14 March Alliance

Three Months Of Vacuum

Presidential Palace Sign

It has been a tough month for the March 8 Alliance. In the last week of July, the Maronite Patriarch launched four consecutive maneuvers against Michel Aoun and his party, taking stances even bolder than his anti-M8 predecessor Sfeir. And just when the Islamist-Lebanese army clashes in Arsal were starting to give a propaganda boost to Hezbollah, Hariri decided to come back to Beirut and turn this Hezbollah opportunity into an opportunity for his party and the March 14 alliance by showing himself as the moderate politician coming home to save the republic. He didn’t only come back to Lebanon at a critical time: He also managed to steal from Hezbollah the moment they had been waiting for. In the aftermath of the Arsal clashes, Hezbollah was supposed to look like the good guy and ISIS the bad one, hence justifying the Hezb’s intervention in Syria. Hariri’s comeback and the relatively quick and bold intervention by the army in the Bekaa threw Hezbollah out of the equation and showed Future Movement instead of Hezbollah as the good guy. The week after that, Hezbollah had to suffer another blow when the user behind the Free Sunnis of Baalbak twitter account was caught and turned out to be a sympathizer of the party. So in order to improve their position, the FPM and Hezbollah launched a political counter-attack on the March 14 alliance.

Contre-attaque no.1

Hezbollah, like most of the time, decided to avoid entering in a direct media confrontation with the March 14 alliance and decided to shift the public’s attention to ISIS: The Islamic State was the main theme in Nasrallah’s speech on the 14th of August. The timing was perfect for Nasrallah: It was on the July 2006 ceasefire day, the target was ISIS, and in the background Israel was dropping bombs on Gaza. It couldn’t get any better than this for Hezbollah.

Contre-attaque no.2

This other counter-attack is courtesy of FPM leader Michel Aoun. While Hezbollah was busy redirecting the public’s attention to ISIS, Aoun was playing it smart by insisting on the only proposal the Maronite patriarch hadn’t violently criticized: The direct presidential elections. The constitutional amendment was proposed by the Free Patriotic Movement in early July but was quickly thrown off the table after almost everyone criticized it. The Free Patriotic Movement might have played a losing card yet one more time, but at least this time it would mean distracting the people from M14’s recent gains. And the M14 coalition fell right into the trap: They stopped mentioning Hariri’s billion dollar comeback and instead decided to get into a media war with the FPM regarding a constitutional amendment that has -1000% chance of passing. The importance of Aoun’s proposal is that it buys him some time: The parliament cannot discuss a constitutional amendment in an exceptional session, so the direct presidential elections bill will have to wait till October 15 (when the parliament starts to hold normal sessions). That date is only two weeks short from November. And what’s happening in November again? The parliamentary elections.

In other words, if Aoun decides to hang on to this bill and wait for it to fail in the parliament in late October it would mean that Lebanon will enter November with no president and a soon-to-be-expired parliament. If Aoun, backed by his allies, decides to vote against an extension of the parliament’s term (It’s highly unlikely that Berri or Jumblatt would give up their positions in the parliament so Aoun will have to ask help from the March 14 Christians to stop an extension of the parliament’s term) the Free Patriotic Movement would have put the M14 alliance in a tough spot: Vote for him president or face a total collapse of the president-less and parliament-less Lebanese regime (since most of the political class doesn’t want parliamentary elections before presidential elections). This direct presidential elections proposal is Michel Aoun’s passport and alibi of doing nothing till the 15th of October. The maneuver depends on the cooperation of the other Christian parties and it will most probably fail, but it’s Aoun’s last bullet in this presidential race.

Jumblatt. Walid Jumblatt.

While the March 8 and 14 alliances were acting normal again by escalating their stances against one each other, another politician was using his old techniques again:  On the last week of July, Walid Jumblatt met Nasrallah. On the first week of August, he met Aoun. On the 18th of August, he met Frangieh. And just when everyone thought that he was once again siding with the M8 coalition, he decided – on the same day he met Frangieh – to issue the following statement: “The Arab Druze must decide between a narrow and temporary sectarian affiliation that is being manipulated by the Syrian regime and a wider Arabic belonging”. And that, dear reader, is how you confuse everyone.

Is Ashraf Rifi the new Abbas Ibrahim?

September and October will be two very important months for the Lebanese parties. The fate of the general and presidential elections will depend on who will have the upper hand by the beginning of autumn. That mainly depends on what will happen with the Lebanese soldiers Kidnapped by the militants in Arsal. During similar events in the past, it used to be Sûreté Générale director Abbas Ibrahim who negotiated with the militants in order to release kidnapped Lebanese (Like in the case of the Lebanese who were taken hostages by Syrian rebels in Aazaz). Since Ibrahim was rumored to be closer to M8 than to M14, his successes were usually considered as mini-victories for the March 8 alliance. However this year the ministries of defense, interior and Justice are in the M14 camp which means that the M14 alliance will most probably use the security ministries  in order to negotiate with the militants instead of Ibrahim.

Here’s an early example:

Commenting on the Arsal clashes between army troops and jihadist militants earlier this month, Rifi assured that the kidnapped soldiers and Internal Security Forces members will be freed “without any exchange for detained Islamists.

(Link)

The March 8 and 14 alliances are likely to fight on who gets to negotiate with the militants. The party that succeeds in the negotiations gains the upper hand for the next few weeks, boosting the alliance’s position in the very critical months of September and October.

The dilemma

The main issue in Lebanon today is whether to (1) organize the presidential elections before the parliamentary elections or (2) the parliamentary elections before the presidential elections .

(1) means that there should be an agreement on a president soon or else the parliament will have to extend its term for a second time until there has been an agreement on a president. That being said, the parliament will have to give free candy in order to pass the extension without any trouble (Free candy is what Lebanese politicians give to the people so that they ignore their mistakes. For example, when the parliament extended its term for the first time, the free candy was the law on domestic violence that the parliament  passed after the extension). In our case, the yummiest free candy would be approving the wage hike for the civil servants just after the extension. (That way calling the parliament illegitimate would mean calling the long-awaited bill illegitimate)

(2) means that the parliament – that couldn’t agree on an electoral law for the past 6 years – is going to agree on an electoral law in the matter of a month and a half and then we’ll happily head to elections in November. There’s only a few thousand problems:

a) It would be a miracle if they would agree on a law.

b) Even if that miracle happens, a president is still needed to sign the law.

c) constitutionally speaking, the miracle can’t happen because the parliament theoretically (that rule has been broken before) cannot legislate with no president in power.

d) The majority of the parliament refuses to the go to elections based on the 2008 modified electoral law.

e) That means that we need a new electoral law.

f) bringing us again to (a)

We’re now a country with no elections, with an expired parliament, with a caretaker cabinet, with no president, and whose students pass without official exams.

95 days since the 25th of May. 82 days till the 16th of November.

Hariri, Arsal, And A Billion Dollar Comeback
Hariri And Salam

Image Credits: Reuters

Future Movement is one weird political party.

Here’s why

August 3, 2014

Following a meeting for the National Islamic Gathering held on Sunday at the residence of MP Mohammad Kabbara, the latter called for a firm conscientious stand in front of God and nation because everyone will have to answer to the people.

The gatherers issued a statement stressing that what is happening in the heroic Sunni town of Arsal is only one link in the chain of the Syrian-Iranian plan to impose submission on the Sunni community.

(Link)

Kabbara claimed on Sunday that the developments in the Beqaa town of Arsal, where the Lebanese Armed Forces are clashing with Syrian Islamists, are meant to “subjugate” the Sunnis.

(Link)

“The solution in Arsal is political and we must protect our northern Bekaa from the volcano’s lava and we must preserve coexistence,” Rifi said in remarks to MTV.

“The mission of protecting northern Bekaa is the mission of all of its residents and our salvation lies legitimate state institutions,” Rifi added, pointing out that “the statelet” of Hizbullah is to blame for the current situation in the country.

(Link)

August 4, 2014

Prime Minister Tammam Salam asserted Monday that there will be no political settlement with militants from Syria battling the Lebanese Army in Arsal, stressing that the rival political parties represented in the Cabinet vow unanimous support for the military.

(Link)

Former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri, a Sunni leader with a large following, has accused al-Qaeda-linked rebel groups in Syria of taking Arsal hostage.

(Link)

In case you were wondering, those were one of the four most prominent members of Future Movement expressing four completely different stances on the Arsal clashes between the Lebanese army and the Islamist militants. Kabbara considered that the Lebanese army and Hezbollah were subjugating Arsal. Hariri however had the exact opposite stance: He accused Al-Qaeda of taking Arsal hostage. Now regarding the Future movement cabinet members, they were also supporting two different ways to solve the crisis. Minister of justice Rifi wanted a political solution while PM Salam was ruling this option out.

One doesn’t have to be an expert to realize that on August 5, 2014 the situation within the Future Movement had reached its worst level since Hariri left Beirut in 2011. The party was out of control, with every member saying something totally and somehow perfectly different from the other.

Here’s what happened next:

August 6, 2014

Saudi Arabia has provided Lebanon’s army, battling jihadists on the Syrian border, with one billion dollars to strengthen security, former Lebanese premier Saad Hariri told reporters in Jeddah on Wednesday.

(Link)

August 8, 2014

Former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, considered Lebanon’s most influential Sunni Muslim politician, returned unexpectedly to Lebanon Friday after three years of self-imposed exile.

His surprise return comes at a delicate time for the country after a week of bloody battles between the army and Sunni extremists from Syria have exacerbated the Lebanon’s own simmering sectarian tensions.

The seizure by the militants of Arsal, a mostly Sunni town filled with Syrian refugees and surrounded by Shiite villages, has further entangled Lebanon into Syria’s catastrophic three-year-old civil war.

(Link)

Let’s rewind 3 years

Hariri left Lebanon in humiliating circumstances. Just after his government collapsed, he was replaced with one of his former allies. He lost the majority in the parliament, and self-exiled himself in France. The self-exile part was horrible. As the FM MPs and officials grew stronger because of his absence, the Sunni void he left in Beirut was slowly being filled by rising Sunni figures such as Mikati and Safadi and by Sunni Islamists, such as Ahmad Al Asir (that everyone forgot about). By 2014, the small victory that was the nomination of Salam to the premiership backfired. While Hariri was skiing in the Alps, Siniora was starting to look like he’s in charge, Mikati and Safadi were becoming strong enough to beat Hariri in the North and Tammam Salam was suddenly one of the most successful Prime Ministers since the Syrians withdrew, successfully coping with an 11 months cabinet formation crisis, a vacancy in the presidency and keeping the middle-eastern chaos out of the country – while making everyone happy at the same time. And to make things worse, Hezbollah and its March 8 allies were getting this week the biggest propaganda boost they had ever dreamed of: (1) Syrian (2) Islamist (3) militants took control of the (4) biggest Sunni town in the Northern Bekaa and (5) attacked the Lebanese army. Meanwhile in the government, the Kataeb were striking power-sharing deals with the M8 coalition while the Lebanese forces were now tempted more than ever to distance themselves from anything that might even be hypothetically linked to ISIS and its Sunni background.

In response to a question whether he blames Hezbollah for the army’s involvement with militants in Arsal, the Lebanese Forces leader said that he did not posses any information that confirmed such a possibility at the time being.

(Link)

That says it all for Geagea. And just when you think things couldn’t go worse for Hariri, Jumblatt was visiting Nasrallah and Aoun in the same week.

So to sum things up, Hariri was losing everything. His party was out of control, his coalition was slowly drifting apart, he was losing the centrist position of Jumblatt and most importantly, he was politically losing against M8 for the first time since he left the country. It was time to come home.

A brilliant comeback…

Hariri had to solve the multiple issues he was dealing with: He had to

(1) Remind everyone of his position in the FM leadership.

August 4, 2014 (4 days before Hariri came back)

Future bloc MP Samir al-Jisr indirectly challenged fellow party member Mohammad Kabbara’s controversial Sunday stance on Arsal, saying that certain “statements must be avoided” and adding that only Saad Hariri represents the Future Movement’s official line. […]

The parliamentarian added that “the Future [Movement]’s stance is only expressed by party leader MP Saad Hariri. I personally cannot express the party’s stance, and I believe we all abide by this.”

(Link)

August 8, 2014 (The day Hariri came back)

“Defending the nation against all types of terrorism can only be through enlisting in the security and military forces that represent the state, whereas claims about supporting the Army through sectarian and factional militias can only lead to weakening the state and the Army,” Kabbara said in a statement.

(Link)

Mission accomplished.

(2) Confirm his position as the supreme Sunni leader in the country. His first stop was the Grand Serail.

With no prior announcement, Hariri arrived at the Lebanese government’s headquarters in Beirut in a Mercedes with blacked-out windows. He grinned widely as he walked into the building, where he met Prime Minister Tammam Salam.

(Link)

Mission accomplished.

(3) Make sure that M14 is still alive.

Les forces du 14 Mars ont tenu hier soir une réunion extraordinaire à la “Maison du Centre” à l’occasion du retour au Liban de l’ancien Premier ministre Saad Hariri. L’ancien président Amine Gemayel, l’ancien Premier ministre Fouad Siniora, l’ancien premier ministre Saad Hariri, le chef des Forces libanaises Samir Geagea, un nombre de ministres et de députés et toutes les composantes des Forces du 14 Mars y ont assisté.

(Link)

Mission accomplished.

(4) End the M8 propaganda by publicly endorsing the Lebanese army and removing the suspicions that Saudi Arabia might be backing ISIS by giving the army a 1 billion dollars grant from the Saudi authorities. (Also, temporarily making use of the rumors  suggested by a “Hariri source” that the United States was behind ISIS’s creation. The rumors don’t mention any Saudi role)

Mission accomplished.

…And fake hope?

There are always three parts in a political deadlock: The first one is just after the crisis. It’s the amount of time till we realize that we’re actually in an endless political deadlock (June 2014, for the current presidential deadlock). The second part is the biggest part of the deadlock . It’s when people forget that it even exists. For example, that’s July 2014 when the cabinet and the parliament ignored the priority of electing a president and carried on with their usual work (for the parliament, it’s doing nothing). This week it’s the happy phase of the deadlock (the third part). It’s when everyone is suddenly so happy because they think things are going to turn out like they want. As a small comparison, it’s like when everyone thought the cabinet crisis ended when there was an agreement to name Salam as a consensual Prime minister. We ended up waiting 11 months to see the cabinet formation. Anyway, here’s why it’s the happy phase:

1) Aoun thinks Hariri is coming home to elect him.

2) Geagea thinks Hariri is coming home to elect him.

3) [Inserts the name of any Lebanese Maronite] thinks Hariri is coming home to elect him.

3) Hezbollah thinks Hariri is coming home to strike a deal.

4) Future Movement thinks Hariri is coming home to reorganize the party.

5) The people who want to elect the commander of the army as president view the Arsal events as a powerful boost that makes him more acceptable, especially in these circumstances.

6) The people who don’t want to elect the commander of the army as president view the Arsal events as a powerful boost in order to keep him in the army where he is essential, especially in these circumstances.

7) Hezbollah views Hariri’s presence in Lebanon as a way of accepting Hezbollah’s de-facto political supremacy.

8) Future Movement views Hariri’s presence in Lebanon as a defiance to Hezbollah.

9) Jumblatt probably believes all of the above.

10) Berri probably doesn’t believe any of the above.

Every possible political party thinks it’s a win if Hariri’s home. Welcome to the happy phase of the deadlock.

Oh, and we’re apparently having our parliamentary elections on the 16th of November. (Yeah, right)

79 days since the 25th of May. 98 days till the 16th of November.

Lack Of Quorum, And What It Means
Yep, that's Walid Jumblatt

Yep, that’s Walid Jumblatt

Lebanon had two busy weeks. Actually, not so busy, since the parliament failed to convene twice to elect the next Lebanese president. With approximately 57 MPs from M8, 52 from M14, and 19 centrists, things aren’t looking good so far for the primary Lebanese candidates (the Maronite Four, Geagea, Gemayel, Aoun and Frangieh).

Samir Geagea and Michel  Aoun are still hoping to relocate to the Baabda palace. Samir Geagea’s candidacy is currently being overshadowed by Amine Gemayel, who is trying to champion himself as Lebanon’s next consensual candidate by visiting every politician that has ever lived on Lebanese territory (see here, here, here). As predicted on the blog two months earlier, both Michel Aoun and Amine Gemayel are trying to gather parliamentary support by showing themselves as consensual strong candidates close to all parties.

However, with none of the Maronite Four expected to win the presidential elections, M8’s decision to boycott the session and deny quorum confirms one undeniable fact: Walid Jumblatt isn’t trusted by M8.  In fact, there is no way that any candidate might win the elections without the support of 65 MPs. The regular scenario implies that all rounds – if the status-quo stays the same – would bring in the same results of the first one. In other words, no candidate can secure the required 65 votes unless centrists side with M8 or M14. But since the M8 alliance is boycotting the sessions, the only explanation available is that it doesn’t believe that the Jumblatt bloc is going to vote for Helou in the second round of the elections – But instead for a moderate M14 candidate. M14 and Jumblatt together have more than 65 MPs,  and such a move from Jumblatt would  halt any Aoun-Hariri deal (by electing Hariri’s main candidate). After all, Walid Jumblatt isn’t very predictable, and he hasn’t stopped changing sides for the past ten years. And the very fact that he precisely waited for this week to reiterate his support for the Syrian opposition isn’t encouraging M8 to trust him more. Needless to say that Kamal Jumblatt voted against his ally’s candidate, Elias Sarkis in 1970. That’s why it’s not very wise from M8 to let the elections proceed normally – even if it means getting criticized by Bkirki for denying quorum.

Lebanon elects its president once every 6 years, which means that if by any mistake – such as providing quorum and Jumblatt supporting M14’s candidate – an anti-M8 president reaches power, it would be total chaos for the March 8 alliance. They would have lost a key position, and more importantly their main negotiation card for the next phase would turn to ashes. If you think that it’s only about the president, think again. There’s the prime minister that comes with him, the cabinet that rules till November, the electoral law, the parliamentary elections, and a whole new era after that. That’s why, for most politicians, a temporary vacuum –  while waiting for a huge deal covering the rest of the issues – doesn’t look so bad.

While Michel Sleiman is expected to leave office in two weeks, there are two things to keep in mind: Vacuum in the presidency is more probable than ever, and politicians don’t trust one another – What a precious discovery.

14 days till the 25th of May.

What’s After The First Round?
Samir Geagea (Reuters)

Samir Geagea (Reuters)

Walid Jumblatt’s Democratic Gathering is reassembled, the March 14 coalition stands together as one unified alliance, and the March 8 coalition isn’t sparing a single effort to stop M14 from winning. Welcome back to 2009.

The Lebanese parties’ different stances are full of meanings. But first, let’s take a look at the results.

Results of the first parliamentary session to elect the Lebanese president:

Round I

  1. White Ballots: 52 Votes
  2. Samir Geagea: 48 Votes
  3. Henri Helou: 16 Votes
  4. Amine Gemayel: 1 Vote
  5. Canceled: 7 Votes (For Tarek and Dany Chamoun, Rachid Karami, Elias Zayek,  Jihane Frangieh)

4 MPs did not attend (Saad Hariri, Khaled Daher, Elie Aoun, Okab Sakr)

March 14’s Moves

In an alliance known for its diversity of Christian parties and representatives, the choice of Samir Geagea isn’t a smart one  for the coalition to win. But strategically speaking, it’s the most brilliant move any of the M14 parties – except the Lebanese Forces – are capable of. Samir Geagea leads M14’s biggest Christian party. Going against him in the presidential elections seems unwise. Future Movement would have lost its biggest Christian ally while the Kataeb – although benefiting from the absence of its main rival on the short-term – would eventually suffer heavy popular losses on the long-term (Similar to what the M14 had to go through after isolating Aoun in 2005). The Kataeb is a relatively small Christian party and any loss in popularity is fatal to it. Future Movement can’t afford to lose such a heavy Christian ally in such times. It would give the impression that Lebanon’s Sunnis are abandoning the Christians, ironically further isolating the Future Movement and giving M8 the upper hand in Lebanese politics.

One doesn’t have to be a mathematician to see that Geagea’s hopes of becoming president are null. You need 65 votes to become president, and Geagea – in the best scenario possible – can gather a maximum of 60. So why go against him when he can’t win?

By supporting Geagea, the Kataeb and the FM are paving the way for their next moves. They threw all their weight behind the leader of the Lebanese Forces – preemptively knowing that he has no chance in winning. The Kataeb successfully eliminated the candidacy of their biggest rival in the coalition for the next rounds: If Geagea can’t gather enough votes to win, perhaps it’s time for another candidate to try his luck. And now that the Future Movement did what was expected from it, and supported the Christian ally, it’s ethically more Ok for Hariri to strike a deal with Aoun or agree with Jumblatt on a candidate, since Geagea can’t make it. In case the Kataeb want to officially propose Gemayel’s name, the right thing to do from the LF would be endorsing him, since the Kataeb endorsed Geagea when he needed them. ‘Terbi7 Jmile’ would be the proper Lebanese comment to say here. The proof? Even before the first session had happened, the Kataeb were already nominating Gemayel for the next electoral session.

March 8’s Move

The March 8 coalition voted white in the elections. There were reports that M8 might vote for Emile Rahme in the elections, in order to give the impression that Aoun – who refused to run against Geagea – is a moderate while on the other hand making sure that Geagea couldn’t be one. He would have been facing the  pro-Syrian Emile Rahme after all.

M14’s endorsement of Geagea was  in fact a double political maneuver:

  1. Sending a message to M8 that M14 is unified no matter how controversial the candidate is.
  2. Persuading M8 to nominate Aoun as their candidate in face of Geagea, so that both candidates get cleared out and a compromise in which a candidate that’s more centrist than both might get better chances. The Kataeb particularly wanted a Aoun-Geagea confrontation so that Gemayel would look like a consensual candidate. After all, consensual candidates have the best chance of winning in presidential elections.

M8’s response was remarkably brilliant. Instead of proposing Emile Rahme in face of Geagea, they decided to be more original and vote white. Frankly, I don’t know what’s more humiliating: To lose the elections, or to lose the elections to no one.

A Quick Look At The Lebanese Centre

While M8 and M14 are busy ‘plotting’ against one another, The centrists are reorganizing themselves. Walid Jumblatt has profited from the new M8-M14 standoffs on the new president and has reunified his bloc (The Democratic Gathering). Although some reports had confirmed that he didn’t want Henri Helou – who defected from his bloc in 2011 – as president, Jumblatt finally ended up endorsing him for several reasons.

By choosing someone that sided – unlike him – with M14 in 2011 (when Mikati was named PM), Jumblatt is playing it smart. True, he is currently closer to M8 since 2011, but he just chose the closest M14  personality to him for the presidency. Henri Helou, after siding with M14 in 2011, and after being nominated by Jumblatt – separately from M14/M8 – suddenly became a consensual candidate representing Lebanon’s centrists. Jumblat could have chosen someone from the National Struggle Front (The MPs who stayed by his side in 2011), but he did choose one of the two Maronites who didn’t: He wants to make sure that M14 has even less votes in the parliament in case it wants to try to elect a president of its own and that he’ll have the biggest bloc possible in the parliament.

Najib Mikati, who was replaced by Tammam Salam with M8’s consent, is siding with Helou for obvious reasons. As a former “centrist PM” it is wiser for him to support Jumblatt’s candidate in the presidential elections. After all, Helou is the most consensual candidate currently on the table, and hence he has one of the best chances to become president after the maneuvers stop (If there’s a veto on the commander of the army and the BDL Governor). Who’s better to serve as his PM than Mikati?

Parliament convenes again next Wednesday.

32 days till the 25th of May.

Another version of this post was published at Executive Magazine.

Presidential ‘Surprises’
Emile Rahme on Al-Manar's Hezbollah TV

Emile Rahme on Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV

The March 8 camp is preparing a series of “surprises” for Wednesday’s parliamentary session to elect a president, reported al-Joumhouria newspaper on Saturday without elaborating.

This does not however include the nomination of Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun, said March 8 sources.

They explained that the camp opted against this option because the lawmaker seeks to be a “consensual presidential candidate among all political powers, while keeping in mind that the March 14 alliance will not vote for him.” […]

The March 8 camp has therefore chosen the possible nomination of MP Emile Rahme instead of Aoun, reported the daily An Nahar Saturday.

(Link)

Surprise.

According to reports all over the internet, the March 8 alliance is thinking of nominating Emile Rahme as their presidential candidate instead of Aoun.

Emile Rahme’s Position

For M14, Emile Rahme is probably the most hated Christian MP. In a way, he’s like Future Movement’s Mohammad Raad, Walid Jumblatt’s Aoun/Geagea, or Hezbollah’s Ashraf Rifi. Emile Rahme is also one of the few MPs that are part of the FPM’s change and reform bloc without being a member of the FPM. Of the 27 men loyal to Aoun in the parliament, he’s one of two or three whose election depends entirely on Hezbollah’s votes. The vast majority of the change and reform bloc MPs (4 for Baabda, 7 for the Metn, 5 for Keserwan, 3 for Jbeil and 3 for Jezzine, a total of 22/27) represent North Mount-Lebanon and Jezzine, where the Christian electorate is at least more than the half in each constituency. 3 extra Marada MPs represent  Zgharta, which is also overwhelmingly Christian (even if the MPs aren’t directly loyal to Aoun but to Frangieh).

The last two MPs are a Druze loyal to Arslan representing Hasbaya, and Emile Rahme. The district Rahme represents is Baalbak-Hermel, Lebanon’s biggest Shia constituency, and happens also to be Hezbollah’s main electoral stronghold (the south is is considered to be more pro-Amal than pro-Hezbollah).

Let’s review Emile Rahme’s pros for a last time. He is Hezbollah’s strongest man in the change of reform bloc and one of the most vocal Christian anti-M14 lawmakers – in the middle between Aoun and Hezbollah – making him a prefect candidate in case M8 wants a rather politically violent candidate in face of Geagea. He’s even from a village that is next to Bcharri, Geagea’s hometown.

But Emile Rahme has an extra feature: He is the only Christian in the change and reform bloc that wasn’t elected by determining Christian votes (Baalbak-Hermel is 65% Shia). In other words, he’s considered to be relatively weak among the Christian electorate. As bad as that might sound, it’s actually something good because this quality is most likely to give him Jumblattist support. Michel Aoun would gain a president from his bloc, Hezbollah would gain a president from a district he electorally controls, Amal would gain a president that used to represent a Shia constituency, and Jumblatt would gain a president that has no popular Christian support. Both centrists and M8 win if Emile Rahme becomes Lebanon’s next president.

The Maneuver

Emile Rahme in Baabda is similar to a declaration of war for M14. Since Jumblatt is going to decide his candidate at the last minute, M14 can’t risk the election of Rahme. The only way to counter this move is by agreeing with M8 on a more moderate candidate. That candidate is no other than Michel Aoun, who didn’t yet officially announce his candidacy and said he won’t do it unless there’s a consensus on him. Emile Rahme’s candidacy (or rumors/reports of his nomination) to the presidency is a message to Future Movement from M8: Strike a consensual deal with Michel Aoun – the lesser of two evils for M14 – or risk the election of Emile Rahme.

Walid Jumblatt Is Still The Kingmaker

If M8 simply wanted to bring a ‘violent’ president from their ranks, they could have opted for Sleiman Frangieh. But the fact that Frangieh is considered to be rather strong especially within the northern Christian electorate wouldn’t make him too popular with Jumblatt. The key for winning here is to make Jumblat side by you in the elections. While M8 were proposing the name of Emile Rahme (Jumblatt might still reject him), M14 sources were speaking of two particular Maronites: Fouad Al-Saad and Henri Helou. These two MPs defected from the Jumblat’s bloc in 2011 when he decided to support Mikati in the parliamentary consultations, putting them at an equal distance between M14 and Walid Jumblatt. The leader of the PSP however ruled out this possibility, and is unlikely to support either of them for the elections – They did leave his bloc after all. The last remaining Maronite from his bloc, Elie Aoun, probably has higher chances than them.

Parliament convenes to elect the president on the 23rd of April.

35 days till the 25th of May.

Strikes, Silence, And Confusion: The War For Baabda Continues
Since it's civil war commemoration week and the parliament will soon elect a president, i thought this unrelated picture of the parliament in 1976 would be the most appropriate for the post.

Since it’s civil war commemoration week and the parliament will soon elect a president, I thought this picture of the parliament in 1976 would be the most appropriate image for this  post.

FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES, THEREFORE, PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERSHIP BREAKS DOWN INTO THREE BASIS GROUPS TODAY AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE: PRO-SARKIS (LARGEST BUT NOT YET DETERMINANT); INDEPENDENTS (SECOND AND KEY); AND PRO-EDDE. PRECISE NUMBERS ARE ANYBODY’S GUESS BUT WE WOULD PLACE SARKIS VOTES IN HAND TODAY AT SLIGHTLY OVER 50 RPT 50 AND, THEREFORE SUFFICIENT FOR ELECTION ON SECOND BALLOT IF SESSION GOES AHEAD. ELECTION BY THIS SLIM MARGIN, HOWEVER, WOULD LEAVE THE NEW PRESIDENT IN A RELATIVELY WEAK POSITION AND FACING A DIVIDED ELECTORATE–NOT A HAPPY PROSPECT. 

In case you were wondering, that was a flashback to the first  presidential elections (1976) of the civil war era, courtesy of Wikleaks’ Kissinger Cables.

Now back to 2014. Lots of things are happening lately and it would be interesting to see where we’re heading with all these events since Berri is going to call for a session to elect a president soon.

The Lebanese Forces

Let’s start with the situation among M14. Exactly 10 days ago, the only person that officially said he was running for the presidency was LF leader Samir Geagea. This early move had 2 motives: (1) Pressuring the Kataeb by making it politically awkward for them to propose another candidate (most probably Amine Gemayel), and (2) forestalling any kind of last-minute compromise between the Future Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement by embarrassing the FM and pushing them to embrace the candidacy of Samir Geagea. If politics in Lebanon were to be normal, the next predictable moves in Lebanon would be the Kataeb becoming shy and refusing to nominate anyone other than Geagea, and the FM supporting no other than the leader of their strongest Christian ally, the Lebanese Forces. That’s why the Lebanese Forces’ political maneuver was a brilliant move in a brilliant timing. But again, to assume that such consequences were definitely going to happen would mean that one simply doesn’t understand the complexity of Lebanese politics. Politics in Lebanon might be predictable, but it’s far from being that predictable.

The Kataeb

As I demonstrated one month and a half earlier, if M14 wants a serious competitor to Michel Aoun that would seem equally moderate, Amine Gemayel is the first name coming to mind. And the Kataeb know the advantage of their leader. He’s relatively on good terms with everyone, used to be a president, shares the same blood of Bachir Gemayel and was also exiled after the civil war. The two last features are particularly appealing to the Christian electorate. Concerning  the moderate part, Gemayel’s already on it: Sajaan Kazzi of the Kataeb called last week for closer and more sustainable ties with Iran. We all know what that means. And although the Kataeb didn’t officially nominate Gemayel, they did hint several times that he was the right man for the job, indicating that – unlike what the LF thought –  they will not support Geagea to the presidency. There was even a report saying that former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi sent his aide to Lebanon – At Putin’s request – in order to help Gemayel in his campaign.

After all, now that the LF are outside the cabinet and acting all by themselves, it’s the best moment for the Kataeb to try to push a competitor from within M14 further outside. If M14 nominates Gemayel to the presidency, The Kataeb would eventually get the upper hand on the LF in the Christian side of M14. As a party that has 5 MPs out of 128 and that can’t even control one constituency alone in the parliamentary elections, believe me, you don’t wan’t to miss that chance.

Future Movement

However, I’m not saying that Amine Gemayel was actually approved by the FM. In fact, the FM are keeping an unusual awkward silence these past few days. True, minor cadres in the party might have said that they supported Geagea to the presidency, but there is still no definite word coming from Saad Hariri. The only things the former premier promised were (1) that the elections would be held on time and (2) that M14 would be fielding one, and only one presidential contender. So basically the movement’s stances stayed exactly the same since March, while everything else around them kept constantly changing. Future Movement’s silence is revealing. The party has five options here. The first one is supporting Geagea. The second one is embracing Gemayel. The third choice is to side with one of the independent M14 figures, such as Robert Ghanem or Boutros Harb. The fourth choice is striking a deal with the FPM in which Hariri would serve as prime minister under Aoun. The fifth final choice is supporting one of the Maronite two (Kahwagi/Salameh) in a deal similar to the 2008 Doha agreement. I’ll discuss the last two choices afterwards.

Geagea is responsible for PM Rachid Karami’s assassination, so embracing him would make the FM highly unpopular among Sunnis. Amine Gemayel also had his dark moments during the war, so he isn’t a favori either. Robert Ghanem might look as a promising candidate for the FM, but again, as this Al-Akhbar article suggests, the FM is more likely to abandon its allies in favor of a more reliable compromise with M8 – The same way they did in 2007 when they decided to back the neutral Michel Sleiman in the last 2 days before Lahoud left office.

Who knew, it turns out that the Lebanese Forces have on one hand an arrogant ally, and on the other hand, yet another arrogant ally. To be fair, Geagea’s early candidacy without consulting his allies was also an arrogant way to treat them.

The Silence 

Now I’m going to move to M8. The FPM, just like the FM, haven’t yet said a definite word on the presidential elections. The FPM didn’t directly nominate Aoun after the LF nominated Geagea in order to give the impression that Aoun, unlike Geagea, is not a polarized candidate but rather a consensual one. In fact, Aoun even sent a message to Hariri  that he won’t run in the elections unless there’s a consensus on him, implicitly inviting Hariri to strike a deal that would bring them both to power. The press is also circulating information revealing that Jean Obeid is Nabih Berri’s number 1 candidate, who also happens to get support from Walid Jumblatt. So basically among M8 the tendency is to get the most moderate candidate available in a compromise that would give M8 the largest number of benefits. In order to counter M8’s strategy, Geagea tried to take a more moderate position: He proposed Hezbollah partnership with Hezbollah  in case he wins.

The Strikes

When you talk about the  Lebanese presidential elections, you can’t simply ignore the neutral side. The most prominent candidates right now are the central bank governor Riad Salameh and the commander of the army Jean Kahwagi (The Maronite Two). Two interesting things happened in the past few weeks. For the first time since last year, Lebanon is witnessing several confrontations between the syndicates and the political class. On another note, the political class apparently just woke up from its coma and realized that the economy is in ashes. Banks are even striking over tax hike proposals. A couple of days ago, a pro-Berri MP sued a bank association (the ABL) while Berri refused to meet them. In other words, the recent discourse regarding the worsening economy aims at undermining the candidacy of BDL chief Riad Salameh while on the other end of the neutral side the army – with support from the executive authority – is implementing security plans everywhere throughout the country. It is even going after Rafaat Ali Eid, which is pretty big. It might be a simple coincidence, but I don’t believe in such things 15 days before the presidential elections. There seems to be a tendency to give the upper hand to Kahwaji as a neutral candidate while undermining Salameh at the same time.

Things are so confusing in Lebanon right now, that even the ElNashra  app notification on my phone is going crazy when it updates me with news on the presidential elections.

ElNashra Notification

40 days till the 25th of May.

Baabda 2014: A Game Of Throne
The 1958 Presidential Elections - LIFE Magazine

The 1958 Presidential Elections – LIFE Magazine

Two weeks ago, Lebanon’s new cabinet was securing the vote of confidence in the parliament. Except for a small number of maneuvers (see here, here, here, here), there was no major breakthrough during the 11 months deadlock regarding the presidential elections. These days are over: The Lebanese political scene is currently inundated with events related – directly or indirectly- to the election of the new Lebanese president.

“We want a strong president”

Read that sentence, and remember it well.  Four men keep saying it, all the time, everywhere, to whoever they meet, whatever the circumstances are.

Question: Should the parliament vote an electoral law? Answer: We want a strong president.

Q: Should the cabinet approve a certain decree?  A: We want a strong president.

Q: Are you in love? A: We want a strong president.

*has nightmares of weak presidents becoming zombies*

Q: Do you like pizza? A: We want a strong president.

For those of you who are wondering what that sentence means,  be surprised, for those five words are full with implications.

1) We: Since the sentence is usually repeated by Samir Geagea, the Kataeb, Sleiman Frangieh, and Michel Aoun, The “We” refers primarily to the leading Four Maronite leaders. If anyone else is saying it, it’s probably an echo.

2) Want: Usually, you want what you can’t have. In the case of the Maronite Four (MF), they are all aspiring to relocate to the Baabda palace for the next 6 years. But they all know that the chances of another neutral candidate are much higher.

3) A Strong President: This is the best part. According to Sleiman Frangieh’s universal definition of strong president – a definition apparently recognized by his other 3 Maronite colleagues, check the interview with Marcel Ghanem – a strong president is a person that meets only one of the following criteria:

  1. His name is Michel Aoun
  2. His name is Sleiman Frangieh
  3. His name is Samir Geagea
  4. His name is Amine Gemayel

This is the part where I stop the sarcasm 😀 . The Maronite Four (MF), along with everyone else, have managed to pull out a breathtaking political maneuver lately. The idea of a strong president, embraced by the Maronite patriarch, and hundreds of other politicians from all sides is not just a simple sentence that everyone repeats on biased TV stations. The idea of seeking a strong president – from a closed group of 4 members – is equivalent to the idea of eliminating all the other choices. This systematic sentimental brainwashing that the Maronite Four have been doing for the past two to three months, by convincing the Lebanese public – via an uninterrupted collective propaganda campaign – that Lebanon needs a strong president has one huge aim: Excluding any other popular Maronite – not belonging to the MF – from the race. The first names coming to mind are former minister Ziyad Baroud, the commander of the army Jean Kahwagi,  and the governor of the central bank Riad Salame.

Samir Geagea/Amine Gemayel’s biggest fear isn’t Michel Aoun or Sleiman Frangieh becoming presidents. And the same goes for Aoun/Frangieh: Their biggest fear isn’t Geagea or Gemayel in office. Their biggest fear is that a neutral figure takes power. Each and every one of them would have to deal with a newcomer to internal Christian politics that is likely to reduce their power – both on an electoral level and on an administrative level. For example, instead of having 3 ministers with the LF, 3 with the FPM, and 3 with the president, The FPM/LF will get to split the president’s share if he’s Aoun or Geagea, hence maximizing their influence in any future cabinet.

 There’s also another synonym of “strong president” : It’s not Michel Sleiman. So when  the MF tell you they want a strong president, you should always understand it as an opposition to extending president Sleiman’s term.

The MF: An Unusual Gathering

Probably for the first time in the history of the blog, I am starting a post with no direct mention to the March 14 or March 8 alliances. And that’s not a coincidence. Michel Aoun’s allies have failed him in May 2013, when they extended the terms of the parliament – against his will. Also in May 2013, Future Movement failed the Kataeb when they refused to support the Orthodox Gathering Law in parliament. 10 Months later, the FM – without the consent of the Lebanese Forces – would enter a cabinet with Hezbollah,  throwing the LF by themselves in the opposition to an all-embracing cabinet. The Maronite Four have learned their lesson: They cannot rely on their Muslim allies, and they are the weaker parties of the M14 and M8 alliances due to their small parliamentary blocs (except for Aoun). After 10 years of counting on their Muslim allies, the Christians parties apparently realized that unless they preemptively unanimously agree on certain matters (Like electing a strong president), their allies were going to compromise and agree on another consensual candidate without consulting them.

Suspicious Timings

In 24 hours, the army dismantled an explosive-rigged vehicle on the outskirts of Arsal, finalized preparations for a Cabinet-sanctioned security plan for Tripoli, confiscated ammunition coming from Syria, raided a refugee camp, while at the same time the military prosecutor – in an unprecedented move – issued warrants against 200 suspects involved in the Tripoli clashes (See here for more details).
In case you’re confused, that’s the commander of the army presenting his candidacy to the presidential elections.

Another interesting observation is Geagea being officially nominated as presidential candidate by the Lebanese Forces. While this seems perfectly normal, it actually isn’t. Geagea is officially running to the presidential elections without previously getting the green light from the other M14 parties, particularly Al-Mustaqbal. So basically, this is what Geagea is trying to do: preemptively proposing his candidature in order to force and put pressure on the Future Movement to endorse him. This political maneuver aims at setting him as the de-facto candidate of the FM, and hence destroying the chances of electing Michel Aoun as president in a future FM-FPM deal. Exactly 1 month ago, the primary candidate from M14 was Gemayel. Due to his preemptive move, Geagea made it harder for Gemayel to run for office, while successfully (?) sabotaging any compromise between M8 and M14 similar to the cabinet one where he was excluded.

Use Your Calculator

 You need 65 MPs to win the elections, and a quorum of 86 MPs to make it happen. Since M14 and M8 both don’t have the absolute majority, expect millions of rounds. Each one will end with approximately 60 votes for each candidate (probably Aoun/Geagea), since Jumblatt will not vote for anyone of them. The press is even circulating information that he said he would start a civil war if one of them gets elected.

So to sum things up, the Maronite Four want one of them as president even though none of the Maronite Four is ready to elect the other (except for Frangieh). Everyone in the parliament either wants Geagea or Aoun, except for Jumblatt. The alternative would be electing someone neutral, from outside the Maronite Four traditional candidates. But hey, there’s the Veto coming from the Maronite Four.

But one should look on the bright side, there are other candidates: A pious (that’s sarcasm) person (please check the video. please.) named Rachid-Louis Labaki, and an actor, Adel Karam, also officially presented their candidacy.

Just kidding. There is no bright side.

50 days till the 25th of May.