HAS DOUBTLESS RECEIVED (WE INFORMED DINITZ AND SUBSEQUENTLY MINISTER BAR-ON IMMEDIATELY ON RECEIVING THE REPORTS FRIDAY MORNING) ABOUT THE MOVEMENT OF SYRIAN TROOPS ACROSS TO THE LEBANESE SIDE OF THE BORDER ALONG THE DAMASCUS-BEIRUT ROAD. THE NUMBER OF TROOPS INVOLVED IS VARIOUSLY REPORTED AS FROM 700 TO 2,000. ACCORDING TO REPORTS WE HAVE SEEN THEY ARE LIGHTLY ARMED. THEY APPEARED AS OF EARLY FRIDAY (WASHINGTON TIME) TO BE DIGGING IN NEAR THE CUSTOMS POST AT MASNA, AT THE FOOT OF THE HILLS ABOUT THREE KILOMETERS IN FROM THE FRONTIER ON THE LEBANESE SIDE, THOUGH SOME ELEMENTS WERE REPORTED TO BE MOVING ON ACROSS THE VALLEY. OUR INITIAL AND TENTATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE MOVE IS THAT THE SYRIANS ARE CONDUCTING A SHOW OF FORCE BY TAKING CONTROL OF THE PASS AND APPROACH AREAS TO MAKE MORE CREDIBLE THE PRESSURE THEY WOULD LIKE TO MAINTAIN ON THE LEFTISTS BASED ON THE THREAT OF SYRIAN INTERVENTION.

9. FINALLY, THE SECRETARY WISHES ALLON TO KNOW THAT WE FEEL THE ISRAELI REACTIONS TO THE LEBANESE CRISIS, WITH THEIR RESTRAINT, HAVE CONTRIBUTED TOWARD CONTROLLING THE SITUATION. THIS IS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH OF US AND WE VERY MUCH HOPE ISRAELI ACTIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED

CHAMOUN
Date: 1976 April 13, 17:30 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID: 1976BEIRUT03288_b
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut
To: Department of State \| Secretary of State

1. IN PRIVATE TALKMONDAY WITH CHAMOUN I MOVED HIM BACK FROM THE PRECIPICE. I TOLD HIM MODERN WORLD IS MOVING TOWARDS INTERDEPENDENCE AND THAT HIS PARTITION PROPOSALS WOULD ONLY RESULT IN CREATION OF SMALL, NON-VIABLE STATES WITHOUT ANY SOLID BASE FOR INDUSTRIAL/ FINANCIAL/ENTREPOT DEVELOPMENT,HE SHOULD BE LOOKING MORE INTO FUTURE AND TOWARDS EVENTUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUNG GENERATIONS.

2. HE FINALLY SAID HE WOULD OPERATE WITHIN LEGAL/ CONSTITUTITDL FRAMEWORK TO SEE IF HIS PEOPLE’S RIGHTS COULD BE SAFEGUARDED IN WHAT WILL BE TIME OF CHANGE. HE WOULD GIVE SYSTEM THREE-FIVE YEARS TO PROVE IT COULD WORK.

3. THIS IS SOME SLIGHT PROGRESS ON AN ISSUE WHICH DOES NOT LOOM LARGE AT THIS MOMENT, GIVEN ALL THE OTHER PROBLEMS,BUT WHICH REMAINS VERY MUCH IN THE MIND OF THE MARONITES.

BROWN

SECRET

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MEETING WITH FRANGIE – SAYS HE WILL SIGN
Date: 1976 April 23, 15:15 (Friday)	Canonical ID: 1976BEIRUT03656_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut
To: Department of State \| Secretary of State

1. AMBASSADOR BROWN SPOKE WITH FRANGIE FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF APRIL 23RD IN JOUNIEH BEFORE RETURNING TO BEIRUT AIRPORT BY HELICOPTER AND TAKING PLANE TO LONDON. DURING LAST HALF HOUR PARTY WAS JOINED BY CHAMOUN. GEMAYEL UNFORTUNATELY COULD NOT MAKE IT.

2. AMBASSADOR REVIEWED WITH FRANGIE ALL THE ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WITHOUT DELAY. HE PLACED PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON OUR INTEREST IN THE WELL BEING OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. AT FIRST FRANGIE WAS ADAMANT, CLAIMING THAT THE SECURITY CONDITIONS ON WHICH THE AMENDMENT WAS IN PART BASED DID NOT PREVAIL. AMBASSADOR THEN TACKLED THIS “VICIOUS CIRCLE” ARGUMENT AND FINALLY GOT FRANGIE TO AGREE TO SIGN THE AMENDMENT. HOWEVER, AS APRIL 23RD WAS A HOLIDAY, FRANGIE SAID HE WOULD DELAY HIS SIGNATURE UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY. (NOT CLEAR WHETHER FRANGIE WAS REFERRING TO GREEK ORTHODOX GOOD FRIDAY OR TO THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WORK AFTER 1100 HOURS ON FRIDAY IN DEFERENCE TO THE MOSLEMS.)

3. FRANGIE HAS SAID BEFORE HE WOULD SIGN BUT HAS BACKED DOWN. HE IS MEETING WITH MARONITES THIS AFTERNOON. THEY MAY PERSUADE HIM NOT TO SIGN, BUT OUR READING IS THAT THE MAJORITY ARE IN FAVOR OF SIGNATURE.

4. IF THE AMBASSADOR WON ON THE SIGNATURE, IT WAS NOT A COMPLETE VICTORY. FRANGIE WENT ON TO SAY THAT, EVEN IF A NEW PRESIDENT WAS ELECTED, HE WOULD NOT RESIGN IF ADEQUATE SECURITY CONDITIONS DID NOT EXIST. BUT THIS IS A BRIDGE WE CAN CROSS WHEN WE GET TO IT.

5. CHAMOUN’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONVERSATION WAS TO START OFF ON THE NECESSITY OF ESTABLISHING A SEPARATE STATE. AFTER A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TALKING TO, THE AMBASSADOR FINALLY GOT CHAMOUN MOVED TO WHAT APPEARS TO BE HIS STANDARD FALL-BACK POSITION, NAMELY THAT HE WOULD HOLD OFF A FEW YEARS TO GIVE THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT A CHANCE.

WARING

CONFIDENTIAL

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MEETING WITH CHRISTIAN LEADERS
Date: 1976 May 6, 17:15 (Thursday)	Canonical ID: 1976BEIRUT04055_b
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut
To: Department of State \| Secretary of State

1. FOLLOWING MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE ON MAY 6TH I HAD A GENERAL MEETING WITH CHRISTIAN LEADERS, WHEN FRANGIE WAS JOINED BY CHAMOUN, GEMAYEL AND FATHER KASSIS. I WENT OVER THE SAME GROUND JUST COVERED WITH FRANGIE AND AGAIN ELICITED GENERAL DISSATISFACTION THAT WE HAD NO SPECIFIC PLAN AND WERE ALLEGEDLY BLOCKING SYRIA FROM PROVIDING THE SECURITY NEEDED FOR THE COUNTRY’S CONTINUED EXISTENCE.

2. CHAMOUN BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT LEBANESE DIFFICULTIES COULD BE ATTRIBUTED MAINLY TO THE PALES- TINIANS. HE WAS PLEASED THAT I HAD CONCEDED THAT THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE LOCAL DIFFICULTIES. THE CHRISTIANS IN LEBANON HAD BEEN ATTACKED. THEIR VERY EXISTENCE HAD BEEN THREATENED. THEY WERE PREPARED TO FIGHT ON IF NECESSARY. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN FISHING IN TROUBLED WATERS AND HAD AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION. OTHER COUNTRIES HAD BEEN THREATENED AND THE UNITED NATIONS INTERVENED. IT WAS INEXCUSABLE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS NOT INTERVENE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN LEBANON. LEBANON WAS GOING UP IN FLAMES WHILE THE WESTERN CIVILIZED WORLD WAS SITTING ON ITS HANDS. THERE WOULD BE NO SOLUTION IN LEBANON UNTIL A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED. THIS WAS DELAYED NOT ONLY BY THE ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES BUT ALSO BY THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS THE FOLLOWING YEAR. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, ALTHOUGH CHAMOUN STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF GETTING THE UNITED NATIONS INTO THE ACT, HE LATER REMARKED THAT NO LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER (ALWAYS A MOSLEM) WOULD ASK THE UNITED NATIONS TO INTERVENE.

3. PIERRE GEYMAYEL THEN EXPRESSED HIS GRAVE DISCOURAGEMENT. HE TOO SAW CONSIDERABLE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN LEBANON AIMED AT DESTROYING THE COUNTRY. ON THE OTHER HAND, MOST OF THE PROBLEMS COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PALESTINIANS. HE DID NOT WISH TO LECTURE THE WESTERN COUNTRIES BUT HE WANTED TO POINT OUT THAT SECURITY IN LEBANON WAS THE MAJOR ISSUE. WITHOUT SECURITY THERE WAS NO POINT IN DISCUSSING RECONSTRUCTION. ATTEMPTS HAD BEEN MADE TO INTEREST THE UNITED NATIONS IN LEBANON BUT THESE WERE UNSUCCESS- FUL. SYRIA, HOWEVER, WAS PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE SECURITY THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE. FOR TWENTY YEARS HIS PARTY HAD BEEN ACTIVELY OPPOSED TO SYRIA. HE WAS NOW CONVINCED OF SYRIAN GOOD INTEN- TIONS. IN ANY EVENT, LEBANON HAD NO ONE ELSE TO TURN TO SO THEY HAD TO COUNT ON THE SYRIANS AND WERE PREPARED TO DO SO. UNFORTUNATELY, THE UNITED STATES, WHILE NOT IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE DIRECT ASSISTANCE IN THE SECURITY FIELD, WAS ALSO PREVENTING SYRIA FROM DOING SO. HE APPEALED TO THE UNITED STATES TO GIVE THE GREEN LIGHT TO SYRIA. REFERRING TO THE PRESENT DELAYS IN THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, GEMAYEL RECALLED THAT HE HAD STRONGLY URGED PRESIDENT FRANGIE NOT TO CONTRIBUTE TO DELAYS AND TO SIGN THE AMENDMENT ALLOWING FOR NEW PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. IN LIGHT OF WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED SINCE THEN HE FELT ASHAMED.

4. FATHER KASSIS THEN MADE COMMENTS OF HIS OWN. START- ING OUT BY NOTING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING IN THE NAME OF THE CHURCH, HE SAID THAT ONE HAD TO LIVE BEFORE ONE COULD PHILOSOPHIZE. HE THOUGHT THAT LEBANON HAD PERHAPS CHOSEN THE WRONG FRIENDS. IT WAS PREFERABLE TO BE A LIVE COMMUNIST THAN A DEAD DEMOCRAT. THE SOVIET UNION HAD COME TO THE AID OF THOSE WHO SOUGHT ITS HELP IN ANGOLA. PERHAPS THE TIME HAD COME FOR THE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS TO SEEK THE AID OF THE SOVIET UNION AND BECOME A COMMUNIST STATE. INDEED, LEBANON COULD NOT ONLY BECOME A COMMUNIST STATE, BUT IT COULD ALSO HELP SPREAD SOVIET DOCTRINE IN THE AREA. KASSIS’ STATEMENT WAS SO STRONG THAT EVEN PRESIDENT FRANGIE INTERVENED TO SAY THAT HE DID NOT SHARE THESE VIEWS. ON THE OTHER HAND, KASSIS, WHETHER WANTING TO EXPRESS HIS GENUINE FEELINGS OR MERELY DESIRING TO GET BACK INTO THE GOOD GRACES OF HIS AUDIENCE, REMARKED THAT HE HAD IN MIND SEEKING SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN THE SAME WAY THE EGYPTIANS HAD SOUGHT IT. ONCE ORDER WAS RESTORED, LEBANON COULD THROW THE SOVIETS OUT IN THE SAME WAY THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD DONE SO.

5. AT THE END OF THE MEETING LUCIEN DAHDAH TRIED TO MAKE SOME SUMMARIES. AS HE SAW THE SITUATION, THREE ALTERNATIVES WERE POSSIBLE. THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE INVOLVED SOME SORT OF SYRIAN-U.S. AGREEMENT. THIS COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A U.S.-USSR AGREEMENT GUARANTEEING THE EXISTENCE OF THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON UNTIL IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO HAVE A STATE OF THEIR OWN, WHICH EACH FAVORED. A FOUR COUNTRY CONSORTIUM COULD BE PUT TOGETHER TO ASSURE THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEBANON. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE WOULD INVOLVE A SITUATION WHERE LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO GO IT ON ITS OWN WITH THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE. THIS WOULD INVOLVE ELECTING A PRESIDENT AND TRYING TO PROVIDING SUFFICIENT SECURITY FOR A GOVERNMENT TO BE FORMED AND THE COUNTRY TO GET BACK ON THE ROAD TO RESTORATION. THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE PARTITION.

6. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT, WHILE I HAD MADE ARRANGE- MENTS TO SPEAK TO EACH OF THE PRINCIPAL CHRISTIAN LEADERS SEPARATELY, THESE ARRANGEMENTS WERE IGNORED, SO THAT I ENDED UP SPEAKING TO THE GROUP TOGETHER. THIS WAS PROBABLY AS A RESULT OF A LITTLE SKULL- DUDGERY ON THE PART OF LUCIEN DAHDAH. IN COLLABORATION WITH FRANGIE. I DID HAVE A PARTICULAR MESSAGE TO DELIVER TO PIERRE GEMAYEL ON DIALOGUE AND WAS AT LEAST ABLE TO DO THAT AS THE RESULT OF A MINUTE OR TWO WITH GEMAYEL ALONE AFTER THE MEETING (SEE SEPTEL.) BROWN

SECRET

NNN

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE
Date: 1976 May 6, 17:35 (Thursday)	Canonical ID: 1976BEIRUT04060_b
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Office Origin: — N/A or Blank — Office Action: ACTION NODS	Archive Status: Electronic Telegrams
From: Lebanon Beirut
To: Department of State \| Secretary of State

1. MET WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE MORNING OF MAY 6TH. HIS ADVISER LUCIEN DAHDAH WAS PRESENT.

2. REPORTED TO FRANGIE ON MY MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT AND CONVEYED TO HIM THE PRESIDENT’S INTEREST IN LEBANON. POINTED OUT THE PRESIDENT HAD ALREADY GIVEN HIS APPROVAL TO A MEASURE AIMED AT PROVIDING 20 MILLION DOLLARS AS AN INITIAL CONTRIBUTION OF AID FOR LEBANON.

3. FRANGIE, LIKE OTHER LEBANESE OFFICIALS WITH WHOM I SPOKE, WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT I HAD NOT RETURNED WITH SOME SORT OF CLEAR-CUT PLAN THAT WOULD SOLVE ALL HIS COUNTRY’S PROBLEMS. HE THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF A CONSORTIUM FOR LEBANON IN WHICH SYRIA WOULD PARTICIPATE AND BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY MATTERS. THE SYRIANS HAD INFORMED HIM, HE SAID, THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO FULFILL THIS ROLE. THEY WERE DESIROUS, HOWEVER, OF RECEIVING SOME SORT OF INDICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES THAT THE U.S. CONCURRED IN THIS ROLE.

4. I POINTED OUT TO FRANGIE THAT WE WERE VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE COUNTRY AND APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE THE IDEA OF A CONSORTIUM. WITH RESPECT TO THE SYRIAN ROLE IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY, HOWEVER, THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT COULD ONLY BE DECIDED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE VIEWS OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SUCH AS ISRAEL AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THE PARTIES WITHIN LEBANON.

5. GENERALLY SPEAKING, FRANGIE LIMITED HIS REMARKS TO SECURITY. HE INSISTED ON THE FACT THAT SECURITY WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE AND THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW THIS COULD BE PROVIDED WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF THE SYRIANS. THE ROLE THE PALESTINIANS COULD PLAY IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY WAS HIGHLY DUBIOUS. IN THE PAST THE PALESTINIANS HAD BEEN THE AGRESSORS AND THERE WERE NO ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD NOT ASSUME THIS ROLE AGAIN. LIBYA AND IRAQ WERE CONSTANTLY CAUSING TROUBLE. UNLESS THE UNITED STATES WITHDREW ITS OBJECTIONS TO SYRIAN INTERVENTION, THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS PARTITION.

6. I REITEREATED TO FRANGIE THE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH SYRIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION WITHIN CONTEXT OF POSSIBLE ISRAELI REACTION AND I REVIEWED THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST PARTITION.

7. THE MEETING ENDED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF CHAMOUN, GEMAYEL AND FATHER KASSIS. IT WAS EVIDENT BY THAT TIME THAT FRANGIE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE U.S. POSITION DID NOT CALL FOR ADEQUATE SECURITY MEASURES FOR HIS COUNTRY WHILE AT THE SAME TIME, IN HIS OPINION, PREVENTED SYRIA FROM PROVIDING THIS.

8. COMMENT: FRANGIE LIKE OTHER OLD-TIME MARONITE LEADERS WANTS A MAGIC SOLUTION. THEY WANT THE U.S. TO IMPOSE IT AND CANNOT RECONCILE THEMSELVES TO THE FACT THAT 1976 IS NOT REPEAT NOT 1958. THEY HAVE SOMEHOW CONVINCED THEMSELVES THAT OUR CONCERN THAT THEY REMAIN STRONG IN ORDER TO NEGOTIATE TRANSLATES, OR CAN BE MADE TO TRANSLATE, INTO IRONCLAD GUARANTEES FOR THEIR FUTURE. THUS, NO DETAILED PROGRAM ELABORATELY SPELLED OUT, EVEN BEFORE THERE IS ANY SORT OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WITH WHOM WE MIGHT WORK, IS A GRAVE DISAPPOINTMENT TO THEM. IT COULD BE, AS WELL, IN INCENTIVE TO THEM TO DO THE BEST POSSIBLE UNDER THE EXISTING POLITICAL SYSTEM AND NOT REPEAT NOT COUNT ON THAT MAGIC. BROWN

SECRET

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You might also like:

The War Files (Part I) – The Chaos Before The War: 1973-1974

The War Files (Part II) – 1975 and 1976: Karami The Presidential Candidate, “Hafez Assad The Latest Incarnation Of the Crusaders”, and “A Certain Brigadier Aoun”

The War Files (Part II) – 1975 and 1976: Karami The Presidential Candidate, “Hafez Assad The Latest Incarnation Of the Crusaders”, and “A Certain Brigadier Aoun”

The Lebanese Parliament in 1976

Today, the post is a compilation of cables about some of the events/battles that happened in the first two years of the war. I start with a very early cable, from the 15th of April 1975. The second cable is interesting because it speaks about a speech where Karami mentions he is a candidate to the presidency (This speech will be widely used by the Christian parties in their propaganda during the war). Note how in the cable – unlike the Christian parties, who made Karami look serious in order to scare their Christian electorate – the candidacy is only considered to be a “RHETORIC, DESIGNED TO DRAMATIZE HIS VIEW OF THE CONFESSIONAL PROBLEM, AND IT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS ANNOUNCING HIS CANDIDACY FOR THE 1976 ELECTION”. In the third cable, U.S. envoy Dean Brown tells us that the Christian leaders “SOUNDED LIKE ASAD IS THE LATEST INCARNATION OF THE CRUSADERS”. In the last cable, you’ll find an early mention of “A CERTAIN BRIGADIER AOUN, LEBANESE ARMY OFFICER, COORDINATING ACTIVITIES OF VARIOUS CHRISTIAN MILITIAS” during the siege of Tal Al-Zaatar.

LEBANESE CRISIS
Date: 1975 April 15, 14:20 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID: 1975BEIRUT04830_b
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006
To: Commander in Chief European Command Vaihingen Germany \| Department of State\| Egypt Cairo \| France Paris \| Greece Athens \| Iran Tehran \| Israel Tel Aviv \|Italy Rome \| Jordan Amman \| Secretary of State \| Syria Damascus \| Turkey Ankara \|United Kingdom London

SUMMARY: MODERATE CHRISTIANS DEEPLY CONCERNED RE ESCALATION CURRENT FIGHTING IN BEIRUT AND CURRENTLY BEWILDERED AS TO HOW A SOLUTION CAN BE REACHED. THEY ARE THE FIRST TO RECOGNIZE THAT LEBANON CURRENTLY LEADERLESS AND ARE SEEKING A LEBANESE MUSLIM WITH WHOM THEY CAN DEAL, HOPEFULLY TO PATCH TOGETHER SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE TEAM THAT CAN RULE THE COUNTRY UNTIL THERE IS A NEW PRESIDENT, AUGUST 1976. END SUMMARY.

1. THIS MORNING DCM AND I WENT TO AMERICAN INIVERSITY HOSPITAL

SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04830 01 OF 02 151513Z

TO DELIVER PRESIDENT FORD’S MESSAGE (STATE 084399 NOTAL) TO FRANGIE’S STAFF THERE. WE WERE USHERED INTO LARGE RECEPTION ROOM WHERE VARIOUS LEBANESE DIGNITARIES WERE PAYING THEIR RESPECTS. AMONG THOSE RECEIVING WAS FOREIGN MINISTER TAQLA. TAQLA TOOK ME ASIDE AND ASKED IF I HAD ANY VIEWS ON THE CURRENT CRISIS. TOLD HIM THAT WE AND OTHER FRIENDS OF LEBANON CONSIDERED IT EXTREMELY GRAVE FOR IN ALL HONESTLY WE DID NOT SEE THAT THE TODAY HAD A GOVERNMENT. TAQLA ENERGETICALLY AGREED, POINTING OUT THAT ONE MUST BE REALISTIC AT SUCH SERIOUS MOMENTS. TAQLA CONFIRMED WHAT WE HAD HEARD LAST NIGHT, THAT YESTERDAY AFTER- NOON’S CABINET MEETING WAS A DONNYBROOK, WITH PRIME MINISTER EXERCISING NO REPEAT NO CONTROL AND MINISTERS SHOUTING AT EACH OTHER. TAQLA DID NOT ATTEND BUT SAID HE OF COURSE HAD BEEN FULLY INFORMED. IN RESPONSE TO TAQLA’S QUESTION, I SAID THAT, LIKE MOST OTHER WESTERN EMBASSIES HERE WE HAD LITTLE OR NO INFORMATION AND THAT I HOPED HE WOULD FILL ME IN ON THE CURRENT SCENE. PROBLEM, AS HE PUT IT, WAS THAT WE WERE FACED WITH ESCALATING VIOLENCE BETWEEN CHRISTIAN RIGHTISTS AND FEDAYEEN RADICALS AND LEBANESE RADICALS WHO WERE BEING SUPPORTED MORE AND MORE BY LESS RADICAL PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS BUT THEY WERE BRINGING ALONG WITH THEM RADICAL LEBANESE MUSLIMS. CHRISTIANS SAW THEIR VERY EXISTENCE IN LEBANON THREATENED AND MORE AND MORE CHRISTIANS WERE INCLINED TO SIDE WITH ULTRA-RIGHTISTS WHOM IN THE PAST THEY HAD NEVER SUPPORTED. I ASKED TAQLA AS TO THE ROLE OF VARIOUS MUSLIM LEADERS AND HE STATED HE CONSIDERED FORMER PRIME MINISTER SAEB SALAAM CURRENTLY AMONG THE MOST IMMODERATE. SAEB IS ACTING NOT ONLY AS AN ULTRA MUSLIM BUT ALSO A “DIRTY” LEBANESE POLITICIAN WHO IS OUT FOR EVERYTHING HE CAN PERSONALLY GAIN AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS COUNTRY. THE SHI’A LEADER IMAM MUSA AL-SADR, WITH WHOM TAQLA HAS BEEN IN CONTACT SHARES TAQLA’S DEEP CONCERN. HOWEVER, BEING MUSLIM HE IS PERSONALLY ON THE SIDELINES AND IS COUNSELING HIS FORCES TO REMAIN COMPLETELY ALOOF FROM THE VIOLENCE. THE IMAM, HOWEVER, IS NOT PLAYING AN ACTIVE ROLE AS OF THIS MOMENT.

2. FORMER PRIME MINISTER RACHID KARAME FROM TRIPOLI IS, ACCORDING TO TAQLA, THE BEST HOPE FOR MODERATION ON THE MUSLIM SIDE. UNFORTUNATELY, TRIPOLI IS EXTREMELY TENSE AND KARAME HAS BEEN DEVOTING MOST OF HIS EFFORTS TO BRINGING BACK SOME RULE AND REASON TO HIS POLITICAL FIEFDOM.

3. TAQLA ASKED IF I HAD HEARD ANYTHING FROM WASHINGTON. I

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POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD MERELY BEEN REPORTING EVENTS UP TO NOW AND AS OF THE MOMENT I DID NOT SEE ANYTHING THAT EITHER THIS EMBASSY OR MY GOVERNMENT COULD DO TO ASSIST. TAQLA CONCURRED BUT SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT I EXPRESS TO THE DEPARTMENT HIS DEEP CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE LEBANON WOULD DETERIORATE TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO ACT IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, RESULT IN SYRIAN ACTIONS AND COULD BRING ABOUT A RESUMPTION OF AREA HOSTILITIES. RATHER NAIVELY TAQLA REQUESTED THAT WE INCREASE OUR VIGILANCE IN THIS DOMAIN AND INFORM HIS IMMEDIATELY IF WE HAD ANY INDICATIONS OF ISRAELI ACTIONS. RE SYRIA, I ASKED TAQLA IF THE RUMOR I HAD HEARD YESTERDAY REGARDING A SYRIAN EMMISSARY WAS ACCURATE. HE SAID THAT A SYRIAN OFFICIAL HAD COME HERE BUT ON OTHER BUSINESS NOT RELATED TO THE CURRENT CRISIS. HE HAS, HOWEVER, SENT A “RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL” TO SEE PRESIDENT ASAD AND TO SEEK SYRIAN HELP IN ABATING PALESTINIAN-LEBANESE PROGRESSIVES’ DEMANDS. I INQUIRED WHETHER THE SECRETARY GENERAL GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE RIYAD, WHO ARRIVED HERE LAST NIGHT MIGHT BE OF HELP. TAQLA SAID HE HAD SEEN HIM LAST EVENING, HAD FILLED HIM IN ON THE SITUATION AS HE SAW IT AND THAT RIYAD WOULD DO HIS BEST. TAQLA ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE DID NOT SEE MUCH THAT RIYAD COULD DO OTHER THAN POSSIBLY BESPEAK MODERATION IN THE MUSLIM LEADERSHIP MEETING THAT WOULD BE TAKING PLACE THIS AFTERNOON AT 1700 LOCAL UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF SAEB SALAAM. WE HAVE HEARD ELSEWHERE THAT THIS MEETING WILL INCLUDE NOT ONLY LEBANESE MUSLIMS OF ALL VARIETIES BUT ALSO PALESTINIANS.

4. UPON LEAVING HOSPITAL, DCM AND I PROCEEDED TO RESIDENCE OF MARONITE POLITICIAN MICHEL KHOURY, SON OF THE FIRST PRESIDENT AND INTIMATE CONFIDANT OF FORMER PRESIDENT CHARLES HELOU. HE IS ALSO CLOSE TO RACHID KARAME. KHOURY’S HOME WAS TARGET OF BOMB ATTACK LAST EVENING AND OUR CALL OSTENSIBLY WAS TO CON- GRATULATE HIM ON THE BOMB’S RELATIVE IMPOTENCE.

SECRET NNN SECRET PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04830 02 OF 02 151521Z 44-S ACTION NEA-09 INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00 IO-10 SP-02 SAM-01 PRS-01 SCCT-01 SY-05 OC-05 CCO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 /074 W ——————— 016602 O 151420Z APR 75 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3888 INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER IMMEDIATE S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 4830

5. KHOURY, WHO WE SAW ALONE, IS AS DEEPLY CONCERNED AND TOOK SAME GENERAL APPROACH AS TAQLA RE ESCALATION. YESTERDAY HE HAD SEEN GEMAYEL, JUMBLATT, FORMER PRESIDENT CHAMOUN, AND HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SAEB SALAAM. HE CONCURRED RE LATTER’S CURRENT POSITION AND GEMAYEL’S PRESENT INTRANSIGENCE. WE ASKED HIM WHAT “DEMANDS” WERE BEING MADE OF GEMAYEL. KHOURY SAID THAT GEMAYEL WAS BEING ASKED TO TURN OVER TO UNSPECIFIED AUTHORITIES THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE “MASSACRE” IN THE BUS. THIS, KHOURY ADMITTED, WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND HAD BEEN REJECTED CATEGORICALLY BY THE PHALANGE LEADER. KHOURY IS CURRENTLY ENDEAVORING TO FIND SOME FACE-SAVING DEVICE SUCH AS AGREEING TO INVESTIGATE THE SHOOT-UP OF THE BUS AND HAVE THOSE RESPONSIBLE TURNED OVER TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THIS MIGHT BE ACCEPTED, HE BELIEVES, BY PALESTINIAN- LEBANESE PROGRESSIVES, BUT HE STATES THE LATTER SEE THE POSSIBILITY OF TOTALLY CRUSHING THE PHALANGE AND THEREFORE ARE MOST INTRAN-

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SIGENT. PROBLEM IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT ARAFAT IS REMAINING ALOOF FROM PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS AND ABU IYAD (NUMBER 2 OF FATAH AND LEADER OF THE BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION) IS THEIR SPOKESMAN. KHOURY IS TRYING TO HAVE A CHRISTIAN LEADER SUCH AS FORMER PRESIDENT HELOU COME OUT WITH A STRONG STATEMENT CONDEMNING GEMAYEL BUT EVEN MORE STRONGLY CONDEMNING THE FEDAYEEN AND THEN BESPEAKING NATIONAL UNITY. HE WOULD HOPE THAT HE COULD THEN CONVINCE RACHID KARAME TO SUBSCRIBE TO SUCH A STATEMENT AND THUS BE A RALLYING POINT FOR MODERATE MUSLIMS WHO ARE THE MAJORITY OF LEBANESE OF THAT FAITH. KHOURY WAS ON HIS WAY TO SEE KARAME WHEN WE LEFT AND WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH US THIS EVENING. ON OF THE COMPLICATING FACTORS, HOWEVER, IS THAT CHARLES HELOU IS NOT REPEAT NOT CURRENTLY IN VERY GOOD PHYSICAL SHAPE AND MAY BE RELUCTANT TO ACT ON KHOURY’S RECOMMENDATIONS.

6. WE ASKED KHOURY WHAT CHAMOUN WAS UP TO. HE SAID NOTHING AS OF THE MOMENT. RE REPORTS THAT CHAMOUN’S FORCES WERE BRINGING IN MORTARS AND HEAVY MACHINE GUNS TO BEIRUT AREA, HE SAID THIS WOULD NOT SURPRISE HIM BECAUSE CERTAINLY CHAMOUN’S MEN WERE SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR PHALANGE COUNTERPARTS. HE INQUIRED RHETORICALLY, HOWEVER, WHAT BOTH CHAMOUNISTS AND PHALANGISTS COULD DO AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN SUPPORTED BY LEBANESE MUSLIMS.

7. AS OF THE MOMENT, SITUATION DOESN’T LOOK TOO BRIGHT. THE ONLY ENCOURAGING FEATURE WE CAN CITE IS THAT TAQLA AND KHOURY, WHO ARE CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDS, SEEM TO BE ON THE SAME TRACK AND BETWEEN THEM MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIND THE CURRENTLY MISSING GIMMICK.

8. FINAL POINT — PRESIDENT FRANGIE’S RECOVERY IS MOVING ALONG WELL BUT HE STILL IS IN CONVALESCENCE.

GODLEY

SECRET

NNN

PRIME MINISTER KARAME OUTLINES POLICY HOPES
Date: 1975 July 29, 09:00 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID: 1975BEIRUT09571_b
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006
To: Commander in Chief European Command Vaihingen Germany \| Defense Intelligence Agency \| Department of State \| Egypt Cairo \| France Paris \| Iraq Baghdad \|Israel Tel Aviv \| Jordan Amman \|Secretary of State \| Syria Damascus \|United Kingdom London

1. PRIME MINISTER RASHID KARAME GAVE A SPEECH JULY 27 AT A GATHERING COMMEMORATING THE 23RD ANNIVERSARY OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION. THE TALK TURNED OUT TO BE A MAJOR POLICY REVIEW, OUTLINING KARAME’S HOPES FOR SOLVING SOME OF THE PROMINENT PROBLEMS PLAGUING LEBANON AT PRESENT. IT RECEIVED WIDE PRESS COVERAGE IN THE JULY 28 PAPERS. SIGNIFICANT ITEMS FROM THE SPEECH, AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS, ARE AS FOLLOWS: — THE PRESIDENCY: THE MOST WIDELY QUOTED REMARK OF THE SPEECH WAS KARAME’S DECLARATION THAT HE CONSIDERED HIMSELF “A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC,” BY WHICH HE INTENDED TO CONVEY NOT ONLY HIS POLITICAL AMBITIONS BUT ALSO HIS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09571 291002Z

GENERAL BELIEF THAT CONFESSIONALISM MUST BE DISCARDED IN CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS. HE ADDED THAT THE NECESSARY CHANGES MUST BE MADE DEMOCRATICALLY AND THROUGH A “FRE DIALOGUE.” HE SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WAS “NOT A SINGLE CHRISTIAN” OPPOSED TO THIS APPROACH. — CONFESSIONAL BALANCE IN THE ARMY: AGREEING WITH THE CHARGE THAT THE ARMY HAD TAKEN ON A “CONFESSIONAL CHARACTER,” KARAME SAID THAT CHANGES WERE BEING MADE TO CORRECT THIS IMBALANCE. (COMMENT: THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT RESHUFFLINGS ARE IN PROGRESS, NOT YET ANNOUNCED OFFICIALLY, THAT WILL REDUCE THE PROPORTION OF MARONITE OFFICERS AND INCREASE THAT OF SUNNIS, SHI’AS, AND DRUZE IN PROMINENT STAFF POSITIONS.) OTHER MEASURES WILL ALSO BE TAKEN, KARAME SAID, INCLUDING THE PRESENTATION OF A DRAFT LAW ON THE ARMY’S RESPONSIBILITIES. — NATURALIZATION MEASURES: A SIMMERING ISSUE OF LONG STANDING AMONG SEVERAL THOUSAND SUNNI INHABITANTS OF NORTH LEBANON WHO HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN LEBANESE NATIONALITY, THIS QUESTION IS SYMBOLIC OF THE BROADER CONFESSIONAL DISPUTE. KARAME PROMISED THAT STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN AT ONCE TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER, AND HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT SOME 90 PERCENT OF THE PENDING NATURALIZATION DEMANDS WOULD BE SETTLED IN FAVOR OF THE CLAIMANTS. — “SOCIAL PEACE:” IN ORDER TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVT AMONG ECONOMICALLY DEPARIVED GROUPS, KARAME PROMISED AN AMBITIONS PROGRAM OF POPULAR HOUSING. ALSO, A NEW PLAN WILL BE PUT INTO EFFECT FOR THE POOR AREAS RINGING CENTRAL BEIRUT. — THE “PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE:” KARAME EXPRESSED GNERAL SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIANS, HOPING FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THEM AND LEBANON SO THAT THE EFFORTS OF BOTH WOULD BE DIRECTED “AGAINST OUR TRUE COMMON ENEMY.”

2. COMMENTS: AT THIS STAGE, KARAME’S WIDE-RANGING PLAN MUST BE CONSIDERED MORE AN INTENTION THAT A CONCRETE PROGRAM, BECAUSE IT IS DEBATABLE WHETHER HE CAN STEER IT PAST THE DANGEROUS POLITICAL SHOALS THAT LIE AHEAD. BUT HIS INTENTION IS UNQUESTIONALBY SERIOUS, AND IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT SOME OF LEBANON’S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ILLS ARE BEING ADDRESSED IF NOT SOLVED. KARAME’S REMARK ABOUT HIS PRESIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PAGE 03 BEIRUT 09571 291002Z

CANDIDACY IS PROBABLY RHETORIC, DESIGNED TO DRAMATIZE HIS VIEW OF THE CONFESSIONAL PROBLEM, AND IT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS ANNOUNCING HIS CANDIDACY FOR THE 1976 ELECTION.

GODLEY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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MARONITES AND PLO
Date: 1976 April 4, 17:05 (Sunday)	Canonical ID: 1976BEIRUT02937_b
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006
To: Department of State \| Secretary of State \|Syria Damascus

1. DAOUDI EITHER MISUNDERSTOOD OR, AS DICK MURPHY SAYS, IS EXCESSIVELY SENSITIVE.

2. IF I GOT NOTHING ELSE FROM MY MEETING WITH FRANGIE, CHAMOUN AND GEMAYEL, IT IS THEIR CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL AND UNMISTAKEABLE BELIEF THAT THEIR PRINCIPAL HOPE FOR SAVING CHRISTIAN NECKS IS SYRIA.THEY SOUNDED LIKE ASAD IS THE LATEST INCARNATION OF THE CRUSADERS.

BROWN

SECRET

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AN EYEWITNESS RETURNS FROM “CHRISTIANLAND”
Date: 1976 July 8, 11:50 (Thursday)	Canonical ID: 1976BEIRUT05993_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006
To: Department of State \| SITREP COLLECTIVE \| Secretary of State \|United States Information Agency

1. NICK LUDINGTON, BUREAU CHIEF OF OF AP IN BEIRUT, HAS JUST RETURNED FROM WEEK IN CHRISTIAN AREA OF LEBANON. ON UNDERSTANDING THAT HIS IDENTITY AS SOURCE WOULD BEPROTECTED, HE SHARED FOLLOWING INFORMATION AND OBSERVATIONS WITH COUNTRY TEAM.

2. SEPARATION WITHOUT PARTITION. WHILE FORMAL PARTITION WAS REJECTED BY ALMOST ALL CHRISTIANS WITH WHOM LUDINGTON SPOKE, TOP CHRISTIAN SPOKESMEN DID EMPHASIZE THAT SOME FORM OF REGIONALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION WOULD HAVE TO BE PART OF ANY IMMEDIATE SOLUTION TO LEBANESE CRISIS. HE AGREED WITH AN EMBOFF’S ASSESSMENT THAT THIS REFLECTS A CHRISTIAN, PARTICULARLY MARONITE, DESIRE TO “RETREAT” INTO MOUNT LEBANON UNTIL SUCH TIME AS PALESTINE QUESTION IS FULLY SOLVED AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS NO LONGER DOMINATE LEBANESE SBODY POLITIC.

3. “PURIFICATION” AND CONSOLIDATION OF CHRISTIAN AREA. HAVING COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO SEPARATE EXISTENCE FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE, CHRISTIANS, AND MORE PARTICULARLY MARONITES, HAVE MADE

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“PURIFICATION” OF AREA UNDER THEIR CONTROL A PRIORITY GOAL. OCCUPATION OF JISR AL-BASHA AND TALL AZ-ZA’TAR PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IS, FOR CHRISTIANS, INDISPENSABLE FIRST STEP. LARGELY LEBANESE SHI’ITE URBAN SLUM QUARTER OF NAB’A, WHICH ALSO HARBORS PALESTINIAN AND LEFTIST GANGSTERS, AS WELL AS LEBANESE COMMUNIST PARTY FOLLOWERS, WILL BE NEXT, WHERE THEY EXPECT NO GREAT DIFFICULTY. THEY ARE ALREADY ENCOURAGING SHI’ITES TO LEAVE FOR WEST BEIRUT. WITH OCCUPATION OF NAB’A, THEY WILL HAVE ELIMINATED MAJOR NON-CHRISIAN AND NON-LEBANESE POCKETS AND ASSURED RESIDENTS OF CHRISTIAN QUARTER OF ASHRAFIYYA FREE AND SECURE ACCESS TO CHRISTIAN MOUNT LEBANON. THEY WILL THEN CONCENTRATE ON ELIMINATING RADICAL PARTIES SUCH AS PPS IN CHRISTIAN TOWNS IN THE METN AND KOURA REGIONS.

4. PLIGHT OF CHRISTIANS LIVING IN AREAS NOT UNDER CHRISTIAN CONTROL IS OF LITTLE CONCERN TO CHRISTIAN LEADERS. THEY ARE AWARE OF DANGER TO WHICH ISOLATED CHRISTIAN VILLAGES IN NON-CHRISTIAN AREAS SUCH AS THE CHOUF, SOUTH LEBANON, THE BEKAA, AND AKKAR, AS WELL ASINDIVIDUAL CHRISTIAN RESIDENT INWEST BEIRUT, ARE EXPOSED AND ARE WELCOMING THEM IN CHRISTIAN AREAS WHENEVER POSSIBLE. THEIR TROUBLE IS THAT THOSE CHRISTIANS WHO CHOOSE NOT TO MOVE MUST BEAR THE CONSEQUENCES.

5. LUDINGTON NOTED THAT THOSE CHRISTIANS LIVING OUTSIDE CHRISTIAN AREA ARE — PERHAPS DEFENSIVELY — AMONG MOST VIRULENT OPPONENTS OF SEPARATION ORPARTITION. THEY HAVE ATTEMPTED TO MAKE THEIR PEACE WITH THEIR ENVIRONMENT AND VIEW THE ACTIONS OF CHRISTIAN LEADERS AS THREATENING THEIR MODUS VIVENDI.

6. TALL AZ-ZA’TAR AS EXAMPLE OF CHRISTIAN FIELD OPERATIONS.

CHRISTIANS DO NOT VIEW TALL AZ-ZA’TAR AS MAJOR MILITARY PROBLEM, AND DELAY IN COMPLETING ITS OCCUPATION ATTRIBUTABLE, IN LUDINGTON’S OPINION, TO CHRSITIAN DESIRE TO AVOID SUFFERING AND UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES BY STARVING RATHER THAN OVERRUNING THE CAMP. WILLIAM HAWI, MILITARY COMMANDER OF PHALANGE, TOLD LUDINGTON THAT TALL AZ-ZA’TAR WOULD SURELY FALL, ONLY QUESTION WAS WHEN. LUDINGTON ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FIGHTERS INSIDE CAMP TO HAVE BEEN ORIGINALLY ONE TO TWO THOUSAND.

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LEFTIST/PALESTINIAN ATTEMPTS TO RELIEVE CAMP THROUGH MONTE VERDE WERE A JOKE; MAIN EFFORT CONSISTED OF ONLY 50 LIGHTLY ARMED MEN SLOGGING IT OUT ON FOOT FROM DAMASCUS ROAD ABOVE KAHALE.

7. COMMAND POST FOR ASSAULT AS A WHOLE IS MAR SHAYA MONASTERY OVERLOOKING CAMP. A CERTAIN BRIGADIER AOUN, LEBANESE ARMY OFFICER, COORDINATES ACTIVITIES OF VARIOUS CHRSTIAN MILITIAS IN PRESENCE OF SUCH LEADERS AS DANY CHAMOUN, MILITARY COMMANDER OF NATIONAL LIBERALS, AND BASHIR GEMAYEL, MILITARY COMMANDER OF METN REGION FOR PHALANGE. AOUN’S EFFORTS CONSTITUTE ONE OF FEW LINKS AMONG CHRISTIAN MILITIAS, WHICH TEND TO REMAIN AUTONOMOUS ON GROUND. ACCORDING TO LUDINGTON, AOUN IS BUT ONE OF MANY LEBANESE ARMY OFFICERS WORKING WITH CHRISTIAN MILITAS, PARTICULARLY IN FIELD OF COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT.

8. THE FIGHTERS ARE COMMITTED. US-TRAINED CAPTAIN IN CHARGE OF PORTION OF ASSAULT, MOVING IN FROM MKALLES SIDE, CLAIMS THAT, GIVEN DEGREE OF COMMITMENT OF HIS MEN, HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO COMPEL THEM TO OBSERVE A CEASE-FIRE ORDER. ACCORDING TO LUDINGTON, CEDAR GUARDS (HURRAS AL-ARZ) FIGHTERS ARE MOST FANATIC OF ALL. PALESTINIANS ARE ANATHEMA. ONE FIGHTER LUDINGTON SPOKE TO SPAT EVERY TIME HE SAID WORD “PALESTINIAN.”

9. AMERICAN ARMS — ESPECIALLY M-16S — ARE MUCH IN EVIDENCE AMONG VARIOUS CHRISTIAN MILITIAS. IN ADDITION, SEVERAL FIGHTERS AT TALL AZ ZA’TAR OPENLY AND PROUDLY BRANDISHED ISRAELI WEAPONS WITH SERIAL NUMBERS FILED OFF. LUDINGTON ESTIMATES THAT CASUALTIES ON CHRISTIAN SIDE HAVE BEEN LIGHT, PERHAPS 100 FOR ENTIRE BATTLE.

10. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF CHRISTIAN AREA. LUDINGTON CONFIRMED THAT MONKS OF KASLIK ARE STILL VERY MUCH INTELLECTUAL MOVERS OF CHRISTIAN AREA. HOWEVER, DAY-TO-DAY AFFAIRS ARE MANAGED BY TRADITIONAL LEADERS AND PARTIES AND THEIR FOLLOWERS.

1. TO GIVE THEIR “SEPARATENESS” STRUCTURE, CHRISTIANS SET UP PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. THEY AVOID USE OF WORD “GOVERNMENT;” INSTEAD, THEY STYLE IT “DAR AL-AMAL,” WHICH MEANS LITERALLY LABOR HOUSE,” BUT WHICH COULD JUST AS

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 BEIRUT 05993 01 OF 02 081244Z

EASILY BE TRANSLATED “ACTION CENTRAL.” STAFFED BY FORMER CHRISTIAN EMPLOYEES OF DEFUNCT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, DAR AL’AMAL PARALLELS PHALANGE PARTY, WHICH IS ONLY FULLY DEVELOPED POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN THE CHRISTIAN AREA. PHHALANGE DENIES IT CONTROLS DAR AL-‘AMAL, BUTPIERRE GEMAYEL HEADS ITS POLITBURO . EXECUTIVE SECRETARY IS MRS. JOSEPH ASWAD, HIS DAUGHTER. IT HANDLES “FUNCTIONS” OF DEFENSE, INTERNAL SECURITY, JUSTICE, PUBLIC WORKS, FINANCE, EDUCATION, SUPPLY,AND HEALTH. DEFENSE, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND JUSTICE ARE DIRECTLY SUPERVISED BY BASHIR GEMAYEL, PIERRE’S SON.

12. DAR AL-‘AMAL HAS SET UP PROVISIONAL TRIBUNALS TO TRY CRIMINALS AND HAS EMPOWERED THEM TO IMPOSE SENTENCES UP TO AND INCLUDING DEATH; IRONICALLY, CLEMENCY CAN BE GRANTED ONLY BY CAMILLE CHAMOUN OR PIERRE GEMAYEL. SIXTY CRIMINALS HAVE SO FAR BEEN JAILED. TAXES — ESPECIALLY ON REAL ESTATE AND IMPORTED LUXURY GOODS — ARE BEING COLLECTED ANDPRICE CONTROLS HAVE BEEN INSTITUTED. THERE ARE PLANS TO BUILD A PORT (PERHAPS AT CHEKKA) AND AN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT SUPERIOR IN LOCATION AND FACILITIES TO BEIRUT AIRPORT, AND TO REBUILD INDUSTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK. IN FIELD OF HEALTH, LEBANESE DOCTORS WORKING IN FRANCE HAVE SENT AT LEAST TWO SHIPLOADS OF SUPPLIES TO HOSPITALS IN CHRISTIAN AREA. IN FIELD OF INFORMATION, NEW LEBANESE NEWS AGENCY, MANAGED BY JOSEPH ABU KHALIL, DIALY NEWSPAPER “AL-AMAL,” AND “VOICE OF LEBANON RADIO ALL SPEAK FOR PHALANGE/DAR AL-‘AMAL. RADIO LEBANON FROM AMCHIT, ON OTHER HANDS, SPEAKS STRICTLY FOR PRESIDENT FRANJIEH AND HIS ENTOURAGE, ESPECIALLY RAMIZ KHAZIN, FORMER DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF INFORMATION. COORDINATION BETWEEN THE TWO INFORMATION MACHINES IS NON- EXISTENT; INDEED, PHALANGE REGARDS EFFORTS OF RADIO AMCHIT AS UTTERLY JUVENILE.

CONFIDENTIAL NNN CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05993 02 OF 02 081255Z 47 ACTION NEA-10 INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 IO-13 EUR-12 SCCT-01 ACDA-07 SAM-01 /085 W ——————— 055004 O P 081150Z JUL 76 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1001 INFO SITREP COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 005 USIA WASHD PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 5993

13. ON LOCAL LEVEL, “POPULAR COMMITTTEES” REPRESENTING DAR AL-‘AMAL FUNCTION IN EACH VILLAGE, TOWN, AND URBAN QUARTER IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH INHABITANTS. SERVICES INCLUDE FOOD DISTRIBUTION, GARBAGE COLLECTION, AND AID TO SICK AND ELDERLY.

14. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. IN ALL OF THIS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS SEEN AS IRRELEVANT. LACKING A MILITIA OF HIS OWN, EVEN PRESIDENT-ELECT SARKIS IS VIEWED AS IRRELEVANT.

15. POPULATION DYNAMICS. JOSEPH ABU KHALIL TOLD LUDINGTON THAT HE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF LEBANESE INCHRSITIAN AREA TO BE AROUND ONE MILLION. INDEPENDENT ESTIMATES AVAILABLE TO LUDINGTON ARE CLOSE TO HALF MILLION. CHRISTIAN LEBANESE OVERSEAS ARE ENCOURAGED TO RETURN TO CHRISTIAN AREA, BUT INFLOW IS SMALL; FOR ONE THING, THE TWELVE BOATS WHICH PLY LARNACA- JOUNIEH ROUTE CARRY ONLY 12 PASSENGERS OUT OF LARNACA IN COMPLIANCE WITH SYPRIOT SAFETY REGULATIONS, BUT UP TO 65 ON RETURN VOYAGE. TO DISCOURAGE EMIGRATION, A DEPARTURE TAX OF 100 LEBANESE POUNDS PER PERSON IS LEVIED IN JOUNIEH, AND FOR MILITARY REASONS YOUNG MEN ARE FORBIDDEN EXIT ENTIRELY. ACCORDING TO ABU KHALIL, CHRISTIAN LOSSES IN FIGHTING HAVE NOT BEEN GREAT– 2,000 CIVILIANS AND

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500 FIGHTERS KILLED IN 15 MONTHS OF CRISIS.

16. SYRIAN PRESENCE. CHRISTIANS APPRECIATE NEED FOR AND ADVANTAGES OF SYRIAN PRESENCE OR ROLE IN LEBANON, EVEN WHILE REGARDING SYRIANS AS COUNTRY BUMPKINS. WITH SYRIANS NOW IN FULL CONTROL OF ZAHLE-“UYUN AS-SIMAN-FARAYA ROAD, THERE IS SOME TALK OF OPENING IT FOR CHRISTIAN TRAVELERS TO DAMASCUS. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, SYRIANS FORBID ALL TRAFFIC BEYOND CREST OF MOUNTAIN, AND IMPOSE THEIR OWN DISCIPLINE ON CHRISTIAN FORCES ON WESTERN SLOPES.

17. SYRIAN INTENTIONS. LUDINGTON COULD GET NO FEEL FOR HOW CHRISTIANS VIEW SYRIA’S ULTIMATE INTENTIONS. HE PERSONALLY TAKES VIEW QUITE DIFFERENT FROM MOST FOREIGN CORRESONDENTS IN BEIRUT. INSTEAD OF VIEWING SYRIAN MOVES IN LEBANON AS PRELUDE TO SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF RENEWED EFFORTS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST, HE BELIEVES THEY FORESHADOW HARDENING OF SYRIAN POSITION VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL EVEN TO POINT OF LAUNCHING WAR, IN WHICH CASE CONTROL OF THE BEKAA AND OF LEBANESE BORDER AREAS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL.

SEELLYE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

You might also like: The War Files (Part I) – The Chaos Before The War: 1973-1974

The War Files (Part I) – The Chaos Before The War: 1973-1974

The Lebanese Cabinet in 1970

Today, we start with the years of political instability that preceded the civil war. The war didn’t come out of nowhere, and tension had been growing for years. In 1973 and 1974 there were difficulties in forming new cabinets, and the successive cabinets couldn’t agree on a way to solve the crises in the country. You’ll find 4 cables here, one about early minor clashes in 1973, and 3 about difficulties in forming three different cabinets in 1973 and 1974. The 4 cables are organized from the oldest one to the newest one.

PROBLEM OF FORMING NEW CABINET
Date: 1973 July 2, 11:40 (Monday)	Canonical ID: 1973BEIRUT07786_b
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005
To: Commander in Chief European Command Vaihingen Germany \| Defense Intelligence Agency \| Department of State \| France Paris \| Iran Tehran \| Israel Jerusalem \|Israel Tel Aviv \| Jordan Amman \| Kuwait Kuwait City \| Russia Moscow \| Saudi Arabia Jeddah \| Secretary of State \|United Kingdom London \| United Nations (New York)

SUMMARY: STRUGGLE TP PUT TOGETHER ACCEPTABLE CABINET HAS PREOCCUPIED PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND TOP GOVT AND POLITICAL FIGURES FOR PAST TEN DAYS. TRADITIONAL RIVALRIES AND MANEUVERINGS OF LEBANESE POLITICIANS HAVE REEMERGED AND THERE IS CONTINUING BLATANT SYRIAN INTERFERENCE IN LEBANESE AFFAIRS. PRESTIGE OF LEFTIST LEADER KAMAL JUMBLATT HAS SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED DUE

SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07786 021304Z

TO SYRIAN, FEDAYEEN AND SUNNI SUPPORT. THIS FACT ADN GROWING CONCERN OVER LONG LAST EFFECTS OF INACTIVITY BY GOL WHICH DATES BACK TO ISRAEL RAID ON APRIL 10 APPEAR HAVE OPENED WAY FOR PARTICIPATION BY JUMBLATT’S GROUP IN ANY NEW CABINET,ALTHOUGH JUMBLATT UNLIKELY BE MINISTERIOR DUE TO STRONG OPPOSITION FORM RIGHT. IT UNCERTAIN WHEN CABINET WILL BE FORMED AND POSSIBLE THAT SOLH COULD BE FORCED ABANDON HIS EFFORTS AND MAKE WAY FOR ANOTHER DANDIDATE. END SUMMARY.

1. IMMEDIATELY AFTER BEING NAMED ON JUNE 21ST TAKIEDDIN SOLH WAS WARMLY WELCOMED BY ALL POLITICAL TENDENCIES IN LEBANON AS WELL AS BY FEDAYEEN, SYRIANS, ETC. HE BRAVELY ANNOUNCED THAT FORMATION CABINET EXPECTED WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS AND BEGAN CONSULTATIONS. RIGHT AWAY RE RAN INTO MAJOR PROBLEM WHICH HAS CON- TINUED BLOCK HIS BEST EFFORTS FORM CABINET: DEMAND BY LEBANESE LEFTIST LEADER KAMAL JUMBLATT THAT HE BE NAMED MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND THAT SOMEONE CONGENIAL TO HIM BE NAMED MINISTER OF DEFENSE. JUMBLATT’S DEMAND WAS SUPPORTED BY SYRIAN SPOKESMAN (E.G. SA’IQA LEADER ZOHEIR MOHSEN) BY FEDAYEEN AND BY AMY SUNNI MOSLEM LEADERS(EXCEPTING SAEB SALAM WHO INITIALLY REMAINED SILEDNT AND THEN CAME OUT AGAINST IDEA). JUMBLATT STATED THAT ONLY HIS PRESENCE AT INTERIOR WOULD ALLOW NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN AND ALLOW SYRIAN-LEBANESE BORDER TO BE REOPENED

2. REACTION TO JUMBLATT DEMANDS WAS QUICK IN COMING FROM MAJOR CHRISTIAN LEADER PIERRE GEYMAYEL (PHALANGE) AND CAMILLE CHAMOUN WHO LET IT BE KNOWN THEY CATEGORICALLY OPPOSED. GEMAYEL REFUSED INVITATION TO JOIN CABINET AS COUNTERWEIGHT TO JUMBLATT. WE UNDERSTAND PRESIDENT FRANGIE JUST AS CATEFORICALLY OPPOSED TO JUMBLATT AS INTERIOR ALTHOUGH HE TAKING PUBLIC ATTITUDE OF NON-INTERFERENCE WITH DUE POLITICAL PROCESS, SAYING HE COULD ACCEPTE WHOMEVER NAMED BY SOLH PROVIDED ASSEMBLY VOTED CONFIDENCE IN HIM. LEFTIST GROUPS AND SUNNI MOSLEMS (EXCEPTING SALAM) HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS RESTATED THEIR INSISTENCE ON JUMBLATT WHILE SOME 65 DEPUTIES (MOSTLY CHRISTIAN AND INCLUDING ARMENIANS) HELD INFORMAL MEETING AT NATIONA ASSEMBLY ON JULY 27 TO LET IT BE KNOWN JUMBLATT COULD NOT GET VOTE OF CONFIDENCE. THEY ESPECIALLY UPSET AT JUMBLATT- SYRIA LINK. ON JULY 28 SOLH CAME CLOSE TO FORMING CABINET

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WITHOUT JUMBLATT, HOWEVER, RAPED INTERVENTION BY SYRIA(IN PERSON ZOHEIR MOHSEN) AND SUNNI LEADER RACHID KARAME (FORMER PRIME MINISTER FROM TRIPOLI) AND SUNNI GRAND MUFTI HASSAN KHALED SUCCEEDED IN PERSUADING SOHL TO RENOUNCE IDEA OF CABINET WITHOUT JUMBLATT. REACTING TO THIS, CHAMOUN PROPOSED THAT SAEB SALAM FORM CABINET AND SOLH BE DROPPED. SAEB SALAM DENOUNCED JUMBLATT AS WELL AS INTERFERENCE BY GRAND MUFTI IN POLITICS.

3. THE TEMPORARY UNITY OF ALL SUNNI LEADERS IN OPPOSITION TO AMIN EL HAFEZ HAS DISAPPEARED IN FAVOR OF RETURN TO TRADITIONAL RIVALRIES BETWEEN SAEB SALAM (AND CAMILLE CHAMOUN) ON ONE HAND AND RACHID KARAME PLUS ANTI-SALAM BEIRUT SUNNIS (AND KAMAL JUMBLATT) ON OTHER. NEVERTHELESS, JUMBLATT HAS SKILLFULLY USED INTERNAL POLITICAL CRISES WHICH HAS EXISTED SINCE APRIL 10, AS WELL AS HIS GOOD RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND THE FEDAYEEN, TO STRENGTHEN HIS PERSONAL POSITION AND THAT OF LOOSE GROUPSING OF LEBANESE LEFTIST WHICH HE HEADS. HE HAS LINED U STRONG SUNNI SUPPORT AND HIS MAJOR RIGHT-WING OPPONENTS SUCH AS CHAMOUN AND GEMAYEL SEEM PREPARED TO SEE HIS GROUP(IF NOT JUMBLATT IN PEROSN) HOLD ONE OR EVEN TWO SEAT IN ANY NEW CABINET WHICH MAY BE FORMED. PRESIDENT FRANGIE ALSO APPEARS READY ACCEPT SOME SUCH COMPROMISE WITH JUMBLATT IF ONLY TO GET GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONING AGAIN AFTER VACUUM OF ALMOST THREE MONTHS. ALTHOUGH JUMBLATT AND HIS SUPPORTERS ARE SHORT ON TOTAL VOTES IN LEBANESE ASSEMBLY(PROBABLY LESS THAN ONE THRID) THE PRESENT REAL POLITICAL EQUATION IS SO BALANCED THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO BLOCK CABINET ALIGNMENTS THEY; DO NOT LIKE AS EFFECTIVELY AS THOSE WHO OPPOSE JUMBLATT AND HAVE BEEN IN SUPPORT OF FRANGIE (AND PREVIOUS SAEB SALAM CABINETS), ALTHOUGH LATTER HAVE TWICE AS MANY VOTES.

4. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHO WILL SUCCEED IN FORMING NEW CABINET, WHEN IT WILL BE FORMED AND WHO MEMBERS WILL BE. THIS COULD TAKE PLACE UNDER TAKIEDDINE SOLH TODAY OR TOMORROW, OR IT COULD DRAG ON FOR WEEKS WITH SOMEONE ELSE BEING NAMED TO TRYWHERE SOLH FAILED. WHEN CABINET HAS BEEN NAMED AND APPROVED WE WILL PROVIDE OUR ASSESSMENT OF WHAT EFFECT IT LIABLE HAVE ON LEBANESE POLICIES IN SUCH KEY AREAS AS RELATIONS BETWEEN GOL AND FADAYEEN AND BETWEEN LEBANON AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. US AND USSR. HOWEVER, TREND TOWARD SOME COMPROMISE WITH LEFT AND FEDAYEEN

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NOTED ABOVE AND REPORTED OUR 7023 IS ALREADY APPARENT. HOUGHTON NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO. SECRET NNNNMAFVVZCZ

INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION
Date: 1973 May 15, 13:35 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID: 1973BEIRUT05568_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005
To: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs \| Commander in Chief European Command Vaihingen Germany \| Defense Intelligence Agency \| France Paris \| Israel Jerusalem \| Israel Tel Aviv \| Jordan Amman \| Kuwait Kuwait City \| Russia Moscow \| Saudi Arabia Dhahran \| Saudi Arabia Jeddah \| Secretary of State \|United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi \| United Kingdom London \| United Nations (New York)

SUMMARY: OVER PAST FEW DAYS EMPHASIS OF GOL- FEDAYEEN CRISIS HAS SHIFTED FROM ARMED CONFRONTATION TO POLITICAL STRUGGLE FOR SUPPORT OF SUNNI MOSLEMS. ‘ ARAFAT AND JUMBLATT HAVE BEEN LEADING EXPONENTS OF FEDAYEEN POSITION AND HAVE ATTRACTED CONSIDERABLE FOLLOWING AMONG SUNNI POLITICIANS WITH WHOM THEY HAVE BEEN HAVING ALMOST CONTINUOUS MEETINGS. FRANGIE, ON OTHER HAND, ALSO MEETING WITH SUNNI LEADERS TO EXPOUND HIS WELL- KNOWN

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05568 151427 Z

POINT OF VIEW. AMONG ISSUES AT STAKE ARE FORMATION OF NEW GOVT, CONTINUATION OF STATE OF EMERGENCY, CONTENT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN, AND ” RIGHTS” OF MOSLEMS. FRANGIE HAS BEEN HOLDING VERY FIRM, AND SUNNI BASE REMAINS RELATIVELY QUEIT BEUT SUNNI POLITICIANS ARE BEHAVING IN TRADITIONAL FASHION BY PUBLIC ADVOCACY OF PALESTINIAN, PAN- ARAB CAUSE. END SUMMARY.

1. OVER PAST THREE DAYS PRESIDENT FRANGIE HAS CONTINUED HOLD ONE MEETING AFTER ANOTHER WITH WIDE SELECTION OF POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS AND BUSINESS LEADERS. AMONG THEM HAVE BEEN LARGE NUMBER SUNNI MOSLEMS. HE HAS BEEN REPORTEDLY HOLDING VERY FIRMLY TO HIS PREVIOUSLY STATED VIEWS ON WHAT RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND GOL, CALLING PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO SITUATION IN OTHER ARAB STATES AND TO HIS STRONG OPPOSITION TO IDEA OF HAVING ARMED MEN CIRCULATING FREELY, TO FEDAYEEN BEING ABOVE LEBANESE LAW ( ” STATE WITHIN A STATE”), AND THREAT TO LEBANESE GOVT AND PEOPLE CAUSED BY HEAVY WEAPONS IN CAMPS IN AND AROUND MAJOR CITIES. IN TALKING WITH BUSINESSMEN HE IS RELIABLY REPORTED TO HAVE SAID ” WE MUST THINK LEBANON BEFORE WE THINK ARAB AND PALESTINIAN”. WHEN ASKED TO ABOLISH CURFEW WHICH HURTING BUSINESS HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT SUCH LOSSES ARE ” RELATIVELY SECONDARY, AND NOT THE IMPORTANT FACTOR.”

2. IN TALKING WITH FORMER PRIME MINISTER SAEB SALAM ON MAY 13, PRESIDENT RELIABLY REPORTED TO HAVE TAKEN VERY TOUGH LINE. SAEB CAME FROM MEETING OF SOME TWENTY SUNNI POLITICIANS AND BUSINESSMEN ( EXCLUDING THOSE CLOSEST TO KARAME AND JUMBLATT) AND CLAIMED HE REPRESENTING SUNNI OPINION IN PRESSING FOR RAPID RESTORATION OF CIVILIAN GOVT AND AGREEMENT WITH FEDAYEEN ON BASIS OLD CAIRO ACCORDS. FRANGIE REPORTEDLY SIAD THAT SETTLING QUESTION OF RELATIONS WITH FEDAYEEN SHOULD COME BEFORE NEW GOVT SINCE OTHERWISE NEW GOVT WOULD FALL INTO SAME TROUBLE AS HAD AMIN EL HAFEZ. HE ALSO REPORTEDLY TOLD SAEB SALAM THAT IF HE THAT ENAMOURED OF FEDAYEEN HE COULD MOVE INTO CAMPS WITH THEM BUT THAT FRANGIE WOULD NEVER CONCEDE LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY EVEN IF CONFRONTATION STEMMING THEREFROM LED TO ACTUAL GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION OF COUNTRY IN WHICH SUNIS AND PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE SEPARATE ENCLAVE. IN PRESIDENT’ S MEETING MAY 14 WITH KAMAL JUMBLATT AND RACHID KARAME, WE

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UNDERSTAND THAT FORMER TOOK HIS USUAL FIRM STAND WHILE LATTER TWO REPEATED ESSENCE OF KARAME’ S PRESENTATION PREVIOUS WEEK ( SEE SITREP 15).

3. ‘ ARAFAT HAS MET SEVERAL TIME WITH SAEB SALAM, KARAME AND JUMBLATT OVER PAST THREE DAYS, AND ALSO WITH BROAD SPECTRUM OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS, ETC. WHILE BOTH FRANGIE AND ‘ ARAFAT ( WITH STRONG SUPPORT FROM KARAME AND JUMBLATT) CONCENTRATING ON SUNNI MOSLEMS, THEY NOT NEGLECTING CHRISTIANS. ‘ ARAFAT GETTING STRONG PROPAGANDA SUPPORT FROM RADIOS IN DAMASCUS, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, ETC. ( GOOD SAMPLE OF MILDLY- WORDED SUPPORT CAN BE READ IN FBIS M142042 Z QUOTING CAIRO VOICE OF PALESTINE).

4. COMMENT: ONE EFFECT OF THESE MEETINGS HAS CLEARLY BEEN TO HEIGHTEN CONFESSIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS ON PART OF SUNNIS. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF SUNNI POLITICIANS, BUT WE HAVE SEVERAL REPORTS THAT THERE IS INCREASING FALL- OUT AMONG SUNNI RANK- AND- FILAI( WHICH BEING VISITED ON ALMOSLPHOUSE- TO- HOUSE BASIS IN SOME SECTORS BY FEDAYEEN REPS). THERE IS APPREHENSION THAT UNLEESS CRISIS IS RESOLVED SOON ANY OUT- BREAK OF HOSTILITIES COULD PRODUCE CONFESSIONAL SPLIT WHICH HAS THUS FAR BEEN AVOIDED. ONE OF MAJOR REASONS NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DID NOT MEET ON MAY 14 WAS DESIRE BY CHRISTIAN DEPUTIES NOT TO HAVE MEETING IN WHICH THERE WAS NO RPT NO SUNNI SUPPORT FOR EXTENDING STATE OF EMERGENCY. THIS INCREASES PRESSURE FOR COMPROMISE BY FRANGIE AND FOR FORMATION NEW GOVT ( OR RESURRECTION OF SOME- WHAT BEDRAGGLED AMIN EL HAFEZ) PRIOR TO CONCLUSION UNDERSTANDING WITH FEDAYEEN. LATTER ARE APPARENTLY ADDING TO THIS PRESSURE BY IMPLYING THEY CANNOT AGREE TO ANYTHING IN ABSENCE OF SUNNI PM. ON OTHER HAND, FRANGIE’ S FIRM STAND MAY BRING HOME TO MANY SUNNIS AMONG UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASSES THAT THEY HAVE A LOT TO LOSE MATERIALLY IN PUSHING THEIR PAN- ARAB, PRO- PALESTINIAN SENTIMENTS TOO FAR. FRANGIE HAS THUS FAR PURSUED WITH SKILL AND COURAGE HIS OWN VARIETY OF BRINKSMANSHIP.

HOUGHTON NOTE BY OC/ T: NOT PASSED CAIRO. CONFIDENTIAL NMAFVVZCZ *** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a *** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL

SALAM ASKED TO FORM NEW GOVERNMENT
Date: 1974 October 3, 16:37 (Thursday)	Canonical ID: 1974BEIRUT12035_b
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005
To: Department of State \| Egypt Cairo \| Israel Tel Aviv \| Jordan Amman \| Saudi Arabia Jeddah \| Secretary of State \| Syria Damascus \| United Nations (New York)

1. AS ANTICIPATED, SAEB SALAM HAS ACCEPTED SUMMONS FROM PRES. FRANGIE TO FORM NEW CABINET (FBIS BE 031113). SALAM IMMEDIATELY ARRANGED FOR PARLIAMENTARY CONSULTATIONS OVER NEXT TWO DAYS FOR THAT PURPOSE. WE RELIABLY INFORMED HE PLANS ANNOUNCE DISTRI- BUTION OF PORTFOLIOS BY SATURDAY, OCTOBER 5.

2. KAMAL JUMBLATT, WHO APPARENTLY MAINTAINED HIS OBJECTIONS TO SALAM UNTIL BITTER END, SEEMS DESTINED TO STAND IN OPPOSITION TO NEW GOVT. IN LEBANESE CONTEXT, HOWEVER, IT WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE THAT JUMBLATT MIGHT PRIVATELY HAVE BEEN RECON- CILED BY INDUCEMENTS OFFERED BY FRANGIE, BUT RUMORS SUGGESTING THIS ARE SCARCE. IN ANY EVENT, INFORMED SOURCE CLOSE TO SALAM TOLD ME AFTERNOON OCT 3 THAT THINGS ARE “GOING WELL” AND THAT SALAM SUPPORTERS NOT PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT JUMBLATT. AN

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OTHER REPORT (UNCONFIRMED) IS THAT JUMBLATT MET WITH RASHID KARAME MORNING OCT 3 TO TRY AND WOO LATTER AWAY FROM HIS ALLIANCE WITH SALAM. KARAME REPORTEDLY REBUFFED APPROACH AS “TOO LATE” AND SAID HIS ALLIANCE WITH SALAM AND EDDE STANDS (FOR TIME BEING AT LEAST). CIRCLES CLOSE TO SALAM ALSO BELIEVE THAT THEY FACE NO REAL DIFFICULTY FROM SHIITE IMAM MUSA AS SADR AND IT MAY BE THAT SALAM AND IMAM HAVE COME TO SOME KIND OF UNDERSTANDING IN THEIR MEETINGS OVER PAST FEW DAYS.

3. SALAM IS SAID TO BE FOCUSSING ON CABINET THAT WILL INCLUDE BOTH PARLIAMENTARY AND NON-PARLIAMENTARY FIGURES. DEPT WILL RE- CALL THAT WHEN SALAM FORMED HIS EARLIER GOVT. FOLLOWING FRANGIE’S ELECTION IN 1970, HE CHOSE MAINLY YOUNGER “TECHNOCRATS”. ALTHOUGH THAT EXPERIMENT DID NOT PROVE PARTICULARLY LASTING OR HAPPY FOR VARIETY OF REASONS, SALAM MAY BE PREPARED TO TRY IT AGAIN ON SOMEWHAT REDUCED BASIS THIS TIIME. AMONG NAMES ALREADY SAID TO BE ON SALAM’S LIST OF “POTENTIALS” THOSE OF ABDULLAH RASI (FRANGIE’S SON-IN-LAW WHO COULD REPLACE TONY FRANGIE AS “FAMILY MINISTER”) AND FORMER FONMIN KHALIL ABUHAMAD (WHO PRIVATELY HAS TOLD ME HE NOT RPT NOT INTEREST IN REURNING AS FONMIN).

4. COMMENT: WHILE MANY QUESTIONS REMAIN TO BE ANSWERED OVER NEXT SEVERAL DAYS, SALAM AND HIS CONFIDANTS APPEAR PLEASED TO HAVE GAINED PRESIDENTIAL NOD AND CONFIDENT THEY CAN RAPIDLY AS- SEMBLE ACCEPTABLE CABINET. SALAM HAS APPEALED TO HIS SUPPORTERS TO REFRAIN FROM “FIRING IN AIR” IN THEIR JUBILATION OVER HIS NOMINATION, THREATENING TO PUNISH VIOLATORS. WITH BACKING OF FRANGIE AND PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT OF BLOCS LED BY, INTER ALIA, CHAMOUN,EDDE, GEMAYEL AND HIS FORMER SUNNI RIVAL KARAME, SAEB BEY APPARENTLY BELIEVES HE CAN QUICKLY TAKE REINS OF GOVT. IN HAND.

GODLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

LEBANESE CABINET CRISIS
Date: 1974 October 8, 07:45 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID: 1974BEIRUT12187_b
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE	Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
From: Lebanon Beirut	Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005
To: Department of State \| Egypt Cairo \| Israel Tel Aviv \| Jordan Amman \| Saudi Arabia Jeddah \| Secretary of State \| Syria Damascus \| United Nations (New York)

A. BEIRUT 12035; B. DAMASCUS 2204 (NOTAL)

1. WEEKEND HAS NOW PASSED WITHOUT PRIMIN-DESIGNATE SAEB SALAM MAKING ANTICIPATED ANNOUNCEMENT RE COMPOSITION OF NEW CABINET. FOLLOWING OCT. 5 MEETING WITH PRES. FRANGIE TO DISCUSS OUTCOME OF SALAM’S CONSULTATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTARY FACTIONS, SALAM MAINTAINED PUBLIC AIR OF CONFIDENCE, TELLING NEWSMEN HE COULD CONCEIVE OF NO OBSTACLES TO FORMATION OF NEW GOVT. BUT ALSO WARNING AGAINST HASTE.

2. DESPITE SALAM’S PUBLIC ASSURANCES, HOWEVER, THERE ARE INDICA- TIONS HE IS ENCOUNTERING TROUBLESOME PROBLEMS ON SEVERAL FRONTS IN HIS EFFORTS TO PUT TOGETHER WORKABLE CABINET. NOT ONLY HAVE KAMAL JUMBLATT AND HIS SUPPORTERS CONTINUED BOYCOTT SALAM’S

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PAGE 02 BEIRUT 12187 080659Z

EFFORTS, BUT PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER KAMAL ASSAD IS APPARENTLY BEING BALKY, PROBABLY BECAUSE HE SUSPECTS SALAM OF HAVING WORKED OUT SECRET “ARRANGEMENT” WITH SHIITE LEADER IMAN MUSA AS SADR–ASSAD’S CHIEF RIVAL IN SOUTH LEBANON. ACCORDING TO SOME LOCAL OBSERVERS, SALAM IS ALSO ENCOUNTERING OPPOSITION FROM HIS “TRADITIONALIST” POLITICAL COLLEAGUES TO HIS REPORTED DESIRE TO INCLUDE SEVERAL YOUNGER “TECHNOCRATS” IN NEW CABINET.

3. IN ADDITION, AS REPORTED REF. B, STRONG OPPOSITION TO SALAM APPEARS TO HAVE DEVELOPED IN DAMASCUS, AND THIS UNDOUBTEDLY IS CAUSING SERIOUS CONCERN ON PART OF SALAM AND PRES. FRANGIE. SALAM MADE POINT OF ATTEMPTING PLACATE DAMASCUS DURING OCT. 6 “VICTORY” RALLY (SPONSORED BY PRO-SYRIAN WING OF LEBANESE BAATH PARTY) BY HEAPING LAVISH PRAISE ON HAFEZ ASSAD AND SADAT FOR THEIR “GLORIOUS” ROLES IN OCTOBER WAR (FBIS BE 061830). (SAEB BEY FOUND HIMSELF A TRIFLE UPSTAGED AT RALLY BY IMAM SADR WHO DES- CRIBED SALAM’S NEW GOVT. AS LEBANON’S “LAST CHANCE” FOR REFORM BEFORE REVOLUTION BECOMES INEVITABLE.) WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT SAUDIS MAY BE WEIGHIN IN WITH SARG ON SALAM’S BEHALF.

4. COMMENT: IN CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR, OCTOBER 7, PRESIDENTIAL CHEF DU CABINET DIB INDICATED SALAM WAS ENCOUNTERING NITTY GRITTY LOCAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN ASSIGNING PORTFOLIOS. DIB ADDED THAT PRESIDENT AND HE EMPHASIZING CRITERIA OF HONESTY RATHER THAN EXPERIENCE. HE THOUGHT THE PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE WAS MAKING PROGRESS BUT HAD NO PROJECTION AS TO WHEN THE CABINET WOULD BE FORMED. HE THOUGHT JUMBLATT HAD OVERPLAYED HIS HAND AND CONFIRMED PRESIDENT’S PREOCCUPATION WITH SYRIAN REACTION TO SALAM.

GODLEY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNN

Ten Months Of Vacuum

Meet the members of The Consultative Gathering

Yeah. I know. Ten.

Before I begin, here’s a small recap of the ninth month of presidential vacancy: It started with Hezbollah launching an operation in the Shebaa farms. When Israel did not respond, Hezbollah was supposed to gain momentum on the Lebanese political scene. But Hariri launched an epic maneuver, and Hezbollah did not politically escalate. In the end, it was a tie.

The second half of February and March are more exciting. Way more exciting.

The Two Presidents’ Men

In the last half of February, PM Salam wanted to amend the cabinet’s voting mechanism after several cabinet members began exercising veto power, stalling several of the government’s projects. What happens next? 7 Lebanese ministers meet and decide to form a “consultative gathering”. The ministers are the ones who are loyal to Amine Gemayel and to Michel Sleiman. The rapprochement between the ministers was logical: They all either belong to one of the smallest Lebanese parties in parliament or represent a former president that no longer has any concrete power (not even one MP). The 7 MPs have two more things in common: In a time of presidential vacancy, (1) they all answer to two of the three former presidents that are still alive while (2) not belonging to any of the two main Christian Lebanese parties. Deep down, it’s not about the voting mechanism, as it is about two political groups marking their territory. The two presidents know that they have no power in parliament that would ensure their same important presence in the next Lebanese cabinet. And they also know that they have an enormous amount of prestige (as former presidents) and that the mainstream Muslim parties are annoyed by the LF, the FPM and the two parties’ rivalry preventing them from supporting Aoun, Geagea, or any other alternative than Aoun and Geagea. Again, this is not about the voting mechanism: This is an advertisement. They are showing the Muslim leadership that there is a possible alternative to the FPM/LF choice: A new “prestigious” presidential Christian alliance that is very weak on the ground (and thus that will not ask for too much power – even if it wanted to), and that could still be – to some extent – representative of Lebanese Christians. The two presidents are asking for political relevance, and in exchange, they will be an asset to weaken the LF, the FPM, or a possible (yet highly unlikely) LF-FPM alliance. For example, if the FPM and the LF reject Kahwaji as consensual candidate, Hezbollah and the FM could count on this new gathering to support the presidential candidacy of Kahwaji. After all, who cares about the other politicians if the biggest party in parliament and the most armed one – along with two former presidents and the army – endorse you?

And the advertisement worked: One of the closest Christian ministers to the FM, Michel Pharaon (Boutros Harb is also a member), joined the new gathering led by Sleiman and Gemayel. Now of course, this rapprochement between the two presidents could eventually have no impact at all, but one should keep in mind right now that the mainstream Muslim parties would have more leverage with their Christian allies (the FPM and the LF).

Hariri also succeeded to undermine the power of PM Tammam Salam (hello there, rivalry) by indirectly encouraging discontent in the cabinet. It’s been a good month of the Future Movement, especially that a new March 14 “national council” likely to reinvigorate the Mustaqbal-led coalition has seen the light.

Approximately one year after the presidential race began, the Maronite Four might be welcoming a new member to their closed group, President Michel Sleiman. The Maronite Four could soon become the Maronite Five.

The Maronite Two

The Aounists and the Lebanese Forces are also about to reach an understanding. The process – whose unannounced intention was probably to slow down the Hezbollah-FM dialogue – has accelerated probably due to the Gemayel-Sleiman rapprochement. The progress in the LF-FPM dialogue could mean two things: (1) That the two main Christian parties are trying to keep the president’s seat to themselves. In other words, the document of understanding could say that only both politicians would be eligible to run for presidency and no one else. Proof? On the 15th of March, Michel Aoun told us once again that he would only agree to a strong president and not to a consensual accord. Welcome back to 2014. But it could also mean that (2) no consensual candidate would become president unless the two Christian parties agree on him. This written paper, as useless as it might seem, should put an end to the Muslim parties’ maneuvering and make Aoun and Geagea panic less about the possibility that Hezbollah and Mustaqbal would go through with a consensual candidate of their own. But in the end we (and they) all know that at least one of the Christians leaders will eventually agree to his ally’s terms. But hey, as they say an Arabic, el mhemm el niyye. An FPM-LF document of understanding should hinder for some time any M8-M14 agreement on Kahwaji (or any other consensual candidate for that matter).

Meanwhile, Sleiman Frangieh, who is probably feeling abandoned by everyone (by “everyone” I mean the Gemayel- Sleiman and Aoun-Geagea talks), launched his own political maneuver and preemptively self-proclaimed himself March 8’s number-two presidential candidate after Aoun pulls out.

Quand le chat n’est pas là, les souris dansent

Right now everyone is acting as if there’s a president in office: Berri wants to call for a parliamentary session amid presidential vacuum (It’s arguably unconstitutional, but hey, who cares). Moreover, the Lebanese cabinet is acting as if it’s not a caretaker one anymore: It spent at least two weeks trying to figure out a decision-making mechanism while there’s no president in power, instead of actually pressuring the parliament to elect a president. Our minister of foreign affairs too forgot that he was a caretaker cabinet member, and decided – like Phileas Fogg – to embark on a journey around the world signing treaties in 10 Latin American countries. (Someone should tell him that signing historic treaties with Cuba is not a priority right now)

Because that’s what care-taking apparently means: Doing everything you can do before someone in charge (a president) comes and tells you that you can’t do it.

When Lebanese politicians suddenly become too greedy, it usually means two things: (1) The status quo is going to end really soon (notice the very high number of decrees that Lebanese cabinets pass in the weeks before leaving power), or (2) the status quo is going to stay for a lot of time, and everyone wants to make sure that their slice of the pizza is in the fridge ready to be eaten whenever they get hungry. Meanwhile, on the southern side of Mount Lebanon, Walid Jumblatt is trying to benefit as much as possible from the vacancy and finish his transition of power before a president who is likely to be from the Chouf tries to interfere from the Beiteddine palace.

But one thing is for sure. It’s no longer about a electing a consensual candidate now. It’s about who would look like the winner once the consensual candidate is chosen.

305 days since the 25th of May. 141 days since the 5th of November. 3 Million years till the next parliamentary elections.

I don’t know if it matters anymore , but here’s the monthly reminder anyway: We still don’t have a president.

Introducing Taymour

Yep, that’s Right. The kid next to Kamal Jumblatt in that picture is no other than Walid Jumblatt

Looking further ahead, “Walid Beyk” believes his elder son Taimur will be prepared to assume the leadership of the Lebanese Druze community whenever Jumblatt decides to “retire and get my green card.” Emitting a low sigh and rubbing his bald head, Jumblatt worried though that his ‘Generation Y’ younger son, Arslan, is less enthralled by the whole Druze feudal ethos (of course, Jumblatt himself was a motorcycle-riding hippy when he was suddenly thrust into the Druze leadership following his father Kamal’s assassination in 1977).

Found on a WikiLeaks cable dating from August 2006.

Taymour. Read this name, and remember it well. Because in the next few months, Lebanon’s parliament is going to gradually see the rise of a new young politician who will one day lead the Lebanese center and eventually be Lebanon’s new Kingmaker. Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt confirmed last Tuesday he will hand over his seat in Parliament to his eldest son, Taymour. In remarks to local daily As-Safir, Jumblatt said Parliament Speaker Berri has promised he would hold by-elections in May after the Druze leader submits a letter of resignation to Parliament.

So Why Now?

If you’ve been following Lebanese politics closely for the past few years, this shouldn’t be too surprising. Like you just read in the cable, Taymour had probably been Jumblatt’s preferred choice to lead the PSP since the last decade. Taymour started participating in a lot of his father’s meetings since the last parliamentary elections (here’s an example of one with Nasrallah 2009). In 2011, Taymour was made the second in command of the PSP. While rumors of Walid Jumblatt giving up his parliamentary seat for his son have been ongoing for quite a time now, Jumblatt chose the perfect moment to end his presence in parliament and formally put his son in charge of the PSP bloc.

1) The Perfect Parliamentary Timing

As I said on this blog a couple of months earlier, Jumblatt’s presence in parliament has seen a steady decline since 2000. It shrunk from 16 in 2000 to 7 in 2011, after 4 of his MPs abandoned him following the Mikati nomination to the premiership. Anyway, it’s very unlikely that Jumblatt would control more than 12 MPs in the next parliamentary elections, let alone keep the 11 MPs he currently has. This why Jumblatt doesn’t want to wait till the next parliamentary elections to get Taymour into Nejmeh Square, because he probably wants him to be elected while there’s still the biggest number of MPs next to him in parliament, which would help his son a lot by giving him some sort of guidance. Also, it would give the impression that Taymour doesn’t have any rivals in the Chouf: While it is very likely that M8 and M14 would field contenders in regular elections, I find it hard to believe that any of the two coalitions would be ready, by their own, to challenge Jumblatt on a Druze seat, in his home district, especially if it’s a by-election: Because if you piss off the PSP while they’re in the middle – and especially while there’s no president, Jumblatt won’t be in the the middle anymore, there will be a president (that you won’t like), and most importantly, Taymour Jumblatt will still win the seat in the Chouf => Not a smart move to challenge the PSP right now. (This opportunity doesn’t come every day for the PSP)

2) The Perfect Governmental Timing

Walid Jumblatt’s minister in the cabinet, Wael Abou Faour, is now Lebanon’s sole raison d’être. Since November 2011, the minister of health has been launching heavily mediatized campaigns to force different Lebanese hospitals, restaurants, factories, pharmaceutical companies, and shops to abide by the guidelines of the health ministry. It might not look like a big deal, but for Lebanon, it was a revolutionary move. Two months ago, I said that it was probably because Jumblatt wanted to (1) maximize his chances at the Rashaya-West Bekaa district in the upcoming elections and (2) at the same time start a transition of power while having the upper hand. Today, I believe we can confirm it. Jumblatt wants to be the man who decides the outcome of the 2017 elections in the southern Bekaa while preparing his transition of power.

3) The Perfect Presidential Timing

There’s something very important about the timing here. Jumblatt didn’t only decide to give up his seat before the parliamentary elections, he decided to give it up before we even had an elected president. And it’s not only because Jumblatt wants to finish the transition before M8 and M14 agree on a deal that is likely to isolate him in the center. We all know by now that – one way or another – the PSP always finds itself in the ruling coalition. What scares Jumblatt here is the identity of the new president. While Sleiman was an ally, the new president might not be one. The last time we had a president from the Chouf (Camille Chamoun), a civil war erupted in the mountains, and Kamal Jumblatt wasn’t reelected in 1957 (And the best part? Kamal Jumblatt was actually an ally of Chamoun when he became president). Jumblatt is aware that a president from the Chouf would gather a certain amount of influence, especially among the Christians of the district. He is also probably more than capable of handling that problem. 2015 is not 1955. He just doesn’t want the transition of power to happen in Mukhtara while a president from the Chouf is interfering from the Beiteddin palace.

And Guess who is from the Chouf? Presidential candidate no. 1, Commander of the Army Jean Kahwaji.

And yes, I am clearly hinting here that the upcoming transition of power in parliament might mean that Kahwaji is the most likely candidate to win right now.

With a new Kingmaker in parliament, hopefully a new King.

300 days since the 25th of May, 136 days since the 5th of November. 3 Million years till the next parliamentary elections.

Reminder: We still don’t have a President.

Nine Months Of Vacuum

Guess What I Found In a 1926 Newspaper?

Technically speaking, the ninth month of vacuum doesn’t end before next week, but the number of events that happened in these last twenty days is too damn high, so I decided to link them to one another as soon as possible.

Behold, the glorious ninth month of presidential vacancy.

The Context

On the 28th of January, Hezbollah finally found the opportunity they have been searching for. Israel had launched a week earlier an airstrike in the Syrian Golan, killing an Iranian General and several commanders from the party, including the son of Imad Mughniyah, who was also killed by Israel in 2008 and was never avenged by the party. Whether the Israelis intended it or not, the strike was actually a very nice propaganda boost for Hezbollah. As I said in a post at the time, it would eventually help Hezbollah in their struggle to put the Syrian opposition and Israel in the same box. And I was right (Yay): A couple days after things calmed down on the southern border, Nasrallah made sure to point out how the Israelis and Jabhat Al-Nusra are both working together to “sabotage the resistance”. Hezbollah could have used the Israeli strike alone to strengthen this discourse, but not responding at the Israeli attack would have been a blow to the morale of the party. On the 28th of January, Hezbollah retaliated to the Israeli strike in the most calculated way possible: The attack happened from the Syrian Golan (where Israel had attacked the earlier), on a contested Lebanese-Israeli-Syrian territory (so not even Israeli), and the casualties were also relatively limited: 2 Israeli soldiers were killed while the Israeli strike killed an Iranian General and several Hezbollah commanders. For Hezbollah, the number was high enough to prove that they weren’t afraid of the consequences and that they wouldn’t let Israel target their men without retaliating anymore. But the number was also kind of low for Israel to respond: They were heading to elections in 40 days: The Israeli ruling coalition would have risked ending a failed military operation (like in 2006) right before the elections, and besides, the number was relatively low when it was compared to Hezbollah’s casualties a week earlier. By choosing the worst context for the Israelis to start a war (by launching the attack on disputed territory, by not kidnapping any IDF soldier, and by choosing the worst timing ever for Israel) Hezbollah wanted to send a message, not start a war. They gambled, and they won. Israel did not attack, and Hezbollah subsequently gained the upper hand – militarily in Syria, and politically in Beirut. (If you’re asking yourself how they won politically in Lebanon, look at how Jumblatt lauded Hezbollah’s ambush)

If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them (Part I)

If you follow Lebanese politics for several years, you’ll find that the Lebanese political parties are very predictable. In the aftermath of Hezbollah’s retaliation – and once it was sure that Israel wouldn’t strike back – the logical response from M14 would have been to constantly, frequently, relentlessly criticize Hezbollah’s “attempt at destabilizing the south, risking the destruction of Beirut’s infrastructure yet again, and dragging Lebanon into a proxy war between Iran and Israel while drowning the country deeper into the Syrian conflict”. Of course, if the Israelis had launched an offensive, M14 would have waited for the offensive to end to start criticizing Hezbollah, since it would make them look as if they’re standing with Israel if they’re too harsh on Hezbollah while the battles are raging. Anyway, what I want to say here is that the Future Movement and Hezbollah had the opportunity to start a political war because of Hezbollah’s military move in Israel, but neither of them took it, although Geagea tried to tun them against one another: He was giving a press conference the day the attack happened, and criticized the party’s move. Future Movement’s response was a clear indicator that they wanted peace with Hezbollah: Of course, Siniora criticized the party for his actions (you have to please your electorate after all), but that’s not what matters: Hariri was relatively indifferent about the issue (He didn’t even tweet about the events that week) and Future Movement’s minister in the cabinet said that Hezbollah did not break the ministerial declaration (yeah, it’s in bold because it’s important). That’s actually huge: Not only does it give Hezbollah an approval from the other side of the political spectrum, it also gives the impression that Hezbollah was acting within the legal limits established by the government. The cabinet’s ministerial declaration is very vague about the resistance (remember when the cabinet spent a whole month trying to write it?) and says that “Lebanese citizens have the right to resist the occupation”. This weird sentence was a compromise between M14 and M8 that was supposed to be midway between M8’s “The people, army, resistance equation” and M14’s desire to remove the previous sentence.

Anyway, the Future Movement made a wise decision here: By stating that Hezbollah’s move was actually within the boundaries established by the weird sentence in the ministerial declaration (Yes, I won’t stop calling weird, because it’s an absolute bullshit sentence that means nothing and could mean anything at all. Even “اكل الولد التفاحة ” would have been a better choice than ” الحق للمواطنين اللبنانيين في مقاومة الاحتلال الإسرائيلي ورد اعتداءاته واسترجاع الأراضي المحتلة”), Future Movement plays it smart and shows that the cabinet – that could be seen as an M14 one – is actually in control of Hezbollah’s actions with Israel (Actually it’s everything but that: The proof? The cabinet didn’t even meet the day the attacks happened). Anyway, Future Movement chose not to clash politically with Hezbollah – despite the LF and the Kataeb’s obvious desire to do so – and played it smooth: After all, they were having a dialogue, and there’s a vacant president seat out there that can’t be apparently filled unless both parties give the green light.

If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them (Part II)

A couple of days after the attack, there was yet another opportunity to start an all-out between M8 and M14. After Geagea’s failed attempt the day of the ambush, came a leaked video about Strida Geagea that was circulated by the M8 media (specifically the Christian M8 media). It shows the LF MP saying “Nchallah ya Rab” when Journalist Denise Rahme informed her about what happened in the South between Hezbollah and Israel. As it turns out, the video was genuine but cut off and MP Geagea was saying “Nchallah ya Rab ma yisseer shi”. Anyway, this was an attempt – this time by the FPM – to start an all-out war between M8 and M14. Just like the LF and the Kataeb, the FPM were desperately trying to break the Hezbollah-FM dialogue. I said it once, I said twice, and I’ll say it every time: The Christians parties fear an FM-Hezbollah agreement more than they fear one another. Because in the end, every time both parties jointly approved something, it passed, regardless of what the Christian parties thought of it. Hezbollah ignored the Aounists twice during the parliamentary extension sessions, and the Future Movement did the same with the LF when they decided in 2014 to go ahead and share the cabinet with Hezbollah while throwing their closest Christian ally alone in the opposition. If Hezbollah and the FM agree on the presidential matter, it would be the ultimate downfall for the Christian parties. It scares them so much that they actually tried to wreak the HA-FM dialogue, first by starting their own dialogue (and then trying to end it in order to end the M8-M14 dialogue as whole), and now by trying to start a political war between M8 and M14 that would eventually end the dialogue and any chance of finding a Hezbollah-FM consensual candidate.

And how did the members of the dialogue react to that attempt? Instead of arguing about Strida Geagea’s video, both parties simply ignored the Christian brouhaha and made their allies panic even more by removing all their political posters from the city of Beirut in order to “defuse tensions“.

If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them (Part III)

So let’s sum things up:

1) Hezbollah – Future Movement dialogue starts => Dialogue “making progress” => Christian parties panic. (That was last month)

2) Hezbollah retaliates against Israel => LF wants the FM to criticize Hezbollah => Instead the FM indirectly endorses Hezbollah => Christian parties panic more => FPM tries to start an all-out war => the FM and Hezbollah respond by signing a “poster removal peace treaty” => Christian parties panic even more.

How much more exactly? The Christian parties would panic so much, that when FM MP Khaled Daher made his faux pas last week and said the anti-Christian comments, the Christian parties were so much paranoid that even the Kataeb – who practically never publicly criticize their allies – asked the FM to throw Daher out. In a way, they were also indirectly asking the FM to up the tone against Hezbollah – after all the only way for Mustaqbal to repair the damage done by Daher would have been by criticizing Hezbollah’s sectarian foundations.

Surprise: The FM threw Daher out, and did not accuse Hezbollah of anything. And to make things worse? According to reports, Hezbollah was advancing in the Syrian south and launching one of the most violent campaigns since their intervention in Syria started. And the FM didn’t say a word about it => Panique Chrétienne Généralisée (Excuse my french)

That was it for the M8/M14 Christian parties. Hezbollah and the FM were serious about the dialogue, and for a while, it seemed that the consensual president would be “forced” on them. It was the apocalypse.

Except it wasn’t.

If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them, Then Beat Them (Part IV)

“Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria is insanity and Hezbollah has brought this insanity to Lebanon.”

“Tying the Golan Heights to south Lebanon is insanity as well ”

After approximately three weeks of bonding with Hezbollah, Hariri threw this bomb on the 14th of February commemoration of the assassination of his father. In 3 weeks, Hariri (1) gave the impression that he had no problem with Hezbollah’s retaliation and made it look as if Hezbollah was following the cabinet’s guidelines that were jointly set by M8 and M14. Then, (2) Hariri managed, whether he meant it or not, to cause confrontations between the members of M8, and between the LF and the FPM. He also managed to (3) undermine Siniora, (4) to throw Daher out and eventually attract a friendly Christian electorate towards M14 while (5) setting boundaries for his MPs, (6) to give the impression that Hezbollah lost him as an ally after they thought they were winning him over, while (7) showing that he is a moderate at the same time because he wants to have a serious dialogue, and (8) highlighting the fact that he is actually making a big sacrifice by negotiating with Hezbollah, which would mean that he is (9) a patriot that values Lebanon above everything else.

These three weeks were supposed to be about Hezbollah’s achievement. Instead, they became all about Hariri, who didn’t even have an achievement.

Lebanese politicians, take notes. Because that’s one hell of a political maneuver.

Hezbollah were so embarrassed by Hariri that they needed to respond quickly in order to prevent him from taking advantage of what just happened: Not even 24 hours had passed after the Hariri speech when a Hezbollah drone flew over Israel (That’s the second one in three years). The drone wasn’t about Israel or Syria, It was a message destined to the FM: Hezbollah wanted to show that Hariri’s speeches, no matter how violent in their criticism, will have no impact whatsoever on Hezbollah’s military decisions. The proof? When Nasrallah gave his speech monday, he barely mentioned Hariri’s criticism. He only lauded Hariri’s anti-terror stance, using it to empower Hezbollah’s position, without even mentioning Hariri’s harsh criticism, as if the “insanity” part hadn’t happened in Hariri’s speech. That means two things: (1) Hezbollah wanted to undermine Hariri by ignoring him, and (2) they wanted to send a message to the Future Movement (by not escalating) that they were still ready to calm things down in order to ensure the success of the dialogue. After all, the road to Baabda goes through Beit Al Wasat and Hareit Hreik.

ِِAs the relation between the FM and Hezbollah is expected to quickly deteriorate now, don’t be too hopeful about breaking the deadlock soon. It seems that 9 months later, we’re back to square one.

Reminder: We still don’t have a president.

269 days since the 25th of May. 105 days since the 5th of November. Three million years till the next parliamentary elections.

Hezbollah’s Retaliation: Is It The Perfect Time And Place?

A map of the Shebaa Farms (Shukran Wikipedia)

In a very unexpected move, Hezbollah fighters attacked an Israeli military convoy in the occupied Shebaa Farms, in south Lebanon, killing two soldiers and wounding seven, in retaliation for Israel’s recent airstrike in the Golan Heights that killed Hezbollah fighters and an Iranian General.

A (Politically) Smart Move

Hezbollah needed to retaliate. For the past 3 years, the party has been constantly criticized for participating in the Syrian civil war and mainly for directing its weapons away from Israel and towards Syria. Even before Syria, Hezbollah faced a similar criticism in the wake of the May 7 events. “Hezbollah’s weapons are being used for political ends and are no longer directed at Israel”. M14 based its electoral campaign in 2009 on this discourse, and it eventually led to its victory in the 2009 parliamentary elections. M14 accused Hezbollah again of using its weapons in internal conflicts after the collapse of the Hariri government in 2011, and after Wissam Al-Hassan’s assassination in 2012. In 2011, it almost led to a fitna, and in 2012, it almost led to the downfall of the ruling M8 coalition.

Hezbollah tried to respond to this discourse by proving that it was still engaging in indirect combat with Israel, but it just wasn’t too convincing for the Lebanese public. The proof? almost no one remembers the drone that Hezbollah sent into Israel in October 2013. What everyone remembered however was Imad Mughaniyye’s assassination. Hezbollah didn’t respond to the attack properly back then, and it made them look weak. A lack of response over last week’s attacks would have made Hezbollah look even weaker (An Iranian General and Mughaniyye’s son were targeted), and it would have given the impression that Hezbollah cares more about its fight in Syria than its fight with Israel, even when Israel targets them inside Syria. Such loss of prestige would have been devastating for the party’s morale.

It was the time for payback. In fact, it was the perfect time for payback.

The Perfect Timing…

There’s a weird alliance going on between Middle Eastern rivals, with the United States and Hezbollah fighting together a common enemy called the Islamic State: Not long ago, the US provided actionable intelligence that probably saved lives in Dahiyeh. This indirect rapprochement was also followed by tense relations between Israel and the United States. Obama said that he will not meet with Netanyahu when the Israeli PM will come to the U.S. in March. One should not forget that for the United States, a possible deal with Iran is on the line here, and that the Israeli elections are in 45 days. Should the Israeli army escalate, Hezbollah could drag Israel into two months of skirmishes, which wouldn’t be a perfect situation for Israel’s electoral process. No one wants to vote while Katyusha rockets are flying around the Israeli north. Even if Israel wants war, it would be a tough call in this particular timing: Hezbollah and Iran always said that “they would choose the perfect time and place” to strike back after every Israeli aggression (while M14 laughed at this sentence and accused them of cowardice). So if Hezbollah wanted to prove a point without suffering major Israeli consequences, now was the time. Such an opportunity doesn’t come twice.

… And A Perfect Location

Hezbollah chose the perfect place to strike. The attack happened in the Shebaa farms:

From the Lebanese point of view, Shebaa is an occupied Lebanese territory. By attacking Shebaa – and Shebaa only – Hezbollah is preemptively turning down an M14 political maneuver accusing Hezbollah of avenging the death of an Iranian General: Hezbollah could counter this maneuver by simply saying that they were not only avenging the death of their commanders, but also trying to pressure Israel into retreating from occupied Lebanese territory: A proxy battle suddenly becomes a liberation war.
From the Israeli point of view – Technically speaking – Israel considers the Shebaa farms to be part of the (annexed) occupied Syrian Golan, not Lebanon. So in a way, Hezbollah retaliated very accurately, in the Golan (from the Israeli point of view), where they were attacked in the first place. Hezbollah did not escalate, and only treated Israel like Israel treated the party. Hezbollah also did not make any abduction (like 2006) which means that it does not want to engage with Israel and start an all-out war. If there was a desire for war, you would have seen an abduction and probably an attack on the Israeli-Lebanese border, not on the Golan-Lebanese border or on disputed territory. Today was about deterrence. About red lines (assassinating Hezbollah’s leaders is apparently no longer acceptable). About changing the rules of the game. It was not a declaration of war (yet). Hezbollah wanted to send a message and at the same time strengthen its political presence in Lebanon while giving Israel the choice of not escalating (since the attack happened in disputed territory)
From an “international” point of view, the attack happened inside disputed Syrian-Lebanese-Israeli territory. So good luck trying to speak of a violation of U.N resolutions, or even accusing one side of hostilities clearly enough to justify an all-out war such as the July 2006 one.

M18/M14’s Discourse: What To Expect

For the next few weeks, M14’s propaganda would be mainly directed at demonstrating how Hezbollah dragged (or tried to drag, depending on the Israeli reaction) Lebanon into another proxy war, while at the same time criticizing Hezbollah for involving Lebanon in the Syrian civil war. But that, Hezbollah should be able to handle. It is the loss of prestige and the impression that Hezbollah was abandoning the Israeli conflict for good while slowly “moving into Syria” that was killing the party politically. Now the party would gain momentum (especially if Israel’s response isn’t strong enough) and most importantly would be able to put the Syrian opposition, the Islamic State, and the Israeli Defense Forces in the same box. It would force Lebanon to rally behind Hezbollah – at least momentarily while/if Israel responds – and it will eventually make Hezbollah look like a victor which should help M8 gain the upper hand in Lebanese politics after eight months of political vacancy and deadlock. The Lebanese cabinet’s slow response to today’s crisis (seriously, why hasn’t the cabinet met yet?) is the perfect proof that there is indeed a political void in Lebanon. A political void that M8 could easily fill should Hezbollah’s Shebaa ambush turn into a military/political victory. Of course, everything depends of Israel’s reaction, and the aftermath of today’s skirmishes, so we’ll have to wait and see.

In the meantime, the only thing we can do is to be grateful we have a wise president guiding us in these times of trouble.

Moulahazat

A Lebanese Political Blog

Lebanese Politics

The War Files (Part III) – The Brown-Chamoun Meetings Of 1976

The War Files (Part II) – 1975 and 1976: Karami The Presidential Candidate, “Hafez Assad The Latest Incarnation Of the Crusaders”, and “A Certain Brigadier Aoun”

The War Files (Part I) – The Chaos Before The War: 1973-1974

Ten Months Of Vacuum

Introducing Taymour

Nine Months Of Vacuum

Hezbollah’s Retaliation: Is It The Perfect Time And Place?