Monthly Presidential Coverage

What’s After The First Round?

Samir Geagea (Reuters)

Walid Jumblatt’s Democratic Gathering is reassembled, the March 14 coalition stands together as one unified alliance, and the March 8 coalition isn’t sparing a single effort to stop M14 from winning. Welcome back to 2009.

The Lebanese parties’ different stances are full of meanings. But first, let’s take a look at the results.

Results of the first parliamentary session to elect the Lebanese president:

Round I

White Ballots: 52 Votes
Samir Geagea: 48 Votes
Henri Helou: 16 Votes
Amine Gemayel: 1 Vote
Canceled: 7 Votes (For Tarek and Dany Chamoun, Rachid Karami, Elias Zayek, Jihane Frangieh)

4 MPs did not attend (Saad Hariri, Khaled Daher, Elie Aoun, Okab Sakr)

March 14’s Moves

In an alliance known for its diversity of Christian parties and representatives, the choice of Samir Geagea isn’t a smart one for the coalition to win. But strategically speaking, it’s the most brilliant move any of the M14 parties – except the Lebanese Forces – are capable of. Samir Geagea leads M14’s biggest Christian party. Going against him in the presidential elections seems unwise. Future Movement would have lost its biggest Christian ally while the Kataeb – although benefiting from the absence of its main rival on the short-term – would eventually suffer heavy popular losses on the long-term (Similar to what the M14 had to go through after isolating Aoun in 2005). The Kataeb is a relatively small Christian party and any loss in popularity is fatal to it. Future Movement can’t afford to lose such a heavy Christian ally in such times. It would give the impression that Lebanon’s Sunnis are abandoning the Christians, ironically further isolating the Future Movement and giving M8 the upper hand in Lebanese politics.

One doesn’t have to be a mathematician to see that Geagea’s hopes of becoming president are null. You need 65 votes to become president, and Geagea – in the best scenario possible – can gather a maximum of 60. So why go against him when he can’t win?

By supporting Geagea, the Kataeb and the FM are paving the way for their next moves. They threw all their weight behind the leader of the Lebanese Forces – preemptively knowing that he has no chance in winning. The Kataeb successfully eliminated the candidacy of their biggest rival in the coalition for the next rounds: If Geagea can’t gather enough votes to win, perhaps it’s time for another candidate to try his luck. And now that the Future Movement did what was expected from it, and supported the Christian ally, it’s ethically more Ok for Hariri to strike a deal with Aoun or agree with Jumblatt on a candidate, since Geagea can’t make it. In case the Kataeb want to officially propose Gemayel’s name, the right thing to do from the LF would be endorsing him, since the Kataeb endorsed Geagea when he needed them. ‘Terbi7 Jmile’ would be the proper Lebanese comment to say here. The proof? Even before the first session had happened, the Kataeb were already nominating Gemayel for the next electoral session.

March 8’s Move

The March 8 coalition voted white in the elections. There were reports that M8 might vote for Emile Rahme in the elections, in order to give the impression that Aoun – who refused to run against Geagea – is a moderate while on the other hand making sure that Geagea couldn’t be one. He would have been facing the pro-Syrian Emile Rahme after all.

M14’s endorsement of Geagea was in fact a double political maneuver:

Sending a message to M8 that M14 is unified no matter how controversial the candidate is.
Persuading M8 to nominate Aoun as their candidate in face of Geagea, so that both candidates get cleared out and a compromise in which a candidate that’s more centrist than both might get better chances. The Kataeb particularly wanted a Aoun-Geagea confrontation so that Gemayel would look like a consensual candidate. After all, consensual candidates have the best chance of winning in presidential elections.

M8’s response was remarkably brilliant. Instead of proposing Emile Rahme in face of Geagea, they decided to be more original and vote white. Frankly, I don’t know what’s more humiliating: To lose the elections, or to lose the elections to no one.

A Quick Look At The Lebanese Centre

While M8 and M14 are busy ‘plotting’ against one another, The centrists are reorganizing themselves. Walid Jumblatt has profited from the new M8-M14 standoffs on the new president and has reunified his bloc (The Democratic Gathering). Although some reports had confirmed that he didn’t want Henri Helou – who defected from his bloc in 2011 – as president, Jumblatt finally ended up endorsing him for several reasons.

By choosing someone that sided – unlike him – with M14 in 2011 (when Mikati was named PM), Jumblatt is playing it smart. True, he is currently closer to M8 since 2011, but he just chose the closest M14 personality to him for the presidency. Henri Helou, after siding with M14 in 2011, and after being nominated by Jumblatt – separately from M14/M8 – suddenly became a consensual candidate representing Lebanon’s centrists. Jumblat could have chosen someone from the National Struggle Front (The MPs who stayed by his side in 2011), but he did choose one of the two Maronites who didn’t: He wants to make sure that M14 has even less votes in the parliament in case it wants to try to elect a president of its own and that he’ll have the biggest bloc possible in the parliament.

Najib Mikati, who was replaced by Tammam Salam with M8’s consent, is siding with Helou for obvious reasons. As a former “centrist PM” it is wiser for him to support Jumblatt’s candidate in the presidential elections. After all, Helou is the most consensual candidate currently on the table, and hence he has one of the best chances to become president after the maneuvers stop (If there’s a veto on the commander of the army and the BDL Governor). Who’s better to serve as his PM than Mikati?

Parliament convenes again next Wednesday.

32 days till the 25th of May.

Another version of this post was published at Executive Magazine.

Presidential ‘Surprises’

Emile Rahme on Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV

The March 8 camp is preparing a series of “surprises” for Wednesday’s parliamentary session to elect a president, reported al-Joumhouria newspaper on Saturday without elaborating.

This does not however include the nomination of Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun, said March 8 sources.

They explained that the camp opted against this option because the lawmaker seeks to be a “consensual presidential candidate among all political powers, while keeping in mind that the March 14 alliance will not vote for him.” […]

The March 8 camp has therefore chosen the possible nomination of MP Emile Rahme instead of Aoun, reported the daily An Nahar Saturday.

(Link)

Surprise.

According to reports all over the internet, the March 8 alliance is thinking of nominating Emile Rahme as their presidential candidate instead of Aoun.

Emile Rahme’s Position

For M14, Emile Rahme is probably the most hated Christian MP. In a way, he’s like Future Movement’s Mohammad Raad, Walid Jumblatt’s Aoun/Geagea, or Hezbollah’s Ashraf Rifi. Emile Rahme is also one of the few MPs that are part of the FPM’s change and reform bloc without being a member of the FPM. Of the 27 men loyal to Aoun in the parliament, he’s one of two or three whose election depends entirely on Hezbollah’s votes. The vast majority of the change and reform bloc MPs (4 for Baabda, 7 for the Metn, 5 for Keserwan, 3 for Jbeil and 3 for Jezzine, a total of 22/27) represent North Mount-Lebanon and Jezzine, where the Christian electorate is at least more than the half in each constituency. 3 extra Marada MPs represent Zgharta, which is also overwhelmingly Christian (even if the MPs aren’t directly loyal to Aoun but to Frangieh).

The last two MPs are a Druze loyal to Arslan representing Hasbaya, and Emile Rahme. The district Rahme represents is Baalbak-Hermel, Lebanon’s biggest Shia constituency, and happens also to be Hezbollah’s main electoral stronghold (the south is is considered to be more pro-Amal than pro-Hezbollah).

Let’s review Emile Rahme’s pros for a last time. He is Hezbollah’s strongest man in the change of reform bloc and one of the most vocal Christian anti-M14 lawmakers – in the middle between Aoun and Hezbollah – making him a prefect candidate in case M8 wants a rather politically violent candidate in face of Geagea. He’s even from a village that is next to Bcharri, Geagea’s hometown.

But Emile Rahme has an extra feature: He is the only Christian in the change and reform bloc that wasn’t elected by determining Christian votes (Baalbak-Hermel is 65% Shia). In other words, he’s considered to be relatively weak among the Christian electorate. As bad as that might sound, it’s actually something good because this quality is most likely to give him Jumblattist support. Michel Aoun would gain a president from his bloc, Hezbollah would gain a president from a district he electorally controls, Amal would gain a president that used to represent a Shia constituency, and Jumblatt would gain a president that has no popular Christian support. Both centrists and M8 win if Emile Rahme becomes Lebanon’s next president.

The Maneuver

Emile Rahme in Baabda is similar to a declaration of war for M14. Since Jumblatt is going to decide his candidate at the last minute, M14 can’t risk the election of Rahme. The only way to counter this move is by agreeing with M8 on a more moderate candidate. That candidate is no other than Michel Aoun, who didn’t yet officially announce his candidacy and said he won’t do it unless there’s a consensus on him. Emile Rahme’s candidacy (or rumors/reports of his nomination) to the presidency is a message to Future Movement from M8: Strike a consensual deal with Michel Aoun – the lesser of two evils for M14 – or risk the election of Emile Rahme.

Walid Jumblatt Is Still The Kingmaker

If M8 simply wanted to bring a ‘violent’ president from their ranks, they could have opted for Sleiman Frangieh. But the fact that Frangieh is considered to be rather strong especially within the northern Christian electorate wouldn’t make him too popular with Jumblatt. The key for winning here is to make Jumblat side by you in the elections. While M8 were proposing the name of Emile Rahme (Jumblatt might still reject him), M14 sources were speaking of two particular Maronites: Fouad Al-Saad and Henri Helou. These two MPs defected from the Jumblat’s bloc in 2011 when he decided to support Mikati in the parliamentary consultations, putting them at an equal distance between M14 and Walid Jumblatt. The leader of the PSP however ruled out this possibility, and is unlikely to support either of them for the elections – They did leave his bloc after all. The last remaining Maronite from his bloc, Elie Aoun, probably has higher chances than them.

Parliament convenes to elect the president on the 23rd of April.

35 days till the 25th of May.

Strikes, Silence, And Confusion: The War For Baabda Continues

Since it's civil war commemoration week and the parliament will soon elect a president, i thought this unrelated picture of the parliament in 1976 would be the most appropriate for the post.

Since it’s civil war commemoration week and the parliament will soon elect a president, I thought this picture of the parliament in 1976 would be the most appropriate image for this post.

FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES, THEREFORE, PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERSHIP BREAKS DOWN INTO THREE BASIS GROUPS TODAY AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE: PRO-SARKIS (LARGEST BUT NOT YET DETERMINANT); INDEPENDENTS (SECOND AND KEY); AND PRO-EDDE. PRECISE NUMBERS ARE ANYBODY’S GUESS BUT WE WOULD PLACE SARKIS VOTES IN HAND TODAY AT SLIGHTLY OVER 50 RPT 50 AND, THEREFORE SUFFICIENT FOR ELECTION ON SECOND BALLOT IF SESSION GOES AHEAD. ELECTION BY THIS SLIM MARGIN, HOWEVER, WOULD LEAVE THE NEW PRESIDENT IN A RELATIVELY WEAK POSITION AND FACING A DIVIDED ELECTORATE–NOT A HAPPY PROSPECT.

In case you were wondering, that was a flashback to the first presidential elections (1976) of the civil war era, courtesy of Wikleaks’ Kissinger Cables.

Now back to 2014. Lots of things are happening lately and it would be interesting to see where we’re heading with all these events since Berri is going to call for a session to elect a president soon.

The Lebanese Forces

Let’s start with the situation among M14. Exactly 10 days ago, the only person that officially said he was running for the presidency was LF leader Samir Geagea. This early move had 2 motives: (1) Pressuring the Kataeb by making it politically awkward for them to propose another candidate (most probably Amine Gemayel), and (2) forestalling any kind of last-minute compromise between the Future Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement by embarrassing the FM and pushing them to embrace the candidacy of Samir Geagea. If politics in Lebanon were to be normal, the next predictable moves in Lebanon would be the Kataeb becoming shy and refusing to nominate anyone other than Geagea, and the FM supporting no other than the leader of their strongest Christian ally, the Lebanese Forces. That’s why the Lebanese Forces’ political maneuver was a brilliant move in a brilliant timing. But again, to assume that such consequences were definitely going to happen would mean that one simply doesn’t understand the complexity of Lebanese politics. Politics in Lebanon might be predictable, but it’s far from being that predictable.

The Kataeb

As I demonstrated one month and a half earlier, if M14 wants a serious competitor to Michel Aoun that would seem equally moderate, Amine Gemayel is the first name coming to mind. And the Kataeb know the advantage of their leader. He’s relatively on good terms with everyone, used to be a president, shares the same blood of Bachir Gemayel and was also exiled after the civil war. The two last features are particularly appealing to the Christian electorate. Concerning the moderate part, Gemayel’s already on it: Sajaan Kazzi of the Kataeb called last week for closer and more sustainable ties with Iran. We all know what that means. And although the Kataeb didn’t officially nominate Gemayel, they did hint several times that he was the right man for the job, indicating that – unlike what the LF thought – they will not support Geagea to the presidency. There was even a report saying that former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi sent his aide to Lebanon – At Putin’s request – in order to help Gemayel in his campaign.

After all, now that the LF are outside the cabinet and acting all by themselves, it’s the best moment for the Kataeb to try to push a competitor from within M14 further outside. If M14 nominates Gemayel to the presidency, The Kataeb would eventually get the upper hand on the LF in the Christian side of M14. As a party that has 5 MPs out of 128 and that can’t even control one constituency alone in the parliamentary elections, believe me, you don’t wan’t to miss that chance.

Future Movement

However, I’m not saying that Amine Gemayel was actually approved by the FM. In fact, the FM are keeping an unusual awkward silence these past few days. True, minor cadres in the party might have said that they supported Geagea to the presidency, but there is still no definite word coming from Saad Hariri. The only things the former premier promised were (1) that the elections would be held on time and (2) that M14 would be fielding one, and only one presidential contender. So basically the movement’s stances stayed exactly the same since March, while everything else around them kept constantly changing. Future Movement’s silence is revealing. The party has five options here. The first one is supporting Geagea. The second one is embracing Gemayel. The third choice is to side with one of the independent M14 figures, such as Robert Ghanem or Boutros Harb. The fourth choice is striking a deal with the FPM in which Hariri would serve as prime minister under Aoun. The fifth final choice is supporting one of the Maronite two (Kahwagi/Salameh) in a deal similar to the 2008 Doha agreement. I’ll discuss the last two choices afterwards.

Geagea is responsible for PM Rachid Karami’s assassination, so embracing him would make the FM highly unpopular among Sunnis. Amine Gemayel also had his dark moments during the war, so he isn’t a favori either. Robert Ghanem might look as a promising candidate for the FM, but again, as this Al-Akhbar article suggests, the FM is more likely to abandon its allies in favor of a more reliable compromise with M8 – The same way they did in 2007 when they decided to back the neutral Michel Sleiman in the last 2 days before Lahoud left office.

Who knew, it turns out that the Lebanese Forces have on one hand an arrogant ally, and on the other hand, yet another arrogant ally. To be fair, Geagea’s early candidacy without consulting his allies was also an arrogant way to treat them.

The Silence

Now I’m going to move to M8. The FPM, just like the FM, haven’t yet said a definite word on the presidential elections. The FPM didn’t directly nominate Aoun after the LF nominated Geagea in order to give the impression that Aoun, unlike Geagea, is not a polarized candidate but rather a consensual one. In fact, Aoun even sent a message to Hariri that he won’t run in the elections unless there’s a consensus on him, implicitly inviting Hariri to strike a deal that would bring them both to power. The press is also circulating information revealing that Jean Obeid is Nabih Berri’s number 1 candidate, who also happens to get support from Walid Jumblatt. So basically among M8 the tendency is to get the most moderate candidate available in a compromise that would give M8 the largest number of benefits. In order to counter M8’s strategy, Geagea tried to take a more moderate position: He proposed Hezbollah partnership with Hezbollah in case he wins.

The Strikes

When you talk about the Lebanese presidential elections, you can’t simply ignore the neutral side. The most prominent candidates right now are the central bank governor Riad Salameh and the commander of the army Jean Kahwagi (The Maronite Two). Two interesting things happened in the past few weeks. For the first time since last year, Lebanon is witnessing several confrontations between the syndicates and the political class. On another note, the political class apparently just woke up from its coma and realized that the economy is in ashes. Banks are even striking over tax hike proposals. A couple of days ago, a pro-Berri MP sued a bank association (the ABL) while Berri refused to meet them. In other words, the recent discourse regarding the worsening economy aims at undermining the candidacy of BDL chief Riad Salameh while on the other end of the neutral side the army – with support from the executive authority – is implementing security plans everywhere throughout the country. It is even going after Rafaat Ali Eid, which is pretty big. It might be a simple coincidence, but I don’t believe in such things 15 days before the presidential elections. There seems to be a tendency to give the upper hand to Kahwaji as a neutral candidate while undermining Salameh at the same time.

Things are so confusing in Lebanon right now, that even the ElNashra app notification on my phone is going crazy when it updates me with news on the presidential elections.

40 days till the 25th of May.

Baabda 2014: A Game Of Throne

The 1958 Presidential Elections – LIFE Magazine

Two weeks ago, Lebanon’s new cabinet was securing the vote of confidence in the parliament. Except for a small number of maneuvers (see here, here, here, here), there was no major breakthrough during the 11 months deadlock regarding the presidential elections. These days are over: The Lebanese political scene is currently inundated with events related – directly or indirectly- to the election of the new Lebanese president.

“We want a strong president”

Read that sentence, and remember it well. Four men keep saying it, all the time, everywhere, to whoever they meet, whatever the circumstances are.

Question: Should the parliament vote an electoral law? Answer: We want a strong president.

Q: Should the cabinet approve a certain decree? A: We want a strong president.

Q: Are you in love? A: We want a strong president.

*has nightmares of weak presidents becoming zombies*

Q: Do you like pizza? A: We want a strong president.

For those of you who are wondering what that sentence means, be surprised, for those five words are full with implications.

1) We: Since the sentence is usually repeated by Samir Geagea, the Kataeb, Sleiman Frangieh, and Michel Aoun, The “We” refers primarily to the leading Four Maronite leaders. If anyone else is saying it, it’s probably an echo.

2) Want: Usually, you want what you can’t have. In the case of the Maronite Four (MF), they are all aspiring to relocate to the Baabda palace for the next 6 years. But they all know that the chances of another neutral candidate are much higher.

3) A Strong President: This is the best part. According to Sleiman Frangieh’s universal definition of strong president – a definition apparently recognized by his other 3 Maronite colleagues, check the interview with Marcel Ghanem – a strong president is a person that meets only one of the following criteria:

His name is Michel Aoun
His name is Sleiman Frangieh
His name is Samir Geagea
His name is Amine Gemayel

This is the part where I stop the sarcasm 😀 . The Maronite Four (MF), along with everyone else, have managed to pull out a breathtaking political maneuver lately. The idea of a strong president, embraced by the Maronite patriarch, and hundreds of other politicians from all sides is not just a simple sentence that everyone repeats on biased TV stations. The idea of seeking a strong president – from a closed group of 4 members – is equivalent to the idea of eliminating all the other choices. This systematic sentimental brainwashing that the Maronite Four have been doing for the past two to three months, by convincing the Lebanese public – via an uninterrupted collective propaganda campaign – that Lebanon needs a strong president has one huge aim: Excluding any other popular Maronite – not belonging to the MF – from the race. The first names coming to mind are former minister Ziyad Baroud, the commander of the army Jean Kahwagi, and the governor of the central bank Riad Salame.

Samir Geagea/Amine Gemayel’s biggest fear isn’t Michel Aoun or Sleiman Frangieh becoming presidents. And the same goes for Aoun/Frangieh: Their biggest fear isn’t Geagea or Gemayel in office. Their biggest fear is that a neutral figure takes power. Each and every one of them would have to deal with a newcomer to internal Christian politics that is likely to reduce their power – both on an electoral level and on an administrative level. For example, instead of having 3 ministers with the LF, 3 with the FPM, and 3 with the president, The FPM/LF will get to split the president’s share if he’s Aoun or Geagea, hence maximizing their influence in any future cabinet.

There’s also another synonym of “strong president” : It’s not Michel Sleiman. So when the MF tell you they want a strong president, you should always understand it as an opposition to extending president Sleiman’s term.

The MF: An Unusual Gathering

Probably for the first time in the history of the blog, I am starting a post with no direct mention to the March 14 or March 8 alliances. And that’s not a coincidence. Michel Aoun’s allies have failed him in May 2013, when they extended the terms of the parliament – against his will. Also in May 2013, Future Movement failed the Kataeb when they refused to support the Orthodox Gathering Law in parliament. 10 Months later, the FM – without the consent of the Lebanese Forces – would enter a cabinet with Hezbollah, throwing the LF by themselves in the opposition to an all-embracing cabinet. The Maronite Four have learned their lesson: They cannot rely on their Muslim allies, and they are the weaker parties of the M14 and M8 alliances due to their small parliamentary blocs (except for Aoun). After 10 years of counting on their Muslim allies, the Christians parties apparently realized that unless they preemptively unanimously agree on certain matters (Like electing a strong president), their allies were going to compromise and agree on another consensual candidate without consulting them.

Suspicious Timings

In 24 hours, the army dismantled an explosive-rigged vehicle on the outskirts of Arsal, finalized preparations for a Cabinet-sanctioned security plan for Tripoli, confiscated ammunition coming from Syria, raided a refugee camp, while at the same time the military prosecutor – in an unprecedented move – issued warrants against 200 suspects involved in the Tripoli clashes (See here for more details).
In case you’re confused, that’s the commander of the army presenting his candidacy to the presidential elections.

Another interesting observation is Geagea being officially nominated as presidential candidate by the Lebanese Forces. While this seems perfectly normal, it actually isn’t. Geagea is officially running to the presidential elections without previously getting the green light from the other M14 parties, particularly Al-Mustaqbal. So basically, this is what Geagea is trying to do: preemptively proposing his candidature in order to force and put pressure on the Future Movement to endorse him. This political maneuver aims at setting him as the de-facto candidate of the FM, and hence destroying the chances of electing Michel Aoun as president in a future FM-FPM deal. Exactly 1 month ago, the primary candidate from M14 was Gemayel. Due to his preemptive move, Geagea made it harder for Gemayel to run for office, while successfully (?) sabotaging any compromise between M8 and M14 similar to the cabinet one where he was excluded.

Use Your Calculator

You need 65 MPs to win the elections, and a quorum of 86 MPs to make it happen. Since M14 and M8 both don’t have the absolute majority, expect millions of rounds. Each one will end with approximately 60 votes for each candidate (probably Aoun/Geagea), since Jumblatt will not vote for anyone of them. The press is even circulating information that he said he would start a civil war if one of them gets elected.

So to sum things up, the Maronite Four want one of them as president even though none of the Maronite Four is ready to elect the other (except for Frangieh). Everyone in the parliament either wants Geagea or Aoun, except for Jumblatt. The alternative would be electing someone neutral, from outside the Maronite Four traditional candidates. But hey, there’s the Veto coming from the Maronite Four.

But one should look on the bright side, there are other candidates: A pious (that’s sarcasm) person (please check the video. please.) named Rachid-Louis Labaki, and an actor, Adel Karam, also officially presented their candidacy.

Just kidding. There is no bright side.

50 days till the 25th of May.

The Time For Moderation

1984…

For a country that took 11 months to get out of the deadlock, the events of the past few days are revealing. Sleiman Frangieh will not run for the presidential elections: It’s official. In his interview with Al-Mayadeen, the leader of the Marada party endorsed the candidacy of Michel Aoun. The FPM leader on the other hand was busy commending Saad Hariri’s speech “characterized with moderation“. On the other side of the political spectrum, Amine Gemayel was praising the Iranian policies in the regions, only days after Hariri promised the Patriarch that the presidential elections would be held on time.

M8 Unified

Although it might be hard to believe, Frangieh’s withdrawal makes sense. For M14, he is the most despised Christian leader out there. For Hezbollah and Amal, he is a minor Christian politician. For the FPM, he is a local ally that mustn’t get stronger under any circumstances, especially that he is more likely to answer to Damascus than to Rabieh in case something goes bad between the Syrian regime and its biggest Christian ally. Frangieh hence has no shot at all to become president in 2014: Even if he runs as the sole candidate backed by M8, his name can never become a consensual one, and M14 pressure on Jumblatt would eventually prevent the latter of voting for the Marada candidate. By running for office in 2014, Frangieh would have angered the FPM, lost the elections, and found himself isolated. Patience is a virtue. Out of the “Maronite four” (Gemayel, Geagea, Aoun and himself), Frangieh is by far the youngest, and the very fact that in 2020 Amine Gemayel would be 78, Michel Aoun 86 and Samir Geagea 67 makes him the perfect candidate for the elections. By then, he would have become M8’s number one, the Syrian crisis would have probably ended, and he’ll get to have 6 years to adapt to any new situation, make new alliances, or switch sides. In 2020, the odds can be in his favor. In 2014, they’re not.

Michel Aoun on the other hand understood the rules of the game (after years of experience). The president is practically always a consensual one, especially in times of crisis. Fouad Chehab was elected for refusing to engage the army in the conflict. Charles Helou was elected because he was one of Chehab’s closest men to the opposition. Sleiman Frangieh was elected for his pro-Nasserist history and his anti-Palestinian tendencies. Elias Sarkis was elected for staying neutral throughout the first year of the civil war. In Lebanese politics, if you don’t compromise, you lose it all: Raymond Edde stayed 50 years in the opposition and never made it to the presidential palace. And for the millionth time (see here, here, here, here and here), this is what Michel Aoun is trying to achieve. Even though he might never become a consensual candidate in the matter of a year’s effort, he can still become M8’s most moderate politician. And how do we know it works? Because his new moderate attitude made Frangieh withdraw for lack of support from M8 and M14, forced the different M8 factions to pamper him more (so he doesn’t defect) and eventually unified M8 behind him while turning him into a more acceptable candidate to M14. After spending most of 2012 and 2013 accusing Hariri of being an extremist politician supporting rogue Islamist militants, he describes Hariri in 2014 of being the voice of moderation. There is no such thing as a coincidence. Everyone hoping to succeed has to be a moderate ahead of the presidential elections. For Michel Aoun, being a moderate means that he’ll have to praise the Future Movement.

M14 Unified

When I say everyone, I include M14’s candidate. And while we’re at it, there will be one, and only one candidate coming from the ranks of M14. Hariri reiterated in his meeting with the Patriarch on Friday that the March 14 coalition would field one presidential contender. Meanwhile in the Christian camp of M14, the Kataeb – now strong of their huge share in the cabinet – are preparing their comeback. Among the possible candidates for the presidency, there’s LF leader Samir Geagea (head of the biggest Christian M14 party) , popular independent MPs such as Boutros Hareb, and last but not least former president Amine Gemayel, leader of the Kataeb party.

M14 needs a candidate that is in full harmony with its policies while being at the same time acceptable by M8. Samir Geagea, while being the strongest Christian in M14, doesn’t fit the criteria. The majority of independent MPs , although enjoying some support and prestige from the parliament – Boutros Hareb has been in the parliament for the past 42 years – are also too violent for M8.

One has to see it from a very particular perspective. Aoun is popular, was a commander of the army and a former prime minister, is seen as protector of Christian interests (due to his stances on the cabinet formation and the electoral law), has strong allies, is currently establishing ties with various parties – notably the Future Movement, and is fashioning himself as a moderate. If M14 wants a serious competitor, the first name coming to mind is Amine Gemayel. He leads Lebanon’s oldest and most prestigious Christian party, had the same stances regarding the electoral law and the cabinet, has good ties with most of the parties and is at the core of M14. Also who’s better to compete with Aoun than the president who appointed him as commander of the army and later prime minister?

The Kataeb are aware of their sudden power in the executive power and of the precious value of their leader: Amine Gemayel asked for the elections to be held on time, dismissed any other consensual candidate by requesting the parliament to elect a strong president (hinting at “the Maronite Four”), nominating himself to the presidency and finally starting to laud some of the M8 rivals, namely Iran. Like Michel Aoun, he is showing his moderate side. While rumors on the streets say that Hariri is likely going to endorse the leader of the Kataeb, Gemayel’s relation with Lebanon’s kingmaker Walid Jumblatt isn’t very good (due to civil war-related issues). Since Jumblatt isn’t a fan of Aoun either, we might probably see a third consensual name endorsed by the centrists. The press is circulating the names of Jean Obeid (who apparently also enjoys the support of Berri and Hariri) and the usual “two Maronites” : the commander of the army and the governor of the central bank.

2014 Is Not 2008 (Or Is It?)

Even if the elections are held on time, and even if the M8 and M14 alliances do not boycott the elections and everything goes according to the plan (no lack of quorum), there is still one problem: None of both alliances can secure 65 votes (absolute majority) to support its candidate. While it is more obvious by the day that M14 and M8 would be each supporting one candidate to the presidency, it remains unclear what side Walid Jumblatt and Mikati’s parliamentary blocs would back. If the Jumblatt-Mikati duo decides not to participate in the elections, neither M8 nor M14 will be able to secure the post for its candidate. Without Jumblatt and Mikati, M14 has around 58 MPs while M8 has a bit less than that (around 57).

The constitution stipulates that a 2/3 majority is necessary to elect a president in the first round, while an absolute majority would be needed for all the rounds after that. unlike 2007, when the presence of M8 and M14 in the parliament would have probably ended in an M14 candidate as a president (since they held the majority), the elections of 2014 are different. Even if everyone shows up, the elections would be like a play. The MPs will keep voting for the same candidates, and since no camp can secure 65 votes, the elections can go on forever. In other words, none of the two coalition will take it upon itself to boycott the parliamentary session and get treated with disregard from the public for “paralyzing the states’ institutions”. Because unlike 2008, there is no coalition holding the majority of votes in the parliament which means that the minority coalition doesn’t need to boycott and block quorum in order to prevent the majority of electing a president of its ranks.

While nothing is official or definite, we are approaching the elections with 2 candidates, Michel Aoun of M8 and Amine Gemayel of M14 that are – unlike 2007 – fighting to get the support of the rival camp by playing the moderate card, while the name of the third consensual candidate is soon to be determined.

Reminder: The government didn’t win the confidence vote yet.

The Presidential Race Begins

In what is probably the most misleading article title since the beginning of time, Naharnet tells us that “Aoun Links Cabinet with Presidential Elections, Says he Nominates Geagea“. In the same context, Berri apparently said that he won’t deal with the matter before March 25, when the 60-day Constitutional deadline for the election of a new president starts. But since every possible politician is talking about the presidential elections, I find it hard how he’ll manage to do that. So what is exactly happening 5 months before the 25th of May?

Mini-heart attack yet? Don’t panic. Aoun isn’t actually going to nominate Geagea (Naharnet forgot to put the word mockingly before says in the title). However, Aoun said that he wants a strong president and he clearly won’t nominate Geagea (since he mockingly nominated him). On the opposite side, he is distancing himself from his ally (and apparently presidential rival) Sleiman Frangieh by asking for the election of a president from the first round (requiring the two-thirds of votes) while Frangieh previously said that he had no problem in electing the president with absolute majority (Here’s a nice post from October explaining why). Meaning that Aoun is likely to nominate someone from the FPM (him?).

Khabsa within M8

Frangieh and Aoun are endorsing two different electoral strategies, meaning that they will probably not be endorsing each other. This small competition is only the beginning. There will come a time where other M8 parties will have to choose between Frangieh and the Aounist candidate . So with who will side Hezbollah? The whole confusion emerging from within the March 8 coalition also means that the other centrist parties would have a much more free hand and will be more able to distance themselves from the March 8 camp or put conditions on the shattered M8 alliance. Jumblatt and Mikati in stronger positions also means that the president would be in a better place in case he wishes to extend his mandate. March 14’s silence and Tammam Salam’s passivity show us that the deal – if a consensus is to be reached – won’t strictly be about the government but rather the whole crisis, and its recent newcomer: The presidential elections.

Too Much USJ And No Jumblatt

Did I miss anyone? Correct! Jumblatt’s quiet attitude for the past few weeks – only 3 weeks earlier he was engaged in a violent media war against M14 and M8 – indicates that everyone is considering his options. After all, Jumblatt is still the kingmaker, and his stances will with no doubt influence everything. In fact Jumblatt’s silence is probably behind most of the parties’ cautiousness. No one wants to rush to the losing side. And the identity of that side will be clearer once Jumblatt takes a decision.

If you’ve been following the news this week you’d be aware of the student elections in USJ and their violent aftermath (see here, here, here). One must keep in mind that USJ is one of the biggest and most prestigious universities in Lebanon, and its political relevance comes from the fact that it is a Christian University mostly attended by Christian students. Other than the demographic cause, the campus where most of the trouble happened is in the heart of Ashrafieh, while the University itself is the Alma mater of roughly half of the Lebanese presidents. That’s why the university elections at USJ matter more – strategically speaking – to the Christian leaders than the elections at the Lebanese University, AUB, LAU or any other university. Although the tensions are more of a yearly tradition now, this year I can’t but relate the unusually high tensions (Classes were suspended for two days in Huvelin campus) to the near presidential elections. For the reasons stated above, whoever the winner is at USJ , it’s a huge boost for him ahead of the presidential elections. Probably explains why Aoun lashed out at Geagea and why Samy Gemayel entered in a media / propaganda war against Michel Aoun and M8 following the elections.

Reminder: We still don’t have a government.

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Frangieh’s Presidential Election Reform And What It Means

Deputy Speaker Michel Sassin declaring Suleiman Frangieh (The Grandfather) President in 1970

Deputy Speaker Michel Sassine declaring Suleiman Frangieh (The Grandfather) President in 1970

With Tammam Salam’s inability to form a government, the parliament’s failures to convene – which is unconstitutional anyway – and the electoral law impasse forgotten, I find myself obliged to talk about something new to Lebanese politics this month: The presidential elections.

Apparently on Thursday, Marada Movement leader Suleiman Franjieh warned of a presidential vacuum as the conflict over Syria continues and suggested that Lebanon adopts the 50 percent plus one vote formula to secure the office.

Wait What

Let alone the fact that Frangieh’s allies took advantage of that particular constitutional clause (Of having the two thirds quorum in the Presidential elections) in order to block the election of an M14 candidate in 2008, the very fact that Frangieh is asking for a modification of that electoral process is very weird. Why? Let’s see why. Because Frangieh belongs to a coalition in the parliament that holds between the third and half of the MPs in the parliament. That means that under the current constitutional rules, Frangieh – Let’s suppose for a while that he will be M8’s candidate – can block the electoral process by instructing his allies to boycott the session. Just to make it clear – and more complicated for you – Frangieh said that a 50% plus one vote should be adopted. Thus Theoretically, Frangieh spoke nothing about the quorum. He only mentioned what the number of votes for the winner should be once there is quorum. So if Frangieh doesn’t want to change the quorum rule in the constitution but only the voting rule, nothing makes sense. Is Frangieh suggesting that we change the quorum or the winning vote number? Let’s see.

M8 has 40% of the votes, M14 45%, and the others (Mikati, Jumblatt …)15% (The numbers aren’t exact, but you get the point)

Case 1: Our lovely non functioning system (Quorum 66%, First round 66%, Second round 50%+1). Frangieh wants to run, but M14 and the others won’t vote for him. Frangieh instructs his allies to boycott. 40%>33% which means that there will be no quorum, thus no elections. In case the others will vote for him, that means he will have 55% of the votes. M14 boycotts, 45%>33%, meaning that there will also be no quorum.

Case 2: Quorum remains untouched with Frangieh’s amendment (Quorum 66%, First round 50%+1). Frangieh wants to run, but M14 and the others won’t vote for him. Frangieh instructs his allies to boycott. 40%>33% which means that there will be no quorum, thus no elections. However, Frangieh is saying that he is making the amendment to make life simpler and easier for the parliament to elect the president. Which means that the amendment doesn’t make any sense (See, I told you!) because the quorum boycott is still here and if he wishes not to boycott and elect the president with 50%+1 he can simply wait for the second round and keep the constitution like it was (see Cas 1)

Case 3: Frangieh was actually talking about the quorum! (Quorum 50%+1%, First round 50%+1). 40%<50% which means that Frangieh can’t freeze the process if he boycotts and has a very high chance of losing because 40%<50%. Unless…

Unless What?

Unless Frangieh is sure he can secure 65 MPs to vote for him. In politics you don’t actually propose something you might lose in, so there’s something fishy about this. If Frangieh meant cas 1 (or cas 2), he was probably just saying things to fill in the blanks of his speech. But if what Frangieh meant was cas 3, then something very dangerous is going on here.

Dangerous How?

If Frangieh can bring 65 votes, but not 86 (the 66% quorum that he wishes to remove in his reform) that can mean only few things. That means he isn’t a consensual candidate because he doesn’t have 66% of the votes (shocking, right?), that he will be running with M14 (See what I mean by dangerous?) against Aoun, or that Jumblatt and Mikati, along with Amal and Hezbollah and someone else will choose him as their sole candidate to the elections and throw Aoun outside which will probably make the latter closer to M14 than M8.

While the theory of having Frangieh and M14 as allies is unimaginable, the very fact that Jumblatt and Hariri have engaged in a media war lately, that Jumblatt is starting to prefer M8’s 9-6-6 formation over M14’s 8-8-8 one and that Aoun is actually getting closer to the Future Movement makes the second theory absurd yet executable.

However the most plausible explanation to this whole reform question is that Frangieh doesn’t want to extend to Suleiman for 6 years. Knowing that a boycott would create another revolutionary vacuum (Expired parliament, no president, no government, Yay!) he is probably paving the way for a small consensual amendment: only 1 (or 2?) extra year for Suleiman while implementing the reform of 50%+1 (M14 and the others should be enough to elect Suleiman), in exchange of something else for M8 (their formula for the government gets adopted? A consensual electoral law?). M8 will be theoretically still boycotting the elections – except this time it’s harmless to the electoral process.

Oh, and speaking of 50%+1, Frangieh’s Grandfather was actually elected by exactly 50%+1 of the votes. Actually, it was 50%+0.5, (he got 50 out of 99 votes. 99/2=49.5 which means he got 50%+0.5) and that is why in the picture, it’s not the speaker Sabre Hamade – his political rival who considered 50%+0.5 instead of the absolute majority (50%+1) to be unconstitutional – proclaiming him president, but Hamade’s deputy.

And look at us, complaining about the 66% quorum.

Moulahazat

A Lebanese Political Blog