8 March Alliance

Tammam Salam’s Options

(Image Credits: AP/Hassan Ammar)

Let’s rewind six months. Tammam Salam was supposed to quickly form a government, end the electoral law dispute via a proposed consensual law from the cabinet and finally supervise the elections. But then came the parliament’s mandate extension. Then came Al-Qussair and the subsequent Lebanese dilemma. Then came Al-Ghouta and the subsequent Lebanese dilemma. Then came the probable American strike and the subsequent Lebanese dilemma. And with them came the refugees, and the subsequent Lebanese dilemma. But now that Lebanese politics are making a slow comeback to Lebanon, the lack of solutions to the current deadlock leaves the Prime Minister Designate with several options to end the crisis.

If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them

When Tammam Salam was first designated in April, I made sure to underline how the nomination of Salam by M8 to the premiership was a political maneuver. It was meant to pressure him by making him consensual (while he wasn’t) thus forcing him (more or less) to take their opinion on the governmental formation. It was by far the most brilliant move by M8 in 2013 that brought us to the current stalemate. If M8 hadn’t nominated him we wouldn’t be standing where we are today and an M14 government would have probably started preparations for the elections.

You Who?

What really makes things hard for the PM-Designate is that the atmosphere of political confusion during the first 9 months of 2013 and the close presidential elections left the coalitions in shatters making it impossible for him to speak with them as united blocs. After the Orthodox Gathering law almost destroyed the M14 alliance, M8 had serious internal problems in summer. And while Aoun was very recently trying to start talks with M14, Berri was busy adding more confusion to the scene by proposing his initiative to solve the crisis (another boycotted dialogue). The apparent bipolarisation of Lebanese politics between M8 and M14 is misleading. Salam will have to please a lot more than 2 blocs.

Veto, Veto Everywhere

“There is a boring public opinion battle in Lebanon regarding the formation of a new government. Some are attacking Hezbollah and accusing it of obstructing the formation of a new cabinet. Our opponents said that they objected to the participation of Hezbollah in the government. Two weeks ago, they said that they would agree to Hezbollah’s participation, after they had disrupted the country for months. We cannot be blamed for being the ones who are disrupting the country. Our only condition regarding the new government is that it reflects the parliamentary representation of the political parties in Lebanon. The concept of the 8-8-8 government is not realistic. In reality this will be a government formed with ten March 14 ministers, that include PM-designate Tammam Salam, who is a pro-March 14 politician.”

That quote from Nasrallah’s speech (September 23) really says it all. There are vetoes coming from all the sides that named Salam. The first third of M14 wants a neutral government, the second third of M14 doesn’t want Hezbollah participation while the last third wants the 8-8-8 ministers formula. The M8 alliance wants full participation (and thus the blocking third+1, so probably 9, 10 or 11 ministers out of 24) in the government, while Walid Jumblatt – The Kingmaker – doesn’t know what he wants (and probably doesn’t want to know so he can stay in the middle and avoid another 7 May-like incident).

The Blurry Aftermath

What exactly is the Salam government’s function? The presidential elections are in May, meaning that the cabinet – if things go well (don’t get too optimistic) and it gets the confidence vote by November – would last for seven months as a non-caretaker government. So what are the objectives of Salam? Electoral law? Parliamentary elections? Presidential Elections? Postponing them (and that means a constitutional amendment)? Or just another normal cabinet in times of elections and regional war? The very fact that no one knows what the new government will be for makes things even more complicated for the PM who can’t form a government that he doesn’t know its goals.

The Options

Remember when I told you about Tammam Salam’s options at the beginning? Unless the PM-Designate desires to commit political suicide by going against the M8 will or resigning, he has no options but to wait for a miracle – like these miracles (a, b, c)- to happen. For a newcomer – relatively weak – rising politician to resign after failing to form a consensual cabinet, it is a fatal bullet to his political career. To go against M8 would put him in confrontation with Hezbollah. If the confrontation is solely political, it would eliminate him as a consensual PM while featuring him as an intolerable alternative to Hariri, which is in the advantage of the two former prime ministers Hariri (who will look like a moderate M14 member) and Mikati (who will look like the strong neutral candidate). If things get nasty on the ground, that’s even worse for him.

That’s why – after 6 months – we’re still at the beginning, where the type (Independent/Political) of the government must be decided. The number of seats, the portfolio allocations, the name of the ministers, and the ministerial statement are yet to be discussed. And the sad part? These are the steps that actually take 99% of the time.

When a matter that should take six hours takes six months, you start to understand how much Lebanon is a failed state.

Is Michel Aoun Switching Sides?

Hariri-Aoun Meeting in 2009 (AFP)

At first sight, Lebanon seems politically normal. No parliamentary sessions, no functioning government, a bad economy, ambassadors visiting politicians, and like always, no solution to the deadlock. However, in the last few days, three consecutive incidents in the March 8 camp almost went unnoticed.

Drawing The Red Lines

The Tomahawk effect that kept all the politicians silent for two weeks is obviously fading away. And while everyone was focused on Berri’s initiative to solve the crisis, another interesting development was marginalized. Michel Aoun, who made sure in the past 3 months to keep his criticism against Hezbollah centered on the party’s political stances, indirectly attacked Hezbollah’s military activity in a statement accusing M14 of initially providing cover for Hezbollah’s telecom network. And that statement wasn’t the only one. A meeting between the FPM leader and the U.S. ambassador Hale ended in a Aounist approval of the Baabda declaration that was recently questioned by Hezbollah.

If It Ain’t Broke Don’t Fix It

Hezbollah clearly understood that something was going wrong. Or why else would a delegation of the party go visit Aoun, only to make sure that the ties between the two allies were still the same? If the ties were still the same, why bother fixing them?

The Wind Of Change

For Aoun to question his 7 year-alliance with Hezbollah at a moment’s notice would be an act of political insanity. Switching sides implies that the second side is indeed willing to accept you as a member. And that is probably what Aoun is trying to do with his small yet remarkably strong statements. You might view that describing the new stances by strong is an exaggeration but one must not forget that the FPM is Hezbollah’s main national ally and by far his strongest political ally, meaning that any criticism, no matter how small it is, is in fact more harmful than the strongest M14 – or even Amal – political stance against Hezbollah. Aoun is checking out if any of the M14 leaders will understand his small hints and welcome his statements. Stronger statements at a faster rate – without an M14 welcoming attitude – might throw Aoun all by himself on the outside, which is not a good thing for a Lebanese politician.

Yet Another Political Maneuver

The issue is far more complicated than the FPM pissing off Hezbollah in a Christian area for popular gain (By rejecting the telecom network in Lebanon’s biggest Christian city). Another Hezbollah Christian ally, Sleiman Frangieh, is preparing himself for presidential elections. Frangieh is younger than Aoun but is also (arguably) the biggest pro-Syrian among Hezbollah’s allies, making him a perfect candidate for the Hezbollah-led alliance in case the war in Syria reaches a certain level of hostilities. Hezbollah might embrace the Frangieh candidacy, and that can justify the FPM’s decaying relation with the party. Aoun wants to make sure that it will be him – or one of his Maronite protégés – who will be the official M8 candidate for the May elections, and his new stances can be seen as a small political maneuver (or even blackmail).

The Lessons Of 1988 And 2008

When the Americans were trying to push for their own candidate in the 1988 presidential elections, Aoun – who wanted the presidency for himself – criticized the U.S. motives and announced that Lebanon is not an American protectorate. What happened next – you guessed it – is that Aoun was eventually removed from power because he went against the regional tide. In 2008, when Aoun failed again to notice that the regional context implied that a centrist president should take power, General Suleiman was elected president. This time though, Aoun seems to have understood the rules of the game. By being slightly more moderate in the wake of the American-Russian agreement on Syria (and even ironically agreeing with the American Ambassador this time), and by trying to settle his issues with most of the Lebanese parties, Michel Aoun is discretely trying to go with the flow and adapt to the circumstances of the next presidential elections.

Greater Lebanon In Jeopardy

If you’re a bit familiar with this blog, you must have noticed that I rarely talk about Syria, and when I do, it’s usually in the context of Lebanese politics.

But Lebanese politics disappeared. For the past two weeks, it has been all about Syria. About the likely American strike on Syria. About the Chemical Weapons in Syria. About the revolution in Syria. About the civil war in Syria. About the Syrian army. About the Free Syrian army. About arming the opposition. About helping out the regime.

Priorities

In a country that has no budget since 2005, no government since March, no elections since 2009, no agreed-upon electoral law, extended mandates for everything ranging from a parliament to a commander of the army, and an outgoing president as a cherry on the top, you would think that the normal priority, or norm, would be taking care of any of the previously mentioned problems. But the very fact that no one is doing anything but wait for things in Syria to get clearer really sums it up. (You might want to check this post)

Pro-Syrias

When the Syrian army left the country in 2005, it was thought that the controversial hegemony over Lebanese politics was forever gone. Who knew that 8 years later, a civil war in Syria will bring it back, yet this time with no controversy? There was always a Pro-Syrian coalition in Lebanon, at least to the extent that it was more pro-Syrian than the others. But as Syria turns into Syrias, pro-Syria in Lebanon becomes pro-Syrias, and Lebanon – at whole, probably for the first time since the 19th century – becomes no more than pro-Syria, or in other words, an affiliated country. With no side winning the civil war, the allegiances will get more and more dangerous until a civil war might find its way to Lebanon. By then it would be too late to separate Syrian and Lebanese affairs.

The Helleu Equivalency

Charles de Gaulle once said that by arresting all Lebanese Zuamas in Lebanon, Jean Helleu indirectly achieved in 48 hours what the French were meaning to do for 25 years: unify the Muslims and Christians (via their hate towards colonialism). The Syrian civil war is achieving what the Syrian leaders could not do for 70 years: Absorb Lebanese politics into Syrian politics. The longer the Syrian civil war lasts, the more Lebanese parties will get involved in it, and the more the decaying Lebanese system will self-destruct itself and find it harder to host the political turmoil.

A New National Holiday

When a Lebanese President makes a speech for the first time in the occasion of Lebanon’s forgotten 93rd anniversary of the creation of the state of Greater Lebanon, you know things are going very (very) bad. Lebanon already has another national holiday, the independence day from France. But the symbolism of the 22nd of November is different from the First of September. The 22nd of November is the day Christians and Muslims of the country united for the first time against a foreign power and set the basis of what would be the political rules for the next 30 and arguably 70 years. The Greater Lebanon context however is different. Until the 1940s, the Muslim population did not agree to the concept of an independent Lebanon from Syria (and a greater Arab state). The boundaries of such a state were considered to be controversial and artificial in 1920, and created problems among the Lebanese Christians and Muslims till 1937, when the Muslim boycott started to fade away with the nomination of Khaireddin Al-Ahdab as the first Sunni Prime Minister. To remember such a day would be to remember what would be the beginning of 20 years of occupation, colonialism, boycott and political confusion among the Lebanese. So why exactly did the president make a speech two weeks earlier on the occasion of that event?

Greater Lebanon

Lebanon’s boundaries are Greater Lebanon’s boundaries. Whether the day symbolizes Lebanese unity or not, it is the day Lebanon became the separate, bigger entity that exists today. An entity distinct from Syria, where its politics would be distinct from the Syrian politics. The National Holiday that is independence day is not important in these times as Lebanon is not facing a Muslim-Christian strife. Lebanon is facing something far more dangerous than that, and it is the slow but steady absorption into Syrian affairs due to the M14 alliance with the Syrian opposition and the M8 alliance with the Syrian regime. Remembering this day would be a reminder from the president to all the politicians that Lebanon is not in Syria.

When the formation of a new government depends on an American-Russian deal about Chemical Weapons in Syria, you know something is just not right.

Marj Dabeq And The Tomahawk Effect

It is said, that in 1516, while the Ottomans and the Mamluks were fighting for the Levant in the battle of Marj Dabeq, a Lebanese prince of the house of Maan, known by the name of Fakhreddine I, wasn’t comfortable to fight on the side of the Mamluks as it was too risky to ally himself with one side when the outcome of the battle was still unknown. As the Syrian princes started defecting from the Mamluk ranks, Fakhreddine went on the top of a hill overlooking the meadow (marj) where the battle was ongoing, and did not intervene with his forces until it was clear that one side was in advantage over the other. Needless to say that it was the winning Ottoman army that Fakhreddine I sided with instead of his initial allies, the Mamluks. The Bohtor princes of Beirut, that fought with the Mamluks till the end, were eventually removed from power in Mount Lebanon by the victorious Ottomans and were replaced by the Maans of the Chouf, who were to rule Lebanon for the next 181 years.

How Is That Related To 2013?

As the Americans prepare their Tomahawks to hit the Syrian regime, surrounded by a growing international debate whether an intervention is needed and legitimate in Syria or not, the Lebanese leaders’ silence on the upcoming war is deafening. In a country whose politics were almost inseparable from the Syrian affairs for the past century, the quiet political scene raises many questions, and shows us a cautious – yet wise – behavior from the Lebanese politicians, à la Fakhreddine, wishing to preserve their status in Lebanon in the wake of a possible massive regional modification. Ironically, Marj Dabeq is not only in today’s Syria, but also in a rebel-area near Aa’zaz (North of the disputed Aleppo)on the Turkish border.

Too Early To Predict

For every Destroyer the Americans send to the East Mediterranean, comes a Russian ship; and even at the height of a possible American intervention, the Iranians are still supporting the regime. No one can deny that Obama is relatively a weak president, and the fact that the British won’t be here for him this time, and that the U.N. isn’t much in favor of a strike only makes things worse. The Americans are already leaking out in details some of the objectives of the “limited” strike (here’s a nice sarcastic piece on that), possibly so that the Russians – who clearly aren’t intending to abandon one of their last allies in the levant – realize that it is a small-scaled intervention and don’t respond. To sum things up, the Americans aren’t very comfortable on the offensive side, while on the defensive side the Syrian counter-attack is still ambiguous (Attacking the Israeli north?), making it too early for Lebanese politicians to take sides. It is not even sure if the Americans will go through with their threat, and if so, no one knows what the result may be. Even a military victory for the Americans can turn into a diplomatic failure – Egypt 1956 is a perfect example. In the middle of a vague outcome after the possible war, it seems wiser for the politicians to abandon their traditional regional allegiances and wait for a winner to side with, instead of risking a political setback due to the ally’s defeat.

The Berri/Hezbollah Political Stances

When a Lebanese Zai’m who was for decades Syria’s man in Lebanon is expected to abandon his affiliation with the pro-syrian M8 alliance and side in the middle, you know that everyone is trying to be a centrist in times of turmoil. Hezbollah’s silence is the most remarkable one on the matter. The party fighting along the regime on Syrian soil didn’t yet mention what its response will be on an American intervention and is probably considering all his options.

Everyone Is Considering His Options

Same goes for all the other parties in Lebanon. They can’t preemptively side with the losing party in Syria, so they are all adopting the “wait and see Fakhreddine I strategy”. Most of the parties are warning of a Fitna in wake of the recent explosions (In order to avoid giving opinions on the U.S. Attack), and even the anti-Syrian M14 coalition is rather silent on the issue of an American strike. Anyone would expect Saad Hariri to tweet in support of such a strike, yet we are left with no tweet since the 23d Of August (ever since the debate on the intervention seriously started). Even as the Syrian regime got officially accused of the Tripoli bombings by the Lebanese judicial authorities, the M14 alliance rather stayed silent on the issue, while Al-Akhbar, one of the most pro M8 newspapers – while criticizing the security branch – was quietly condemning the Syrian regime for the Mamlouk-Samaha plot of last year, in a sign that everyone is converging towards a centrist stance.

You compromise, or lose it all.

Lebanon, Or The Mailbox

Smoke rises from the shattered wreckage of the large ABC department store. Scores of people were injured when a rebel bomb exploded in the crowded store. July 8, 1958. Lebanon was always a mailbox.

In 48 hours of chaos, hundreds of Syrians die due to a chemical attack, a Palestinian group launches rockets on Israel‘s Naharaya, Israel responds by raiding a Palestinian camp on Lebanese territory, while later that day two car bombs target mosques in Tripoli. A week earlier, another bomb (courtesy of a Syrian opposition group) rocks the southern suburb of Beirut, just after a week of a Hezbollah-Israel clash that was followed by days of silence. For a republic where the political status quo is still the same since March, things are moving a little too fast on the security side.

As you can see from the small intro above, Lebanon is practically non-existent in Lebanon. It’s all about Syrians, Israelis and Palestinians. The only thing in common between every one of them is the Lebanese soil, where they apparently like to send each other messages.

“Global Jihad Terrorists”

Imagine for a while that Samir Geagea bombarded Larnaca. As a response, the Cypriote air force starts shelling Michel Aoun’s residence. Now that I’ve clearly showed how irrelevant that move is, I would like to point out something here: Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) – An Al-Qaida affiliated group that carries the name of Abdallah Azzam, a.k.a. The Father Of Global Jihad – launched two rockets on an Israeli town, and in response, the Israeli Army attacks the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) in Nehmeh south of Beirut. Once you realize that the AAB and the PFLP-GC are ideological threats and political foes – For the AAB is an islamist right-wing Al-Qaida affiliated anti-Syrian(regime) group, while the PFLP-GC is a secular leftist pro-regime Palestinian party – you understand that the Israeli attack is more like bombing Iran for something Saudi Arabia did, on Jordanian Soil (or simply shelling Aoun’s residence for something Geagea did, you get the point). For the IDF, they were targeted by “Global Jihad Terrorists” (Check the IDF spokesman’s tweet here), so they responded on “terrorists”.

Morse Code

The Syrians and Israelis are communicating. When Chemical weapons are used en plein Damas while UN inspectors were in the area, you understand from Bashar Al-Assad’s show of force that the red lines (Chemical Weapons) the west is drawing mean nothing to him, and that the anti-regime countries couldn’t care less about the Syrian opposition and are not ready to intervene, no matter what. The answer didn’t take a lot of time to come: The Israelis could’ve hit something other than the PFLP-GC, something a bit more related to the AAB. But they chose the Palestinian group that has the closest ties to the regime in Damascus for a reason: They want to deliver a message to Al-Assad, that he is not as free to act as he thinks he is. If they wanted to hit back on the Islamist perpetrators of the attacks, or on the Lebanese (strictly speaking), they would’ve hit Hamas or Hezbollah, but they wanted the message to cross the Lebanese border.

Syria’s Spillover And Psychological Warfare

Lebanon is not only the mailbox linking the Syrians and Israelis, but also the one linking the Syrian themselves. The opposition and the regime, along with their Lebanese allies, are sending each other messages in an accelerating rhythm. No one is making a sufficient remarkable breakthrough on the ground in Syria, which made both sides in a need of a psychological warfare in every possible location. Perhaps intimidating the population, targeting its beliefs, and demoralizing it might eventually lead to questioning the power of both sides among their supporters, and helping to shatter the military front from the opposite side.

The Mailbox’s Side Effects

A month earlier, graffitis in the Christian areas were calling for federalism. After the Rouais bombing in the southern suburbs, Hezbollah’s zone became similar to an independent canton as the party increased its security measures. In yesterday’s press conference, Tripoli politicians started warning of establishing self-security (الامن الذاتي) in the city. In fact, with time passing by and the worsening of Syrian crisis, with no government, with a non-elected parliament, with an outgoing president, with a commander of the army whose presence depends on a ministerial decree, with fear and suspicion spreading everywhere, and with the loss of control and the falling apart of the state’s institutions, the main side effect of the Syrian spillover is no longer the refugees problem, or the shelling of Hermel and Arsal, but rather a slow and steady disintegration of the Lebanese entity and the creation of small federal/security zones that might at any moment clash with each other and drag Lebanon to another civil war.

The End Of The March 8 Alliance?

“There is no such thing as the March 8 alliance anymore, Berri told The Daily Star.”

That quote from the Daily Star article (entitled March 8 finished, Aoun out in the cold) sums it up. But Is really Aoun out in the cold? Or is it some kind of an ingenious Berri tactic?

Between The Lines

The key ministerial portfolio held by an Amal movement minister in the last government was the foreign ministry (of Adnan Mansour). If one reads between the lines, Berri says at some point that “On the domestic level, our choices differ and each will follow their own course”. In other words, Berri is a political genius that just made a bluff. While saying that he will not support the FPM in their struggle for their governmental share, he implicitly states that the FPM are obliged to support him to keep the foreign ministry under Amal control because both have the same choices on a non-domestic level. And Gebran Bassil fell in the trap by agreeing with Berri that “We support Speaker Berri’s saying that we diverge on domestic matters and converge over strategic issues.” In other words, Aoun would be backing a Berrist for the Foreign ministry post but Berri would not be backing Aounists to occupy the domestic-related ministries (All the ministries currently held by Aounists such as the telecom and energy ministries)

No More Sacrifices For Allies?

Rewind to June 2011: A small dispute (Called back then العقدة السنية, meaning “the Sunni Knot”) between Hezbollah’s Sunni allies (Mikati and Karami) over the number of posts that should be held by each of them delays the government’s formation. In a government of 30 ministers, there should usually be 6 Sunnis and 6 Shias; Mikati’s government eventually had 7 Sunnis and 5 Shias. It was Berri back then who untied the knot by sacrificing one minister of his share for Ahmad Karami. This time, Berri made his preemptive move as the Salam cabinet formation is clearly facing difficulties. By declaring the 8 March Alliance dead, Berri is dissociating himself from his allies: He will no longer be pleasing them from his share should they want an extra minister. He is making it clear for Tammam Salam that he is not letting go a minister so that the coalition doesn’t collapse like he did in 2011.

Zoom Out

According to Gebran Bassil, “Political lineups have been shattered”. By getting too busy analyzing the small details, the big picture became unnoticed. While Michel Aoun was busy shattering the March 14 Alliance into pieces via his Orthodox Gathering Law, the other side was preparing to strike back. March 8 knew what was March 14’s Achilles’ heel, but the opposite is also true. March 14’s counter-attack didn’t take long. After the May electoral confusion that nearly destroyed the ties between Gemayel, Geagea and Hariri, March 14 made their move. It was clear that Aoun wanted elections he was going to win, while Berri saw the extension as an alibi to stay 17 extra months as a speaker. It was clear that Aoun wanted his son-in-law Shamel Roukouz to succeed Jean Kahwagi as a Commander of the army, while Berri had no interest in it. It was also clear that there was a tense atmosphere between Berri and Mikati that developed into a constitutional crisis. The plan was very simple: Let time play its role: Postpone the governmental formation until the M8 Alliance collapses. With no government, the extension of the parliament’s terms was an easier job while the constitutional crisis became evident with the appearance of certain deadlines that were irritant to Aoun and Mikati: One doesn’t want an extension of Kahwaji’s term, the other doesn’t want to see the parliament legislating in the presence of a caretaker government (probably to appear as the protector of the Sunni interests in Lebanon). Thus M14 played it smart : They stood by Berri when he wanted to extend the parliament’s term, then blocked all the speaker’s attempts to hold a session by standing with Aoun and making sure that there will be a lack of quorum. All it took was 1 month of conflicting interests between the M8 members to (apparently) end a 7 year alliance. All it took was letting the M8 alliance rule and fail due to the lack of chemistry between its parties.

No Electoral Ground

Political alliances are usually built on the foundations of the electoral alliances. In no electoral district the FPM and Amal find themselves forced to ally with each others to win. No Aounist is elected in a region having Amal votes, while no Amal MP is elected due to Aounist help. In fact, the two parties were an exception in 2009 when they ran against each other in Jezzine (while they were allies), making it easier for M14 to have a seat in the district (even if it didn’t eventually win any MP in the constituency). Once they don’t need each other to get into the parliament, the two parties won’t stick together till life in the parliament. Geagea needs Hariri to secure him MPs in Zahle and Akkar. Jumblatt and Hariri need each other to prevail in the Chouf. Baabda is ideal for an FPM-Hezbollah electoral alliance, and the Kataeb need the small Sunni and Druze votes to prevail in certain constituencies. Out of all the alliances, the easiest one to break was the Berri-Aoun one, because it had no electoral basis.

À La Adnan Sayyed Hussain?

Berri is apparently distancing himself from the Hezbollah-FPM duo and getting closer and closer to the “centrists”, comprising Jumblatt, the President, Mikati and – who knows – Salam. Salam was trying for the past 4 months to get his formula of 8/8/8 ministers (8 for centrists, 8 for M8, 8 for M14) accepted. Once M8 ceases to exist, Hezbollah and Aoun may get their share of 8 ministers independently from Berri, who would be taking a part of the centrists’ share. Once again, Rewind to 2011: A minister supposedly centrist resigns from the Hariri government (That included 10/30 of the ministers from the opposition). The resignation of the eleventh minister, Adnan Sayyed Hussein, who was theoretically a minister loyal to the president, brought the government down (after more that the third of the ministers resigned). Berri might be planning the same strategy again: By announcing the end of the March 8 alliance, he is in fact trying to ensure the blocking third in the government for the “ex-M8” members (by pushing himself to the center away from Aoun). M8 might be playing dead in a last attempt to maximize its share in the government.

So Is It The End?

If you consider that the March 14 coalition doesn’t exist anymore, than you are right to consider the March 8 coalition destroyed. Perhaps it is true: Nobody knows where Jumblatt stands – actually nobody ever knew – while Mikati and Berri are distancing themselves from everyone. On the two other sides: Hezbollah and the FPM struggle alone while the OG law spread confusion and cautiousness between Geagea, Gemayel and Hariri. One thing is sure though: If M14 and M8 are truly from the past now, than they fought themselves till collateral damage prevailed.

Only know you love her when you let her go. Time to see what alliance members truly love each others.

Waiting For The Electoral Law – March 14’s Hybrid Law: A Review

Lebanon's Electoral Map According To The March 14's Hybrid Law. The colored districts are the small winner-takes-all ones and the big ones within the white line are the big districts under proportional unlike in the picture.

Lebanon’s Electoral Map According To The March 14’s Hybrid Law. The colored districts are the small winner-takes-all districts and the big ones within the white line are the big districts under proportional representation.

The Lebanese Forces, Future Movement, and the PSP agreed on a hybrid electoral law last week. The law is very similar to the electoral law the Lebanese Forces proposed in February (Here’s the analysis on that law), with some exceptions. I’m going to use the same arguments I used when I reviewed the previous law, but comment on the new changes. Unlike the previous law that had an unclear criteria here, I didn’t find any criteria at all for this law

Here’s the number of voters by sects, in case you’re interested:

Also, here’s a table for the seat allocations:

Table of seats according to March 14’s hybrid law (High Res)

In a nutshell, the law separates Lebanon into two types of constituencies: 26 small districts (Allocated 68 seats), that are in most cases cazas, under a winner-takes-all system and 6 big districts (Allocated 60 seats), that are in most cases the mohafazas, under a PR system. The main aim of the law is to get the biggest number of Christian-elected MPs to the parliament. The electoral constituencies are in most cases the administrative districts (Cazas, Governorates) of Lebanon. However, there are some few weird things: West Bekaa-Rashaya or Baalbek-Hermel aren’t separated. Also, on a bigger level, the Mohafaza of Mount-Lebanon is split to two districts: A northern bigger one and a southern smaller one (Aley-Chouf).

From Unclear Criteria To No Criteria At All (Or How It Keeps Getting Worse)

My criticism on the old law proposal:

The previous law proposal of the Lebanese forces allocated the seats on the basis of a certain criteria that you can see here. However, a big number of the districts don’t obey to any of the criteria. For example, in Jezzine the Greek Catholics aren’t considered to be a minor sect in the district so the seat stays in the caza and doesn’t shift to the governorate. That’s only one example, and there’s a lot more. Apparently the Christian seats are taken as one block and the minor Christian sects’ seats within a Christian district with a Maronite majority don’t go to the Mohafazas and stay in the caza. The lawmakers need to clarify a few things. Also, there are other districts where the criteria is missing something or doesn’t match the district’s seat repartition. For example, why is it that the Protestant seat gets transferred from Beirut I to the Governorate and not the Armenian Catholic one?

My new criticism: There seems to be no criteria at all in the allocation of seats. There are several small changes in a lot of districts (The Chouf gets 4 MPs instead of 3 in the old hybrid LF proposal. Baalbak gets 4 instead of 5. Tripoli gets for instead of 3, just as examples). Also, the law is clearly in favor of the March 14 parties, while giving the Christians a bigger influence than the 1960 law.

Unequal Voting (same criticism than before)

Among other things that makes this draft law odd is the disproportion of seats within the majoritarian system. For example, Akkar, where 120608 voted in 2009, has 3 seats, while Bcharre that had 17183 voters in 2009 has 2 seats. Bcharre voters are 4.55% of the North’s voters, while Akkar voters are 31.96% of the North voters. That means that on the Mohafaza scale, the Akkaris get to choose 31.96% of 11 MPs which is 3.51 MPs. A total of 3.51+3=6.51 MPs for the people of Akkar, while Bcharre gets to choose 4.55% of 11 MPs which is 0.50 MPs. A total of 2+0.50=2.50 MPs for Bcharre. the number of electors in Akkar are 7.01 times more than Bcharre, which means that Akkar should have 7 times more MPs. Ironically it only has 6.51/2.50= 2.6 times more than Bcharre.

That disproportion between the districts will be present in almost all hybrid laws, because some districts get to have more influence sometimes even though they have a smaller population. And after all, that’s how the law gives more influence to Christians. When the Akkar (66% Sunni) district should be as 7 times more influential than Bcharre (100% Christian) and is instead only 2.66 times more influential, you get to understand how the Christians, 38%, will be able to elect 52 MPs (40.62%). A big number of the small districts happen to be mainly Christian and that’s how the Lebanese Forces draft law can boost the number of the Christian-elected MPs.

The Analysis (The Small Differences That Made Future Movement and the PSP Accept The Law)

If you take a look at the previous electoral law proposed by the Lebanese Forces in February, you’ll quickly spot some interesting differences with the current consensual LF-PSP-FM law:

Instead of having 3 seats, Tripoli gets one additional seat. That means that the Mikati Bloc will find it harder to run on the Mohafaza now that it has lost a Sunni MP there (The “proportional representation” North district has 4 MPs now instead of 5, making it hard for Mikati to get an extra MP using the M8 votes of the Mohafaza, while the FM will get an extra MP on the caza where they can easily win all the 4 seats of Tripoli because it’s under a majoritarian system)
Instead of having 5 seats, Baalbak-Hermel ends up with 4 seats (1 gets transferred to the governorate) meaning that Hezbollah will lose an extra MP that will be put in the governorate where he will be subject to the influence of all of the governorate’s voting where the Shias are 42% thus lessening the Shia influence on that extra seat.
Beirut: Instead of having a Beirut I of 5 MPs and a Beirut III of 2 MPs, the number of MPs becomes 4 for Beirut I that is up to 85% Christian and 4 to Beirut III that is 28% Christian. Meaning that the Christians lose the ability to elect en extra MP in Beirut I while also losing the ability to influence the election of 2 more MPs that were transferred from Beirut III to the Mohafaza (according to the previous LF law) where the Christians are 35%. That suits the FM by minimizing the Christian influence.
Also, there’s a remake of Beirut I. It loses Mdawar (the Armenian district) to Beirut II, meaning that the Armenian population, that supports M8, would not be able to help M8 win Beirut I anymore.
Instead of Having 3 MPs in the Caza and 2 in the Mohafaza for Kesserwan (like the previous LF law proposal), there are now 2 in the Caza and 3 in the Governorate. The LF has lost the 2 previous elections in Kesserwan. Minimizing the number of MPs on the Caza is a smart way from them to get a better result, so that they might win that extra MP in case they get better results in Northern Mount Lebanon.
And now the Best part, the Chouf and Southern Mount-Lebanon: Baabda that has no more than 18% of Druze votes gets removed from Southern Mount Lebanon and added to Northern Mount Lebanon. Also, the Chouf gets an extra MP, making them 4. That can only mean that Jumblat will be able to directly control 6 seats on the majoritarian system (4 from Chouf, 2 from Aley), but also to influence the election on the “Proportional Representation district” of Chouf-Aley (Southern Mount-Lebanon), where the Druze will form around 40%, now that it’s deprived from the Christian-Shia heavyweight of Baabda. 40% of 7 MPs is somewhere around 3 MPs for Jumblatt (that’s if he’s running alone), giving him a total of 9 MPs. Jumblatt will thus be (more or less) able to keep the same size of his bloc.
Northern Mount-Lebanon: Now that Baabda joined the others, the Shia vote will be somewhere around 15%. However, 2 of the 12 seats are Shia, meaning that 16% of the seats are Shia. There will be thus an overflow from the Christian votes toward the Shia seat, and the Christian influence (including the LF) would not be diminished in the PR district.
Hasbaya-Marjeyoun aren’t separated anymore, and there is only 1 MP on the Caza scale and not 2 like before. This is clealry intended to maximize the number of seats on the Mohafaza (South) scale, where M14 hs a bigger chance of getting MPs, knowing that the Shias are a majority in Marjeyoun-Hasbaya meaning that M8 will still win anything there because of the winner takes-all system. The Shia still are a majority in the South, but with proportional representation and a big number of seats, M14 will surely do better.

How Much Christian-elected seats?

On The winner-takes-all districts: Beirut I (4), Baabda (3), Metn (4), Kesserwan (2), Jbeil (1), Batroun (2), Bsharri (2), Koura (2), Zgharta (2), Jezzine (2), Zahle (5). A total of 29
On the Proportional Reresentation districts: North (4.4 = 40% of 11), Northern Mount Lebanon (8.68 = 72% of 12), Southern Mount Lebanon (2.6 = 37% of 7), Bekaa (3.36 = 28% of 12), South (1.65 = 15.6% of 11), Beirut (2.8= 35% of 8). A total of 23.49 seats

That means that the Christians, under that draft law, would elect 52.49 seats. Under the previous hybrid law draft, the Christians were able to elect 56. The Lebanese Forces had to please their allies somehow….

So Who Wins?

I’m going to consider that the Lebanese are reluctant to change, elect the same MPs again and again and apply the results of 2009 on the new Lebanese Forces law.

The Cazas

M14: Koura (2), Batroun (2), Bcharri (2), Meniyeh-Donieh (2), Tripoli (4), Akkar (3), Metn (1/4), Chouf (4), Aley (2), Saida (2),, Zahle (5), West Bekaa-Rashaya (3), Beirut (4,2,4). A total of 42/68 seats in the winner-takes-all districts for M14

M8: Zgharta (2), Metn (3/4), Jbeil (1), Kesserwan (2), Baabda (3), Jezzine (2),Tyre (2), Saida Villages(1), Nabatiyeh (2), Bint Jbeil (2), Marjeyoun (1), Baalbak-Hermel (5). A total of 26/68 seats in the Winner-takes-all districts for M8.

PS: For Beirut, I considered that the agreements of Doha splitting the Beirut 2 seats equally between M14 and M8 are now history. For the Governorate of Beirut (Proportional Representation), I use the same results as 2009.

The Governorates

I used the results of 2009, and made these tables:

PS: I don’t know what the minimum threshold (The minimum percentage that a list should have so that it can get one of its candidates elected) will be, so I made the assumption that it would be somewhere around 10%. That’s why you will notice the presence of independent MPs.

That means that the final outcome is 68 (26+42) MPs for M14, 55 MPs for M8 (29+26), and 5 Independent MPs.

As you can notice, we have an independent breach, but the results are clearly in favor of M14, even almost the same results than 2009 (70-58). A lot of things changed since 2009 and a number of alliances will probably change, but that’s approximatively how the results might look like.

With 9 seats for Jumblatt, and a difference of 70-58, the Bey of Mukhtara will still be Lebanon’s Kingmaker. That’s exactly why the Progressive Socialist Party gave its approval to this draft law.

Gerrymandering, Again.

Moulahazat

A Lebanese Political Blog