WikiLeaks, Drugs and Lebanese Politicians

This is the 9th post in a series of monthly posts covering (forgotten/ignored) WikiLeaks cables about Lebanon. 

The Lebanese have been circulating a video – The Lebanese Forces supporters seriously, almost everyone else sarcastically – of the Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea warning the youth about drugs and their repercussions on society [note the inspirational soundtrack in the background and the “Samir Geagea” at the end. We’re definitely going to win the Oscars this year] . Since there hasn’t been a lot of political breakthroughs recently (the past three months have basically been about protests, the government not responding to protests, unfruitful dialogues – who knew, right? – and epic fistfights in the Lebanese parliament), I thought it would be interesting to unearth WikiLeaks cables mentioning drugs and Lebanese politics. I’m publishing three cables. The first one is from the war and ironically mentions how the drug exportation trade isn’t working out for the Lebanese Forces finances. The second one quotes Michel El Khoury (the son of Lebanon’s first post-independence president and a former minister of defense and central bank governor)  saying that “Hariri’s judgment might be impeded by some kind of narcotic addiction”. The third one is a conversation with the PSP’s second-in-command, Duraid Yaghi, in which he says that “increased cultivation of illegal drugs is feeding into Hizballah’s strength in the Bekaa region” and that “The sale of the crops feed into Hizballah’s weapons network”.

Take a look at the three cables. In case you’re too lazy, the drug parts are in bold.

LEBANESE FORCES FINANCES
1985 April 4, 14:34 (Thursday)
85BEIRUT2048_a
SECRET
SECRET
— Not Assigned —
1. S-ENTIRE TEXT.
2. LEBANESE FORCES OFFICIAL WHO REMAINS LOYAL TO DEPOSED CHIEF FUAD ABU NADER CONTENDS THAT PART OF REBEL LEADER JA’JA’S APPEAL TO RANK AND FILE IS HIS PROMISES THAT ECONOMY MOVES INTRODUCED BY ABU NADER WOULD END. HE OBSERVES, HOWEVER, THAT PROMISES WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR JA’JA’ TO KEEP.
3. ACCORDING TO THIS OFFICIAL, LF OPERATING EXPENSES ALONE AMOUNT TO 26 MILLION POUNDS A MONTH, MOSTLY STRAIGHT SALARY PAYMENTS. THIS FIGURE PROVIDED NOTHING FOR AMMUNITION REPLACEMENT (BADLY NEEDED), SPARE PARTS FOR EQUIPMENT (BADLY NEEDED — ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL LF TANKS COULDN’T MOVE INTO ACTION NOW WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT REPAIR), UNIFORMS,TRAINING, ETC.
4. OFFICIAL SAID INCOME SIDE WILL PRESENT JA’JA’ WITH DIFFICULT PROBLEM, BEFORE UPRISING, OFFICIAL SAID,INCOME
5. OFFICIAL NOTED THAT LF HAD RE-OPENED NIGHT OPERATIONS AT FIFTH BASIN AT BEIRUT PORT TWELVE DAYS BEFORE UPRISING BECAUSE OF NEED FOR FUNDS, SO JA’JA’ WILL CONTINUE TO BENEFIT FROM THIS SOURCE. ON OTHER HAND, HE SAID, WITH SYRIANS OPENING ROADBLOCK AT MADFOUN BRIDGE, LF REVENUES FROM BARBARA CHECKPOINT HAVE DISAPPEARED; HE OPINED THAT JA’JA’ MIGHT GO AS FAR AS TO OFFER UP CLOSING OF BARBARAH CHECKPOINT AS PEACE OFFERING TO SYRIA NOW THAT SYRIAN ACTION HAS MADE IT FINANCIALLY IRRELEVANT. EVEN ASSUMING LF TIGHTENS UP TAXATION IN AREAS UNDER ITS CONTROL AND PERHAPS EXPAND FIFTH BASIN OPERATIONS, IT WILL STILL LEAVE THEM, HE ESTIMATED, MINIMUM OF 6 MILLION POUNDS SHORT EACH MONTH.
6. OFFICIAL OBSERVED THAT EFFECTIVENESS OF DEA OPERATIONS MADE EXPORTATION OF HASHISH AN UNPROFITABLE OPTION.
7. ANOTHER OPTION WOULD BE CONTRIBUTIONS BY KEY LF REBEL FINANCIAL ANGELS; HE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY PIERRE ASHKAR AND MICHEL MURR BUT HE QUESTIONED HOW LONG THEY WOULD WANT TO PICK UP THE DIFFERENCE. REMAINING OPTION WOULD BE ONE LF WAS MOVING TOWARD BEFORE UPRISING: COMBINATION OF ECONOMY MOVES AND OF SELLING MILITARY RESOURCES ON CIVILIAN ECONOMY. MOVES IN THAT DIRECTION HAD BEGUN PRIOR TO MARCH 12 UPRISING, SPECIFICALLY IN COMPUTER AREA, WHERE OFFICIAL SAID LF HAS MOST SOPHISTICATED OPERATION IN COUNTRY; AND IN VEHICLE MAINTENANCE.
BARTHOLOMEW
MGLE01: A STRATEGY SESSION WITH PRIME MINISTER SINIORA AND HIS FRIENDS
2006 July 7, 14:00 (Friday)
06BEIRUT2291_a
CONFIDENTIAL,NOFORN
CONFIDENTIAL,NOFORN
— Not Assigned —
BEIRUT 00002291 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ).
SUMMARY ——-
1. (C/NF) The current weakness of the “March 14” parliamentary majority — and the deleterious effect this has on Prime Minister Siniora’s ability to govern — has become a matter of great concern for supporters of Siniora, such as former Central Bank Governor Michel el Khoury. At a 7/3 dinner he hosted, Sheikh Michel el Khoury worried about disorder within the Hariri family and the supposed weak personality traits of majority leader Saad Hariri (who, he claimed, may even be suffering from a narcotic addiction). Sheikh Michel proposed that “March 14” be headed by a (non-Hariri-associated) Secretary-General. Better organization within “March 14” is necessary to counter a massive flow (Sheikh Michel estimated it at USD 100 million per month, over half from Iran) of external funding for Hizballah.
2. (C/NF) Summary, continued: Siniora’s Telecommunications Minister, Walid Jumblatt-allied Druze politician Marwan Hamadeh, called for using Saudi petrodollars to neutralize Iran’s financial support for Hizballah and its allies. Hamadeh suggested that there is even a bright side to the threat of Sunni-Shia strife in Lebanon, in that it helps to restrain Hizballah’s behavior. Prime Minister Siniora, who eventually joined Sheikh Michel’s dinner at which these exchanges took place, expressed frustration with his government’s current “standstill,” but expressed determination to forge ahead, particularly on privatization. End summary.
SHEIKH MICHEL CONVENES A STRATEGY SESSION —————————————–
3. (C/NF) Former Central Bank governor Michel el Khoury gathered the Ambassador and emboff at a dinner with Prime Minister Siniora, Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh, and Siniora’s chief advisor, Mohamad Chatah. While waiting for Siniora — who was detained at the office by a meeting on transportation policy that lasted well past 9 PM — to arrive, Sheikh Michel explained that the purpose of the dinner was to map out strategies for bucking up Siniora’s government and the flagging “March 14” parliamentary majority that makes up its base of support.
4. (C/NF) Sheikh Michel goes back a long way with Siniora, himself a former Central Bank official. He insisted that despite the slow progress Siniora’s government has made and the multiple obstacles it has faced in its nearly one year of existence, Siniora was an “irreplaceable” leader. “I would do anything to help him,” Sheikh Michel said, “not just because he’s my friend,” but because Siniora’s success was the only hope for the country.
NEEDED: CHRISTIAN SUPPORT FOR SINIORA, “MARCH 14” ————————–
5. (C/NF) Sheikh Michel spoke of the need to translate Siniora’s personal popularity into political support for “March 14.” This was of particular importance within the Christian community. Among Christians, Siniora remains personally popular — even if not at the same high levels as initially — while support for “March 14” had plummeted under what Sheikh Michel described as a demagogic assault by Michel Aoun and his supporters.
6. (C/NF) To this end, Siniora’s most recent meeting with the Maronite Patriarch had been very useful, according to Sheikh Michel. (Comment: Siniora likewise was very positive in describing his relationship with the Patriarch during a separate meeting with the Ambassador, claiming that he and the Patriarch had “agreed on every issue” in this last meeting. See reftel. End Comment.) Sheikh Michel said that he was working with the Patriarch and others in the Maronite community to build grassroots support for Siniora.
BEIRUT 00002291 002.2 OF 004
7. (C/NF) One constraint on Christian political support for Siniora has been the unpopularity of the parliamentary majority leader, Saad Hariri. As they waited for Prime Minister Siniora to arrive, Sheikh Michel, Minister Hamadeh, and Dr. Chatah all expressed frustration with the susceptibility of Christians to anti-Sunni Muslim sentiment, much of it directed against Hariri. Sheikh Michel expressed frustration with the fact that the same Christians who approved Aoun’s alliance with Hizballah have been ready to entertain the worst possible suspicions about Hariri and his Sunni Muslim supporters, seeing them as a Trojan horse for Saudi-style Wahhabism in Lebanon.
SOLUTIONS START AT (THE HARIRI) HOME ————————————
8. (C/NF) In part, Sheikh Michel and his Lebanese guests agreed, this has much to do with poor organization within “March 14,” and within the Hariri family as well. For a start, Saad Hariri’s relationship with Siniora has been rocky, although Hamadeh suggested that there had been improvements recently. Beyond that, Saad Hariri arguably has political responsibilities equal to those of his father, Rafiq Hariri, with all the financial implications — given the importance of patronage in Lebanon — that that entails. Yet Saad had only a fraction of the wealth that Rafiq had to draw upon, as Rafiq’s fortune had been divided up, following his assassination in February 2005, among a number of family members, with Saad, Rafiq’s second-born son, being only one among them. Other family members, such as Saad’s reputedly miserly stepmother, Nazek, were unresponsive to the patronage needs of the Hariri-led Future Current and its “March 14” allies.
DANGER: IRANIAN MONEY, “SHIA-IZATION” ————————————–
9. (C/NF) All the while, Iranian money continues to pour into Lebanon, funding the political and social activities of Hizballah and, according to some reports, those of pro-Hizballah, pro-Syrian groups in predominantly Sunni areas of the country, such as the rural and impoverished Akkar region in the North. Sheikh Michel, citing contacts in Lebanon’s banking sector, claimed that the amount of revenue Hizballah brings in from abroad each month equals approximately USD 100 million. Of this, some USD 60 million comes from Iran; the remainder comes from other external sources, such as pro-Hizballah fundraisers in West Africa.
CAN “MARCH 14” NEUTRALIZE IT WITH SAUDI HELP? ———————————————
10. (C/NF) As a result, we are seeing the “tashyi’i” (“Shia-ization”) of many predominantly Sunni parts of the country, Hamadeh complained. (Comment: Another term used to describe this seeming surge of Iranian influence — one that, from all appearances, annoys Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah to no end — is “tafris,” “Persianization.” End Comment.) Hamadeh could not explain Saad Hariri’s ongoing cash-flow problem with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the royal family of which reportedly has been slow to pay Hariri-owned business enterprises the billions it owes them. Even so, the only antidote to Iran’s relentless policy of cash-for-“tashyi’i” was to neutralize it with an equal flow of Saudi petrodollars, Hamadeh said. This had been a topic of discussion when he and Druse leader Walid Jumblatt met with Saudi King Abdullah in Jeddah recently.
11. (C/NF) Hamadeh said that he and Jumblatt had emphasized to King Abdullah that they were not asking for money for themselves. Rather, they wanted the KSA to play a direct role in alleviating poverty, supporting economic development, and bolstering its friends on the Lebanese political scene. Part of this could be accomplished by donations for charitable institutions, but part of it also had to be “political money,” Hamadeh said. He expressed confidence that Lebanon could absorb an influx of Saudi cash while keeping it out of the hands of radical Sunni Muslim groups.
CONCERNS ABOUT SAAD HARIRI ————————–
12. (C/NF) Patronage aside, Sheikh Michel and his Lebanese
BEIRUT 00002291 003.2 OF 004
guests saw Saad Hariri as no match for Nasrallah politically. The Hizballah leader took advantage of the young, reluctant politician’s inexperience and seemingly weak personality. In an aside with the Ambassador, Sheikh Michel also expressed concern about the possibility that Hariri’s judgment might be impeded by some kind of narcotic addiction. He understood that Hariri had used drugs as an undergraduate at Georgetown University to the extent that it seriously impaired his studies. He wondered whether Hariri had ever actually quit. (Comment: If so, this might explain some of the personality traits that we have noticed in our interaction with Hariri, such as a very short attention span. End Comment.)
SUNNI-SHIA CONFLICT: A POTENTIALLY USEFUL THREAT ——————————————— —-
13. (C/NF) Those present at the dinner noted that one reason behind Saad Hariri’s caution in dealing with his opponents is a sincere belief that Lebanon is in danger of experiencing Iraq-style sectarian strife between Shias and Sunnis. Hamadeh suggested that Shia-Sunni conflict was in fact a two-edged sword. While it frightens the country’s foremost Sunni leader, Hariri, it surely must also frighten the foremost Shia leader, Nasrallah. As such, Hamadeh argued, the threat of Shia-Sunni conflict could be used to pressure and restrain Hizballah; it did not make sense to try to wish the threat away.
“MARCH 14” NEEDS MORE STRUCTURE ——————————-
14. (C/NF) Sheikh Michel suggested that one thing “March 14” needed was a better organizational structure. The appointment of a Secretary-General for the movement, one with real authority, could help in this respect. In order to deflect paranoia and anti-Hariri sentiment in the Christian community, it would be important that whoever filled this position not be a Sunni Muslim from the Hariri-led Future Current political party, Sheikh Michel said. SINIORA REMAINS DETERMINED ————————–
15. (C/NF) Prime Minister Siniora finally arrived after 10 PM, a little worse for the wear after an exhausting day, but still displaying confidence and energy. While his government was working to make progress on several fronts, he admitted that things were currently at a standstill. Even so, he was determined to forge ahead, particularly on privatization. Here, he was targeting the largely state-owned Intra Investment Corporation, which he derided as a “symbol of corruption.”
16. (C/NF) When the Ambassador and emboff described the concerns of international elections experts about the draft electoral law recently submitted to Siniora (reported septel), Siniora was unfazed. If there were problems with the draft, they could be worked out in due time, he insisted. He gave the impression of being receptive to comments on the draft law from IFES and other international elections experts.
17. (C/NF) Siniora cautioned Sheikh Michel and his guests that he had to pick his battles carefully. At one point in the dinner conversation, one of the guests pointed out that General Georges Khoury, chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces’ intelligence wing, was less than reliable. This was true, Siniora replied, but Khoury was also very close to the Maronite Patriarch, an ally whom Siniora could not afford to antagonize.
COMMENT ——-
18. (C/NF) Fears of Sunni militancy have combined with suspicion and resentment of the Hariri family and its wealth, particularly in the Christian community. Consequently, a great deal of Christian opinion about Hariri and “March 14” is skewed to the point of irrationality. Aoun can strike an alliance of convenience with Hizballah and yet be perceived among a sizeable portion of Christians, probably still a majority, as the most effective defender of communal interests. Christian politicians who align with “March 14,”
BEIRUT 00002291 004.2 OF 004
on the other hand, find themselves upbraided as sellouts and “inauthentic” representatives of their own community. In this situation, Sheikh Michel — son of Lebanon’s first president, Beshara el Khoury, and a Maronite patrician — deserves praise for the unconditional backing he is giving the Sunni Muslim Siniora.
19. (C/NF) Comment, continued: Even so, Hariri, Siniora’s government, and “March 14” seem never to miss an opportunity to increase Christian fears about a militant Sunni threat. The past few weeks have witnessed the sudden, inexplicable legalization of the ultra-extreme Hizb ut-Tahrir, which had been banned since the early 1960s (and which has been banned more recently in the United Kingdom on security grounds). On June 30, Mahmoud Qul Ahgasi (also known as Abu al-Qa’qa), leader of Ghuraba al-Sham, a mysterious Syrian-based Sunni Muslim group that is at once jihadist and pro-Asad regime, appeared on a television broadcast from the Beirut studio of the pan-Arab “al-Arabiya” channel, his back to a picture window in the studio that, embarrassingly, looked out on Siniora’s offices in the Grand Serail. Given all this, opening the valve of a massive Saudi petrodollar pipeline — assuming one really exists — would not be without risk. Still, we agree with the basic thrust of this dinner conversation: given the patronage system that still prevails in Lebanon, and given the evidence of huge amounts of incoming Iranian money, “March 14” needs to find some funding sources of its own, with Hariri and/or the Saudis still the most likely source.
End comment.
FELTMAN
B. BEIRUT 919
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY ——–
1. (C) Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) Vice President Duraid Yaghi said September 19 one-third of the population of his hometown of Baalbek does not support Hizballah, although it is in an area of strong Hizballah influence. However, according to Yaghi, continued unemployment and increased cultivation of illegal drugs is feeding into Hizballah’s strength in the Bekaa region. Yaghi, a Shia, suggested Lebanon donors should consider funding an illegal drug crop eradication and substitution program. Furthermore, he admitted that the March 14 coalition had made several mistakes in May, but said what was more worrisome was that the coalition had not yet agreed on a unified electoral platform or even begun planning for the 2009 parliamentary elections. We believe there may be an opportunity for a USG-sponsored crop substitution project in Baalbek and will explore further options. Separately, anti-Hizballah and prominent Shia businessman Abdullah Bitar told the Ambassador he will take on Hizballah by running in the elections for a Nabotieh seat, and hopes to join forces with other key players in forming a list. End summary.
BAALBEK DOES NOT BELONG TO HIZBALLAH ——————-
2. (C) Former Shia MP and current Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) Vice President Duraid Yaghi estimated to the Ambassador on September 19 that 30-35 percent of Baalbek’s population does not support Hizballah. Baalbek, situated in the heart of Hizballah’s stronghold in the Bekaa Valley, contains “brave voters” who overwhelmingly supported PSP and other parties in the majority over Hizballah in the most recent municipal elections, he said. However, Baalbek lacks any significant presence of state institutions, such as the Internal Security Services (ISF) or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). According to Yaghi, the state “is not there.” Without these visible signs of state authority or other state-provided social services, Yaghi worried Hizballah was gaining greater support. Baalbek’s residents, he said, often “turn to Hizballah before going to the police or the courts.” Generally speaking, said Yaghi, Hizballah buys its loyalties from residents by providing them $200-$300 per month, offering educational scholarships, and providing health and social services.
FIX THE DRUG PROBLEM, DIMINISH HIZBALLAH LEVERAGE —————————
3. (C) According to Yaghi, the incidence of hashish and opium cultivation continues to rise in Baalbek. Lack of employment opportunities, he believed, is driving greater numbers of Baalbek residents to plant the illegal drug crops. The sale of the crops feed into Hizballah’s weapons network, as well as provide valuable income to families, he said. The drug problem, Yaghi said, is not new. In May 1996, while he was MP, Yaghi and then-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri drafted Decree 8666, which allows for the creation of a government eradication program, with the use of international donor assistance, for the Bekaa region, especially in Baalbek and Hermel. The decree still exists, Yaghi said, but nothing ever came of it. (Note: ISF Counternarcotics Unit head has told Embassy INL Director that the ISF and LAF conduct eradication campaigns on a yearly basis, with the exception of 2007 when the program was not carried out because of the Nahr al-Barid conflict. End Note.) Yaghi requested assistance from the U.S. and other donors to revive the drug eradication effort, suggesting that any success with such a program could sway support away from Hizballah and towards the March 14 coalition as the 2009 parliamentary elections BEIRUT 00001389 002 OF 003 approach. (Note: INL funding will provide training in December for 50 ISF officers in counternarcotics tactics. The course will be taught by DEA instructors. End Note.)
MARCH 14 MADE MISTAKES; NOT PREPARED FOR ELECTIONS ————————–
4. (C) Yaghi admitted that the March 14 coalition to which his party belongs made several mistakes in May. First, he said, March 14, and specifically March 14 leader Saad Hariri’s Future Movement miscalculated the extent of Hizballah reaction when Future Movement pushed the Druze leaders Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh, who was minister of telecommunications, to close down Hizballah’s communication networks. After the ensuing takeover of West Beirut by Hizballah, and the subsequent agreement reached in Doha that paved the way for election of President Sleiman, Yaghi believed March 14 should have publicly admitted its mistake, while articulating a vision. Neither has happened, Yaghi said, and “we find ourselves in a bad situation.”
5. (C) Furthermore, he warned, the re-districting agreement reached in Doha for the 2009 parliamentary elections that placed Baalbek and Hermel into one district exacerbates March 14’s problems. Baalbek by itself, he said, probably would produce two Sunni and two Christian candidates to counter Hizballah’s four candidates. However, both MP slots in Hermel will go to Hizballah candidates, he predicted. As one district, if Hizballah wins the majority, all ten MP seats will go to Hizballah. Yaghi said he planned to talk with Hariri “soon” about his concerns for Baalbek and to secure Hariri’s assurances that tangible assistance would be forthcoming to Baalbek’s voters, and not just words of support.
6. (C) Yaghi was also visibly concerned about the lack of a unified March 14 message. He fretted that if another two months pass before the platform is decided, then March 14 should not expect favorable election results. In Baalbek, he said, Hizballah has been preparing for the elections for the last six months, while March 14 has not started. In addition, Yaghi envied the fact that Hizballah speaks “with one voice,” while March 14 has many parties and many different voices, he said.
7. (C) Yaghi did not believe the 2009 elections would be delayed, as “everybody thinks they will win.” He did not foresee Hizballah initiating any type of military action that could put the elections in jeopardy, and opined that Hizballah’s backers, Iran and Syria, would not support such a scenario. Yaghi supported President Sleiman’s decision to launch the National Dialogue, but did not believe any serious discussion of Hizballah’s weapons would occur until after the elections.
ANTI-HIZBALLAH SHIA RUNNING IN ELECTIONS ——————–
8. (C) In a separate September 22 meeting with the Ambassador, anti-Hizballah prominent Shia businessman and head of the Nabatieh Traders Association and the Economists Union Abdullah Bitar (Ref A) stated his intentions to take on Hizballah and run in the elections as a candidate from his hometown (and current residence) in Nabatieh, a Hizballah stronghold in southern Lebanon. Alone, he anticipated he could win approximately 5,000 votes from Nabatieh proper, and 10,000 votes from its surrounding areas. Believing that Lebanon’s southern residents would be willing to vote for non-Hizballah candidates, said he hopes to join forces with anti-Hizballah figure Ahmad al-Assad (Ref B) (who Bitar noted had distanced himself from him in the last few months), Hariri, and the Communist party to offer an alternative to Hizballah.
COMMENT ——- BEIRUT 00001389 003 OF 003
9. (C) Despite losing his last contest for an MP seat, Yaghi remains actively involved in politics. He is also president of Baalbek’s Bar Association. Independent Shia organizer Lokman Slim and others have encouraged Yaghi to consider running as a candidate in the 2009 elections, but Yaghi says he is reluctant due to the personal risks. (Note: In May, his house was set on fire by unknown assailants, but presumably the attack was politically motivated. An investigation is currently underway. End note.) The picture Yaghi paints of the March 14 coalition’s prospects for electoral success in 2009 is disheartening, but echoes the message we have carried to our March 14 interlocutors that a unified platform is very important to winning the elections.
10. (C) Although USG projects in the Bekaa are limited, we believe there could be an opportunity for an USG-sponsored crop eradication and substitution program. A similar project located along Lebanon’s northern border was considered previously by UNDCP, but did not get off the ground. However, we will explore the feasibility of resurrecting such a project for the Bekaa. If feasible, such a project could used an effective tool of the GOL to blunt expanding Hizballah influence in Baalbek. End comment.
SISON
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5 comments

  1. This wikileaks is dated April 4, 1985, that’s BEFORE Geagea took over the LF in January 15, 1986. It’s also only THREE WEEKS after the March 12, 1985 uprising, hardly enough time to start a drug exporting policy or any other major changes in income sources. Besides, the official speaking had just been ousted, so his info against those who ousted him is not reliable anyway.

    1. In the end, WikiLeaks is nothing but conversations and reports, and they could be reliable or not. One can choose to believe what he wants to believe, and one will eventually believe what he wants to believe. I try to find interesting cables (depending on the context), and I post them here. Tout simplement.

        1. I never said the article was specifically about Geagea (There’s the LF, the PSP, Hezbollah and Mustaqbal in the cables). Geagea’s video was the context that got me to look into drugs and Lebanese politics on WikiLeaks.

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